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EMPEDOCLES
An Interpretation

Simon Trépanier

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Studies in Classics aims to bring high-quality work by emerging scholars to the attention of a wider audience. Emphasizing the study of classical literature and history, these volumes contribute to the theoretical understanding of human culture and society over time. This series will offer an array of approaches to the study of Greek and Latin (including medieval and Neolatin), authors and their reception, canons, transmissions of texts, ideas, religion, history of scholarship, narrative, and the nature of evidence.

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Dirk Obbink, Oxford University
Andrew Dyck, The University of California, Los Angeles

Contents

Preface and Acknowledgments xi
Abbreviations xiii

Chapter I The Single-Work Hypothesis 1
  1. The Unity of Empedocles' Thought 1
  2. The Case for the Single-Work Hypothesis 6
  3. The Two Titles 15

Chapter II The Framework: Proem and Doctrine 31
  1. A Single Theory of Everything 31
  2. The Direct Evidence for Empedocles' Proem 34
  3. Indirect Evidence for Empedocles' Proem: Sedley's Thesis 38
    a. The Hymn to Venus 41
    b. The Address to Memmius and the *Semina Rerum* 41
    c. The Sacrifice of Iphigenia 43
    d. General Precepts 44
  4. Proposed Reconstruction 44
    a. The Division by Addressees: Plural and Singular 46
    b. Fragments Addressed to Plural Addressees 46
    c. Fragments with a Single Addressee 51

Chapter III Interpreting the Framework 73
  1. The Proem and Doctrine: Difficulties of Interpretation 73
    a. Gods and Men 73
    b. The Aim of the Present Section 74
    c. A Preliminary Objection: Aristotle on the Presocratics 75
    d. The Proems of Parmenides and Lucretius 75
    e. The Function of a Proem 76

- f. Empedocles' Divinity according to B 112, B 115, and B 17/*ensemble* a 79
- 2. Pedagogical Strategies and Protreptic Philosophical Works 88
  - a. Plato and Empedocles as Representatives of the Hierarchical Tradition of Thought 88
  - b. Protreptic Philosophical Works: Rhetorical Features in Empedocles' Proem 100

Chapter IV The Persuasion of Empedocles 109
- 1. General Remarks: Empedocles' Heroic Synthesis 109
- 2. Bacchics, Orphics, and Pythagoreans 116
  - a. Three Related Movements 116
  - b. The Afterlife: A Basic Typology 120
  - c. Orphic or Pythagorean? 123
  - d. Empedocles' Rational Theology and Eschatology 126
- 3. Parmenides' Poem: Unity by Exclusion 129
  - a. A Defense of the Current Consensus 131
  - b. A First Contrast: βίος 137
  - c. First and Second Order 138
- 4. Historical Interlude: Divine and Mortal Knowledge 144
  - a. Poetic Pessimism and Causal "Overdetermination": Pindar 145
  - b. The Homeric Gods before the Unity of All Things: Two Types of Response 146
  - c. Xenophanes on Knowledge 147
  - d. Heraclitus: God's-Eye View and Geometrical Mean 148
- 5. Empedocles' Response to Parmenides: The Continuity of Thought 152
  - a. Divine and Mortal Thought in Parmenides 152
  - b. Ancient and Modern Critiques of Parmenides 153
  - c. Empedocles' First Principles as Thinking Beings 159
  - d. Empedocles on Mortal and Divine Thought 163
- 6. Intelligible Order: B 17/***ensemble*** a 170

Conclusion 181
  - 1. Widening Gaps 181
  - 2. Clarification and Elaboration in B 21, 23, 26, and 35 184

Notes 193
Appendix 250
Bibliography 257
Index Locorum 275
Selective General Index 287

> ὦ φίλοι, οἳ μέγα ἄστυ κατὰ ξανθοῦ Ἀκράγαντος
> ναίετ’ ἀν’ ἄκρα πόλεος, ἀγαθῶν μελεδήμονες ἔργων,
> ξείνων αἰδοῖοι λιμένες, κακότητος ἄπειροι,
> χαίρετ’· ἐγὼ δ’ ὑμῖν θεὸς ἄμβροτος, οὐκέτι θνητός
> πωλεῦμαι μετὰ πᾶσι τετιμένος, ὥσπερ ἔοικα . . .
>
> Empedocles, fragment B 112.1-4, Diels-Kranz

> 'Remember that you are not a god' was the most regular and most typical of all expressions of Greek wisdom; it would not have been, if the Greeks had not been tempted to forget it, and to think that they were, or could be, gods.
>
> J. Griffin, *Homer on Life and Death*, p. 168

Preface and Acknowledgments

The main work for this study was completed by the end of the summer of 2001. As it now stands, it represents around two-thirds of what was then my doctoral dissertation, written under Brad Inwood, of the University of Toronto. Apart from other material it then contained and now published elsewhere, the only chapter I have undertaken to rewrite in depth is chapter I, where I have attempted to improve the case for the single-work hypothesis.

Since my supervisor, in his 1992 study of Empedocles, had already committed himself in print to the single-work hypothesis, I had originally decided to avoid the issue, and intended to concentrate on a much narrower topic, the nature of the Empedoclean first principle Strife. But in 1999 the publication of the Strasbourg papyrus by Alain Martin and Oliver Primavesi, which occurred, fortunately for me, before I had gotten too far along into the dissertation, made me reconsider the whole question. The result is the present work, whose unity, such as it is, centers on the relationship between literary form and philosophical ideas. Readers who primarily want to get at the "naked arguments" should thus be warned that I have not attempted, in the first instance, to reconstruct Empedoclean philosophical doctrine, but have sought to reconstruct and interpret a didactic epic poem, so far as the evidence will allow, all the while remaining sensitive to the literary and rhetorical elements the work exploited in order to articulate a "Theory of Everything," and thus secure its place upon "the peaks of wisdom." Nevertheless, I hope that my endeavors here can also serve as a useful springboard from which to approach more narrowly focused doctrinal issues, and I have taken some steps in that direction in other publications.

The excitement caused by the Strasbourg papyrus, to which I hope this study can contribute, means that many older questions in the study of Empedocles will be the object of renewed scholarly attention. In fact, some already have. While I have done my best to take account of as much of it as I could, in order to see my own work through to completion, I had to choose a cutoff date, which turned out to be late 2002. Since then, that I am aware of, the works I would have wanted to take account of, but could not, include Jean Bollack's long-promised edition of the *Katharmoi*, and the first number of the journal *Aevum Antiquum* 1 (2001; only available as of April 2003), which contains papers from various specialists on Empedocles collected together by Jean-Claude Picot. The latter publication presents new material from late Aristotelian commentators, which appear to provide further details concerning the chronological divisions of the cosmic cycle. For readers' convenience I have included these works in the bibliography, but have not integrated their various theses into my discussion. I look forward to studying both of them.

My first thanks go to Brad Inwood, who accepted to act as my supervisor despite a late "conversion" to philosophy, and who also did not mind my decision to write on Empedocles after his own work was published. More recently, professor Andrew Dyck of UCLA, in his role as co-editor of this series, has corrected me on many points of fact, and made many helpful criticisms and suggestions, while Jean-Claude Picot has been very generous with his comments and objections, forcing me to clarify my thoughts as best I could. I would also like to thank Jonathan Burgess, Eric Csapo, and Alexander Jones, who all provided prompt and helpful criticisms of various aspects of the thesis, and bravely tried to reign in its length. Finally, I wish to convey my gratitude to the external reader of my thesis, Daniel Graham, of Brigham Young University, who saved me from one serious error of fact, and forced me to have a hard second look at my interpretation of Parmenides. I have tried my best to respond to all their comments and I am solely responsible for the remaining defects.

Funding for the thesis upon which this work is based was provided by two University of Toronto Doctoral completion Grants (2000–2001) and (1998-1999), a Leonard Woodbury Fellowship (1998-99), by three Ontario Graduate Scholarships (1995-1998) and a University of Toronto Open Fellowship (1994–95).

A section of chapter IV first appeared as a separate study, "The Structure of Empedocles's Fragment 17," in the journal *Essays in Philosophy*, Vol. 1, Number 1, 1999 1–21. Permission to reproduce that material here was obtained from the journal's editor in chief, Michael Goodman.

My comments on *ensemble* d in chapter I, and those on fragment B 26 in the conclusion, are both versions of passages which first appeared in my study "Empedocles on the Ultimate Symmetry of the World," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, 24 (Summer 2003) 1–57. My comments here on *ensemble* d are condensed from pages 14–18 of the *Oxford Studies* article, while pp. 28–30 from the latter are an abridged version of my discussion of B 26 in the current work. Permission to reuse that material here has been obtained form the journal's editor, Professor David Sedley.

Abbreviations

Bollack	Bollack, J., *Empédocle*, vol. i. *Introduction à l'ancienne physique* (Paris, 1965); vol. ii. *Les origines: édition et traduction des fragments et des témoignages*, vol. iii. *Les origines: commentaires* (both ii and iii, Paris, 1969; repr. Paris, 1992).
CAG	*Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, esp. Simplicius, whose commentaries on the *Physics* 1–4, ed. Diels (Berlin, 1882) and 5–8, ed. Diels (Berlin, 1895) span volumes IX and X.
Dox. Gr.	H. Diels, *Doxographi Graeci* (Berlin, 1879; repr. Berlin, 1965).
DK	Diels-Kranz, H. Diels and D. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, (Berlin, 1934^5). DK collects the direct quotations from lost works, i.e. the fragments, in one series, labeled "B" (which, strictly, also includes the context from the quoting source), while testimonia of various kinds are collected in the "A" series. References to fragments (i.e. the quotation alone) is generally abbreviated to B series numbers, with the author identified by context, e.g. in a discussion of Empedocles, B 35 = DK 31 B 35.
ECC	D. O'Brien, *Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle: A Reconstruction from the Fragments and Secondary Sources* (Cambridge, 1969).
GP	J. D. Denniston, *The Greek Particles*, revised by K. J. Dover (Oxford 1950; repr. Indianapolis, 1996).
HGP	W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. I (Cambridge, 1962); vol. II (Cambridge, 1965).

Poem	B. Inwood, *The Poem of Empedocles* (Toronto, 2001; 1st ed. 1992).
KRS	G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven, M. Schofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 2nd edition (Cambridge, 1983).
LSJ	H. G. Liddell, R. Scott and H. Jones *Greek-English Lexicon*, 9th edition, (Oxford, 1940; with revised Supplement, 1996).
Lucretius	D. Sedley, *Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom* (Cambridge, 1998).
M-P	A. Martin-O. Primavesi, *L'Empédocle de Strasbourg (P. Strasb. gr. Inv. 1665–1666) Introduction, édition et commentaire* (Berlin/NewYork/Strasbourg, 1999).
RE	A. Pauly, G. Wissowa, W. Kroll, K. Mittelhaus, etc, *Realencyclopädie des classischen Altertumswissenschaft* (Stuttgart, 1893).
Wright	M. R. Wright, *Empedocles: The Extant Fragments, Edited with Introduction, Commentary, Concordance* (New Haven, 1981; repr. Indianapolis, 1995).
Zuntz	G. Zuntz, *Persephone: Three Essays on Religion and Thought in Magna Graecia* (Oxford, 1971).

CHAPTER I

The Single-Work Hypothesis

1. THE UNITY OF EMPEDOCLES' THOUGHT

From the 1850s until fairly recently, the scholarly consensus on the philosophy of Empedocles amounted, in essence, to a charge of inconsistency. Whether at the same time, or over the course of his philosophical career, the same philosopher-poet, it was repeatedly argued, had held two very different and incompatible world views, which he advanced in two separate poetic works. In one poem, entitled *Physics* or *On Nature*, Empedocles gave a rigorously materialist explanation of all things as the temporary combinations of the four eternal elements (earth, air, fire, and water), whereas in the other work, the *Purifications*, he recounted his exile from the company of the blessed gods, and told of his struggle through various reincarnations to regain that *Paradise Lost.*[1]

But times change, and nowadays it is just as easy to feel that such a division in Empedocles' thought, while remarkable on its own, is made all the more singular for the fact that it was neither expressed by Empedocles himself, nor was so much as noticed by any of our ancient sources. The fragments themselves certainly voice no distinction between the truth-value of Empedocles' various teachings, nor do they contain any "palinodes" or retractions. As for the fairly large body of ancient secondary sources on Empedocles, not one of them attributes any distinction of this kind to him.[2] Even Diogenes Laertius, the only ancient author who appears to quote from two or more poems (VIII 77, cited below) does not seem aware of any such distinctions. He does not overtly relate any given doctrine to a particular poetic work, and much less does he betray any awareness of tensions or contradictions between Empedocles' doctrines. Rather, when Diogenes does consider Empedocles' thought, he, like every other ancient source, treats it as an undifferentiated whole.[3]

Thus, at the very least, one can doubt that if Empedocles was indeed aware of any contradictions between his doctrines, he bothered to advertise the fact, or went so far as self-consciously to articulate two antithetical systems. Once again, twenty-two and a half centuries had to pass before anyone thought to segregate Empedocles' doctrine of reincarnation and purification of the soul from his "scientific" account of the world, so as to play them off against each other. That is not to say, of course, that Empedocles' belief in transmigration of the soul and his elemental physics are ultimately coherent, so that a division of the two may in the end be a more charitable interpretation. Whether or not these two doctrines, as advanced by Empedocles, are indeed irreconcilable, is an issue I will take up later, but to begin it should be obvious enough that Empedocles himself need by no means have taken the two to be self-evidently contradictory. Even so, the assumption that he did, or at least should have, eventually became so ingrained that scholars came to see in him, as Jaeger put it, a "philosophical centaur."[4]

Conversely, for all that one may now more readily incline to question the division of Empedocles' thought, it would nevertheless be overly facile, as well as wrong, to dismiss the division of the corpus between these two titles as solely the product of nineteenth-century, positivist prejudice. The division itself would not have occurred, nor could it have found credence, but for actual evidence attesting to two thematically contrasted titles for Empedocles' main work(s), found mostly but not exclusively in Diogenes Laertius or, to be exact, in his sources. Most of this material will be examined in the second and third sections of this chapter, but I begin with the passage from Diogenes that has served as the cornerstone for the division of the Empedoclean corpus. In book VIII, chapter 77 of his *Lives of the Philosophers*, the closing paragraph of his life of Empedocles, Diogenes writes:

τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ φύσεως αὐτῷ καὶ οἱ καθαρμοί εἰς ἔπη τείνουσι πενταχισχίλια, ὁ δὲ ἰατρικὸς λόγος εἰς ἔπη ἑξακόσια.

His work (?) *on nature and the purifications amount to about five thousand verses, whereas the medical discourse <amounts> to six hundred (lines ?).*[5]

Since nothing survives of the so-called *Medical Discourse*, while the other two titles do occur in other authors, most modern editorial work has divided our fragments between them.[6] The most influential, not to say canonical, reconstruction of this kind has been that of Diels in his *Poetarum Philosophorum fragmenta* (1901) III/1, subsequently abridged into his *Vorsokratiker* (1903), with its many re-editions. Diels's work, the culmination of a century of outstanding German scholarship on early Greek philosophy, reconstructed the poem *On Nature* as the original home of all the biological and cosmological fragments. Conceived of as a reply to Parmenides—but this is now sometimes questioned—it posited six everlasting first principles, fire, water, earth, and air, as well as Love and Strife, whose interactions produced an endless cosmic alternation between two extreme situations: a complete unity under Love, and a total separation of the four visible elements under Strife, with two worlds like ours in between, in which both forces operate.[7] By contrast, all the fragments of a mythic or religious kind were assigned to *The Katharmoi* or *Purifications*. In these we find Empedocles claiming to be a god (B 112), giving a first person narrative of his fall from that higher state, and teaching men their true nature as demons banished into our world for some transgression (B 115). These demons, we there learn, must purge their guilt over several mortal incarnations, if they are to have any hope of returning among the blessed gods. For Empedocles' hearers, this ultimate goal is to be sought in the context of their current incarnation by leading a "pure" life, which consists in cultivating one's intellectual faculties and, on a more practical level, in abstaining from blood sacrifice and the eating of meat. Once established, the incompatibility between the two works of course required an explanation. At the time, a developmental hypothesis was felt to be most satisfactory: the two views represented different stages of Empedocles' thought.[8]

The Unity of Empedocles' Thought and Ensemble d *of the Strasbourg Papyrus*[9]

But even in its heyday, the division of Empedocles' philosophy into two antithetical halves was never entirely unanimous. More recently, those early dissenting voices have grown from a barely perceptible murmur to a loud and clearly articulated alternative.[10] The question is so fundamental as to leave no other issue unaffected, and any general investigation of Empedocles' thought requires taking a stand on this issue, preferably at the outset. Did Empedocles really have two philosophies? And if so, how did they relate to one another? Thanks now to the Strasbourg papyrus, first published in 1999 by A. Martin and O. Primavesi, henceforth M-P,[11] we know that Empedocles had only one world view. While the existence of two separate poems is not directly denied by this new material, the second-longest continuous section of the papyrus, called *ensemble* d by its editors, so closely marries Empedocles' demon-lore to his physics that it is henceforth untenable to imagine that he himself viewed them as incompatible. The importance of this new evidence will justify jumping ahead to it, out of turn, in order to consider how the two questions intersect in what is now in this regard the most telling passage of the corpus. I quote the first fifteen lines of *ensemble* d from Martin and Primavesi's edition,[12] followed by their English translation:

[ἄν]διχ' ἀπ' ἀλλήλω[ν] π̣εσέ̣[ει]ν̣ καὶ π̣[ότ]μ̣ον ἐπισπε̣ῖν
[πό]λλ' ἀεκαζομέν[ο]ισιν ἀ[να]γκα[ίης ὕ]π̣ο λυγρῆς
[ση]πο[μ]ένοις· Φιλίην δὲ [καὶ Ε]ὐ̣ν̣[οίη]ν̣ νυν ἔχουσιν
[ᶜ/Αρ]π̣υιαι θανάτοιο πάλοις̣ [ἡμῖν παρέσ]ονται.
˻Οἴ˼μ̣οι ὅτ(ι) οὐ πρόσθεν με δ̣ι˻ώλεσε νη˼λεὲς ἦμαρ,
˻πρὶν˼ χηλαῖς̣ ˻σχέ˼τ̣λι' ἔργα βορ̣˻ᾶς πέρι μητ˼ί̣ σ̣α̣˻σθαι·˼

[νῦν δ]ὲ μάτη[ν ἐν] τῶιδε νότ̣[ωι κατέδ]ε̣υσα παρειάς
[ἐξικ]ν̣ούμε[θα γὰ]ρ̣ πολυβενθ̣[έα Δῖνον (?)], ὀ̣ΐω,
[μυρία(?) τ(ε) οὐκ] ἐθέλουσι παρέσσε[ται ἄλγ̣]εα θυμῶι
10 [ἀνθρώποις(?)· ἤ]μεῖς δὲ λόγων ⟨σ'⟩ ἐπιβ[ήσομ]ε'ν' αὖθις
[κείνων· ὀππότ]ε δὴ συνετύγχανε φ[λογ]μὸς ἀτειρής
[ ]ω̣ς ἀνάγων π[ο]λυπήμ[ον]α κρᾶσιν
[ζῶι(?)]α̣ φυτάλμια τεκνώθ[η]σ̣αν
[τῶν καὶ(?) ν]ῦ̣ν ἔτι λείψανα δέρκεται ἠ̣ώς
15 [ ]ε̣ἰ̣ς̣ τόπον ἐσχάτιο̣[ν β]ῆ'ν'[13]

. . . to fall apart from one another and meet their fate, as they (i.e. the limbs), much against their will, rot away by bitter necessity. And whereas we now have Love and Goodwill, the Harpies with the lots of death will be with us (hereafter). (5) Alas that the merciless day did not destroy me sooner, before I devised with my claws terrible deeds for the sake of food. But now in this storm I have in vain drenched my cheeks: for we are approaching . . . I perceive, and though they do not wish it, countless griefs will be present to men in their minds . . . (10) —but we shall make you enter once more into the former account;[14] when an inextinguishable flame occurred . . . bringing upwards a mixture of much woe . . . beings capable of reproduction were engendered . . . even now daylight beholds their remains . . . (15) I went to the uttermost place . . .

The passage has two main parts, with the break coming at line ten, where Empedocles indicates a transition. It is not immediately clear, however, exactly how the two halves of the passage relate to one another. For if we owe it to the serendipitous nature of the find that the passage combines themes we do not elsewhere find so closely juxtaposed, this also means that its organization is somewhat unclear. Unlike a quotation, the passage is not a grammatical unit and, as indicated, straddles a transition of topics at line 10. I will first consider each half separately, then ponder their relation.

The fragment begins mid-sentence, with Empedocles referring to a coming destruction of life, rendered by the Homeric term π[ότ]μον ἐπισπεῖν, *meeting one's fate*, through separation, or "falling apart," perhaps of the limbs, or of the four elements. This is a process no doubt caused by Strife, the cosmic agent of separation, as many parallels show, e.g. B 20.4, but here referred to obliquely as Harpies, if the editors' supplement is sound. Following that, by a striking coincidence, we have the previously known two-line fragment B 139, Empedocles' first-person cry of anguish at having tasted flesh, which its source, Porphyry, *De abst.* 2 .31.5, links to purifications. For that reason, Diels and many in his wake assigned it to the *Katharmoi*, but this can now be doubted (see below). In terms of textual transmission, the papyrus now shows that Empedocles devised the horrific deed χηλαῖς, *with his claws*, a new reading, better than the previous text, which had χείλεσι, *for my lips*. These new *claws* seem to imply that Empedocles perpetrated some bloody crime in an earlier, carnivorous incarnation. The consequence of this transgression, as the next three poorly preserved lines perhaps show, is not the end of that particular individual's existence (i.e. Empedocles'), but the inclusion of its agent within some deep recess of the world, or some sort of cosmic process, (cf. **d** 8, πολυβενθ[έα Δῖνον(?), *the very deep Whirl*; but Δῖνον is highly conjectural). That process, in turn, will bring with it many aches and woes. These are perhaps to be understood as the same phenomenon of "falling apart" discussed in the opening lines, only now pictured from the inside, from the subjective standpoint of him who will be forced to undergo that dissolution.

At **d 10** Empedocles breaks off from these matters. Although the first feet of the next lines are missing, their general subject is obvious enough: it is an account of the appearance of life, a zoogony. The process described is comparable to another passage, B 62, where the origins of humanity are described, and this allows us to fill in some of the details.[15] Lines 11 and 12 describe the separating-out of a π[ο]λυπήμ[ον]α κρᾶσιν, a *much suffering mixture*, presumably from the subjacent region, drawn upwards by a portion of fire, and the result is the production of living creatures. In the fuller account of fragment 62, we learn that it is the fire remaining in the mixture of earth and water that draws out the "whole-natured forms," as Empedocles there calls these first organisms, while it seeks to join its like in the heavens.[16] Although Strife is not named in this last section of the passage, the activity of separation described here can only be conceived of as under its influence. As such, the new passage does not so much contribute anything novel to our understanding of the workings of the zoogonic process, but rather to its fuller characterization as a sorrowful event, tied to Strife.[17]

It is in this regard that we can see the connection between the two sections of the passage. It is a meditation upon the role of Strife in the world. This is what accounts for the general pessimism we find in both halves, and even hints at what must have been Empedocles' general train of thought, or at least its dramatic portrayal, in the now-lost broader context. Having perhaps described the cosmogony of Strife, or brooded upon some other aspect of its agency, he turned to give an account of its zoogony, but, led on by such reflections, he first railed against his own involvement in the process. The emotional power of this *cri de coeur*, perhaps second only to the lament of the "exile from god" in B 115, also indicates the strong dramatic potential of at least parts of the work. Beyond that, as I have said, the break at **d 10** seems to indicate that those first nine lines are in fact a digression in a longer account. If not, the transition seems abrupt, even by Empedocles' standards, contrast for instance B 17.14 or **a (ii) 21–30**.

For my immediate purpose, the most interesting aspect of this link between the two parts of *ensemble* **d** is the way in which it lays bare the underlying unity of Strife and its activities. For, if I am correct that the whole passage is concerned with Strife's activities, it displays Empedocles making a seamless transition from the "demonological" to the physical, or even more telling, from the personal back to the physical. The transition is so seamless in fact that what it actually reveals is the extent to which such a distinction, whenever maintained, has been imposed upon the material, rather than actually felt by Empedocles.

Thus, to return to the larger question of the unity of Empedocles' thought, it is clear that this new material forcefully confirms a "unitarian" approach, against the traditional division of his thought. To be sure, even before the papyrus a broader if vague consensus had already emerged, moving away from Zeller's division and favoring a claim of *compatibility* on the level of ideas between the two supposed works.[18] Indeed on this level, as that of language, it was and is still largely recognized that attempts to establish criteria for a clear distinction between the two works, when applied to unidentified fragments, are likely to founder in a bog of subjectivity. The new evidence shows this to be more than a trend: as far as the interpretation of Empedocles' thought is concerned, the question of its division into two incompatible systems can now be safely abandoned.

2. The Case for the Single-Work Hypothesis

The division in Empedocles' thought, it will be recalled, took its initial cue from the testimonium of Diogenes Laertius (VIII 77), in which he appears to give the two titles of Empedocles' major works. While, as I have said, the tendency even before the publication of the Strasbourg papyrus was towards a united interpretation of Empedocles' thought, two interpretations, by Osborne (1987) and Inwood (2001; 1st edn.1992), went further than that and challenged the very notion that the Empedoclean corpus comprised more than one major work. The two questions are related, but bear an asymmetrical relation: the existence of a single work would prove the unity of Empedocles' thought, but the unity of his thought does not prove that he wrote only one work. After extensive surveys of the evidence, both concluded that it was just as likely, if not slightly more so, that Empedocles in fact wrote only one poem. Osborne further suggested that it was probably in three books and about two thousand lines long (1987, p. 29). According to their interpretation, it is unclear whether or not Empedocles himself gave it a title, but subsequently two titles were attached to the work, the *Katharmoi* being perhaps older than the more generic *Peri Phuseos*,[19] and that is what would explain the occurrence of both in the testimonia. Both authors, however, correctly stressed the fact that the hypothesis of a single work is not demonstrable to the exclusion of the traditional view; it is simply more plausible. I incline to follow them in that moderate belief.

For the most part, their proposal has met with skepticism.[20] To my knowledge, only O'Brien (see note 20) has attempted to refute it at length, although he did so before publication of the papyrus. The new material, it may be thought, now also strengthens the case for a single poem. On general grounds, it is obvious that the hypothesis of two poems is no longer required as a means of avoiding contradictions we can now see Empedocles did not recognize. The question, however, as I have stated above, does not rest exclusively on such grounds. Even with the unity of Empedocles' thought being now assured, that does not prove that he only wrote one work. The question must still be decided on the basis of a wide array of secondary sources, and here Diogenes' evidence remains unchanged, even though *ensemble* **d** gives us very good reasons to believe that the poem Simplicius had before him also discussed reincarnation.[21]

In table 1 I have assembled all the fragments and testimonia known to me for which there is external evidence linking them to one or the other title.[22] In some instances, as the reader will see, this evidence is very slight, so that the neat tabular form should not be mistaken for a claim to objectivity.

Table 1: Fragments and testimonia with external evidence as to their source.

The *Physics*

***Physics* I** (in known relative order)

B 1. Diogenes Laertius VIII 60: ἦν δ' ὁ Παυσανίας, ὥς φησιν 'Αρίστιππος καὶ Σάτυρος, ἐρώμενος αὐτοῦ, ᾧ δὴ καὶ τὰ περὶ φύσεως προσπεφώνηκεν οὕτως·

Παυσανίη, σὺ δὲ κλῦθι, δαίφρονος 'Αγχίτου υἱέ.

B 17/ *ensemble* **a** (ed. M-P). Simplicius, *in Phys*. 157, 25: 'Εμπεδοκλῆς οὕτως ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Φυσικῶν παραδίδωσι . . . The last line of *ensemble* **a** has 'Γ' in the margin, which indicates that B 17/ *ensemble* **a** = lines 232-300 of book I. (The elements and the cosmic cycle.)

B 21 Simpl. *in Phys*. 159,13: (after B 17): πλείονα δὲ ἄλλα εἰπὼν ἐπάγει ἑκάστου τῶν εἰρημένων τὸν χαρακτῆρα, τὸ μὲν πῦρ ἥλιον καλῶν, κτλ (The elements as they appear in nature.)

B 23 Simpl. *in Phys*. 159.27: καὶ παράδειγμα δὲ ἐναργὲς παρέθετο τοῦ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν. (The simile of the painters.)

B 26 Simpl. *in Phys*. 33.18: (quotes B 21.12) καὶ ὀλίγον δὲ προελθὼν φησι . . . (The cosmic cycle)

B 35 and 98. Simpl. *in Phys*. 32, 11: (after B 98, on the elemental ratio of blood and tissues) καὶ πρὸ του τῶν δὲ τῶν ἐπῶν παραδίδωσι λέγων, B 35 (The return of Love to the elements). B 35 very probably belongs to Bk I, as lines 1-5 quote B 17+ **a (ii) 18-20**.

DK 96 (?) Simpl. *in Phys*. 300.19: λέγει γοῦν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Φυσικῶν. . . (Elemental ratio of bone)

(relative position in Bk I unknown)

B 6. Tzetzes, *Exeg. In Iliad*. 53.20 ἀκούσατε μίκρον κἀκ τοῦ πρώτου τῶν φυσικῶν 'Εμπεδοκλέους (Names of elements = Homeric gods)

B 8. Aetius I. 30,1, (Diels, *Dox. Gr*. 326,10): 'Εμπεδοκλῆς φύσιν μηδενὸς εἶναι, μίξιν δὲ τῶν στοιχείων καὶ διάστασιν· γράφει γάρ οὕτως ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Φυσικῶν (φύσις an erroneous belief)

The *Katharmoi*

***Katharmoi* I** (in probable order)

B 112, Diogenes Laertius VIII 54: ὅτι δ' ἦν 'Ακραγαντῖνος ἐκ Σικελίας, αὐτος ἐναρχόμενος τῶν Καθαρμῶν φησιν· (112.1-2; at VIII 62, 1-3, 5-11)

ὦ φίλοι οἳ μέγα ἄστυ κάτα ξανθοῦ 'Ακράγαντος
ναίετ' ἀν' ἄκρα πόλεος . . .
χαίρετ'· ἐγὼ δ' ὑμῖν θεὸς ἄμβροτος οὐκέτι θνητός
πωλεῦμαι μετὰ πᾶσι τετιμένος ὥσπερ ἔοικα . . .

B 113 Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Mathematicos*, I 302 (after quoting B 112.5): καὶ πάλιν·

[πρᾶσσων
ἀλλὰ τί τοῖσδ' ἐπίκειμ' ὡσεὶ μέγα χρῆμα τι
εἰ θνητῶν περίειμι πολυφθερέων ἀνθρώπων;

B 115 Plutarch, *De exilio* 607 c: ὁ δ' 'Εμπεδοκλῆς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς φιλοσοφίας προαναφωνήσας (quotes only B 115.1, 3, 5, 6 and 13)

ἔστιν 'Ανάγκης χρῆμα, θεῶν ψήφισμα παλαιόν
ἀίδιον, πλατέεσσι κατεσφρηγισμένον ὅρκοις·
εὖτε τις ἀμπλακίῃσι φόνῳι φίλα γυῖα μιήνῃ,
⟨νεικεΐ θ'⟩ ὅς κ(ε) ἐπίορκον ἁμαρτήσας ἐπομόσσῃ,
δαίμονες οἵτε μακραίωνος λελάχασι βίοιο,
τρίς μιν μυρίας ὥρας ἀπὸ μακάρων ἀλάλησθαι
. . . (lines 7 to 12 omitted)
τῶν καὶ ἐγὼ νῦν εἰμι, φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλήτης,
νείκεϊ μαινομένῳ πίσυνος

Hippolytus of Rome, *Refutation of All Heresies* VII 29, H. Marcovich. After quoting B 115 1-2, 4-13 and 110, accuses Marcion of teaching the *Purifications*: τοὺς 'Εμπεδοκλέους λανθάνεις διδάσκων Καθαρμούς.

Simpl., *in Phys*. 1184, 5-10: Τί δὲ διαφέρει τοῦ ὅτι πέφυκεν οὕτως τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης λέγειν αἰτίαν μὴ προστιθέντα; ταῦτα δὲ 'Εμπεδοκλῆς ἔοικε λέγειν ἐν τῷ·

ἐν δὲ μέρει κρατέουσι περιπλομένοιο χρόνοιο'
(B 17. 29)
καὶ ὅτ' ἀνάγκην τῶν γινομένων αἰτιᾶται·

ἔστιν 'Ανάγκη χρῆμα θεῶν σφρήγισμα παλαιόν,
ἀίδιον, πλατέεσσι κατεσφρηγισμένον ὅρκοις'
(B 115.1-2, sic)

***Physics* II**

B 62 Simpl. *in Phys*. 381, 29 εἰπόντος δὲ τοῦ 'Εμπεδοκλέους ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ τῶν Φυσικῶν πρὸ τῆς τῶν ἀνδρείων καὶ γυναικείων σωμάτων διαρθρώσεως ταυτὶ τὰ ἔπη· (Origin of humanity.)

***Physics* III**

B 134 Tzetzes, *Histories* (or *Chiliades*) VII 522 'Εμπεδοκλῆς τῷ τρίτῳ τε τῶν Φυσικῶν δεικνύων τίς ἡ οὐσία τοῦ θεοῦ κατ' ἔπος οὕτω λέγει… (The god as 'holy mind')

***Physics* (no book number given)**

B 34. Aristotle, *Meteorol.* 384a1 (cf. also *Probl*. 929 b22): ὥσπερ 'Εμπεδοκλῆς ἐποίησεν ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς. (Binding property of flour and water)

B 54 Aristotle, *Physics* 196b22, λέγει οὖν ἐν τῇ κοσμοποιίᾳ (Aither/air sinks down into the earth)

B 103. Simpl. *in Phys*. 331. 10 καὶ πολλὰ 'άν τις εὕροι 'εκ τῶν 'Εμπεδοκλέους Φυσικῶν...(on chance) **B104**. *ibid.*

***Katharmoi* II**

Wright 152/Inwood 85 Herodian, *Universal Accentuation* (from a palimpsest ed. by H. Hunger, 1967):

παρὰ μέντοι 'Εμπεδοκλέους ἐν β' τῶν Καθαρμῶν ἐστιν εὑρέσθαι ἐκτεταμένον τὸ α, ὡς δῆλον κἀκ τῆς συγκριτικῆς παραγωγῆς· μανότερος γὰρ ἔφη ὡς τρανότερος·

τῶν γὰρ ὅσα ῥίζαις μὲν ἐπασσυτέραι[σιν] ἔνερθε
μανοτέροις [δ' ὄ]ρπ[ηξ]ιν ὑπέστη τηλεθ[άοντα].

B 153a (?) Theon of Smyrna *Aspects of Mathematics Useful for the Reading of Plato* p. 104

τὸ γοῦν βρέφος δοκεῖ τελειοῦσθαι ἐν ἑπτὰ ἑβδομάσιν, ὡς 'Εμπεδοκλῆς αἰνίττεται ἐν τοῖς Καθαρμοῖς

***Katharmoi* (?)**

B 135 Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1373 b14, καὶ ὡς 'Ε. λέγει περὶ τοῦ μὴ κτείνειν τὸ ἔμψυχον

B 128 Porphyry, *De abstinentia* 2.20. The context is a discussion of early cult practices according to Theophrastus (Fortenbaugh # 584), where the latter used Empedocles as evidence for the greater antiquity of bloodless offerings, over that of ritual sacrifice:

ἀλλὰ καὶ παρ' 'Εμπεδοκλέους, ὅς περὶ τῆς θεογονίας διεξιὼν καὶ περὶ τῶν θυμάτων παρεμφαίνει λέγων· (Bloodless offerings to "Queen Kypris")

B 143 Theon of Smyrna, *Aspects of Mathematics Useful for the Reading of Plato, p. 15*

κατὰ ταὐτὰ δὴ καὶ ἡ τῶν πολιτικῶν λογῶν παράδοσις τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἔχει καθαρμόν τινα οἷον ἡ ἐν τοῖς προσήκουσι μαθήμασιν ἐκ παίδων συγγυμνασία. ὁ μὲν γὰρ 'Ε. . . . φησι

Thematic Overlap

An important initial observation is that even the fragments explicitly linked to one or the other title hardly uphold a water-tight thematic division. To begin with the *Katharmoi*, of three certain references in the testimonia to a work titled *Katharmoi*, only B 112, in which Empedocles proclaims his status as a god and describes the thousands thronging about him as they seek oracles and healing utterances, unambiguously implies a religious or purificatory context. The other two, B 153a and Wright # 152, could be *given* a religious or ritualistic import, but on their own rather imply a "scientific" context.[23] Fragment B 153a is from Theon of Smyrna, a first or second century AD Platonist, who tells us that in the *Katharmoi* Empedocles *hints*, αἰνίττεται, that the embryo is fully formed after seven weeks.[24] The term *hints* suggests that the passage did not occur in a purely descriptive account of fetal development, but the report is confirmed by Aetius (V 21. 1/*Dox. Gr*. 433 = DK 31 A 83), where it is linked to other chronological specifics concerning the development of the fetus. Against Sedley (see note 23), it more likely figured in Empedocles' anthropogony, where various chronological correspondences between the development of the fetus in the current world and the original formation of human life were advanced (DK A 75). The third passage, Wright #152 = Inwood # 85, comes from a palimpsest of Herodian's *Universal Prosody* (late second century AD). It apparently describes the asymmetry of trees upon the vertical axis, the fact that branches spread further out from the trunk than do roots. Why Empedocles wished to impart this information, it is hard to say, and while a purificatory context cannot be rigorously excluded, the lines are certainly easier to place in a biological discussion.

As for the material cited from the *Physics*, it is much vaster, but there as well the evidence does not present a monolithic uniformity. A passage from Simplicius makes the most telling point. Simplicius, who only refers to the work he quotes as *ta Phusika*, never *ta Peri Phuseos*, is far and away the most important source of our fragments of Empedocles, all of which, with one exception, Diels assigned to the *Peri Phuseos*. That one exception occurs when, to illustrate the concept of necessity in Empedocles, Simplicius quotes the two opening lines of B 115, the fragment that describes the banishment of the *daimon*.[25] This is a passage which on the two-work hypothesis it would be difficult to place anywhere but in a religious context. Indeed our principal source for it, Hippolytus, at VII 29 of his *Refutation of All Heresies*, links it and fragment B 110, usually assigned to the *Physics*, with the title *Purifications*. Does this show that Simplicius also had a copy of the *Katharmoi*? It is notable that he simply treats it as additional evidence for the point at issue, and does not specify that it came from a different poem than *every other fragment* he quotes. And if that is an *argumentum e silentio*, which also depends on the assumption of a clear division of subjects between works, then we can wonder why Simplicus did not make more use of the *Katharmoi*, if it also discussed embryology and trees, as the evidence from Theon and Herodian might indicate. Some special pleading would be required to explain this,[26] but by far the more economical explanation is that the poem that Simplicius owned, and which he refers to as *ta Phusika*, covered all these topics. If Simplicius did not quote more of the "purificatory" material, this was because his goal was to illustrate Aristotle's discussion, not provide a balanced picture of Empedocles. Thus, while it would be unfair to Simplicius to say that he was misrepresenting Empedocles, his interests followed those of his master, who did take a rather one-sided interest in Empedocles.[27] That this was the case, it will bear repeating, has been shown by the Strasbourg papyrus. For unless we are willing to imagine that *ensemble* **d** is not from the same poem as the other three passages, two of which, *ensembles* **a** and **c** overlap with passages Simplicius quotes from the *Physics*, we are forced to admit that the same poem Simplicius owned also discussed reincarnation.[28]

The Evidence for Book I and Its Proem: The Argument from Complementarity

An even more compelling argument for the unity of the work is the manner in which the relatively abundant fragments for book I of the *Katharmoi* and the *Physics* fail to clash. On the contrary, with the important exception of B 115, discussed above, they complement one another. Here, thanks again to the papyrus, for the first time we can speak of known quantities.[29]

The most secure starting-point for any reconstruction of book I is the position of B 17 and its continuation into *ensemble* **a**. On the very last line of *ensemble* **a**, a stichometric mark in the left margin of the papyrus, a capital gamma, "Γ," indicates that this line was the 300th line of that particular book. When combined with Simplicius' note that fragment B 17 occurred in book I of the *Physics*, this allows us to place this passage at lines 232–300 of Book.[30] Following that, we also know from Simplicius that B 17 was followed by fragments B 21, 23, 26 (and probably then B 35 and 98), in that order, a series of passages which reiterate and develop the basic picture put forth in fragment B 17. One may note in particular lines 1 to 5 of B 35, which most likely refer back to B 17/ *ensemble* **a (ii) 18–20**, and Simplicius' remarks introducing fragment B 23, which he calls "a perspicuous illustration" of Empedocles' doctrine, i.e. as first expressed in B 17. This shows that the overall structure of book I, from line 300 on, must have been anchored upon B 17/*ensemble* **a**. More generally, since nearly all the other "scientific" fragments presuppose the doctrine of the elements and the cosmic cycle, it seems only reasonable to posit that most if not all of the doctrinal material in the poem followed DK B 17/*ensemble* **a**.

Further, that the seventy-odd lines of B 17/*ensemble* **a** stood as the beginning of Empedocles' *doctrinal* exposition seems extremely likely on several grounds. First, its quotation by Simplicius, for a continuous thirty-five lines, as well as the frequency of its occurrence in the doxography, show it to have been *the core* doctrinal passage of the work.[31] Second, the passage itself contains a strong introductory or programmatic flavor. In particular, Empedocles is at pains there to name his first principles simply and directly (cf. B 17.18–20), rather than identifying their names with those of traditional divinities, as he does elsewhere, e.g. B 6.[32] But most significant of all is the fact, stated above, that the later fragments, which Simplicius ties to it, act as developments, applications or illustrations of the basic picture it presents.

If all of that is correct, this naturally leads us to wonder what may have occupied the first 232 lines of the poem. This raises the important question of the proem to the *Physics*, or as I would have it, the single poem.

As has always been known, Plutarch, who at *De exilio* 607c–d quotes parts of B 115, tells us that the passage came "in the beginning of [Empedocles'] philosophy," and that it was made as a sort of opening proclamation, προαναφωνήσας. Further, as shown in table 1, there is evidence from Hippolytus and Simplicius allowing us to align it with either title. Plutarch's testimonium, being by far the most explicit, is what led most nineteenth-century editors, including Karsten (1838), Bergk (1839), and Mullach (1860) to place the passage in the proem to the *Physics*, while Diels (1901), following Stein (1852), removed it on thematic objections, and placed it in the *Katharmoi*. In terms of thematic continuity, this was in fact a sound decision, for the combined rhetorical force of fragments B 112 and 115 is far greater than if they are considered apart.[33] Nevertheless, van der Ben, whose 1975 work attempted to revive the alternate position, was also right to argue that "philosophia" must relate to, or at least include, physical lore, so that B 115 should have figured in the proem to the *Physics*.[34] Until the papyrus, what seems to have decided in favor of the position established by Diels was a reference by Simplicius, *in Phys.* 161.13–17, to the first two lines of fragment B 17, which he describes as τὰ εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ παρατεθέντα. This, it was thought, placed the fragment very close to the opening of the *Physics*. But as Primavesi saw early on into work on the Strasbourg papyrus, this should be understood as a reference by Simplicius to his own quotation, not to Empedocles' work.[35] Since nothing henceforth stands against Plutarch's testimony, while the position of fragment 17 implies a long preamble, the obvious conclusion is that the proem, to the *Peri Phuseos* at least, included B 115. In other words, before unveiling his doctrine, Empedocles began his poem with what must have been a rather long proem, which included an account of the fall of the *daimon*.

How then does this affect the single-work hypothesis? Here, to my enduring surprise, the editors of the papyrus remain agnostic (see M-P 115–119), and do not think that this new arrangement even tilts the balance toward the single-work hypothesis. Taking this a step further, David Sedley has recently argued, in the context of his own reconstruction of the proem of the *Peri Phuseos*, that the term whereby Empedocles describes himself in B 112.5, θεός, a *god*, is incompatible with his self-description as a δαίμων in B 115. This, he thinks, presents internal evidence for the division of the works, since fragment B 112 is attributed to the *Katharmoi* by its source.[36] While recognizing that Sedley does raise an interesting question, I do not think it unanswerable, but will postpone my full reply to a later chapter.[37] Against this overly cautious position, it seems to me that two new factors established by the papyrus, the unity of Empedocles' thought and the absolute position of B 17/*ensemble* **a**, on their own suffice to shift the balance of probabilities towards the single-work hypothesis. But that is not all. For there is yet another important reason to reject the two-work hypothesis, which has so far gone unnoticed.

The reason is a difficulty generated by the two-work hypothesis which, while not immediately conspicuous, becomes apparent once we actually undertake to reconstruct the proem of this putative *Physics*. Without entering for now into too much detail, this can be shown simply by drawing up a list of fragments any such reconstruction would most likely include. For brevity's sake, and to show that I am not forcing the issue, I refer the reader to other such reconstructions already on offer, especially van der Ben (1975), Sedley (1998), and M-P (1999), but also to DK and Wright.

First therefore, in the current state of our knowledge, the proem of the *Physics* would obviously have to include the story of the *daimon*, i.e. B 115, and some related material, as in van der Ben (1975), M-P (1999), or Sedley (1998).[38] Conversely, as argued above, we would have to exclude from the proem all passages which rely explicitly upon the doctrine of the elements and the cosmic cycle, for these will have followed B 17. After that, there would still be left a certain amount of material that could reasonably be situated in the proem, about forty to fifty lines.[39] The original location and relative order of these fragments will be taken up and discussed at greater length over the next chapters, but for now they would include: passages outlining the shortcomings of ordinary thought, DK B 2 and 3; promises of things to come if the disciple follows the master, B 110 and 111; and the "Eleatic laws," B 8 to 15, the axioms that nothing comes into being from nothing, etc. Yet even on the most generous criteria of inclusion, we would still be left with a significant gap in our evidence: the very opening lines of the poem would be lost to us.

On its own, this may seem an innocuous fact, the mere hazards of an indirect textual tradition. But when we compare it with the state of preservation of the first book of the *Katharmoi*, a significant pattern emerges. For there it turns out that the only preserved sections are *the very opening lines* of book I. According to Diogenes, who is perhaps relying here on Timaeus or Heraclides Ponticus (see my discussion below), we have the poem's opening lines, in which Empedocles addresses the "friends from Acragas" and informs them of his divine status. More important, the term used by Diogenes' source is ἐναρχόμενος, which has a quasi-technical force, meaning *the very beginning*.[40] This is a noteworthy fact, given that the cataloguing of works in the ancient bibliographical tradition, especially epics, often included a quotation the work's opening line(s), the *incipit*, along with the author's name and the work's title, where extant. This has meant that the opening lines of poems are often the most likely to survive when a whole work is lost.[41] Its absence from the *Physics*, one of the best preserved of lost works, would thus be at the very least somewhat anomalous. But even more significant is that B 115, as we know from Plutarch, did not open the poem in which it stood, it merely came in the opening section. Plutarch's words are ἐν ἀρχῇ, roughly *in the opening section*, not ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ, *at the* (*very*) *beginning*. Thus, on the single-work hypothesis, the indirect evidence coheres with rather than conflicts with the internal thematic unity which B112 and B115 display. Yet here a defender of the two-work interpretation would be put in the uncomfortable position of asking us to accept that, for no better reason than chance, the very opening lines of the *Katharmoi* have been preserved, while little else has, whereas the opening lines or worse, the whole opening section, of the *Physics* has not survived. And that would be so, even though on any variant of the two-work hypothesis, the *Physics* is by far the better preserved and more significant work.

While this hardly resolves all remaining difficulties, I think that this last argument, when considered with the other evidence considered so far, justifies the single-work hypothesis as a viable option, or more strongly still, as simply the better explanation for the whole of our available evidence. Accordingly, in what remains of this introductory chapter, I will generally assume the correctness of the single-work hypothesis. My reason for doing so, once again, derives not from any misplaced confidence in its indubitable correctness, but is rather motivated by its mere plausibility: only by adopting the hypothesis can we test its soundness, and measure how well or ill it accounts for the full range of available evidence. If I am anywhere along the right track, proceeding this way will not only refine the picture of what that single work contained, but also, depending upon the viability of that same reconstruction, consolidate the case for the single-work hypothesis.

Books II and III: Biology and Kulturgeschichte?

The evidence for the remaining books is much sparser than for the first, but even so it also presents significant enough convergence to support the assumption of a single original work.

In the case of book II, fragment B 62 from Simplicius indicates that it was concerned, at least in part, with biology and/or the origin of humanity. If we consider our only attested passage for book II of the *Purifications*, the testimonium from Herodian, the two lines on trees or bushes are a consistent match for such a theme. And given that much, I do not think it unreasonable to venture linking these two passages with a third, the testimonium from Theon of Smyrna on the formation of the fetus discussed above. In particular, if I am correct that its chronological speculations were correlated with phrases from the first emergence of humanity, then its link to B 62 is all the more plausible.

As for book III, the only evidence comes to us from Tzetzes, and it has usually been dismissed on account of its lateness and Tzetzes' poor reputation as a scholar. On three occasions, *Chil.* 7.517, *Epist.* 97 and, most extensively, at *Chiliades* 13.74–78, he quotes most of fragment 134, which he claims occurred in book III of The *Physics*, τῷ τρίτῳ τε τῶν Φυσικῶν. The lines describe a non-anthropomorphic god, which the fifth-century Neoplatonist Ammonius identified with Apollo (CAG 4.5 *De Interpretatione* 249,1, Busse). Tzetzes' attribution was regarded with suspicion by earlier editors. First, the subject matter of the passage seemed out of place, according to the two-work hypothesis, and they were accordingly reassigned to *The Purifications*. Second, the fact that Tzetzes alone bears witness to a third book of the *Physics*, led Diels to suspect a forgery. To be sure, the *Suda*, two centuries before him, only mentions the title περὶ φύσεως τῶν ὄντων, *on the nature of the things that*

are, and suggests that the work was in two books, although the manuscript tradition on that point is corrupt.[42] While some skepticism is still justified, given Tzetzes' reputation and the fact that the lines were obviously a purple passage, Diels's case against Tztetzes has come under repeated attack, and it seems on the whole more likely that Tzetzes did have access to the poem.[43] His knowledge of it can be confirmed from other passages, e.g. *Exeg. In Iliad.* 41. 14 ff. Hermann,[44] and more recently, possible evidence for the survival of Empedocles' poetry down to the Renaissance increases the likelihood of his having seen it.[45]

Thus, if Tzetzes' testimony to a third book is at least plausible, we are naturally led to wonder about the possible contents of that same book. Tzetzes claims that it discussed the nature of god or the divine. If so, then one possible link to such a theme is found in Porphyry's quotation of fragment B 128. The passage describes a past Golden Age, in which men worshipped Love alone, and did so by means of bloodless offerings. The fragment is preserved by Porphyry, *De abstinentia* 2.21, and is thought to be indebted to or an abridgement from Theophrastus's lost work *On Piety*. Porphyry introduces the passage as evidence in the case for the greater antiquity of bloodless sacrifice over that of sacrificial ritual, and in doing so he incidentally claims that Empedocles described the origin of the gods and the institution of sacrifice: [Empedocles] *who, in discussing sacrifices and the origin of the gods, suggests* [this] *when he says . . .*[46] Here as well, even though the evidence is severely underdetermined, the possibility of a link remains obvious.

What is still more convincing, to conclude this section, is the manner in which the single-work hypothesis produces an inherently cogent order of development for the doctrinal sections of the work. Beginning with an account of the first-principles and the cosmic cycle (B 17/*ensemble* **a**), supported by argument, illustrations (B 20/*ensemble* **c**, 21, 23, 26) and further details on the cycle and the elements (B 35, 98, and 96), the work could then have then contained a cosmogony (cf. Aristotle, *Physics* 196a 22, ἐν τῇ κοσμοποιίᾳ), either toward the end of book I or opening of book II. In either the case, book II probably dealt with biology and various *quaestiones naturales*, including the origins of man (B 62), a subject which could in turn have led, in book III, to a history of human society and culture, perhaps with a particular focus on cult and religion. This, *mutatis mutandis*, is the same broad ordering of subject-matter that we find reproduced in the two great surviving cosmologies from Antiquity, Plato's *Timaeus* and Lucretius's *De Rerum Natura*.

3. The Two Titles

Thematic Content: Titles or the "Diadoche" Tradition?

Beyond testimonia attached to quotations or doxographic reports, which can stand witness to the contents of specific passages, there is also a fair amount of evidence for the broad thematic contents of the work. Of these it might seem that the title(s) of the work(s) should stand at the head of the line, except that there is no way of showing that either *Peri Phuseos* or *Katharmoi* goes back to Empedocles. Indeed, as argued most fully by Schmalzriedt in his general investigation of Presocratic titles, it is relatively certain that Presocratic works were not usually given titles by their authors.[47] With the significant exception of drama, the custom of assigning titles to literary works belongs to later ages. The implications of this fact are clear enough: when later authors took it upon themselves to propose a title or a classification for a work where neither yet existed—and in the earliest instances this may have amounted to the same thing—that itself was an act of interpretation. So far as the first Greek philosophers are concerned, it is also clear that a number of their works, written before the various branches of knowledge had yet spread apart, presented later ages with serious difficulties of classification, to say nothing of titles.[48] For Empedocles specifically, if the single-work hypothesis is correct, I suggest that most of our evidence can be better understood as testimony to early debates concerning what was more important and fundamental in the work, rather than a dispassionate or comprehensive description of its contents. A better question to ask, and therefore the one that I will pursue in these pages, will be how the single work could have plausibly inspired the titles it eventually acquired, rather than which of the two extant titles should have exclusive domain. Now especially, in the new state of our knowledge provided by *ensemble* **d**, the wide thematic distance between the two preserved titles is by no means impossible to explain: the interweaving of the ethical and the physical, or the material and the spiritual, were clearly a fundamental feature of the work.

Still more importantly, the classification by titles and subject matter is not the only ancient scholarly tradition to which we have access. Another historical or historiographical tradition can also throw some light on this phenomenon, and by the same stroke confirm its plausibility. This alternative is the "diadoche" tradition, the classification of philosophers by succession or at least influence, of which Diogenes' *Lives of the Philosophers* is the largest extant specimen. Significantly in this case, and despite its obvious shortcomings and subjective nature, the *diadoche* tradition often posits a multitude of influences upon a thinker.

Two good and early examples of this approach to Empedocles are found in the fragments of Alcidamas and Timaeus, whose testimonies survive in Diogenes' *Life of Empedocles*. The mixture of "religious" and "scientific" themes the work contained, I have argued, has already been demonstrated by *ensemble* **d**, but now we can also see that it was well recognized by these early witnesses.

Alcidamas, a fourth-century author and student of Gorgias, himself said to be a student of Empedocles, gave the following, probably speculative, description of the schooling of Empedocles and Zeno (*apud* Diogenes VIII 56):

> And Alcidamas, in his book on natural history, says that Zeno and Empedocles were students of Parmenides around the same time, and then went away, Zeno to philosophise on his own, Empedocles to study with Anaxagoras and Pythagoras (!). And from the latter Empedocles emulated the dignity of his life and bearing, from the former his natural science.[49]

A few generations later, the historian Timaeus relates a controversy surrounding the identification of an unnamed intellectual hero whom Empedocles depicted, now our fragment B 129. Timaeus, *apud* Diogenes, VIII 54 (FGrHist. 566 F 14) advocates an identification with Pythagoras, but concedes that "others say that in saying this he was referring to Parmenides."

What both of these passages attest is that within a century or two, Empedocles' name alone sufficed to evoke, all at once, associations with Pythagoreanism, Elea and Ionian natural science. Indeed, with respect to fragment B 129, one may well ask, if the passage occurred in the *Katharmoi*, as traditionally thought, how anyone could have championed Parmenides as Empedocles' main intellectual influence? Conversely, if the passage occurred in the *Physics*, why would anyone have suggested Pythagoras? For such a controversy to arise, it seems necessary that this dual influence was discernable in a single work that combined these influences, rather than in the single author of two different types of work.[50]

The Earliest Evidence for Each Title, 1: Ancient Medicine and Plato's Phaedo

The earliest mention of Empedocles as an author occurs in the Hippocratic treatise *On Ancient Medicine*, chapter 20.[51] It is usually dated to the last third of the fifth century precisely on the basis of this passage, where Empedocles is given as representative of the type of the speculative philosopher: *just as Empedocles or others who have written on nature,* περὶ φύσιος, *on what man is fundamentally, and how man first arose and how he has been assembled.*[52] But once again, as shown by Schmalzriedt, *op. cit.* 94–5, the term περὶ φύσιος here is not indicative of a title, only of a genre or subject, namely speculative natural science. In other words, the passage merely represents what the Hippocratic author, or the current wisdom in his milieu, took to be the most important feature of Empedocles' work. And so far as it goes, that was a sound judgment. At the same time, it would be pressing historical accuracy too far in the other direction to presume that the author of *On Ancient Medicine* could not have used this term to describe Empedocles' work if it also contained a message on the fate of the soul. Once again, the advantage of the single-work hypothesis is that, by demonstrating the plausibility of both titles, it does away with the need to show that only one is authentic or original.

On the other side of this question, the earliest *certain* mention of the *Katharmoi* as a title for a work of Empedocles does not occur until a century later, in a fragment of Dicaearchus of Messana, Aristotle's pupil. I will consider it below. Before that, however, I suggest that an allusion in Plato's *Phaedo* may prove to be the earliest witness to the *Katharmoi* title. To my knowledge, it has so far gone unnoticed.

That Plato knew Empedocles' poetry well can be shown from a number of passages that borrow from it or parody it, for instance *Symposium* 189c2–193d5, *Politicus* 268e8–274e4,[53] or *Phaedrus* 248b–249b5, which so obviously imitates Empedocles B 115 that DK prints it in section C as an *Anklang*. On completely different grounds, if it is also kept in mind that, one generation later, Aristotle quotes Empedocles more than any other philosopher except Plato (see Bonitz's *Index Aristotelicus*, s.v.), one can fairly safely infer that Empedocles was not only an author with whom Plato must have been familiar, but that Empedocles was also for him a significant literary and philosophical predecessor. More specifically, within this broad current of influence, it has also long been noted that the *Phaedo* contains many Empedoclean and/or Pythagorean themes.[54] These are so numerous and interesting as to warrant separate study elsewhere, but for my present concern, the most pertinent passage is the definition of philosophy as a purification, *katharsis*, 65e–67b, and 69c, which Plato interprets as the separation of the soul from the body. The most important lines are at 69c 1–2, where Plato has Socrates establish wisdom as the only "good" or the only evaluative moral standard, unrelated to the "trade" in pleasures and pains:

> . . . *goodness of that sort [i.e. a hedonistic calculus] may be a kind of illusory facade, and fit for slaves indeed, and may have nothing healthy or true about it; whereas, truth to tell, temperance, justice and bravery may in fact be a kind of purification of all such things,* κάθαρσίς τις τῶν τοιούτων πάντων, *and wisdom itself a kind of purifying rite,* καὶ αὐτή ἡ φρόνησις μὴ καθαρμός τις ᾖ. (transl. Gallop)

Socrates's equation of virtue with purification, κάθαρσις, or of wisdom itself with a purification ritual, καθαρμός, is as good an indication as could be wished for the plausibility of the *Katharmoi* as a potential label for Empedocles' poem in the early fourth century.[55] Such a term, I think, while deliberately metaphorical in Plato, would once again have been an apt description of the poem's tone and aims, no less so than *Peri Phuseos*. Plato is simply alluding to a widespread occurrence in early and classical Greek philosophy, the equation of any specialized knowledge with religious mysteries, accessible only to those who have undergone a preliminary purification. To take but a few well-known early examples, the Socrates of Aristophanes' *Clouds*, speaks of mysteries at lines 143 and 254 ff.; Plato himself has Diotima initiate Socrates at *Symposium* 209e–210a; and earlier still, Parmenides refers to himself in his poem as "the man who knows" (DK 28 B 1.3), which is best taken as a reference to some kind of initiation.[56] But the most explicit and consistent use of such terminology in a Pre-Platonic author occurs in Empedocles, who in numerous passages (e.g. B 3.1–8, 112, 131, 132) equates his teaching with religious mysteries.[57] In the most celebrated instance, B110.1–4, Empedocles promises the disciple that:

> εἰ γάρ κέν σφ' ἀδινῇσιν ὑπὸ πραπίδεσσιν ἐρείσας
> εὐμενέως καθαρῇσιν ἐποπτεύσῃς μελέτῃσιν,
> ταῦτά τέ σοι μάλα πάντα δι' αἰῶνος παρέσονται,
> ἄλλα τε πόλλ' ἀπὸ τῶνδ' ἐκτήσεαι . . .

For if, pressing these down into your tightly-packed thinking organs, you contemplate them with goodwill and pure attentions, all of these will stand by you for your whole span, and you will acquire many more from them.

The verb ἐποπτεύσῃς, *you will contemplate*, refers to the *epopteia*, the final vision accorded initiates in mystery cults, granted only to those who have cleaned themselves by preliminary purification rites.[58] These latter are mentioned here via the term καθαρῇσιν . . . μελέτῃσιν, which I can only weakly translate as *pure attentions*. The possible appropriation by Empedocles of the term καθαρμός to describe his own teachings is not inappropriate, I think, both as a descriptive metaphor, as well as a more direct reference to practical advice and ritual prescriptions which the poem must have also contained (see B 112.9–12 for the promise of such advice, and B 138 and 140 for specific instances). This should not surprise us unduly, especially if the work aimed to provide the hearer not only with a theory of the world, but also a way of life, which in a Greek context would naturally include specifications for ritual practice, cf. B 128. This, we may imagine, Empedocles could have done following Pythagorean precedent, or the wider tradition of wisdom literature. Finally, it is worth noting that the theme of purity is by no means a foreign accretion within Empedoclean natural science, but was obviously so integral to it that it survives into the doxography. I quote Aetius I 7, 28 (= *Dox. Gr.* 303; DK 31 A 32, where the curious hexameter-like phrasing of the passage perhaps reflects the original): καὶ θείας δὲ οἴεται τὰς ψυχάς, θείους δὲ καὶ τοὺς μετέχοντας αὐτῶν καθαροὺς καθαρῶς, *and he thinks that souls are divine, as well as those pure men who partake of them purely.*

The Earliest Evidence for the Titles, 2: Aristotle

Despite such a promising link for the *Katharmoi* title, the next source to offer us a number of quotations from Empedocles, Aristotle, does not appear to have used that or indeed any title for the work. In the majority of cases Aristotle, like Plato, simply states that "Empedocles says" (for a full list, see Bonitz's *Index*, s.v.), which is a good although inconclusive indication that there was only one poem of which he expected his hearers to be aware.[59] Only twice does Aristotle appear to give a title along with a quotation. These two instances occur at *Meteorologica* IV 381b32 and *Problemata* 929b15, both works of dubious authenticity,[60] where they introduce DK B 34 as occurring ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς, *in the physics* (?). Given the general nature of the *Problemata*, henceforth *Problems*, usually understood as a compilation of excerpts from later Peripatetic treatises, and the fact that the *Problems* passage reproduces the same quotation as *Meteorologica* IV, it is very likely that the former is based on the latter, so that we are in fact dealing with a single quotation. The specific term τὰ φυσικά, moreover, while it is the title used for the poem by later sources, e.g. Aetius (I 30, *Dox. Gr.* 326, 10), the scholia to Dionysius Thrax (p. 166, 13 Hilgard = DK 31 A 25), Simplicius and Tzetzes, occurs *only* here in Aristotle. While that might be further reason to doubt the authenticity of *Meteorologica* IV, the treatise would in any case still provide early evidence for an Empedoclean title. But more importantly, even if we assume the authenticity of *Meterologica* IV and the *Problems*, it is far from clear that when Aristotle uses the term ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς, he necessarily means it as a title. Taking as comparison two further passages, *Rhetoric* 1373 b14, which introduces B 135, καὶ ὡς Ἐ. λέγει περὶ τοῦ μὴ κτείνειν τὸ ἔμψυχον, *and as Empedocles says concerning the ban on killing animals*, and *Physics* 196b22, λέγει οὖνὲν τῇ κοσμοποιίᾳ, *as he says in his cosmology*, introducing B 54, I suggest that the phrase ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς, like περὶ τοῦ μὴ κτείνειν, merely introduces a subject or denotes content. If we can now safely assume, as I have argued we can, that the poem owned by Simplicius contained both "physical" as well as "religious" doctrine, the phrase ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς will seem more plausible as a reference to certain sections of the poem, rather than to a title. As for the title *Katharmoi* itself, Aristotle's practice may count against it being current in his day, or at least so current that he felt obliged to use it. Then again, little prevents us from also imagining that Aristotle did know it, but knew equally well that it had no authority, and felt that it was inappropriate for the work of the *phusiologos par excellence*.[61]

The Dialogue "On Poets" and Empedocles' "Persika"

Although we know much less about it, it appears that Aristotle also had a fair amount to say about Empedocles in his lost *On Poets*. The work is generally thought to be an early dialogue, and it contains a curious mix of the anecdotal along with much more serious matters, including a first version of the theory of *katharsis*.[62] The passage which is of most interest for its information on Empedocles' literary output is fragment 1 in Laurenti's edition of the dialogue, (Janko 10, Rose^3 70), reported by Diogenes VIII 57–8:

> Ἀριστοτέλης . . . ἐν δὲ τῷ Περὶ ποιητῶν φησιν ὅτι καὶ Ὁμηρικὸς ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ δεινὸς περὶ τὴν φράσιν γέγονεν, μεταφορικός τ' ὢν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς περὶ ποιητικὴν ἐπιτεύγμασι χρώμενος. καὶ δὴ ὅτι γράψαντος αὐτοῦ καὶ ἄλλα ποιήματα τήν τε τοῦ Ξέρξου διάβασιν καὶ προοίμιον εἰς Ἀπόλλωνα, ταῦθ' ὕστερον κατέκαυσεν ἀδελφή τις αὐτοῦ—ἢ θυγάτηρ, ὥς φησιν Ἱερώνυμος—τὸ μὲν προοίμιον ἄκουσα, τὰ δὲ Περσικὰ βουληθεῖσα διὰ τὸ ἀτελείωτα εἶναι. Καθόλου δέ φησι καὶ τραγῳδίας αὐτὸν γράψαι καὶ πολιτικά.

> *Aristotle . . . in his 'On Poets' declares that Empedocles was Homeric and powerful in expression, capable of vivid illustrations as well as able to make good use of all the other resources of the poetic art. And although he also wrote other poems, 'The Crossing of Xerxes' and a 'Hymn to Apollo,' Aristotle says that his sister later burned them — or his daughter, according to Hieronymus — the Hymn by accident, but the Persian poem on purpose, because it was unfinished. And he adds that he also wrote tragedies and political works.*

The passage presents a tangle of difficulties and curiosities. Least problematic is the opening sentence, with its straightforward and positive assessment of Empedocles' poetic merit. Much more mysterious is the list of "other works" which follows. Aristotle, or perhaps Hieronymus of Rhodes (a Peripatetic philosopher, ca. 290–230 B.C.), claims that while Empedocles did write other works, two of them were not officially published, while a number of tragedies and political discourses were. The tragedies, as is clear from the sentences that immediately follow the passage quoted, were of debated existence in antiquity, with Hieronymus claiming to have 43 of them, while other scholars disputed either their number or their pedigree (for discussion, R. Goulet, *Dictionnaire des philosophes anciens*, p. 82; full ref. in note 50). Still more bizarre is the story of the burnt works. As Wehrli suggests in his edition of Hieronymus's fragments, fr. 30, the implication of this tale is that these works were never extant.[63] However, the "correction" of Aristotle by Hieronymus on the identity of the individual who burnt them is more difficult to explain precisely. Wherli *ibid.* suggests that the statement goes back to Aristotle, perhaps occurring in the *On Poets*, and that Hieronymus corrected him in his own treatise. Since the Aristotelian dialogue included anecdotal material, this may well have been the case. The question is impossible to prove or disprove conclusively, but other indications suggest that this information belongs to the later stratum, i.e. Hieronymus.

The title offered for one the two apocryphal works is the "Crossing of Xerxes," ἡ τοῦ Ξέρξου διάβασις (sc. the Persian king's crossing from Asia Minor to Greece, which was the standard way of referring to the event as a chronological marker), but the next lines refer to it by the less descriptive title *Persika*, τὰ Περσικά. Assuming that this information is from Aristotle himself, some have been encouraged to speculate on the existence and contents of this "Persian poem."[64] Among these, Sider went so far as to suggest that fragment B 34 may have belonged to it. The basis for his claim is the fact that the two quotations of fragment B 34 in the Aristotelian corpus, mentioned above, present a curious anomaly: while the majority of the *Meteorologica* MS quote the fragment as occurring ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς, *in the physics*, one of them (E) gives the source of the fragment as ἐν τοῖς περσικοῖς, *in the Persian poem*, whereas the *Problems* manuscripts *unanimously* record that second reading. Modern editors have generally restored both texts to ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς. For the *Meteorologica* this can be done simply on the greater weight of the predominant manuscript tradition, while the *Problems* passage is quite probably dependant on *Meteorologica* IV. The most likely scenario is that the author of the *Problems* worked from a text that had the variant reading from *Meteor.* IV. If so, this would mean that the error is a very old one.[65]

But against Sider's case for B 34 being an authentic fragment of the lost *Persica*, it seems that this "title" can be more simply explained as an early conflation of the phrases ἐν τοῖς περὶ φύσεως and ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς. As Sider himself points out, *op. cit.* 77, the adjectival formulation φυσικός or τὸ φυσικόν is not until later the usual way of designating topics in natural science. Aristotle *may* have fashioned the term for his own lectures, the φυσικὴ ἀκρόασις, but τὸ φυσικόν is much more common later, e.g. among the early Stoics. By far the predominant Aristotelian usage is τὰ περὶ φύσεως, for example *Met.* A 4, 985a11: ὧν ἡμεῖς διωρίσαμεν ἐν τοῖς περὶ φύσεως.[66] Depending on the authenticity of *Meteorologica* IV, this might even justify changing 381b32 back to ἐν τοῖς περὶ φύσεως. If the work is indeed that of Aristotle, the original text might have read ΕΝΤΟΙΣΠΕΡΙΦΥΣΕΩΣ, easily confused with later terminology, where a scribe might have expected ΕΝΤΟΙΣΦΥΣΙΚΟΙΣ, hence producing ΕΝΤΟΙΣΠΕΡΣΙΚΟΙΣ.[67]

Accordingly, instead of supporting the attribution of a *Persika* to Empedocles on the actual authority of Aristotle, this convergence shows instead how a textual mistake could have been exploited by Hieronymus or some other Hellenistic author and transformed into something else entirely. An isolated reference by "Aristotle" to a *Persica* no one else had ever heard of required an explanation, which perhaps Hieronymus undertook to provide. Of course this does not explain the *Hymn to Apollo* or any other of the details advanced in the anecdote, but it does illustrate how this type of fabrication might occur, perhaps more than once.[68] On the whole, to repeat the obvious, the story of the burnt works seems much more plausible as an anecdotal explanation for otherwise unattested works than a fully historical version of events.

Finally, it is worth noting that the passage, be it ultimately from Aristotle or Hieronymus, remains silent on the title of the main work or works, and certainly does not mention the *Katharmoi*. If there were two main works, Aristotle's appreciation of Empedocles' poetic style implies stylistic homogeneity across both poems (cf. also Theophrastus' judgment, note 58), but once again the overall impression is that Aristotle refers to Empedocles' style without qualification for the simple reason that his audience did not expect any distinctions to be necessary. Similarly, nothing precludes the phrase *and many other poems*, καὶ ἄλλα ποιήματα from meaning that there were other poems "besides the *Physics* and the *Katharmoi*" but the impression it leaves is one of a contrast between a single work for which Empedocles was known, and the *apocrypha* which Hieronymus introduces.

Dicaearchus, Theophrastus, and Timaeus of Tauromenion

The first secure attestation of the term *Katharmoi* as a title does not occur until a generation later, in Aristotle's student Dicaearchus of Messana, (fl. 330–320 B.C.), fragment #85 in Fortenbaugh and Schutrümpf, eds.[69] The quotation itself occurs as one item in an otherwise tedious list of works performed by rhapsodes in symposia, compiled by Athenaeus around 200 A.D., *Deipnosophistae*, 14.12 620d:

> τοὺς δ' Ἐμπεδοκλέους Καθαρμοὺς ἐρραψῳδησεν Ὀλυμπίασι Κλεομένης ὁ ῥαψῳδός, ὥς φησιν Δικαίαρχος ἐν τῷ Ὀλυμπικῷ.
>
> *The rhapsode Cleomenes performed the Katharmoi of Empedocles at Olympia, as Dicaerachus says in the 'Olympic* (*dialogue*?).'[70]

Unfortunately, since we do not know if the work in question was a dialogue or a scholarly work, e.g. on musical contests, it is impossible to tell how Dicaearchus meant this information. Did he present it as an historical fact, or was this performance of the *Katharmoi* fictional, merely mentioned in passing by an interlocutor in a dialogue? Even if Dicaearchus did present it as a fact, it does not tell us if the recitation in question was the *première*, in the presence of the author, or simply a performance given at some later date at the initiative of the rhapsode.[71]

Of more interest is the fact that we owe our earliest sure attestation of the *Katharmoi* title to a fellow Sicilian, who was also the preeminent cultural historian of antiquity. So far as one can tell from this passage, Dicaearchus did not feel the need to introduce or argue for the title he used. On the single-work hypothesis, this may imply that it was already known or at least recognizable under such a title by then, as *Phaedo* 69c may indicate.

On the other hand, a determined defender of the two-work hypothesis might still prefer to explain Dicaearchus' fragment as nothing but the first known reference to this particular work. But as we now know, this putative work is not likely to have contained much of the material assigned to it in DK, and especially not B 115.[72] What then might this pared-down *Katharmoi* have contained? The only suggestion on offer is David Sedley's variant on the two-work hypothesis, made in cognizance of the new material. According to Sedley, the *Katharmoi* were "nothing more or less than . . . a set of purificatory oracles and 'healing utterances.'"[73] But even if one ignores the other arguments against the two-work hypothesis, the only known fact we have concerning this work—

beyond its title—is that it was performed by a rhapsode at the Olympic games, and this seems to weight heavily against Sedley's reconstruction. While it is true that the ancients had more patience for literary catalogues than we do, purificatory oracles and healing utterances are quite unpromising material for a live performance, at Olympia no less. Such collections of oracles were more commonly kept by seers for highly selective excerpting at an appropriate moment, since the serial recitation of several oracles in a row would hinder their credibility.[74]

A more plausible compromise solution for Dicaearchus' specific choice of title has been advanced by Obbink. Writing before publication of the Strasbourg papyrus, Obbink noted that all the other known parallels to literary *Katharmoi* consist of collections or compilations.[75] On his interpretation, the *Katharmoi* mentioned by Dicaearchus may have been a rhapsodic abridgement of the larger work. To be sure, the more dramatic features of the "religious" passages would certainly have lent themselves to vivid performance, and a rhapsode may have wished to focus on such material, to the exclusion of expository doctrine.

While Obbink's suggestion has genuine merit, I do not think it is demonstrable to the exclusion of my preferred alternative; but even if Obbink is right, the single-work hypothesis is not threatened. Once again, the *Katharmoi* title is not untrue to the spirit of the whole work.[76] If such an abridgement of the work existed, it either escaped Aristotle's notice a generation before Dicaearchus, or Aristotle felt no need to refer to the *editio minor*.[77] The same also holds for Theophrastus, not quite a generation older than Dicaearchus, who quoted Empedocles B 128 in his lost *On Piety*, see above, p. 15. Although the subject matter there described by Theophrastus seems eminently suited to *Katharmoi*, he does not link B 128 to any title, and the fragment is said to occur merely παρ' Ἐμπεδοκλέους. Finally, Timaeus of Tauromenion, a contemporary of Dicaearchus, tells us in an admittedly garbled passage that lines B 112.4–5 were "from his poetry."[78] This is significant since Diogenes VIII 54 specifies that these lines were the very opening of the *Katharmoi*. Thus, since a contemporary of Dicaearchus could "quote" the *Katharmoi* without feeling the need to specify an origin for the quotation, one is again left with the impression that Empedocles was known for only one major work.[79]

The Testimony of Diogenes Laertius

So much for the case for a single poem. Against it still stands the testimonium of Diogenes Laertius at VIII 77, the only extant author who appears to name both titles as independent works. In his 1995 review, 435 ff., O'Brien takes Osborne (1987) especially to task for not accepting the worth of this passage, or at least for not meeting the burden of proof needed to dismiss it.[80] Against O'Brien, it seems to me that the most useful result of the challenge, even before the publication of the papyrus, was to show how surprisingly weak the case for the two poems is.

To begin, can we even presume that Diogenes consulted either of the two putative poems? In two other instances, it is true, he appears to have consulted them first-hand, giving a "title" along with a quotation: VIII 54, ἐναρχόμενος τῶν Καθαρμῶν *at the very opening of the Katharmoi*, and VIII 60, Παυσανίας. . .ᾧ τὰ περὶ φύσεως προσπεφώνεκεν οὕτως, *Pausanias . . . to whom he addresses the physics thus*. Must we therefore imagine that these indicate his knowledge of the original(s)? Surely not.[81] Notably, both of those instances show traces of ancient biographical detective work, for they are attempts to extract biographical evidence from the *corpus*. As such, it is unlikely that Diogenes was the first to draw these inferences. Rather, they must have been part of the biographical literature for centuries, some of them going as far back as the Lyceum. They by no means reflect any first-hand acquaintance with the work(s).

This of course is hardly a revolutionary statement. That Diogenes' *Life of Empedocles* is essentially a compilation, one that has a convoluted prehistory of its own, has long been known.[82] Still, in order to dispel any doubts about the matter as far as Empedocles is concerned, I offer table 2. What it shows is that for nearly every Empedoclean fragment quoted by Diogenes, we can identify at least one intermediary source, either directly, or by means of a simple cross-reference within the same life. The only passages for which no source is given are the doxographic cluster at the end, which Diels (see ref.) had already shown was dependent upon earlier material. Should that not suffice, I offer one further observation. At VIII 59, Diogenes includes B 111 as a biographical quotation, to support Satyrus' account (in a dialogue?) of the sophist Gorgias as a disciple of Empedocles and witness to feats of sorcery. In the fragment,

Table 2: Diogenes' quotations from his Life of Empedocles

	Location	DK Number	Title and Source, when given.
1.	VIII. 54	B 112.1–2	ἐναρχόμενος τῶν Καθαρμῶν No source. Heraclides Ponticus?; Timaeus? Cf. VIII 62, 66
2.	54	B 129	No title. Timaeus
3.	59	B 111	δὶα τῶν ποιημάτω. Satyrus
4.	60	B 1	τὰ περὶ φύσεως. Aristippus and Satyrus.
5.	62	B 112.1.2; 4–11	Heraclides Ponticus (or Timaeus)?
6.	66	B 112.4–5	ἐν τῇ ποιήσει. Timaeus
7.	76–77	B 6.2–3; 17.6; 17.8-9; 117	Cf. Diels, *Dox. Gr.*, 168

Empedocles promises supernatural powers to the disciple, and the passage was used to prove his *alazoneia*. Notable is that Diogenes does not associate the fragment with any title: διὰ τῶν ποιημάτων, *in his poems* (or rather *verses*; the plural does not imply plural works, see LSJ s.v.). Presumably he was unable to do so because his source failed to inform him on the point.

This demonstrates, I think, that Diogenes did not choose to control his sources independently, even though the survival of the poem into much later antiquity implies that it was probably not impossible for him to do so. More importantly, however, it raises the possibility that Diogenes' crucial bibliographical notice at VIII 77 could have been corrupted by his own ignorance. If the single-work hypothesis is correct, it cannot be wholly excluded that he might have misunderstood the alternative titles for the single work as the titles for two distinct works.[83] This might even explain the rather large number of 5,000 verses he cites as the length of the Empedoclean *corpus*, which is about double what one would expect three books to total, and over twice the 2,000 lines transmitted in the admittedly faulty manuscripts of the *Suda*. But since numbers are easily susceptible to corruption, this must remain a remote possibility; one can just as easily emend the text without recourse to it.[84] Further, however much one may wish to impugn Diogenes' judgment (and one is occasionally tempted to do so), it is equally certain that in some cases at least his source-materials were of a professional quality, so that it would be unwise simply to reject his testimony. Here once again is the text of Diogenes VIII 77:

> τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ φύσεως αὐτῶι καὶ οἱ καθαρμοί εἰς ἔπη τείνουσι πενταχισχίλια, ὁ δὲ ἰατρικὸς λόγος εἰς ἔπη ἑξακόσια.

DK, following Crönert, speculated that the ultimate bibliographical source for this reference, as for the bibliographical reference in the *Suda*, was a certain Lobon of Argos, a poorly known author of a (comic?) work *On Poets*, who may have lived in the third century B.C.[85] The basis for Crönert's identification was a set of common features found in certain bibliographical notices, mostly from the Suda, various *scholia* and Diogenes Laertius, which recur in two notices where Lobon is named as the source, (Diogenes I 34, and I 111). These notices typically include a very short biographical notice, a funerary epitaph where available, and a list of works, the scale of which is usually indicated by a line-numbering given in ἔπη, *verses*, not strictly hexameter lines, and as opposed to the more common (and later?) bibliographical term for line, στίχος. While the identification of Lobon as the ultimate author of Diogenes VIII 77 remains highly conjectural, the term ἔπη may yet indicate a certain antiquity, as does more likely the phrase τὰ περὶ φύσεως, for which later sources usually have τὰ φυσικά, see above, p. 22. But the notice at Diogenes VIII 77 is also intriguing on account of two more curiosities: first, the fact that the source only gives the *combined* number of verses for both putative works; second, that it lists both of them together in one arm of a *men . . . de* construction, to which is opposed the otherwise unattested medical work.[86]

I suggest the following solution. Diogenes' notice, from an old, probably unidentifiable source, is not so much a title as a list of contents. Or, if one must insist that it is a tile, what Diogenes preserves at VIII 77 is *the long form* of the title, somewhat like referring to Hesiod's *Works and Days*, instead of the *Works*.[87] Two grounds may be offered to shore up this claim.

First, the original poem, as all its ancient readers could see, and as *ensemble* d now lets us see as well, combined teachings on physics, τὰ περὶ φύσεως, with purifications and eschatology, οἱ καθαρμοί. Because these were both significant and distinctive features of the work, the need arose to mention them both in the more formal catalogue of works concluding the life, if not necessarily before that.

Second, when we compare this passage to other bibliographical notices from "Lobon," we find that it shares with them a tendency to long, descriptive titles, and the habit of giving book-counts or line numbers, when these are given, to individual works, not to the whole corpus of each author (the line numbers themselves are suspiciously large and vague).[88] To the latter I have found only two potential exceptions in the fragments of "Lobon."[89] For purposes of illustration and comparison, I quote two typical notices from Crönert's collection:

> ΕΥΜΟΛΠΟΣ . . . ἔγραψε τελετὰς καὶ τὴν εἰς Κελεὸν ἄφιξιν καὶ τὴν τῶν μυστηρίων παράδοσιν τὴν ταῖς θυγατράσιν αὐτοῦ γενομένην ἔπη τὰ πάντα τρισχίλια, Χειροσκοπικὰ πεζῶς βιβλίον ἕν. (from the *Suda*, fr. 4, Crönert)
>
> *Eumolpus: . . . he wrote initiations and the arrival at the house of Celeus, and the teaching of the mysteries being bequeathed to the his daughters, three thousand lines all told, and a Palmistry in prose, one book.*

> ΕΠΙΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ . . . ἐποίησε δὲ Κουρήτων καὶ Κορυβάντων γένεσιν καὶ θεογονίαν ἔπη πεντακισχιλία, Ἀργοῦς ναυπηγίαν τε καὶ Ἰασονος εἰς Κόλχους ἀπόπλουν ἔπη ἑξακισχιλία πεντακόσια, κτλ. (Diog. Laert. I 111, fr. 16 Crönert)
>
> *Epimenides . . . composed the birth of the Couretes and the Corybants and a theogony, 5,000 lines; the building of the ship Argo and Jason's sailing to Colchis, 6,500 lines.*

Although we might be tempted to recognize in each of the subjects listed a separate title, e.g. for "Eumolpus," *The Initiations, The Arrival at the House of Celeus, The Teaching of the Mysteries*, our knowledge of the myths and/or institutions to which these works pertained allows us to see that the notices, which to our taste fall somewhere between a title and a description, do not list separate works, but list a series of episodes from a single work. The initiations, the arrival at the house of Celeus and the transmission of the mysteries are elements in the programme of the celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries, and were presumably described in a single epic ascribed to the mythical Eumolpus. Much the same no doubt applies to Epimenides' birth of the Corybants and his theogony, as well to the Argonautica ascribed to him. These long, inelegant, yet descriptive titles were probably imposed by the lack of an established shorter one, and the author's desire to identify the work by specifying as much of the contents as possible. Thus, if these comparisons from "Lobon" have any worth, perhaps ultimately not that much, we should take it that when "Lobon" gave the combined verse total which are first reproduced at Diogenes VIII 77, it was because he meant to describe only one work.

But even if we put "Lobon" aside, both grammar (*men . . . de*) and the combined verse-numbers are strong and mutually reinforcing reasons to suppose that a single work is all that was ever meant by the source of Diogenes VIII 77. An even stronger ground for thinking this is that the *Suda* notice, which is probably a mere abridgment of Diogenes Laertius,[90] does not omit the otherwise unattested *Medical Discourse*, but does drop the *Purifications* "title." This would be puzzling if we were dealing with two works, for why should the *Suda* not mention the *Katharmoi*, even if it had long gone out of circulation, but not at all if the *Suda* merely compresses the same notice, having also *correctly understood* Diogenes' notice as a reference to a single poem. Thus, instead of being the central piece in the case for the two-work hypothesis, Diogenes VIII 77 just as easily supports the assumption of a single work. I would gloss it as follows:

While (μέν) *his physics* (τὰ περὶ φύσεως αὐτῷ) *and purifications extend to about five thousand lines* (*two thousand?*), *his* (δέ) *medical discourse extends to six hundred.*

The Two Titles: Conclusion

The tendency of modern scholars to interpret Diogenes VIII 77 uncritically as titles for two separate works, I suggest, is the result not so much of the actual Greek of the passage, as of our ignorance of the direct textual tradition. It was also abetted by the collusion of three further factors: 1) the general tendency of literary quotations, i.e. our fragments, to thematic unity; 2) the post-classical habit of giving titles to literary works being read uncritically back into classical and archaic works; 3) the belief that science and religion do not mix. While the third of these has long since retreated, the second was not formally disproved until Schmalzriedt (1970), and the first, while in a sense always known, resulted in an assumption of thematic consistency for each putative work that did not find a counterexample in the *corpus* until publication of *ensemble* **d**.

However, if my interpretation of Diogenes' notice is correct, this produces a further potential complication for the reconstruction of the work. The complication is this. If both the *Physics* and the *Katharmoi* are appropriate titles for the whole work, because they both reflect actual content, this also raises the possibility that certain authors could have used both terms, not as titles, but simply to denote those parts of the work thematically appropriate to those terms. For some, e.g. Simplicius, the *Physics* seems to denote the whole work, but I have suggested that Aristotle comes close to a thematic or descriptive usage, even though we have no evidence that he ever used the word *katharmos*. The case for both *Physics* and the *Katharmoi* being used as titles is supported by a few passages whose contents do not seem to match those terms, as argued above. But in other cases it does not seem possible to distinguish if, by terms such as *physics* or *purifications*, a given author means to denote the whole work, as a title, or merely the parts of it thematically appropriate to those terms.[91] At some point, probably not before the third century B.C., both terms were used to denote content, and this seems to be what lies behind Diogenes' source. It is unclear to me if this is what Diogenes was doing, or whether he was merely following his sources. In either case, an excellent parallel for this whole situation is found in the way later authors refer to Hesiod's *Works and Days*. As West shows in note on the title, Stobaeus, by abbreviation, can quote a passage from the *Days* as from the *Works*, whereas Proclus and Diaconus allude to passages from the *Days* as simply from the *Days*, not the *Works and Days*.[92] Had Hesiod's text not survived, one wonders, would modern scholars have divided the *Works and Days* into two poems? Perhaps the only important difference between the two cases is that Empedocles' poem most likely did not confine physics and religious teachings to wholly separate sections or books. As *ensemble* **d** shows, he seems to have interwoven the two themes. For this the best parallel known to me is Lucretius' variation between expository and "pathetic" style in the *De Rerum Natura*, for which Empedocles, as in other matters of poetic style, may well have been the model.[93]

The Single-Work Hypothesis and Empedocles' Addressees

To conclude this chapter, let me reiterate that the unity of Empedocles' thought remains more important than the question of the different titles. Given that we can no longer claim distinct content for either putative work, the division of the corpus simply fails henceforth to be all that significant, especially if all it can achieve is to reduce the *Katharmoi* to a mere handful of passages. The advantage of the single-work hypothesis, to touch upon one last potential objection to it, is also shown by the impracticality of attempting to define any other formal criteria to distinguish the two putative works. For if the poem from which Simplicius quoted also dealt with reincarnation, and hence most likely with purification, then the sole remaining grounds for differentiating the two works shrinks to differences of addressees. According to the traditional division, the *Katharmoi* were addressed to the people of Acragas, whereas the *Peri Phuseos* was meant for the private delectation of the disciple Pausanias.[94] A recent study of the question by Obbink, however, has shown that matters are not so simple.[95] The multiple addressees of Empedocles, which include his Muse, the gods, the people of Acragas, as well as the disciple Pausanias, are no reliable keys to a division of the works, and there are ample literary *comparanda* to show well that a single poem can have multiple addressees. Once again it will be prudent not to base too much on such shaky evidence, and our energies will be better spent attempting to understand the unity of Empedocles' thought than in forcing apart its articulations.

CHAPTER II

The Framework

Proem and Doctrine

1. A Single Theory of Everything

Empedoclean Panpsychism

The unity of Empedocles' thought imposes on interpreters a stronger obligation than before to take the entire corpus as a set, to attempt an interpretation in which all pieces must have a place.[1] The first step in this undertaking will be to consider which fragment(s) can better serve as a general framework. According to the traditional division of the corpus, two fragments provided the respective and mutually incompatible frameworks for each poem. The *Peri Phuseos* took as its foundation the exposition of the cycle found in B 17, whereas fragment B 115 presented the central theme of the *Katharmoi*.[2] The contrast in outlook each provides at a first glance, it must be admitted, can seem quite stark. Whereas B 17 is a long, mostly impersonal account of the ultimate constituents of the universe, outlining their behavior and arguing for their absolute reality, B 115 describes the punishments long-lived *daimones* undergo after perjury or befouling themselves with blood, according to an "oracle of Necessity." This consists in a series of toilsome reincarnations through each of the great world-masses, and ends on a startling first-person confession by Empedocles that "I too am now one of these, a fugitive from god, in thrall to raving Strife." The main problem, as correctly discerned by Zeller, is that neither appears to have any obvious connection to the other. On the one hand, we have an impersonal, objective, and potentially reductionist physics, contrasting with, on the other, a dramatic and personal myth, enjoining the hearer to adopt a "pure" way of life and perhaps promising thereby some form of salvation. To many, as outlined above, it has seemed that there is simply no reconciling these two perspectives. At the very least, it would not be wrong to say that we have in each the germs of two competing outlooks, whose claims, at least since the Enlightenment, have been felt to be less and less capable of agreement.

In considering this matter therefore, it will be of use to distinguish between two separate questions. First there is, for us moderns, an ongoing and lively philosophical debate concerning the proper relation and relative claims upon us of subjective and objective forms of knowledge, or between the first-person and third-person viewpoint, and the relation of either to religion and science. I do not think it controversial in this regard to venture that the more positivistic appreciation of science 100 years ago had a part to play in the sharp distinction some felt between the two halves of Empedocles' teachings, one that we do not now feel so keenly. Second, there is the historical question of what relation the two had for Empedocles. That, thankfully, is no longer at issue: the evidence shows that Empedocles did not distinguish his physical from his religious teachings *qua* truths. In fact, it does not even seem appropriate to use such terms in discussing his thought. For once *we* abandon the presumption of a necessary incompatibility between science and religion, it becomes all the more clear that such qualifications applied to each half of the division, whenever advanced on its basis, can now be identified and rejected as historically inaccurate.[3] Although both fragments may seem to us to be reaching for opposite sides of some type of mind-body dualism, or the respective claims of subjective and objective forms of knowledge or, to invoke an even hoarier opposition, myth versus science, a closer reading of the primary evidence restores the lost middle ground between fragments B 17 and B 115.

First in importance is the fact that, for Empedocles, "matter has mind." This panpsychic creed is explicitly stated at B 110.10 and immediately distinguishes his physics from its standard modern counterpart. That his commitment to it was no isolated point or of marginal interest can be seen from its implicit presence in many other passages. For example, at B 17.9, in the middle of his main account of the cosmic cycle, Empedocles declares that the *one* has learned *to grow from many*. Or again, at B 35.14 he describes the production of mortal compounds through the mixture of the elements in the following terms: *they [i.e. the elements] quickly began to grow mortal, which* had *previously* learned *to be immortal*. In both cases, and others could be cited, this intriguing and consistent identification of "impersonal" cosmic change with learning makes it clear that we are dealing with more than a merely ornamental metaphor.

Such thematic overlapping, moreover, does not operate in only one direction. For, to consider the question from the opposite angle, it has long been noted that the description of the *daimon*'s banishment in fragment 115, as religious a passage as any in the corpus, contains many thematic links with the physical doctrine. Most conspicuously, the fallen *daimon* is said to wander throughout the four great elemental masses (B 115. 9–11), and its fall is declared the result of having put its trust in Strife. Had the latter statement been found in any number of other Greek poets, we might be tempted to interpret it as a mere metaphor, but here it is unmistakably a reference to the same Strife which is also the cosmic agent of separation. It can also be taken to describe a physical process. In both passages therefore, while we can speak of the main emphasis being more subjective or impersonal, more religious or scientific, more psychological or physical, Empedocles has tempered and coordinated each account with allusions to both perspectives.

Finally, to round off this important general point, I note that the converse application of the principle that "matter has mind" is that "mind has body." This is nowhere asserted by Empedocles, but can be accepted as an uncontroversial assumption of his age.[4] Thus one should avoid reading into the otherworldliness of his religious teachings any spurious metaphysical claims. This was not maintained as such by proponents of the two-philosophies interpretation, but stressing the lack of any *obvious* connection between what we term the religious teachings and the physics leads all too easily to not attempting any connection of any kind. This in turn *is* a division imposed on the material, albeit tacit, where none in fact exists. If both pictures produced by fragments B 17 and B 115 are taken as fundamental yet basically irreconcilable, if each is the whole story as it were, this predetermines us to finding no link between them.

By all of this I hope to have made as clear as possible the simple fact that, for Empedocles, B 17 and B 115 must be true within the same universe, without canceling each other out. Until we have reason to think otherwise, the story of the fallen *daimon* can and should be taken as no less true or valid than the account of our origins as a compound of elements. When we return therefore to the initial question, that of the proper framework, it becomes clear that if the two are not taken as *a priori* incompatible, the crucial factor in deciding which of them can better serve as our general framework becomes a much more specific—and banal—question, that of the proper scope of application of each statement.

The Scope of Fragment B 17 versus B 115

Having allowed that both passages are not mutually exclusive, it is also clear that Empedocles does not assign them the same domain. Although I have already considered the grounds to think that fragment B 115, *inter alia*, preceded fragment B 17, I now also note that fragment B 17, without doubt, has the greater scope or area of application. Simply put, this fragment is Empedocles' broadest pronouncement on the totality of external and internal reality, and the general framework it describes is our best evidence for Empedocles' macrocosmic account of the cosmos, his theory of the universe and all it contains. This should not be taken to mean, however, that the principles described therein are exclusively macroscopic, or operate only on a cosmic scale. In fact, we know they do not, but their description in these passages concerns their activities viewed at their fullest deployment, where their domain is repeatedly said to cover "everything." This is clearly stated at B 17.7, 17.30, and now even more explicitly in the continuation of B 17 at lines **a (i) 8–a (ii) 2** of the Strasbourg papyrus:

> ⸤ἐξ ὧν πάντ(α) ὅσα τ' ἦν ὅσα τ' ἐστ(ὶ) ὅ⸥σα τ' ἔσσετ' ὀπίσσω·
> ⸤δένδρεά τ' ἐβλάστησε καὶ ἀνέρες⸥ ἠδὲ γυναῖκες,
> ⸤θ⸥ῆρές τ' οἰωνοί ⸤τε καὶ⸥ ὑδατοθρ⸤έμμονες ἰχθῦς⸥
> ⸤κ⸥αί τε θεοὶ δολιχα⸤ίων⸥ες τιμῇσ[ι φέριστοι.] [5]

from which [comes] everything that ever was, is, and will be hereafter, and [from which] spring up trees and men and women, and wild beasts and birds and fishes raised in water, and even long-lived gods, mightiest in honor.

The passage, as in its doublet in B 21, begins by creatively reusing a Homeric formula to stress the universality of the first-principles as the ultimate sources of "all things,"[6] and then illustrates the point with a miniature catalogue, where Empedocles lists the emergence from the six first principles of various forms of life. Significantly, the catalogue concludes its list of created beings with *long-lived gods, mightiest in honors*. The importance of this remark for the history of Greek philosophy and early Greek theology cannot be understated, but it also has a much more immediate application with respect to B 115: if Empedocles included *gods* within the scope of his natural philosophy, then surely we can entertain the possibility that he also found room for *daimones*—if they are not in fact one and the same.[7]

By contrast with the universal scope of B 17, the "oracle of Necessity" of B 115 describes a law of reincarnation which, while presumably always valid, nevertheless seems to cover only a certain subset of creatures within the world, the *daimones who have obtained a great life-span* (line 5). Certain thematic continuities suggest it is not simply tacked on to this larger story, but these can be explored later. The key point shown by an initial comparison of the two fragments is that while B 17 is obviously meant as a universally valid account of everything, the scope of B 115 is much more restricted.

2. THE DIRECT EVIDENCE FOR EMPEDOCLES' PROEM

The Single-Work Hypothesis and the Relative Positions of B 17, B 115, and B 112

These considerations, I think, only serve to reinforce the consensus according to which B 17 stands as the general framework of Empedocles' philosophy. Yet if considerations of scope reinforce the view that B 17 is more fundamental than B 115, it is also quite certain that the world view advanced in B 17 was not introduced first, but that it followed other material. Such an ordering is not likely to be without significance, but an investigation of that significance is better left until after we can clarify, so far as our evidence will allow, just what material is likely to have preceded B 17.

The one certain fact in these matters, as already seen in chapter I, is the position of B 17. The combination of a stichometric Γ on the last line of *ensemble* **a** indicates that this particular line was the 300th verse of the book in which it occurred, while the five-line overlap between that *ensemble* and B 17, which Simplicius quotes as from the first book of the *Physics*, allows us to estimate that the B 17 + *ensemble* **a** must have run from lines 232 to 300 of that same book.

Yet, as also discussed above, despite its location well into book I, the internal properties of B 17/*ensemble* **a** also give it an indubitable introductory flavor. Adding to those previously mentioned, I offer the following grounds for thinking this to be the case: 1) the universal scope of the passage, cf. above; 2) the focus on the most basic entities of the system and Empedocles' consistent use of the same simple terms to name Love, Strife, and the elements, as opposed to his more usual practice of varying their epithets;[8] 3) the fact that B 21, 26 and 35, which Simplicius and other evidence indicate must have followed B 17, act as developments or clarifications of the basic picture it presents; and finally 4) its formal structure, which I only mention here as relevant, and which I will discuss more fully in chapter IV. Thus, on the one hand, the fact that B 17/*ensemble* **a** began some 230 lines into the first book obviously means that we are not dealing with the beginning of the work, while on the other, many elements conspire to indicate that B 17 was also a beginning of some sort.

The situation would be puzzling if older and more recent epic practice did not establish that a proem, of varying length and content, but often involving the invocation of divinities, generally preceded the main subject matter of a long hexameter poem. This seems to have been true for epic in general, but appears even truer within the narrower genre of didactic poetry, as in Hesiod and Parmenides.[9] Accordingly, the most plausible explanation for the introductory flavor of B 17 is that it is the opening of Empedocles' *doctrinal exposition*, following a long proem on a different but related set of topics. The frequency with which B 17 is quoted in the doxography, although there it tends to be found in shorter snippets, certainly confirms its worth as *the* core doctrinal statement of the poem. In this regard, Simplicius is *l'exception qui confirme la règle*, for it was his own recognition of its importance that led him to make it the longest quotation in the corpus, a total of 35 lines. The significance of this is that we now have a better basis than ever before for reconstructing the proem of, on the two-work hypothesis, Empedocles' *Physics*, or as I would have it, of the single work. If B 17 was either the very opening of the work's doctrinal section, or at least very close to it, this provides us with a 230-line frame, or *terminus* within which the fragments belonging to the proem must fit.

Despite such definite progress, it remains unfortunately true that the remaining evidence for the proem is much less precise than we should like. Perhaps the only certainty about it is that, with a little over 230 lines to fill, it must have been comparatively long. What evidence we do have for its contents is divisible into two classes. First in importance are the fragments whose position is vouched for by ancient testimony, then those whose inclusion in the proem is indicated either by thematic links to passages of that first class, or whose placement there is made plausible on more general comparative bases. In this section I consider the strongest candidates, those fragments whose position is indicated by an ancient witness. In the next I will examine the less secure candidates, for whom thematic and/or comparative grounds exist for "grafting" them onto the stronger ones.

The best external evidence for Empedocles' proem, once again, is Plutarch's statement, *De exilio*, 607 c, that fragment B 115 occurred at the beginning of Empedocles' poem:

> Ὁ δ': Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς φιλοσοφίας προαναφωνήσας . . .
>
> *But Empedocles, making an opening proclamation at the beginning of his philosophy . . .*

The choice of the verb προαναφωνέω indicates that its content must relate in a prefatory manner to what follows, whereas the term philosophy must refer to the undifferentiated general body of knowledge that constitutes Empedocles' teachings. Such an arrangement was in fact the dominant interpretation in an earlier stage of scholarship, until thematic considerations prompted Diels (1901), after Stein (1852), to relocate it to the *Katharmoi*.[10] Since then, although attempts to relocate the fragment to such a context had been made, none gained general acceptance, or was able to overcome the *communis opinio* established by Diels.[11] At present, however, the new evidence from *ensemble* **d** categorically overrules that thematic objection, and thereby opens the possibility of placing B 115 before B 17/*ensemble* **a**. Plutarch's testimonium, it is true, does not eliminate other possibilities, especially on the two-work hypothesis, but even for the two-work defenders, Simplicius' own quotation of the first two lines of B 115, (ref. in table 1) is good evidence for putting B 115 in the *Physics*.[12] The contents of B 115, moreover, are by no means incompatible with the teachings of B 17. Rather, as mentioned above, the two are linked by deliberate and telling poetic resonances: at B 115.9–11, the *daimon* is described as forced to wander through all four elements, and his fall is linked to Strife, the cosmic agent of separation.

The only other fragment we can place in the proem on the basis of direct evidence is B 112, which Diogenes tells us opened the *Katharmoi*, VIII 54, ἐναρχόμενος τῶν Καθαρμῶν. . . . In this regard B 112 is, after B 115, the only other fragment we can place with near certainty in a proem. And if so, it surely stood at the very opening of the work. The difficulty lies in the fact that Diogenes appears to tell us that these lines belonged to another work. Yet if the single work-hypothesis is correct, that objection now has but little force.[13]

Instead, though both passages are strongly contrasted in terms of their respective emotional states, both also share a more fundamental concern with explaining the superior status of Empedocles *vis-à-vis* unenlightened ordinary mortals. In this regard at least the thematic appropriateness of both passages to *a* proem is without serious doubt. A distinction between the erroneous ways of mankind and the superior viewpoint of the teacher, as poet, sophist, or philosopher is a common or even necessary stance for whoever claims to have anything new to teach. One could cite many examples throughout Greek literature, starting with Hesiod, *Theogony*, 22–34, down to Anaxagoras B 17. But whereas such claims to authority can take different forms, e.g. inspiration from the Muses in Hesiod, or simple personal authority in the case of Anaxagoras, it is notable that in both B 112 and B 115, Empedocles makes a claim to divine or at least superhuman status.[14]

Indeed, if B 112 and B 115 did belong to the same work, as in the traditional DK arrangement (and against those who would now relocate only B 115 to the *Physics*) then it is not impossible to discern the sequence of ideas they display. In B 112, the opening lines of the work, Empedocles brazenly advertised his superiority to mortals in the most striking manner possible. Having struck such a note, he then proceeded to qualify his claim, and in particular to explain how it could ever come to pass that he a man, had become god.[15] The pathos of B 115, in which Empedocles confesses his accursedness before all, should not obscure the fact that this information is also the key to his eventual salvation, and the source of his superiority to the rest of mankind, who do not even realize their fallen state.

Thus, instead of being fundamentally irreconcilable, the sequence formed by B 112 and 115, and now, on the single-work hypothesis, B 17 can be closely related as complementary parts of the broader rhetorical strategy of Empedocles' message. Fragments B 112 and 115, by establishing Empedocles' claim to superhuman status, serve to prepare the way for the more definitive "account of everything" we find in fragment 17.[16] In this regard, to anticipate my fuller discussion in chapter IV, no doubt the most potent parallel for such a pattern is the relation between proem and doctrine in Parmenides' poem. In the proem to that work, it will be recalled, Parmenides relates his trip to a place beyond day and night, "far from the path of men" where a goddess instructed him on the nature of true being. It is those instructions, which we could more properly term a divine revelation, which constitute the following, and most important, doctrinal sections of the work. If the reconstruction I advocate is accurate, this is also what we have in Empedocles, where the doctrinal section, beginning with B 17, was advanced upon divine authority. The crucial distinction between Parmenides' proem and that of Empedocles would then be that, while Parmenides presented himself as the passive recipient of divine knowledge, Empedocles claimed to be himself a divine authority, the active possessor of some final truth about the world. This, I point out, has excellent textual support at B 23.11, from the simile of the painters, which Simplicius, *in Phys.*159.27, tells us was meant to illustrate B 17. The last line addresses the disciple directly, and enjoys him *to know these things full well, having heard the tale from a god*, θεοῦ πάρα μῦθον ἀκούσας. To this DK can only comment, in an embarrassed note: *wer ist gemeint? Emped. selbst (wie B 112.4) sicher nicht; die Muse wie B 3,3. 4,2?* But if we place these words in the sequence I have suggested, this muddle becomes perfectly intelligible. The line obviously refers to Empedocles, not the Muse, and shows him as he meant to present himself to the hearers of his poem.

3. Indirect Evidence for Empedocles' Proem: Sedley's Thesis

Beyond the opening lines from B 112 and the story of the *daimon*'s fall in B 115, there is little hard evidence for what can have preceded B 17. To be sure, with over 230 lines to fill, the exile of the *daimon* was probably not the exclusive subject of the proem, and it is rather likely that Empedocles covered other topics. These could have been part of a long proem, or we must speculate, despite the reasons advanced above, that other physical lore preceded B 17. Against the latter possibility is that we have no direct grounds to suggest what other cosmological doctrine could have preceded B 17, whereas the direct and indirect evidence does suggest a rather long proem.[17] To begin, a number of other fragments dealing with reincarnation and demon-lore, B 116–128, traditionally assigned to the *Katharmoi*, should now probably be assigned to the proem.[18] For, although they are without specific attributions, the consequence of transferring B 115 to the proem is that this becomes their most likely position. That is so, I believe, even if we need also keep in mind that the poem most likely interwove the religious and physical themes, and did not confine them to one place, as shown by *ensemble* **d**.

Secondly, we now have some indirect grounds to suggest that other material, previously of unknown location, should also be situated within the proem. In a 1989 article, and now in his *Lucretius*, David Sedley has made a good case for reading Lucretius' proem to the *De Rerum Natura* as a self-conscious imitation of Empedocles, in the tradition of Latin *aemulatio* of Greek canonical authors.[19] He does so, following others in this, most notably David Furley,[20] by pointing out a number of striking parallels and thematic links between the proem of the *De Rerum Natura* and passages from the fragments of Empedocles. Although concentrated in the proem, the evidence for this link also includes passages beyond it, notably the extensive praise showered upon Empedocles at the end of book I, lines 714–34, and the name of Empedocles' Muse, *Calliope*, which Lucretius applies to his Muse at VI 94. While the cumulative nature of his case allows for disagreement on individual parallels, the aggregate number of possible links should in my view carry conviction, so that we can be reasonably assured of Lucretius' intent to portray himself as Empedocles' Latin successor in the tradition of scientific didactic poetry.

Where Sedley's case is less convincing is his attempted reconstruction of the proem to Empedocles' poem on the basis of that identification, or rather the *Physics*, since he defends the division into two works, according to his own revision of the two-work hypothesis.[21] Sedley contends that in Lucretius' proem we can discern not only individual passages of Empedoclean inspiration, but also the actual structure of his Empedoclean model. In this I think his treatment is less successful. Although space precludes reviewing all the parallels Sedley suggests, and *a fortiori* a detailed critique of all relevant points, I will in what follows review some of the more interesting links proposed, and criticize them where need be. From Sedley's discussion I select four possible parallel themes for consideration: the hymn to Venus (1–43); the address to Memmius and the *semina rerum* (50–61); the sacrifice of Iphigeneia (80–101); the magnitude of Lucretius' poetic task (136–45).

a. The Hymn to Venus

Within the larger proem to the whole of the *De Rerum natura*, I 1–144, the opening hymn to Venus (1–43) is one of the most curious and debated passages in all of Lucretius.[22] In particular, Lucretius' choice of Venus as the very first subject for his scientific poem, his invocation of her to be the guiding spirit of his work, and his prayer that she intervene in human affairs to quiet the terrors of war, are all very difficult to assess in light of his devotion to Epicurean philosophy. As he himself tells us, perhaps immediately at 44–9,[23] the standard Epicurean doctrine regarding gods or the divine is that they are remote and do not concern themselves with human cares. Conversely, all three make perfect sense in an Empedoclean context.[24] For, among other functions, Empedocles' cosmic power Love, which he also calls Aphrodite or Kypris, perhaps also to be identified with both *Kalliopeia* (B 131.3) and his *much-courted white-armed virgin Muse* (B 3.3), was the author and Queen of a Golden Age of peace (B 128). On this basis, Sedley argues that Lucretius portrayed his relation to Venus as an analogue to Empedocles' relation to Aphrodite, and did so before a public discerning enough to recognize the allusion.[25] Reinforcing such an identification, and providing more direct evidence of Lucretius' desire to assume the poetic mantle of Empedocles, are the very Empedoclean effects contained in the ten opening lines of the hymn. As first shown by Furley (1970), whom Sedley follows on the point, Lucretius twice works a reference to the four elements into his description of the activity of Venus, detailing her relation to stars (fire) and sky (air), sea (water) and earth (earth). This of course is very reminiscent of the wanderings of the *daimon* in B 115, whose circuit includes all four large elemental masses, thus foreshadowing the doctrine of the four elements, but once again does not serve any further purpose in its Lucretian context.

For all the above reasons, therefore, Sedley conjectures that the proem to Empedocles' *Peri Phuseos*, beyond the story of the fall of the *daimones*, contained as well a hymn to Love.[26] As for its place in the work, he suggest that it most likely would have figured right at the beginning, as in its putative imitation, and thus before the exile of the *daimon*, according to the convention of invoking the Muses or a particular god at the beginning of a poetic work.[27]

Having expressed above my agreement with Sedley's general thesis, I think this the best place to explain my reservations about the further application of his conclusion to a reconstruction of the lost Empedoclean original. In particular, I worry about the soundness of Sedley's general approach. For it should be obvious enough almost to go without saying that, while the hymn to Venus does contain a very high ratio of overlap with Empedoclean themes, it does not follow from this that each individual parallel or allusion to Empedocles need have occupied the same respective position in the lost original. Indeed, how can Sedley reasonably exclude the possibility that Lucretius meant the hymn to Venus to be recognizably Empedoclean, but not necessarily an adaptation or partial translation of Empedocles' own proem? Even within the tradition of *aemulatio*, there is a wide enough spectrum of originality available to the Roman poet, and the new work need not be either a translation, or a Greek scheme with Roman accretions.[28] And as for the specific identity of Lucretius' hymn to Venus with its putative model, it is not the case that all of it can be understood as Empedoclean, or Empedoclean with a few Epicurean correctives and Roman modifications. For instance, there seems to be no specific Empedoclean or Epicurean precedent for the decidedly anthropomorphic and erotic description of Venus' lovemaking with Mars (31–40).[29] Nor does the scene itself seem particularly Roman—as opposed to the epithet *Aeneadum genitrix*. If one must venture a literary precedent, the scene is much more likely inspired from the bard Demodocus's tale of the love of Ares and Aphrodite in the *Odyssey* 8.267–366.[30]

Another difficulty is of course the complete loss of any corroborating ancient evidence for such an opening hymn, as opposed to that for the longer proem. On the contrary, for reasons advanced in chapter I, I think that the evidence would deny it as a possibility. (If this putative hymn possessed any of the literary merits of its putative imitation, more is the pity.) We do have, it is true, a short hymn to Love at B 17.20–26, and other Empedoclean passages furnish Greek epithets equivalent to the ones Lucretius applies to Venus, such as *alma*, or the phrase *hominum divuomque voluptas*, [31] but once again no other source allows us to verify the very existence of such a hymn. And if, as Sedley conjectures, both it and the address to Pausanias (see next section) occupied over two hundred lines, we can be somewhat surprised to find no traces of it in the relatively abundant doxography.[32]

Finally, against the general convention that an epic must be preceded by a hymn, Sedley seems to overlook the most potent parallel for Empedocles' proem, the proem to Parmenides' poem. Its force as a parallel must certainly be reckoned greater than the proem of Lucretius, not only because of the clear dependence of Empedocles upon Parmenides, but also because of the general difficulty of excluding other influences upon Lucretius than Empedocles, e.g. the Homeric hymn to Aphrodite. Although Parmenides' proem has clear ties to earlier traditions of divine inspiration, most notably Hesiod's meeting with the Muses, its abrupt beginning and description of Parmenides' conveyance to his meeting with the goddess does not allow for a more traditional (and stationary) hymn.[33] While this provides us with no positive information concerning the proem of Empedocles' poem, it certainly shows that an opening hymn was not an obligatory feature of archaic didactic poetry, as does also B 112, even on the two-work hypothesis. Given that much, I submit that the indirect evidence from Diogenes, suitably corrected via the single work hypothesis, allows B 112 to stand as a more than viable alternative to Sedley's opening hymn to Aphrodite.

b. The Address to Memmius and the *Semina Rerum* (50–61)

The next parallel adduced by Sedley is a comparison of Lucretius' address to Memmius and his outline of the content of book I with lines from fragment 17 of Empedocles. Rather than supporting his reconstruction, a comparison of the two passages tends to refute the possibility of employing Lucretius as a viable model for the *structure* of Empedocles' proem. To the extent that the two passages should be compared (and they should), the comparison shows Lucretius reusing material from several different lines and combining them in new ways. The most pertinent Lucretian lines in the passage are I 54–60:

> Nam tibi de summa caeli ratione deumque
> disserere incipiam et rerum primordia pandam,
> *unde omnis natura creet res auctet alatque*
> *quove eadem rursum natura perempta resolvat,*
> quae nos materiem et genitalia corpora rebus
> reddunda in ratione vocare et semina rerum
> appellare suemus et haec eadem usurpare
> corpora prima, quod ex illis sunt omnia primis.

For I shall begin to discourse to you upon the most high system of heaven and of the gods, and I shall disclose the first-beginnings of things, from which nature makes all things and increases and nourishes them, and into which the same nature again reduces them when dissolved—which, in discussing philosophy, we are accustomed to call matter, and bodies that generate things, and to entitle the same first bodies, because from them as first elements all things are. (trans. M. F. Smith, Loeb 1975/1992)

Sedley begins by pointing out the broad similarity of the address to Memmius in the preceding lines, 50–53, to Empedocles' address to Pausanias in B 1, and then compares the structure and vocabulary of lines 55–57 with the opening two lines of fragment 17. I give the first five lines of DK 17, as I also want to consider the next few lines (the lines singled out by Sedley are italicized in both passages):

> δίπλ' ἐρέω· τοτὲ μὲν γὰρ ἓν ηὐξήθη μόνον εἶναι
> ἐκ πλεόνων, τοτὲ δ' αὖ διέφυ πλέον' ἐξ ἑνὸς εἶναι.
> δοιὴ δὲ θνητῶν γένεσις, δοιὴ δ' ἀπόλειψις·
> τὴν μὲν γὰρ πάντων σύνοδος τίκτει τ' ὀλέκει τε,
> ἡ δὲ πάλιν διαφυομένων θρεφθεῖσα διέπτη.

I will tell a double tale. For at one time one alone grew to be out of many, but at another in turn from one [they] *grew apart to be more. And double is the generation of mortals, double their falling-away; for the communion of all things both begets and kills mortal life, and as* [*these things*] *grow apart again,* [*mortal life*] *is nurtured, then vanishes.*

In Lucretius, particularly reminiscent of the Empedoclean passage is the symmetry of the two opposite processes of growth and decay, described in two closely matched verses, 56–7. So far Sedley is entirely correct to compare the two. But if we scratch a little further beneath the surface, we can also observe how Lucretius modifies and even simplifies the original. In Empedocles, there is a more complex exploration of the apparently neutral value of either direction of each process, since death, or dissolution, is referred to as "growing-apart." By comparison, Lucretius presents a simpler and more intuitive life-death opposition. (Notable as well is the omission in Lucretius of the question of "one and many" a concern for Empedocles in his debate with Parmenides, but of relatively little importance to Lucretius.) That this play on the ambiguity of life and death in Empedocles is not an over-subtle reading is made clear by the fact that the point is taken up again and amplified in the convoluted double chiasmus of lines 4 and 5, detailing the creative and destructive consequences—for mortals—of the cosmic alternation of one and many.[34] In failing to notice this simplification, Sedley also misses how, in recasting the life-death motif, Lucretius borrows from the following lines in the Empedoclean passage. For when Lucretius abandons the complicated double chiasmus of his Greek model, in flattening it out into a simpler opposition, he also transfers to each line terms from the more developed contrast in Empedocles B 17.4–5. Thus, if in line 56 of Lucretius *auctet* seems to reproduce to ηὐξήθη from 17.1, *creet* seems to take up τίκτει or γένεσις from B 17.3 and 4, while *alat* recalls θρεφθεῖσα from B 17.5.[35] In turn, line fifty-seven's *rursum . . . resolvat* corresponds closely to πάλιν διαφυομένων, and *perempta, take away completely*, is close to B 17.3 ἀπόλειψις or again 17.5 διέπτη. Although asyndeton of the kind found in lines 56–7 is perfectly Lucretian, the close match between these polar opposites and those found in B 17 3–5 seems too strong for coincidence. It seems obvious that B 17. 3–5 have an equally legitimate claim to have served as an inspiration for the Lucretian passage. What this shows is that, even on a small scale, Lucretius is quite free in refashioning his model.

To reinforce the point, I consider one last plausible Empedoclean borrowing in the passage, the terms *genitalia corpora* or *semina rerum* which Lucretius uses of the atoms, but which recall rather Empedocles' roots, the ῥιζώματα πάντων (B 6).[36] Once again one must agree with Sedley in recognizing a probable debt to Empedocles, but the fact that it came from another fragment than 17, and that Lucretius omits the identification of the elements with various gods, as in B 6.2–3, discourages further inferences.

Far more damaging than this general methodological point, to conclude the consideration of this second parallel, is the obvious bad fit between the *absolute* position of each set of lines in their respective work. As I have already suggested, B 17, from lines 232 ff. of book I, is best understood as the beginning of the doctrinal part of Empedocles' poem, not as part of the proem. But since the lines occur in Lucretius as early as 55–56, only halfway into the proem of the *DRN*, this is a serious blow to the first half of Sedley's reconstruction. While he is right to point out that both passages are programmatic, and announce the basic theme of each work, I would suggest once again that Lucretius here re-uses Empedoclean material in a manner which, while it displays his poetic debt, nevertheless does not provide a key to the structure of his model.

c. The Sacrifice of Iphigenia

Despite these difficulties with Sedley's thesis, I can end my critique with a more positive appreciation of his contribution to the question. For if his contention that Lucretius' proem more or less faithfully reproduces that of Empedocles strains belief, we should not for all that overlook the genuine merit of many of the parallels he advances. Without speculating here upon their relative positions within the proem, it is possible to agree with Sedley far enough to grant that, for lack of any other evidence, the presence of similar passages in Lucretius' proem *may* indicate their having belonged to the proem of Empedocles' poem.

Of the topics Sedley proposes for what would have followed in the latter part of Empedocles' proem,[37] after the hymn to Love and the address to Pausanias, I single out two of the most impressive connections. At I 80–101, after praising Epicurus's intellectual achievement in breaking the fetters of religion, Lucretius illustrates the evils of religious superstition with a pathetic mythological example, the sacrifice of Iphigenia by Agamemnon. Although the actors are different, the horror of human sacrifice as an argument against religion, or what passes for it, is very similar to B 137. In that passage Empedocles denounces the dominant religious practice of animal sacrifice from the standpoint of his own belief in reincarnation, by showing family members unwittingly slaying their kin.[38] In Empedocles, the contrast is between true religion and its perversion in animal sacrifice, and its force as an example depends on the blurring of the boundary between the human and animal, human sacrifice being strongly implicit, but still only implicit. In Lucretius, the contrast is between the calm mind of the Epicurean sage and the crazed extremes of religious fanaticism, and the topic of human sacrifice is directly addressed. Although in this instance there are no strong verbal parallels between the two scenes, it is hard not to see in it a Lucretian remodelling of the original to Epicurean ends.

d. General Precepts

The final parallel I wish to consider is striking on its own, but also for the coherent sequence it (for once) may suggest in the Empedoclean model. At the end of his proem, before embarking upon the exposition of his atomic physics, Lucretius stresses the deficiencies of the Latin language and announces the principle that *nullam rem e nilo gigni . . . umquam* (150ff.). This resembles very much the group of Empedoclean fragments dealing with the negation of generation and absolute destruction (DK B 8–15, especially 12 to 14) and the resulting incorrectness of ordinary, mortal language. The only difference is Lucretius' specific imputation of deficiencies to Latin, as opposed to Empedocles' more general criticism of "ordinary mortal thought." The Empedoclean fragments, of which B 8 is attested by Aetius to have come from the book I of the *Physics*,[39] are usually placed before DK 17 because of the generality of their content and the way in which their Eleatic critique of generation prepares the hearer to better appreciate Empedocles' proposed solution in B 17. The Lucretian parallel therefore dovetails with what was already suspected on independent grounds, and here, if I may at last agree with Sedley, could well preserve traces of the transition between the two subjects.[40]

4. Proposed Reconstruction

The Extant Fragments and the Number of Lines

All of these considerations indicate that 232 lines is by no means an implausible length for the proem of the work Simplicius had before him, especially when one also takes into account Empedocles' grandiloquence and use of repetition. Based on the previous survey, and on the hypothesis of a single work, I can now propose a list of the fragments likely to have stood in Empedocles' proem, in their probable order. The table (next page) includes all of the fragments for which I believe there is a case for inclusion in the proem, grouped by theme.[41]

From table 3 it is possible to make a rough estimate of the fit of this reconstruction within the available space. Taking into account that the total number of 133 lines includes 29 of identifiably debatable status, and that certain fragments included here on thematic grounds could well have come from elsewhere, it is safe to infer that this final tally is probably somewhat high. Even on a conservative assessment, therefore, I would venture that the extant fragments represent less than half of the proem, which will have stood at around 232 lines. This leaves ample space for transitions between the extant material and reinforces the plausibility of the proposed reconstruction.

Table 3. Proposed Reconstruction of the Proem

Group by Theme	DK Number		Total lines
	Witness	Thematic	
Address to the "friends from Acragas"	112		12
	113		2
		114	3
Exile of the daimon, Description of the "cave" and of reincarnation	115		14
		116	1
		117	2
		118	1
		119	1
		120	1
		121	4
		122	4
		123	3
		125	1
		126	1
		129[a]	6
		135	2
Invective with plural addresses		124	2
		141	1
		144	1
		145	2
		136	2
		137	6
Address to the Muse and to Pausanias		3.1-5	5
		131[a]	4
		3.6-8	3
	1		1
Critique of mortal thought, Promises of things to come		2.8-9	1
		2.1-7	8
		111[a]	9
		110[a]	10
		11	3
		15	4
		4	3
Eleatic laws		12	3
		13	1
		14	1
		3.9-13	5
	Total number of lines 133		

No complete reconstruction of the proem, much less an edition, will be undertaken in what follows. The purpose of this section remains a general review of the evidence, devoted to pursuing any clues as to the probable location of fragments and to analysis of the context in which they are cited. A discussion of every single fragment will not be attempted, and I will make only occasional stops to mine richer veins of information. This must be so even though the resulting discussion, as I am painfully aware, will be quite uneven, but such is the nature of the evidence. Finally, only once this general outline has been traced will a unified interpretation of its meaning be attempted, a task to which I will devote the subsequent chapters of this study.

a. The Division by Addressees: Plural and Singular

If the opening section did in fact take the form of a public address to the Acragantines, as in the sequence B 112, 113, 114 and beyond, it is nevertheless the case that the great majority of fragments in the corpus are directed at an individual disciple, identified as Pausanias in B 1. There is no external evidence as to how the transition was handled, nor is it known if the "friends from Acragas" were dropped completely thereafter, or if they also figured later in the work. By B 17, circa 230 lines into book I, we find that a single disciple is addressed, who is never thereafter named in the extant material, and none of the following fragments whose location is known on external grounds has a plural addressee.[42] It seems therefore that the change of addressees occurred before B 17, with Pausanias continuing on as the work's exclusive addressee as far as book II at least.[43] One important result of postulating that the change of addressees occurred within the proem is the possibility of including within it fragments addressed to a single person, but which seem on other grounds to belong to the proem. Among these are fragments B 2 and 3 (probably in fact several fragments, see below) preserved by Sextus, B 110 and 111, and the collection of Eleatic-inspired statements, which DK prints as a set, B 8 to 15. Accordingly, I propose to divide the proem into two large halves, with those different addressees marking out the different sections.

b. The Fragments Addressed to Plural Addressees

i. The Address to the "Friends from Acragas"

The key fragment is B 112, as seen above. On the single work hypothesis, B 112 is the best candidate for the opening of the work, followed closely by B 113 according to Sextus *Adv. Math.* I, 302. If in turn B 115 served to explain and qualify Empedocles' initial claim to divinity at B 112.4, it must have then followed 112 and 113 fairly closely, as argued by Zuntz (1971), DK and others in their reconstructions of the *Katharmoi*, or by Osborne (1987) and Inwood (1992) on the single-work hypothesis. As also seen above, both passages share a concern with establishing Empedocles' superhuman status, no doubt as the foundation for the teachings that followed. Such as scheme, paralleled in Parmenides, indicates a concern with epistemology, or at least with establishing authority in the openings of both works. This, it should be noted, was recognized in antiquity, as can be seen by the attention shown it by Sextus Empiricus and the earlier sources he draws upon. For Empedocles specifically, Sextus argues that the claim to divinity in B 112.4 can be easily misunderstood by the layman, and mistaken for arrogance, but *that he who approaches the matter in a scientific frame of mind, will recognize that the view is generally a very old one, namely that like is known by like. . . .* Even more tellingly, Sextus goes on, after quoting B 109, to link the theme of purification and intellectual grasp of the divine: *He will comprehend that Empedocles called himself a god, because he alone, having kept his mind clean of evil and unmuddied, grasped by means of the god within* [i.e. his elemental composition] *the god without.*[44] This testimony, by invoking physics as the solution to the quest for divinity, proposes a "solution" to the riddle of B 112, which is a rival to the "solution" of B 115, and serves yet again to collapse the barrier between the two themes. Against the division of the corpus, Sextus or his source feels no need to explain why a riddle posed in one work, the *Katharmoi*, should have to be sought in another, the *Physics*, or even displays an awareness of the two putative works. This easy transition from the theme of divinity to natural science thus once again supports the single-work hypothesis, but it also confirms that B 112 preceded the doctrinal contents of the poem. It must have, if its shocking opening claim was so explained later on.

DK B 112 and the Subject of the Work

The opening sentence of B 112 is a greeting to the Acragantines who dwell on the citadel, and the very first word of the poem is "friends." The term is proleptic in the standard rhetorical sense of a preemptive qualification, which precludes others. Here the term is employed because of the obligation this qualification entails: as friends, they are required to listen to Empedocles' words.[45] Who these friends were, and if any special significance attaches to their association, it is impossible to know. In light of the subsequent eschatological material, KRS 313 suggests a Pythagorean *hetaireia*, but given the rhetorical function of the term, it could just as easily allow a much wider intended audience.

Beyond this overt rhetorical purpose, it seems natural to wonder, as the single-work hypothesis now invites us to do, if B 112 has any thematic ties to the main body of the work. For it is a regular feature of Greek epic, as found most famously in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, that the opening lines, or introit, contain an indication of the work's main subject. The *Iliad* is the story of the rage of Achilles, μῆνιν . . . Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος, and the *Odyssey*, more indirectly, announces itself to be the story of Ulysses's homecoming, by referring to

Ulysses, the ἄνδρα . . . πολύτροπον.[46] Here, according to the single-work hypothesis, the very first words of the poem are ὦ φίλοι. Does this suggest any link, direct or indirect, to the subject matter of Empedocles' poem? I think it does. Most obviously, the words ὦ φίλοι might well be an allusion to the ultimate importance of Φιλότης or Φιλίη in the poem. Love, Aphrodite, or Joy as she is variously called, B 17.24, is for Empedocles not only the force of harmony and good in the world, but she is also the probable divine patroness of his work, and certainly the key to his eventual liberation from his thralldom to Strife. Although the full significance of the term would only be apparent later, through hindsight, it seems reasonable to infer that ὦ φίλοι hints at the central thrust of the poem. Just as in the great epics upon which he patterned his own work, Empedocles had the opening words of his poem give some indication of its content, or at least its theme. For its content, although formulated in the garb of the great epics, was almost entirely novel.

The Fictional Setting

The setting of B 112 is apparently an address to Empedocles' friends in Acragas, but the situation is not entirely clear. Zuntz argued that Empedocles was not physically present, given the detail with which he describes his attire and manner, and the adulation that follows him wherever he goes. Even KRS follows him in this, against their earlier judgment.[47] Against that view I raise three considerations. First, the ethos of the address is unmistakably meant to evoke a vivid dramatic speech, with rhetorical questions (B 113, 136), and exclamations (B 114, 124) mixed with violent self-accusation (B 115). Second, the resulting fictional setting for the work, a sort of open letter in hexameter verse, is something unheard of for the period.[48] Zuntz's alleged parallel with Pindar's third Pythian is not valid because, within that genre, the composer and performer(s), whether as soloist or chorus, are recognized as potentially distinct.[49] Here, within the *fictional* setting of the work, who but Empedocles are we to imagine is speaking? And if so, then why presume he addresses the Acragantines from afar? The standard fictional situation in didactic works is that the addressee (as distinct from the dedicatee, although they may be the same) is present before the teacher, at least for those passages where he is directly addressed, for instance Perses in the *Works and Days*, Cyrnus in Theognis, Parmenides and his goddess, or even Pausanias, in the passages traditionally ascribed to the *Physics*. The single-work hypothesis, if adopted, of course powerfully reinforces this last point. Third, the excessive description of the obvious we find in B 112, which was the essence of Zuntz's objection, is readily explainable in terms of the need to set the scene at the opening of the work. It serves to identify the location and characterize Empedocles for the hearers, at the same time glorifying the poet's home city.[50] If anything, the specificity of the address betrays the intention to reach a wider audience, and thus indicates the Panhellenic status to which Empedocles aspired for his poem.

Such considerations lead me, in the wake of Osborne and Inwood, to think that B 112 was the opening passage of the work, and that the fictional context of the work's opening was an oration delivered at Acragas by Empedocles himself.

Empedocles' Authority Matches that of Parmenides' Goddess

Having thus shown the viability of B 112 as the opening of the poem, and attempted to clarify the fictional setting of that fragment, I can now offer some more specific considerations as to its function. Here it is well known that Empedocles' work, despite its clear poetic and doctrinal debts to Parmenides, is by and large a reply to the elder thinker's teachings, which Parmenides had represented in his poem as a divine revelation granted to him by a goddess. Empedocles' intent to challenge Parmenides is displayed most conspicuously at B 17.26, σὺ δ' ἄκουε λόγου στόλον οὐκ ἀπατηλόν, *but you, listen to my array of words which does not deceive*, in which Empedocles, borrowing a phrase from Parmenides, directly contradicts the goddess's deprecation of cosmology as a deceitful array of words, 8.51–2: δόξας δ' ἀπὸ τοῦδε βροτείας/ μάνθανε κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀκούων, *but from this point on begin to learn mortal opinions, listening to the deceitful array of my words.*

Considered in this respect, it is hard not to be struck by the high degree of counterbalancing, indeed of almost symmetrical counterpoint, which the fictional setting of B 112 presents in relation to the fictional situation found in Parmenides. Most conspicuously, as critics had noted even before the viability of the single-work hypothesis, Empedocles inverts the teacher-pupil relation found in Parmenides.[51] In Parmenides' poem, Parmenides is the mortal recipient of a goddess's teachings. Empedocles, however, as himself a god (B 112.4 or B 23.11) is the authority for his teachings, while Pausanias and the friends from Acragas are the mortal recipients of his divine revelation. But that is not all: there is also an inversion in the settings and spatial relations of the agents in both poems. While Parmenides rode a chariot beyond Night and Day, far from the beaten track of men, where he was greeted by a goddess (B 1.26: χαῖρ(ε)), Empedocles the god travels from outside, back into the community (B 112.4 χαίρετ(ε)).[52] While Parmenides the mortal had to reach the ends of the world to find true persuasion, Empedocles' persuasion leaps into the breasts of mortal men, ἐπὶ φρένα πίστιος ὁρμή (114.3), right in the midst of human life and activity. In all three instances, where Parmenides seems to imply that truth and the divine must be sought beyond humanity, Empedocles stresses the reintegration of truth and the divine to the human community and to man himself.[53] All of these oppositions, I submit, cannot be coincidences; they surely are the counterparts, on the level of claims to authority, of Empedocles' doctrinal opposition to Parmenides.

ii. *The Exile of the Daimon and Related Fragments*

For this section, the anchor upon which the rest hangs is B 115. Based on our knowledge of B 115's location, we are at liberty to fill out the story of the *daimon*'s fall by the addition of fragments usually ascribed to the *Katharmoi*. The reconstructions put forth by Zuntz in his edition of the *Katharmoi* (1971), or Wright in her edition (1981), are both serviceable attempts to reconstitute a coherent narrative,[54] and as such are still of use, provided it is also understood that in *ensemble* **d** of the papyrus, and the new context it provides for B 139, we now have good evidence that not all such "religious" material was confined to the proem. In the first place, *ensemble* **d**, with its predominantly zoogonic subject matter, probably does not belong there, but perhaps to book II.[55] Second, the swift transition between eschatology and scientific cosmology in *ensemble* **d** most likely indicates that such abrupt shifts also occurred elsewhere. For whether **d 10** indicates a promise to return later on to the topic of the afterlife, as suggested by Sedley (see Osborne (2000) 336 n. 9), or refers the hearer back to B 62, as M-P contend, 309, in either case this shows that the fragments dealing with metempsychosis and like topics did not all belong to the proem. Even though for most of these a location in the proem remains most likely, *faute de mieux*, it cannot simply be assumed that the proem is their only possible home. Perhaps the only exception to this rule of thumb is the material dealing with the "Golden Age of Love," i.e. B 128–130. If, as suggested above 20–22, book III did indeed deal with the nature of the divine and the origin of cult, that seems to provide positive evidence for not for placing those fragments in the proem.

iii. *Invective with Plural Addressees*

Within the material likely to have stood before B 17, not all of which is "religious," I have suggested that the fragments addressed to plural addressees should be considered a distinct class, and have done so largely on the basis of external evidence. Now, on internal grounds, I propose to further subdivide the fragments with plural addressees into two halves. My basis for suggesting this is the notable difference in tone between Empedocles' largely conciliatory opening in B 112 and 113, and the much harsher tenor of B 124, 141, etc. The addressees themselves are presumably still the friends from Acragas, but against them Empedocles now aims some very strident invective. The main target of his censure is the tradition of ritual sacrifice and meat eating, which according to the Orphic/Pythagorean outlook expressed in B 115 are tantamount to cannibalism. The link between the two is particularly clear in B 136 and 137, the first with its direct charge of cannibalism, the second with its pathetic scene of a *pater familias* slaying a farm animal, in fact his reincarnated son, both preserved by Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* IX 127–129. If the addressees in this section are the same as the friends from Acragas, this would probably rule out recognizing them as members of a Pythagorean *hetaireia*, for it is not likely that they would be active participants in either ritual sacrifice or meat-eating. As for the relative position of the fragments within the broader group of "religious" material, such vehement condemnations only make sense by contrast with, and thus following upon, an account of metempsychosis. Accordingly, I would place this invective after B 115 and the passages relating Empedocles' multiple lives, B 116–126.[56]

iv. *Two Parallels from Lucretius: B 137 and 129*

In addition to those considerations, two parallels from Lucretius increase the likelihood for location in the proem of B 137 and 129. The first B 137, has already been discussed above, where following others I noted its resemblance to the sacrifice of Iphigeneia in Lucretius. If we seek further specifics concerning its location, thematic ties link it to the invective Empedocles directs to plural addressees.

The other fragment, B 129, which I omitted from my critique of Sedley's thesis, praises the feats of an unnamed intellectual hero, probably Pythagoras.[57] Both Furley and Sedley have rightly compared it to Lucretius' praise of Epicurus at *De Rerum Natura* I 62–79.[58] In Lucretius, as in Empedocles, the identity of the hero is not stated, although Lucretius is marginally more forthcoming in volunteering the term *Graius homo*. The silence on this point in both passages, it seems, is meant to be puzzling, but each is also a meant to voice a claim to a certain tradition. In the case of both authors, the identity of each tradition may have been immediately apparent to the *cognoscenti*, to others perhaps only through hindsight as they read on. In any case, as far as the possible location of B 129 is concerned, if it was meant to signal the author's intellectual allegiances, then one likely place for such a claim would be at the outset of the work, as in Lucretius.[59] Beyond that, there is little to go on if we wish to establish its position with more accuracy, and thematic considerations only suggest a place among the fragments describing the exile of the *daimon*.

c. Fragments with a Single Addressee

The material likely to have stood in the proem after the change to a single addressee is thematically more varied than the previous fragments, but at the same time more difficult to disentangle. At the very least one can recognize among the candidates: an address to Pausanias (B 1), an address to the Muse (B 3), promises to the disciple of things to come (B 110, 111), criticisms of ordinary mortal thought (B 2, 4 and 8 to 15), and statements of Eleatic inspiration, laws describing the nature of the world (B 12, 13, 14). Because of the greater variety of material in this section, it will prove necessary to divide the work of reconstruction into two phases. Before attempting a general reconstruction of the second half of the proem, I will focus instead upon fragments and their contexts in quotation, with attention to any clues about location provided by the sources of the fragments. The question of the probable general order for the whole second half of the proem can then be dealt with separately, by way of conclusion.

i. B 1: The Address to Pausanias

Diogenes (VIII 60), relying on Aristippus and Satyrus, says that Empedocles dedicated the *Peri Phuseos* i.e. the physical lore, to Pausanias, and quotes B 1 (through them) in support of this. The fact that Pausanias is named only here in the extant fragments, including his patronymic, while elsewhere he is only addressed as a second person singular pronoun,[60] would tend to indicate that this was the first mention of him.[61] The specific verb Diogenes uses, προσπεφώνηκεν, has the primary meaning *addressed*, and that is why DK makes it the first fragment of the *Physics*. However, the term also carries the more technical sense of *dedicated* (LSJ s.v. II 1). On the single-work hypothesis, where one must recognize at least two different sets of addressees, this technical sense can be invoked to allow that while Pausanias was the poem's sole dedicatee, he was not necessarily its sole addressee. Indeed, the specific form of address, Παυσανίη, σὺ δὲ . . . with a postponed δέ, of itself may imply the presence of another addressee.[62] This, however, is not a hard and fast rule, and could as easily indicate a change of topics.[63] In either case, the single line contains evidence of a transition of some sort, and Empedocles often uses such addresses, as did Hesiod before him, to negotiate a passage to another topic. The close link, discussed above, between the plural addressees and the material dealing with reincarnation, itself relying upon Plutarch's testimony to the position of B 115, means that B 1 most likely came after that material, admittedly quite a way into the proem.[64]

ii. DK B 2 and 3: The Critique of Mortal Knowledge and the Address to the Muse

The probable location of B 2 and 3 in the proem of either the *Physics* or the single work is something upon which all modern editions agree, and needs no defense. Indeed the content of both passages, including an analysis of the shortcomings of normal mortal understanding (B 2), the address to the Muse, and the injunctions directed to the disciple (B 3) makes their most natural location a position before the doctrinal sections of the poem. This does not mean, however, that these fragments have always been properly understood, or that proper attention has been paid to their transmission.[65] Notably, these two fragments have not fared well under the two-work hypothesis. To show this, and because of their special relevance to my thesis, I will consider them with greater detail than most other fragments in my reconstruction.

The Context in Sextus Empiricus

In his history of criterion of truth (book I of *Against the Logicians* or *Adv. Mathematicos* VII) Sextus Empiricus reviews various doxographic interpretations of the κριτήριον ἀληθείας according to earlier philosophers. Sextus first mentions Empedocles in paragraph 115, one part of a longer section devoted to the thinkers who assume that that all cognition is through the senses, on the principle that "like perceives like." There Sextus tells us that, since Empedocles postulated six first principles, and assumed that like perceives like, he must have thought there were six criteria. After briefly including Democritus and Plato in this group (116–120), he returns to Empedocles in paragraph 121, and illustrates this claim by citing B 109 "*through earth we see earth, water, water*, etc."

But, as we next learn, Sextus also knows another interpretation of Empedocles' epistemology. At paragraph 122 he tells us: "There were others who said that, according to Empedocles, the criterion of truth was not the senses, but ὀρθὸς λόγος, *right reason*, of which there exists a divine and a mortal kind. Of these, the divine kind is inexpressible, the limited expressible." It is in the context of reporting this interpretation that Sextus excerpts as supporting evidence two quotations (B 2 and 3), from what he tells us is a continuous passage. It is unclear if Sextus is excerpting the fragments directly from Empedocles, or perhaps from a longer quotation in his source. The former would be a natural assumption, except that in B 3 Sextus mistakenly strings together an address to the Muse (3.1–5) and an address to the disciple (3.6–13), so that he is more likely depending on an intermediary.[66] Although Sextus does not here disclose the source or sources (*others who* . . .) whom he is following, Blank has suggested, in his recent commentary on *Against the Grammarians*, that "the ultimate source of all this material may have been a Posidonian doxography, whose traces may be seen in the importance it accords to 'right reason.'"[67]

Whatever its ultimate origin, Sextus' interpretation of Empedocles' epistemological presuppositions is at best partial, for the passages quoted in its support do not fit very closely the general scheme it proposes. As such, this is a good instance of a set of "embedded texts."[68] More than is usual, here we can see that the fragments are being given a different meaning by their new context. In this case, Empedocles' words are in fact being refracted through the distorting lenses of *two* later philosophies. Sextus' source (or sources) quoted them to support an interpretation according to the epistemology of "right reason," while Sextus himself makes use of that later interpretation, apparently because he wants to see in it a contradiction between B 2 and 3 on the issue of the validity of the senses. In arguing for this alleged inconsistency Sextus is engaging in a polemical refashioning of the material to his own skeptical ends. He is also, mostly likely, not doing so from the original, but via his source, whom for lack of a more accurate term I propose to call Stoic.

B 2: The Critique of Mortal Thought

Sextus begins with B 2, quoted to support the idea that the criterion is not to be found in the senses. The last lines, B 2.7–8, are the most important for him:

> οὔτως οὔτ᾽ ἐπιδερκτὰ τάδ᾽ ἀνδράσιν οὔτ᾽ ἐπακουστά
> οὔτε νόῳ περιληπτά.

Thus these things are neither to be gazed at by men, nor heard, nor grasped by the mind.

Having thus "shown" that, according to Empedocles, the criterion is not to be found in the senses, Sextus then quotes another line and a half, B 2.8–9, through which, he claims, his source sought to refine Empedocles' epistemology. This source glossed B 2.8–9 as implying that, according to Empedocles, "truth is not altogether unattainable, but is attainable as far as mortal thought can reach." (VII 124) Sextus, presumably through his source, tells us that the verse and a half followed B 2.1–8, which breaks off in mid-verse: διασαφεῖ τοῖς προκειμένοις ἐπιφέρων, *he clarifies [his meaning] by adding to the earlier lines. . . .* Because the meter permits using the first half-verse of the second passage to complete line 8, some editors read the two as a single fragment, as in DK, but more recent editors, e.g. Wright # 1; Inwood, *Poem* # 2, separate the two. I think they are correct to do so. As found in the best MSS of Sextus, the lines are:

> σὺ δ᾽ οὖν, ἐπεὶ ὧδ᾽ ἐλιάσθης,
> πεύσεαι· οὐ πλεῖόν γε βροτείη μῆτις ὄρωρεν.

The lines are not that difficult, but have been much misunderstood. Wright and Bollack, for instance, understand the passage to mean that Empedocles is here describing his teachings as mortal: *mortal understanding has certainly advanced no further*, scil. than my mortal teachings.[69] In this they were reacting to DK, who, following Karsten (1838) and Stein (1852), were uncomfortable with such a reading and emended πλεῖόν γε to πλέον ἤ, which would give: *you will certainly not learn more than mortal intelligence has achieved.* This, it was thought, was supported by B 3.7 where Empedocles enjoins his Muse (or the disciple, see below) "not to speak more than is holy." But if that is so, what are we then to make of Empedocles' claims to superhuman status in B 112 and 115? And if that is apt to seem too controversial for some, one can at least wonder how this supposed mortal truth relates to the divine kind of truth which is mentioned by Sextus' source.

I suggest another approach. Empedocles, speaking as a god, tells his disciple, *but you, since you have turned away thus* (i.e. *to me*),[70] *you shall learn. Mortal intelligence certainly rises no higher.*[71] The lines are a compliment to Pausanias, and not an aside by Empedocles, or a comment upon his own teachings. In other words, Empedocles is claiming that Pausanias has reached the peak of mortal learning, but must find divine assistance to proceed further, cf. Parmenides B 1.3, where Parmenides is already *a man who knows*, εἰδότα φῶτα, before he meets the goddess. This is the only way sense can be made of the distinction between mortal and divine understanding advanced by Sextus' Stoic source, for only that way do we have a contrast between a limited but still positive mortal understanding, and something greater. The impression that the βροτείη μῆτις in question must be Empedocles' relies on the unproved assumption that these lines followed immediately upon the rest of the fragment. If that were so, then we would have stronger grounds to think that the understood object of this mortal knowledge would be the neuter plurals in the previous lines. As it is, the only certain context for this mortal knowledge is an address to Pausanias, so that the mortal intelligence in question may in fact be his, cf. Sextus' term ὁ ἀνθρώπινος λόγος, *human reason.* What appears to have confused modern commentators more than anything else is the relatively positive appreciation Empedocles here makes of normal human understanding, as opposed to his more critical evaluation of it elsewhere. But if we understand this as a compliment to the good will of Pausanias, we can avoid a more difficult clash with Empedocles' otherwise consistent claim to superhuman knowledge.

That Empedocles himself spoke as the divine authority for his own poem, I have already argued on the basis of B 112, 115, and more strongly B 23.11, θεοῦ πάρα μῦθον ἀκούσας, but the claim can be further reinforced. First, I note that in B 2.1–6, Empedocles castigates the mortals who mistakenly think they have found the 'whole' when this whole in fact only corresponds to their own limited experience (cf. the very same criticism in DK B 39.3, where many mouths vainly issue forth untruths, the mouths themselves being described as ὀλίγον τοῦ παντὸς ἰδόντων, *knowing very little of the whole.*). On that analysis, the typical shortcoming of mortal understanding is to mistake the part for the whole, which in turn implies that divine understanding must grasp this whole. Now it is surely not accidental that in B 17/**a** (**i**) 8, B 21.9 and B 23.10 Empedocles asserts the capacity of the first principles to generate "all things" (strictly, B 23.10 speaks of all mortals). This, I suggest, is easily enough translated into an epistemological claim: teachings that can give an account of all things do succeed in grasping "the whole." Second, Empedocles' claim to divine or superhuman knowledge can be verified from other doxographic evidence. Beyond the passage currently under discussion, where Sextus links Empedocles to divine truth, in *Against the Grammarians* 302–303 Sextus quotes B 109 in order to justify Empedocles' claim to divine status in B 112. 4, not as an idle boast, but as based upon a deeper understanding of his elemental, hence divine composition.[72] More explicitly, if much later, Proclus mentions Empedocles in his commentary on the *Timaeus* (*Comm in Tim.* in 29d,

p. 351 ed. Diehl). Discussing the narrator Timaeus' disclaimer at 29d, where he characterizes his physics as merely human or only plausible, Proclus commends such precaution, and contrast it with Heraclitus, Empedocles and the Stoics, whom he groups together as divine dogmatists, i.e. people who claimed unmediated access to truth itself. Since, moreover, Proclus supports this claim by quoting B 3.8, he as well, albeit perhaps at some distance, may be relying on the same Stoic source as Sextus.

It remains to say a few words on the general meaning of B 2 and 3. Here, provided that we understand Empedocles as having spoken from divine, not merely personal authority, the standard reading of these lines in modern scholarship seems correct: the two fragments articulate Empedocles' refusal to choose either the senses or reason, *nous*, to the exclusion of the other. This is most explicit in B 3.5–8, where he instructs the disciple to place *no more trust* in one sense than the other (reading πιστήν at B 3.10, after Fränkel) but further reinforced at B 2.7–8, where he includes "grasping with the mind" alongside the senses, as one of the means whereby the disciple could follow his teachings. In light of B 3, I would read B 2.7–8 as at least a partial response to the goddess's injunction, in Parmenides B 7, to follow reason alone in the quest for truth.[73] Instead of championing the senses against *nous*, and choosing the other branch of a "senses versus mind" dichotomy, Empedocles ought rather to be understood as refusing to honor the dichotomy. (To use modern jargon, I think that he was a coherentist.) As for the sources of B 2 and B 3, it appears that the earlier, possibly Stoic, source was closer to the truth than Sextus. Against the more sympathetic, if anachronistic, treatment of Empedocles' epistemology by the first source, Sextus thought that Empedocles' views on the status of human knowledge—and its dependence on sense-perception—were open to a charge of contradiction.[74] But as I hope to have shown, this contradiction is merely apparent, and predicated upon a misreading of B 2.7–8, where Empedocles does not reject either the senses or reason completely, but merely the status of either as final and authoritative, to the exclusion of the other.

Further Problems with Sextus' Testimony

Concerning the exact position and direct function of B 2 and 3 in the proem, matters are more complicated. Sextus quotes B 3, which he tells us followed B 2, so as to point out what he sees as a contradiction in Empedocles over the status of the senses as sources of knowledge. But B 3 itself is only in part concerned with that question, namely B 3.9–13, and it is difficult to see how B 3.1–8 bear upon it. Further complicating the issue is the need to recognize two different addressees within B 3. As pointed out by DK, or later Wright, B 3.1–5 are addressed to the gods and Empedocles' Muse, but the injunctions that follow, B3.9–13 seem more appropriate as an address to Pausanias.[75] For if it is possible to conceive of Empedocles telling his Muse in B 3.6–8 not to "say more than is holy" and thereby seek to *épater les bourgeois*, it is more difficult to accept his injunctions to "look" and "understand" (B 3.9 and 13 respectively) as meant for anyone else than the disciple.[76]

All of this points to some confusion on Sextus' part, which is difficult to explain as simple textual corruption or deliberate omissions.[77] Instead, it seems just as likely, if not slightly more so, that in both cases Sextus has either been misled by his sources, or is freely combining separate excerpts from them. Accordingly, I am more skeptical than most editors have been of Sextus' testimony concerning the unity and relative order of these passages. Some common thematic link between what, following Wright, I will consider separate fragments is nevertheless visible, since both passages can be read as an appeal to self-mastery or restraint. In B 3.1–5, this is takes the form of a prayer to the gods and an address to the Muse, whereas B 3.6–8, if read continuously with what precedes, contains a warning to either the Muse or the disciple on the dangers of cultivating the adulation of the masses. As such, both seem to have some tenuous link to Sextus' comment that, according to Empedocles, the senses do have some credibility, "provided reason is in control of them" (see note 74 for text). The comment certainly does not find any obvious application in the fragment. Probably Sextus' Stoic source was more explicit on the issue, perhaps reading into Empedocles' call for restraint an identity, as *logos*, of the individual's rational controlling faculty and the divine. Whatever the case, rather than cling to Sextus' testimony, it seems more prudent to consider the fragment in however many separate parts clarity and intelligibility require.

DK B 3.1–5 and B 131: The Address to the Muse

The first part of the fragment, B 3.1–5, is an appeal to the gods and the Muse, meant to indicate a transition between subjects. This is likely not only on internal grounds, but also for the reason that B 3.3–5,

> καὶ σέ, πολυμνήστη λευκώλενε παρθένε Μοῦσα
> ἄντομαι, ὧν θέμις ἐστὶν ἐφημερίοισιν ἀκούειν,
> πέμπε παρ' Εὐσεβίης ἐλάουσ' εὐήνιον ἅρμα.

and you, white-armed, much-remembering virgin Muse, I beseech you, send to me the things which are lawful for creatures of a day to hear, driving your well-reined chariot from the halls of Piety.[78]

may be compared to Bacchylides V 176–8:

> λευκώλενε Καλλιόπα
> στᾶσον εὐποίητον ἅρμα
> αὐτοῦ·

White-armed Calliope, stay here your well-built chariot

While both the metaphor of the "chariot of the Muse" and the epithet "white-armed" are commonplaces, their combination in both passages is something of a coincidence.[79] Even more striking is that the Muse *Calliope* in Bacchylides occurs as well in Empedocles B 131 (as also in Lucretius VI 94), and thus suggests linking B 3.1–5 with B 131.[80] Whether Bacchylides influenced Empedocles cannot be proven, but the question at least deserves to be raised. More assuredly, the parallel from Bacchylides supports ascribing a similar function to the Empedoclean passage: as in Bacchylides, where the address to the Muse indicates a transition from narrative myth back to prayer and praise of the victor, so here, as was already evident on internal grounds, we can be confident that the passage marks a transition of some kind.[81]

Indeed, to consider now the first lines, the passage begins with Empedocles exclaiming *but gods, turn my tongue away from their madness, and from holy mouths channel a pure stream.* We do not know whose madness is meant, and Sextus' suggestion that he is *criticizing those who claim they know more* (VII 124) is probably inferred from B 3.7 rather than from knowledge of the passage's original context. Diels (1901 p. 107) tentatively suggested Parmenides, but the term μανίη, *madness* seems far too strong for the man to whom Empedocles' thought owed so much, beyond the fact that the plural genitive requires at least two individuals. Also, the characterization by Empedocles of what preceded as madness, and the vocabulary of purification invoked to dispel its effects (holy mouths, pure spring) points to a more specific, stronger transgression than the everyday foolishness of ordinary men.[82] The obvious candidate, I suggest, must be Empedocles' greatest abomination, ritual sacrifice. Although there is no way of proving, first, that the passage that preceded it has survived among our fragments, or second, that any one surviving fragment is the only valid candidate, the passage that would best suit this hypothesis is clearly B 137. That fragment, depicting a father unwittingly sacrificing his reincarnated son, constitutes Empedocles' most vehement attack against blood sacrifice, a target that would well deserve the name μανίη.[83] As seen above, moreover, the parallelism between it and the sacrifice of Iphigeneia in Lucretius independently argues for B 137's place in the proem. In light of all this, I suggest placing B 3.1–5 after B 137 and thus before B 2, despite Sextus' notice that B 3 followed B 2.8–9.[84]

I can now consider the possible link between B 3 and B 131, of which I give the first three lines:

εἰ γὰρ ἐφημερίων ἕνεκέν τινος, ἄμβροτε Μοῦσα,
ἡμετέρας μελέτας <ἅδε τοι> διὰ φροντίδος ἐλθεῖν,
εὐχομένωι νῦν αὖτε παρίσταο, Καλλιόπεια . . .[85]

For, immortal Muse, if for the sake of any among mortals [it ever pleased you] that our concerns should cross your mind, stand now by me in my prayer, Calliope . . .

As pointed out above, the presence together in Bacchylides of the chariot of the Muse, the epithet white-armed, and the name Kalliope, the last of which occurs here, suggest a link between B 3.1–5 and B 131. Further, both Bacchylides and Empedocles B 131 make reference to mortals as *creatures of a day*, while Wright in turn has shown the possibility of linking both passages into a continuous sequence, one which conforms to the traditional pattern of a ὕμνος κλητικός.[86] This pattern would be: in B 3.1–5, Empedocles calls on the Muse to set out from the home of Piety, whereas in B 131 he specifies the final destination of her outing, and beckons her to his side.[87]

A potential objection to this arrangement is the contention that the term ἡμετέρας μελέτας *our concerns*, contains a reference by Empedocles to another work or passage. It would thus belong, on the two-work hypothesis, to another poem or, on the single-work hypothesis, further into the work.[88] Against this Wright has argued that the reference is simply to the Muse's general care for mortals in the past, which Empedocles calls on her to renew.[89]

Perhaps a further, albeit inconclusive, consideration in favor of placing B 131 alongside B 3 is that there appears to be some evidence that both sources, Sextus, who quotes B 3, and Hippolytus, *Ref.* VII 31.3–4, the source of B 131, are to some degree relying upon similar doxographic material. Sextus, I have suggested, is probably dependent upon a Stoic source, whereas Hippolytus comes at Empedocles via a Middle-Platonist source, as his talk of the intelligible world of Love shows.[90] Still, Hippolytus' talk of the Muse as an allegory for δίκαιος λόγος, *just reason* as a divine helpmate to Love, does recall to some extent the divine and inexpressible component of the ὀρθὸς λόγος from Sextus' Stoic source. Of course no solid inferences can be made in such obscure matters, but there do seem to be some common elements in both authors' allegorizing the Muse into a type of *logos* doctrine.[91]

All told, despite some serious misgivings, I am not entirely convinced by Wright's reconstruction, and prefer to reserve judgment.

B 3.6–8: Pausanias or the Muse?

The second half of B 3, lines 6–13, is unevenly transmitted, but appears to be divisible into two or three sections. The last five lines stand together, are reasonably free of difficulties, and can be reviewed first. They address the disciple, and warn him to keep all of his means of perceiving/understanding open and receptive. This clarifies somewhat the prescriptions of B 2.7–8, while the length of the warning points to the doctrinal significance of what followed. In light of the obvious problems with the unity of B 3, I would advocate a location for them apart from what precedes in Sextus.[92]

The remaining lines, B 3.6–8, are replete with difficulties, which are best appreciated by looking at the text directly. Three sources provide us with a text. Sextus is the main authority, but B 3.6–7 are quoted also by Clement of Alexandria, and line 8 by Proclus.[93] The DK text is as follows:

μηδέ σέ γ' εὐδόξοιο βιήσεται ἄνθεα τιμῆς
πρὸς θνητῶν ἀνελέσθαι, ἐφ' ὧ θ' ὁσίης πλέον εἰπεῖν
θάρσεϊ—καὶ τότε δὴ σοφίης ἐπ' ἄκροισι θοάζειν.

Nor will you ever be compelled to take the flowers of well-seeming honor from mortals, on the condition that you say more than is holy, rashly—and then to throne on the peaks of wisdom (?).

Given the poor state of preservation of the lines in Sextus, the text in DK is more than usual the product of editorial decisions. Some of these are obviously correct and need only be noted. In line B 3.7, ἐφ' ὧ θ' ὁσίης is found in Clement, and is better than the garbled ἐφωθοείης from the MSS of Sextus. More debatable is DK' s interpretation of θάρσεϊ as a dative of manner, and the rest of the line as an infinitive clause dependent upon the indicative future βιήσεται. In particular, θοάζει is the MS reading in both Sextus and Proclus, while the ν is a modern supplement. Proclus, moreover, who quotes most of that line, has καὶ τάδε τοι σοφίης ἐπ' ἄκροισι θοάζει. This might support separating θάρσεϊ off as not syntactically linked to the main part of the line, as in DK, but then again it could be taken to reinforce a less convoluted construction with two imperatives, which would only require emending θοάζει to θόαζε. The imperative θάρσει, moreover, is a far more common epic expression, while following Proclus' text avoids the harsh syntactic break after the first foot as in DK's text. I return to this line below.

Perhaps the two most serious problems remain the identity of σέ and the function of εὐδόξοιο . . . ἄνθεα τιμῆς as either the subject of βιήσεται, or the direct object of ἀνελέσθαι in the infinitive clause. I begin with the pronoun, although the solutions to both difficulties are not readily separable. Concerning the pronoun, the two obvious candidates for its antecedent are the Muse and Pausanias. The case is difficult precisely because there are good reasons for choosing either of the two, and both have their champions.[94] In favor of the Muse there is the context from Sextus, and that the individual in question is forced to *speak more than is holy*, B 3.7. This might marginally be applicable to Pausanias, but according to B 5 Empedocles expected him στεγάσαι φρενὸς ἔλλοπος εἴσω, *to conceal (my teachings?) in your silent mind*, to which we can compare B 110.1–2, where quiet meditation seems meant. Perhaps the two amount to the same thing, but there does seem to be a mismatch between the requirement of total silence on the one hand, and mere avoidance of certain topics on the other. In favor of Pausanias there is the continuation of the passage, B 3.9–13, which clearly applies to the disciple, but not to the Muse, and the odd familiarity with which Empedocles would be addressing her, by contrast to the more humble tone in B 3.2–5 and B 131.

Without any confirmation of the lines' context, I suspect that no consensus will be possible. My own opinion is that B 3.6–7 are more suitably addressed to the Muse, while B 3.8 remains a more difficult case to determine. Regarding B 3 6–7, my grounds for thinking so are mostly philological, that is to say comparative. More specifically, two passages from Parmenides may be able to throw some light on these lines.

One apparent inspiration for the first two lines of the passage is Parmenides B7.3–5, spoken by the goddess to Parmenides:

μηδέ σ' ἔθος πολύπειρον ὁδὸν κατὰ τήνδε βιάσθω
νωμᾶν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἠχήεσσαν ἀκουήν
καὶ γλῶσσαν . . .

But let not much-tried habit force you down this way, to wield an unseeing eye and a resounding ear and tongue . . .

The opening words and the main verb are the same in both passages (the verb in Empedocles is a future indicative, an imperative in Parmenides) and in both passages we find a dependent infinitive clause in the following line. In terms of syntax, this seems undoubtedly to have been Empedocles' model.[95] Because of this, there is reason to prefer construing εὐδόξοιο . . . ἄνθεα τιμῆς as the subject of βιήσεται, rather than the object of ἀνελέσθαι, at least if that means that the verb is left without an expressed subject. Further, in accordance with what has already been argued above, the comparison reinforces the observation that Empedocles has appropriated for himself the role of the goddess in Parmenides' poem, and is himself the divine authority for the teachings in his poem. This in turn might incline us to posit that only Pausanias can be the recipient of such instruction. But before we come too quickly to a conclusion on the matter, I submit that a second Parmenidean passage, while further from B 3.6–8 in grammatical form, is closer to it in spirit. The passage in question is the goddess's address to Parmenides upon his arrival at her home, DK 28 B 1.24–28, (text after Coxon):

ὦ κοῦρ' ἀθανάτῃσι συνήορος ἡνιόχοισιν
ἵπποις θ', αἵ σε φέρουσιν, ἱκάνων ἡμέτερον δῶ
χαῖρ', ἐπεὶ οὔ τί σε μοῖρα κακὴ προὔπεμπε νέεσθαι
τήνδ' ὁδὸν, ἦ γάρ ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων ἐκτὸς πάτου ἐστίν,
ἀλλὰ θέμις τε δίκη τε·

O youth, companion to immortal charioteers and horses which bear you, as you reach our home, greetings! For it is no evil fate which sent you to travel down this road, which is indeed far removed from the path of men, but right and justice.

The goddess is at pains to assure Parmenides that his extraordinary voyage is not a transgression, a violation of divine prerogatives, for which he would be punished like the great criminals of myth, perhaps more specifically Phaethon, who stole the chariot of his father the Sun, and had to be killed by Zeus.[96] She explains that it is right and just for him to be received by her. His access to her home, after all, through mighty aetherial gates, was won thanks to soft words and cunning persuasion (B 1.14–15), not stealth or violence.

In Empedocles, if we posit that the addressee is the Muse, then, I suggest, we can see that the passage amounts to an indirect formulation of the same assertion.[97] Empedocles is saying: *But you at least*, μηδέ σέ γ', *the blooms of fair-seeming honor will not force you to take <them> up from mortals, and for that to say more than is holy*. A small but significant difference between our passage and the opening of Parmenides B 7.3 is the particle γε. The rhetorical importance of it, in a context where the hearer knows a divinity is being addressed, is that she is thus being signaled as distinct, above either venality or the temptation of vainglory, at least before a mortal audience, πρὸς θνητῶν.[98] The point is that, by cooperating in Empedocles' project, the Muse, like Parmenides' goddess, is assuring the hearer that the new and unfamiliar ideas advanced therein have divine sanction: the poetic success of Empedocles' work, guaranteed by the Muse, itself underwrites the legitimacy of its content.

To arrive at such a reading, it is probably best to understand the subject of βιήσεται as *the blooms of fair-seeming honor*, as in DK. This is supported by Parmenides B 7.3, and is any way a more natural reading, with the subject closer to the main verb. Wright, for instance, who translates *to take up garlands of glory and honor* with ἄνθεα as the direct object of ἀνελέσθαι, on the parallel of *Odyssey* 21.117, ἀέθλια κάλ' ἀνελέσθαι *to win beautiful prizes*, nevertheless has to posit a missing subject for the verb.[99]

But, it may be objected, if ἄνθεα is the subject, then there is no direct object for ἀνελέσθαι. To this the most plausible answer is that the middle form of the verb may imply that the blooms are themselves the understood object of the verb. For this one may compare *Iliad* 16.7–10:

τίπτε δεδάκρυσαι Πατρόκλεες, ἠΰτε κούρη
νηπίη, ἥ θ' ἅμα μητρὶ θέουσ' ἀνελέσθαι ἀνώγει,
εἱανοῦ ἁπτομένη, καί τ' ἐσσυμένην κατερύκει,
δακρυόεσσα δέ μίν ποτιδέρκεται, ὄφρ' ἀνέληται

Why, Patrocles, are you overcome with tears, like a little girl, who, running after her mother, orders her to pick her up, clutching at her dress, and pulls at her as she hastens by, glaring at her through tears, until she picks her up?

Although a passive meaning is also possible at both 16.8 and 16.10, a middle form seems more likely, as translated, and with it, the possibility that this same middle conveys the notion of self-interest.[100] As such, it voids any need to voice the object of *picking up* in both subordinate clauses. I suggest that the same phenomenon is at play in B 3.7, where the flowers of honor are both the subject and the direct object (as also in DK's translation). Empedocles' Muse would thus be neither mercenary nor susceptible to the superficial allure of mortal favor, cf. εὐδόξοιο, *fair-seeming*, which may connote an ambiguous valuation of the τιμῆς, *honor*. Πρός with a genitive, moreover, *at the hands of*, is a frequent poetic form with verbs to designate the source from which one obtains some good or ill. Lastly, while not themselves decisive considerations, word order and the line-break also support taking πρὸς θνητῶν ἀνελέσθαι together.

I turn now to the second half of the second line. The standard translation of ἐφ' ὧ θ' ὁσίης πλέον εἰπεῖν is to take ἐφ' ὧ θ' in the sense, frequent in the Classical period, of expressing a condition, which is then specified by an infinitive clause. This would translate: *on the condition that you speak more than is holy*. But here it seems just as likely that Empedocles is employing ἐπί with the dative to express cause, a usage that is especially common to explain motivation for mental states (LSJ s.v. III 1). Thus I would rather take ἐφ' ὧ θ' as referring back to that verb as the motivation for the infinitive εἰπεῖν, not as introducing a new condition.[101] The meaning will be: *and for that reason, to speak more than is holy*. Glory or desire for glory winning the Muse over before men, which in turn leads to saying more than is holy, seems a more intelligible sequence than some force compelling Pausanias to win garlands of glory, but only *on the condition of* telling of unholy things. That, if pressed, even seems to imply that Pausanias could only ever attain honor (or vainglory?) through charlatanry. Lastly, how should the expression *to say more than is holy*, ὁσίης πλέον εἰπεῖν be understood? Against the suggestion that this is a reference to mysteries, understood as things which are somehow holy themselves, but not holy to divulge to the *profanum vulgus*, I propose a simpler division of all possible objects of reference between the holy and the not holy. The "not-holy" are simply the abominable cults and erroneous ideas of ordinary men, decried and rejected a few lines earlier, according to my reconstruction. These traditional themes the Muse Calliope will not sing, despite the popularity and dubious honor they might confer.[102]

This leads me back to B 3.8. As edited by DK, the line surmises for the disciple the final goal in the temptation quackery, *and then to throne on the peaks of wisdom*. The first word of the line, however, θάρσεϊ, DK construes with the verb εἰπεῖν from the previous line, so that its meaning is adverbial, *to speak more than is holy, rashly*. But following the interpretation of the previous lines given above, as well as Karsten (1852), it seems better to punctuate after εἰπεῖν. If so this means, first, that the line can now be considered in isolation, and second, that it does not necessarily hang with the remaining material found in B 3. As argued above, it is quite possible that B 3 is really a collection of passages assembled on thematic grounds by Sextus' source, perhaps in as many as four parts (B 3.1–5; 6–7; 8; 9–13). It seems more cautious, therefore, to work here from the inside out, making the best sense possible of B 3.8 itself, rather than assuming that Sextus has provided us with its original context.

If the line is considered alone, then by far the most obvious reading for the first word is θάρσει, an imperative meaning *take heart*, or *dare*. Assuming that θάρσει is in fact an imperative, that in turn informs the interpretation of the difficult verb θοάζει. The principal meaning of θοάζειν, a transitive verb mostly found in poetry, is *to move quickly*, *ply*, *hurry on*, LSJ *s.v.*, and it occurs with frequency in religious contexts, especially to describe ritual service.[103] Although LSJ cites this very passage as its main example of a putative secondary meaning for this verb, *to sit*, in all the other examples cited the main meaning could equally well apply, so that one can well doubt the existence of this secondary meaning. Here moreover, following Proclus' τάδε, a good reading, cf. B 2.7, 101.2, rather than Sextus' τότε δή, provides a direct object for θοάζει, following the verb's primary meaning, *hurry, move, dispatch*, instead of *sit* or *throne*. Further still, removing the final iota, without metrical repercussions, allows an easy transformation to the imperative θόαζε, *hurry* or *dispatch*, to match θάρσει. While emendation is never ideal, this suggestion is less violent and more readily justified than the addition of ν, as in DK, which depends, I think erroneously, on the assumption that B 3 forms a continuous passage.[104] The iota could have been unhappily suggested by θάρσει, or mistakenly added early on in the transmission of the line, especially if the line was transmitted alone before Sextus (it so occurs in Proclus). In terms of sense the line transmitted Proclus, which omits the first foot, reads: *and these things throne* (?) *upon the peaks of wisdom* (it is hard to ascertain just what Proclus thought the verb meant.) This is not obviously wrong, and matches the positive and confident tone Proclus imputes to it, in his review of those thinkers who think they have attained truth. But if Proclus' interpretation can still hold regardless of the meaning of θοάζω, not so DK's and those of subsequent editors, which must rely on the very dubious assumption that the verb means *to sit*.

The final factor to consider is the possible addressee. Depending on whether one assigns the line to the Pausanias or the Muse, the original meaning(s) might have been:

> θάρσει, καὶ τάδε τοι σοφίης ἐπ' ἄκροισι θόαζε.

[to Pausanias] *Take heart, and revere these things (my teachings) upon the peaks of wisdom*, or [to the Muse] *Take heart, and convey these matters upon the peaks of wisdom*.

The injunction to *take heart* seems more appropriate for Pausasnias, but an address to the disciple does not make obvious sense of θόαζε. Perhaps the verb's frequent association with religious service and devotion may justify thinking it means *serve* or *venerate*. The disciple is being told that the teachings, or the rather the first principles they expound, are the new gods, and should be shown the due reverence, cf. B 6. But if addressed the Muse, then θόαζε can easily have its primary association with speed. Instead of a warning not to violate mortal limits, addressed to Pausanias, they would attest Empedocles' willingness to reach for the skies.[105]

The main difficulty with the latter, which must be acknowledged, is the curious injunction *take heart*, or *dare* addressed to the Muse. For if many passages can be cited where an archaic or classical Greek poet orders his Muse or the Muses to accomplish some task, I know of no certain parallel for the Muse being told to *take heart*. Perhaps the novelty of Empedocles' doctrine may justify taking it as meaning *dare*, and if so, this may even provide a good reason for thinking that B 3.6–8 are indeed continuous: it was precisely because he recognized the difficulties and dangers inherent to his project that Empedocles went to such length in the previous lines to preemptively refute all charges of impiety or personal ambition.[106] In a different respect, it can also be compared to Pindar's words to his *thumos* at *Ol*. 2.89 or *Nem*. 3.26, where the poet asks it to choose a theme or subject. In both those cases, his *thumos* seems to be doing what he usually asks his Muse to do. Even more explicitly in fragment 150 Snell, Pindar says μαντεύεο, Μοῖσα, προφατεύσω δ' ἐγὼ, which seems to mean something like: *Propose a theme, and I will put it into verse*.[107] On that basis, Empedocles may be speaking about his craft, and shoring up his own courage before the monumental poetic task that lies ahead of him. If so, the force of θάρσει may be little more than ἄγε, a common order in Greek poetry, meaning little more than *pay attention*, and indifferently directed at Muses and mortals alike.

While I see no way of deciding between Pausanias and the Muse, it matters less than the recognition that, in either case, the implicit claim contained in B 3.8 is a confident assertion of Empedocles' teachings as the peak of wisdom, not a modest reminder to think mortal thoughts. As in the case of B 2.8–9, it may be that most modern editorial work has fathered upon B 3.8 a meaning exactly opposite to its intent.

iii. B 110 and B 111: Things to Come

Fragments B 110 and 111 both announce to the disciple promises of things to come. In B 110, Empedocles says, lines 1–2: "*for if, pressing these,* σφε, *down into your close-packed prapides, you contemplate them favorably in pure meditations, these,* ταῦτα, *will be with you for life* (? δι' αἰῶνος), *and you will also acquire many more from them.*" It is not altogether clear to what exactly ταῦτα refers, but based on the disciple's ability to assimilate ταῦτα and hold them in his *prapides*, roughly, *thinking organs*, and not let them be washed away by the constant battering of the senses, the probable objects in question are the master's teachings.[108] As such, the passage seems to contain a reference back to the whole of the work, and it is usually thought of as an *envoi.*[109] But then again, the ταῦτα of 110.3 could just as easily be anticipatory, so that the futures we find in the fragment could indicate that this material is to be located before any such teachings.

Fragment B 111 is the centerpiece in the case for Empedocles' charlatanism, and this was the reason for its preservation in antiquity.[110] The fragment outlines, in the future tense, a number of practical powers that Empedocles promises to teach the disciple alone, "*since for you alone I will accomplish all these things*" (line 2). These include knowledge of drugs or remedies, weather control and raising the dead. While such abilities cannot be related in any obvious manner to Empedocles' known doctrines, similar types of feats do figure quite prominently in the biographical tradition.[111] It is difficult to decide whether Empedocles meant by these claims that he could teach the disciple to work miracles, i.e. violate the laws of nature, or to exploit, in a more rationalistic vein, the *hidden* laws of nature.[112] Some scholars have been so uncomfortable with the Paracelsian tones which the lines strike that they have argued that they must be spurious.[113] Others suppose they were offered in an ironic vein, or that such promises may have been later abjured.[114] Whatever the case, and however they are related to Empedocles' main teachings, the fragment's authenticity should not be doubted. Bollack in particular, vol. iii p. 20, has made a good argument in favor of the lines' being genuine, by pointing out the very Empedoclean trope contained in its central lines, in which Empedocles weaves a reference to the four elements into his description of the weather that he will teach the disciple to control. This is the same idiosyncratic, poetic effect already encountered in B 115, and almost certainly guarantees their authenticity. As for the question of location, unlike the more complicated case of B 110, with its possible reference back to previous teachings, the future tenses here mean that a position in the proem, before the main body of teachings, is as likely a location as any.

iv. B 8 to B 15: Eleatic Laws and the Critique of Mortal Thought

Fragments B 8 through 15 are usually thought of as a set.[115] The uniting factor for the group is a shared concern with Eleatic arguments denying the possibility of generation from nothing or destruction into nothing. Not all of the fragments, however, directly formulate or reformulate Eleatic theses. Only B 12–14 are direct statements about change and generation, whereas B 8, 9, 11 and 15 criticize ordinary mortal thought for failing to appreciate the relevance of those notions to other opinions current among mankind. The fragments come from as many as four sources, but two alone cover the full range of the material. From Plutarch's polemical treatise *Against Colotes*, come B 8, 9, 10, 11, and 15 (B 8 is also known from Aristotle and Aetius,[116] the latter telling us that the lines are from book I of the physics), and from the anonymous treatise *De Melisso Xenophane Gorgia* come B 12, 13, and 14.

The Context of B 8, 9, 11, and 15: Plutarch's "Against Colotes"

Plutarch's work is a rebuttal of the Epicurean Colotes' (c. 310–260 BC) thesis that "According to the doctrines of the other philosophers it is not possible to live." (1107e) Colotes' treatise apparently quoted widely from earlier thinkers to demonstrate that only Epicureanism furnishes a sound basis for life. In this instance, Colotes quoted B 8 of Empedocles and gave it what we would call a reductionist interpretation. The passage at issue is Empedocles' famous critique of men's mistaken belief in growth and decay as presupposing *ex nihilo* creation and *in nihil* destruction. What men take to be growth, Empedocles says, is rather mixture of preexisting elements; what they take as destruction, merely the separation of compounds. Thus there is no growth (φύσις) of any mortal thing, or any end in destructive death (lines 1–2, taking the genitive οὐλομένου θανάτοιο as a genitive of definition).[117] Colotes argued from this that, since according to Empedocles only the elements exist in the strict sense of having a continuous existence, by that standard men do not fully exist, hence the impossibility of life, according to Empedocles.

In paragraphs 10 to 12 of his reply (1111f–1113e), Plutarch disputes Colotes' interpretation of B 8 as captious and then quotes two more fragments in support of his counter-interpretation. He argues (1113 a) that Empedocles' philosophical aims are in fact more in line with the assumptions implicit in ordinary language, and that instead of discounting appearances he seeks to "save the phenomena." This even extends to a toleration of ordinary language, rather than its rejection, provided one corrects its mistaken implications, as Plutarch shows by quoting B 9.

As far as the surviving evidence indicates, it is Plutarch who is in the right.[118] As we learn from the next quotations, B 11 and 15, Empedocles draws certain moral and philosophical conclusions from the denial of absolute creation and destruction, and these only make sense if one takes for granted the genuine existence of men. Empedocles decries as foolish men's *expectation*, B 11.2 ἐλπίζουσιν, of absolute destruction, which, given the context, it might not be too strong to render *hope*. Instead, death is an *avenger* (B 10), and men are not wise to think they can only suffer good or ill while they are made mortal, as if they were 'nothing' at other times (B 15). Although in this Empedocles is not clear about the mode of after-life or pre-mortal existence he attributes to mankind, such statements are enough in themselves to disprove Colotes' contention that Empedocles did not think of men as truly existing.[119]

B 12, 13, 14

B 12, 13, and 14 are found together in the anonymous treatise *De Melisso Xenophane Gorgia*, which gives slight ground for believing that they form a set. There is no evidence as to their location, but once again their thematic link to the fragments from Plutarch makes this the most useful context in which to consider them. Empedocles makes two (or three) general points: there is no generation *ex nihilo* or destruction *in nihil* (B 12); there is no void in the universe—or the whole—and the universe is all there is (B 13 and 14). These are Empedocles' own formulations of a set of notions first put to philosophical use by Parmenides, and which became fundamental topics for all subsequent Greek physics.[120] The exact form of their departure from Parmenides' formulation is a matter of some debate, which I cannot consider in here. At the very least one can note the different use to which these arguments are put in Empedocles. Whereas in Parmenides such considerations lead to strong doubts concerning the reality of the world of appearances, in Empedocles the denial of absolute generation and destruction is put to the opposite purpose: to deny the world we know could ever end completely or have some absolute beginning. Instead of a break with life as known and habitually imagined, a radical departure or κρίσις, Empedocles stresses the inescapable continuity of the here and now.[121]

Internal Unity, Order, and Position of B 8–15

While recognizing the usefulness of grouping this material together from the standpoint of interpretation, I find that the evidence for the proximity of both groups of fragments is uneven. While the sequence B 8, 9, 10 makes sense in the order quoted by Plutarch, the link to B 11 and 15 is debatable, for Plutarch gives no indication of the relative or absolute position of B 11 and 15. Since 11 and 15 argue against an understanding of death as *in nihil* destruction, and therefore an event that puts us beyond the capacity to suffer, *post mortem*, any good or ill, their context may have been a discussion of reincarnation, and so could be placed with that material.[122] As for the sequence 8, 9, 10, while we know that B 8 at least came from book I, according to Aëtius, I do not think it likely that these passages belonged to the proem. The fact that they seem to rely on the doctrine of mixture for their critique of mortal understanding, along with the presence of the more or less technical terms μίξις τε διάλλαξις τε μιγέντων, to me indicates a position after B 17/ *ensemble* **a**. Similarly, B 9.5, where Empedocles concedes that he will continue to use ordinary terms, despite recognizing their inaccuracies, seems to require that he have first made his own doctrine clear. Finally, the opening words of fragment 8, ἄλλο δέ τοι ἐρέω, *and I will tell you another thing*, while a standard epic turn of phrase, may also reprise the opening of B 17.1, δίπλ᾽ ἐρέω, *I will tell a double tale*, and thus indicate a position after B 17/ *ensemble* **a**.[123] Thus while Sedley's parallel with Lucretius' critique of the deficiencies of the Latin language (discussed above, section 3.d) may provide some grounds for placing B 8, 9, and 11 in the proem, the internal evidence weighs against it. As a result, only B 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 seem very likely to have stood at the end of the proem, on the basis of both the parallel with Lucretius and internal evidence.

v. Conclusion: Proposed Reconstruction of the Second Half of the Proem

The Change of Addressees from the "Friends of Acragas" to Pausanias

It is time to gather together the various strands of evidence considered throughout the last four subsections. If I am correct, an important transition occurred in the proem after the material describing the fall of the *daimon* and the invective against ritual sacrifice and meat eating. This transition was probably articulated by means of an invocation of the Muse (DK B 3.1–5, perhaps including B 131, and B 3.6–8) and was most likely followed by a change of addressees from the "friends from Acragas" to the disciple, Pausanias (B 1).[124] In particular, the interpretation I propose of B 3.1–5 provides a ready reply to those inclined to question the very possibility of such a shift in the work, i.e. between the respective themes of B 112 and B 17/ *ensemble* **a**, or the *Katharmoi* and *Peri Phuseos* material. As for the change of addressees, the lines B 2.8–9, which I would place in the same general vicinity, seem to provide the best evidence for Empedocles having made a distinction between the disciple and the common run of mankind: *but you, since you have turned away thus (i.e. to me), you will learn*. This would be the point of the passage: to single out the disciple, who follows the master and his way of life, as opposed to the carnivorous crowd. If that is correct, I may add, then the verb ἐλιάσθης, *you have turned away*, may be the first attested use of the metaphor of 'conversion' in the Western tradition. Much more needs be said to reinforce this move, which I will undertake in the next chapter, but here I can at least invoke a comparison with Platonic dialogues, where a change of interlocutors signals a shift to another level of discussion. Finally, if the general scheme I have proposed is correct, then perhaps therein also lies the explanation for the postponed δέ in B 1, which can indicate a change of interlocutors, perhaps here the Muse and Pausanias. The original might have looked like this:

DK B 3 ἀλλὰ θεοὶ τῶν μὲν μανίην ἀποτρέψατε γλώσσης,
ἐκ δ' ὁσίων στομάτων καθαρὴν ὀχετεύσατε πηγήν.
καὶ σέ, πολυμνήστη λευκώλενε παρθένε Μοῦσα,
ἄντομαι, ὧν θέμις ἐστὶν ἐφημερίοισιν ἀκούειν,
πέμπε παρ' Εὐσεβίης ἐλάουσ' εὐήνιον ἅρμα.
μηδέ σέ γ' εὐδόξοιο βιήσεται ἄνθεα τιμῆς
πρὸς θνητῶν ἀνελέσθαι, ἐφ' ᾧ θ' ὁσίης πλέον εἰπεῖν.
θάρσει, καὶ τάδε τοι σοφίης ἐπ' ἄκροισι θόαζε.
DK B 1 Παυσανίη, σὺ δὲ κλῦθι, δαΐφρονος Ἀγχίτεω υἱέ.

But gods, turn their madness from my tongue, and from holy mouths channel a pure spring. And you, white-armed, much-remembering virgin Muse, I beseech you, send to me the things which are lawful for creatures of a day to hear, driving your well-reined chariot from the halls of Piety. Nor shall the blooms of fair-seeming honor ever compel you to win them from men, and for that to say more than is holy. Be daring, and convey these matters upon the peaks of wisdom.

As for you, Pausanias, son of wise Anchites, pay attention.

The Critique of Mortal Thought, Things to Come, Eleatic Laws

For the remainder of the material, no direct testimony attests either its presence in the proem or its relative location, although the internal evidence for a location in the proem is good, as seen above. The three most distinct themes within this material are: 1) promises of things to come, B 110 and 111; 2) the criticism of mortal thought, B 2, 4, 11, and 15, (perhaps including B 8, 9, 10, but I think that unlikely); and 3) a set of positive doctrinal statements or "laws" of Eleatic inspiration (B 12, 13, 14). The last theme, as I have already argued, most likely came at the very end, and could plausibly have led to B 17/*ensemble* **a**.

Taking that much for granted, I propose to begin sorting the rest out by first considering any possible internal links within this material. While "promises of things to come," bears no obvious relation to the other two themes, the second, Empedocles' criticism of mortal thought, does in part relate to my third theme, the Eleatic laws of B 12, 13, 14. It is important to point out, however, that the critique of mortal thought does not consistently rely on mankind's ignorance of Eleatic laws. There is within this material a gradation of dependency upon Eleatic strictures. The most closely linked to it are B 11 and 15, where Empedocles defends the plausibility of an afterlife on the general grounds that nothing can be completely destroyed into nothing. B 8 and 9, in turn, if they do belong to the proem, rely only indirectly upon these ideas to refute ordinary notions of growth and decay, and more directly upon Empedocles' own doctrine of elements and mixture. Finally, B 2 and 4 make no use of Eleatic laws, but criticize mortal thought on altogether different grounds.

Within this general context, it is notable that the two passages that criticize mortals without any reference to Eleatic doctrine, B 2 and B 4, directly contrast these mortals with Pausanias. Although here once again one is reduced to speculation, perhaps the contrast expressed in B 4 and B 2 between bad or ordinary men, and the hope Empedocles voices for Pausanias, gives some tangible indication of my suggested transition between addressees. I would thus place B 2 and B 4 a little after B 1. Further, since in B 4 Empedocles seems to be taking his leave of these mortals, dismissing them as bad or base precisely because they cannot recognize his truth, B 4 seems to me the later passage of the two.

As for any other possible joins within this material, there is perhaps an interesting link to be made between B 2 and the promise of things to come, which at least deserves to be raised. At B 2.8–9 when Empedocles says to Pausanias: *but as for you . . . you will learn*, this seems as good an introduction as any other extant passage for the list of practical powers Empedocles promises the disciple at B 111.[125]

This still leaves open the position of B 11 and 15. As has long been observed, the particular interest these fragments present is that within them Empedocles applies Eleatic laws on generation and destruction not to the elements, as he does at B 17, but to men, or some part of them.[126] Not until Sedley, however, was it also noted how these two applications, in the context of a single work, could play off one another:

> . . . the denial of literal birth and death with which it <the proem> ends not only gives a philosophical basis to the transmigration doctrine that precedes it, but also prepares the ground for the physical exposition to follow, which will likewise be founded on the Parmenidean tenet that nothing literally comes to be or perishes.[127]

While I have distanced myself from the specifics of Sedley's reconstruction, on this important point I agree wholeheartedly with his suggestion that if we place B 11 and 15 in the proem, or at least before B 17/*ensemble* **a**, they can serve not only their immediate argumentative function of supporting the plausibility of an afterlife, but may also prepare the reader for the concept's application to the doctrine of elemental stability. Having already stressed the foreshadowing of the elements in the description of *daimon*'s wanderings in B 115, I think it wholly appropriate that here as well the human or demonic cycle of reincarnations builds towards the final account of the great cosmic cycle in B 17/*ensemble* **a**.

The only other plausible location for both fragments would be earlier, closer to the material dealing with reincarnation, as perhaps in Wright, who places B 11 and 15 in the Katharmoi, before B 115. If so, the less aggressive, indirect cast of Empedocles' criticism in B 15.1, οὐκ ἂν ἀνὴρ τοιαῦτα σοφὸς φρεσὶ μαντεύσαιτο, *a man skilled in thought would not divine such things,* could suggest placing that fragment before B 115, for it would hardly be required after the account of the *daimon*'s exile. But against a location near or before

B 115 is that B 11 and 15 are not addressed directly at plural addressees, who are in any case usually the targets of a much more vehement tone of invective. Moreover, if Empedocles spoke in B 112 ff. from authority as a god, then it would be out of place for him to support his argument with an appeal to human wisdom. At this point in the account, the example of *a wise man* must have rather Pausanias as its target: if he too is wise, he will not credit the belief in the total destruction of men by death. I note also that whereas the doctrine of B 115 is advanced on authority, not argument, only in B 15 do we have an intersection of Eleatic argument, concern with the after-life and an appeal to human wisdom. As suggested by Sedley, the passage thus seems both a reprise, with variation, of B 115's *oracle of necessity*, (cf. μαντεύσαιτο) and a bridge to the themes of human wisdom and Eleatic laws. For that same reason I would prefer a location near B 2, which, since it is devoted to a more detailed analysis of the shortcoming of ordinary human intelligence, reinforces and elaborates the contrast between the wise and the foolish, the permanent and the ephemeral.

As for B 11, its tone is more cutting, but once again it is cast not in the form of a direct address, but as a critique of an attitude described in the third person. As was the case for B 15, that leads me to think it does not belong in the first half of the proem. The stronger form of its statement, however, whereby Empedocles casts aspersions upon the *fools . . . who hope that what was not previously comes to be* etc., points instead to a position closer to the other criticisms found in B 2, so that I place B 11 before B 15.

B 3.9–13

The only remaining passage unaccounted for is DK 3. 9–13. The lines consist of a set of positive instructions to the disciple on how to maximize his openness to the teachings that will follow, and for that reason I have separated them from the address to the Muse. The instructions amplify a similar statement at DK 2.7–8, and the intent in both is quite likely a polemical response to Parmenides' choice of *nous* to the exclusion of the senses in ascertaining the true nature of the universe. Empedocles specifies that the disciple must not exclude any one means, but must trust them all equally. There is little certain ground for deciding on a location, but the length of the warning points to the doctrinal importance of what followed. The two most likely candidates for its sequel would thus be either B 17 or the material from B 12–14. However, given that the arguments of DK 12–14 seem to rely for their persuasiveness almost exclusively on *nous*, whereas in B 17 we find appeals to the senses, as well as to *nous* or mental functions, I suggest that B 3.9–13 may be a more fitting introduction to that passage.[128]

CHAPTER III

Interpreting the Framework

1. The Proem and the Doctrine: Difficulties of Interpretation

a. Gods and Men

According to the reconstruction offered above, Empedocles did not open his work with an account of the four elements, or the elements plus Love and Strife. Although these six "first principles" are basic to his whole conception of the universe, and any interpretation of his thought must make them its central object, his poem began, and perhaps ended, with a claim to superhuman status.[1] This aspect of the work is confirmed by its presence in the biographical tradition from the start,[2] and now, if my interpretation of B 23.11, B 2.7–8 and other doxographical material is valid, we have good evidence that Empedocles consistently portrayed his teachings as a divine revelation, thereby matching the authority of Parmenides' goddess.

How should this claim be understood? How central should we make it to his thought? And what does it tell us about Empedocles' conception of divinity? Although the details of the scheme remain unclear, I am of the opinion that we must take his claim to be a god, or on verge of becoming one, as earnest, and that it is an integral part of his philosophical project. The essential point, already well canvassed by those committed to a unified view of his thought, is that Empedocles in the end, despite the apparent *hubris* of B 112, is not to be understood as claiming the status of an *eternal* Homeric god, but rather that of a *long-lived god*, according to his own particular formulation.[3]

This identification is assured by the two separate and distinguishing attributes of these gods, both of which Empedocles claims for himself. According to the recurring formula he employs to describe them at B 21.12, 23.8 and **a (ii)** 2, these gods are *long-lived and mightiest in honors*, θεοὶ δολιχαίωνες τιμῆισι φέριστοι. The first, long-lived, is used at B 115.5 to describe the *daimones* who undergo banishment, albeit not in exactly the same terms. The *daimones* are said *to have obtained a life of long span*, δαίμονες οἵτε μακραίωνος λελάχασι βίοιο, but this seems close enough to warrant identifying the two. In turn, the identification of Empedocles with one such long-lived *daimon* is assured by his open claim to such status in the last line of the fragment.[4] The other attribute of these gods is that they are *mightiest in honors*. Although the link is liable to be more controversial, it is surely no accident that in B 112 Empedocles lays a great deal of stress on his honor. As he tells his countrymen, he is a now a god, *honored by all*, μετὰ πᾶσι τετιμένος, B 112.5, and whenever he reaches a city, he is worshipped by men and women, ἀνδράσιν ἠδὲ γυναιξὶ σεβίζομαι, B 112.8. Such thematic continuity is obviously not coincidental. Finally, clinching the link is the presence of both themes in fragment B146. While that fragment's location is unknown, it appears to have been part of a longer section detailing the best types of reincarnation. In the original, the passage probably also included B 127, where we learn that, among plants, laurel is the best incarnation, among animals, the lion. B 146 was probably the passage's conclusion:

> εἰς δὲ τέλος μάντεις τε καὶ ὑμνόπολοι καὶ ἰητροί
> καὶ πρόμοι ἀνθρώποισιν ἐπιχθονίοισι πέλονται
> ἔνθεν ἀναβλαστοῦσι θεοὶ τιμῇσι φέριστοι.

Finally they become seers, poets and healers, and leaders to men on earth, whence they spring forth into gods, mightiest in honors.

It has long been noted that these lines have an autobiographical ring to them, for the four summits of human excellence Empedocles mentions correspond to capacities he was thought to have united in his person.[5] In light of all this, I conclude that there is little doubt that the portrait Empedocles left of himself in his work betrayed confidence in his own apotheosis (if that was not already behind him). In maintaining this, it should be stressed, I lay no claim to originality. My position on this point is squarely in the mainstream of Empedoclean studies, as formulated by such scholars as Zuntz (1971), Wright (1981) and Inwood (1992).

b. The Aim of the Present Section

Taking that much for granted, in what follows I want to show that, starting from the unity of Empedocles' thought, and building upon the single work hypothesis, better sense can be made of the material previously thought to belong to the *Katharmoi* as the proem of a single poem. By better sense I mean a reading that will provide a satisfactory *literary* unity to the corpus, one which will prove historically plausible by comparison with works of the same genre and/or period.

c. A Preliminary Objection: Aristotle on the Presocratics

Before I start, however, it is necessary to make clear what is at stake in such a claim, not only for the investigation of Empedocles, but as well for the study of Aristotle as historian of the Presocratics. For it is bound to be an objection to my unitarian interpretation of the Empedoclean *corpus* that it charges Aristotle, our earliest and most penetrating critic of Empedocles, with a fairly serious misrepresentation of Empedocles' thought. It was Aristotle, after all, who in the *Poetics* (1447b) famously called Empedocles a φυσιολόγος, *natural scientist*, rather than a poet or god, and who, despite his numerous and extensive discussions of Empedocles' physical doctrines, only once betrays an awareness of Empedocles' religious teachings (*Rhetoric* 1373 b). Such a distortion will seem all the more difficult to credit to the extent that none of our ancient sources appears to have bothered pointing it out during the entire period during which Empedocles' work(s) remained in circulation. Here I merely sketch out the difficulty and a first level of answer. A fuller and more satisfactory explanation will emerge as I proceed.

On the two-work hypothesis, the tension between Empedocles' religious lore and scientific teachings does not pose a serious problem for the interpretation of the Aristotelian and Theophrastian doxography. Although Aristotle at *Rhetoric* 1373b 14, where he quotes B 135, for once shows an awareness of Empedocles' prohibition on killing the "ensouled," and hence of the *Katharmoi*, one could still in good conscience think that the numerous discussions Aristotle devotes to Empedoclean natural science all stemmed from the *Physics*. Thus, only if we could show why Aristotle had no grounds to favor the *Physics* over the *Katharmoi*, something nearly impossible to prove, could one accuse Aristotle of being selective or one-sided in his interests. Even then, this need not involve misrepresenting Empedocles.

On the single work hypothesis, however, this seems inevitable. The charge is harsh, but not entirely unwarranted, and is certainly not an insurmountable obstacle to the single work hypothesis. As is now well recognized, it is but a single instance in a more general Aristotelian and Peripatetic tendency to misrepresent the Presocratics, one that subsequently tainted the whole doxographic tradition.[6] Although less dramatic than the distortions wrought upon Heraclitus or Parmenides, following too closely in Aristotle's footsteps here leads to a very incomplete picture of Empedocles.

d. The Proems of Parmenides and Lucretius

The fragments considered so far have been divided between those belonging to the proem and the doctrinal sections of the single work. The dividing line between the two, I have argued, was most likely B 17/*ensemble* **a**, spanning lines 232–300 of book I of the work Simplicius had before him. Within the opening 232 lines, I further suggested that we should recognize an important division between material addressed to the "friends from Acragas," which came first, and a later section, of a different tone, addressed to the single disciple Pausanias. (In this regard, it might be more accurate to define the proem exclusively as the material addressed to the 'friends,' while the passages addressed to Pausanias before B 17/*ensemble* a might be considered preliminary in some sense, but not part of the proem proper. Despite the possible inaccuracy, I will continue to refer to the whole 232 opening lines as the proem, as a more convenient way of distinguishing peculiarly Empedoclean doctrine, i.e. the six first-principles, the cycle, etc., from the material that preceded it.) Furthermore, I have suggested that the majority, but by no means all, of the fragments traditionally assigned to the *Katharmoi* had as their most likely home the opening the work, the first section of the proem in my reconstruction, before the change of addressees to Pausanias. Thus, the traditional arrangement of these fragments, allowing for a few changes and minor adjustments, is still of service, and should be transplanted more or less wholesale to that part of the work.

Now if we take a step back and consider the resulting structure as a whole, an interesting fact arises: the *Katharmoi*, which might in some respects be termed the proem proper, turns out to be the very material which modern scholars have felt to be so hard to reconcile with the physical doctrines advanced in the main body of the work. Should this surprise us? Not in the least. For when we look to the two other literary works most capable of throwing some light upon Empedocles' poem, namely Parmenides' poem and the *De Rerum natura*, we find in each of those cases as well that the relation between the work's proem and its main doctrines are highly problematic. In both of those instances, generations of critics and scholars are unanimous in recognizing them as incompatible in anything like a straightforward manner. Yet for all that, no Homeric question has sprung up around these texts, but general agreement exists in positing *some* relation between proem and doctrine, even though it requires speculation on the part of the interpreter to unlock its meaning.[7] In this regard, even before I advance my own interpretation of the relation between Empedocles' proem and doctrine, I note that it is no strong objection to it that the link between the two seems difficult or less than obvious. On the contrary, once the proem and doctrinal sections are considered in light of the works of Parmenides and of Lucretius, and provided some link can eventually be discerned between the two groups of fragments, this counts rather in favor of supposing they belong to a single work.

e. The Function of a Proem

What then unites these three works, beyond the fact that they present similar difficulties relating to their proems? To answer that, it is necessary first to take a step back and consider the possible functions of a proem in early Greek poetry.[8] This specialized topic is not discussed directly in the ancient sources, but the functions of proems in general, or simply openings to works, was of special interest to ancient theorists of rhetoric, and that is where the most useful discussions are to be found. Aristotle deals with the question at some length in *Rhetoric*, III, chapter 14, and his treatment is all the more useful for its wide-ranging interest in a variety of arts, not just public speaking, where proems (or preludes) may play different roles. According to Aristotle, despite a variety of possible purposes, the most common function of a proem is "to show what the aim of the speech is" (1415a23), and he cites to this effect the opening of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, both of which indicate quite directly the subject-matter of each work.[9] Beyond this predominant use, Aristotle lists a number of other possible functions. Despite their variety, which arises from the need to adjust one's discourse to the circumstances, their single underlying goal is always to influence the public, including drawing its attention, rendering it benevolent, etc., so that we can group these together as a second, less well-defined type, which we will call an indirect opening. Since other ancient theorists suggest a similar division, I will adopt it as uncontroversial.[10]

In the broadest terms, then, it is possible to recognize a difference between proems that announce their subject or goal directly, and those that employ indirect means to broach the main topic. For my purposes it is important to note that, as Aristotle's two citations from epic show, the rhetors did not invent any of these techniques, which must be as old as public speaking itself. Examples of both types certainly can be found before them in poetry. The two quotations given by Aristotle from epic exemplify the direct approach, to which one can oppose a famous passage from Pindar, *Olympian* VI, 3–4, where the poet comments upon what constitutes a fitting opening:

> ἀρχομένου δ' ἔργου πρόσωπον
> χρὴ θέμεν τηλαυγές.

But at the beginning of a work one must set down a resplendent facade.

Pindar stresses the importance of a striking opening, no doubt at least in part so as to call his audience to attention, and thus better dispose them to hear the praise of the victor. Notable by its absence of course is the announcement of the main subjects of the work, the athlete and his victory at the games, which Pindar often postpones, in order to give pride of place to his *resplendent facade*.[11]

The Indirect Opening: Problems of Continuity

This leads to an even more important point concerning the indirect opening, the potential conflict over continuity of subject matter. For if the sole aim of the opening is to respond to external circumstances, which can vary considerably, this poses difficulties for the integrity or unity of the work. This is not so much a concern for informal addresses and the like, but it does present a problem in more polished works, notably poetry, where some type of organic unity is usually expected. This, of course, is not the place to enter into a general discussion of the concept of unity in art or poetry, so I will simply rely upon its importance in critical practice and illustrate my point by a relevant counterexample: while the tradition according to which the Homeric hymns formed detachable proems is certainly understandable from the standpoint of performance, where a short "warm-up" exercise may help ease the transition into a more difficult main program,[12] that does not constitute an argument—or at least a good one—for their inclusion in either epic. The question obviously turns on different, internal grounds. And if it is not possible to conceive of every imaginable reason why a poet should prefer the direct to the indirect opening, it is nevertheless true that each of the three poets we are considering began his work with a proem that only indirectly lead up to his main subject, and that this of itself, we have grounds to think, presented them with difficulties of unity. Thus, despite the increased complications involved, to which one can also add the risk of a misunderstanding on the part of the audience of the actual topic at hand, an indirect approach was judged preferable to a direct announcement of the poem's actual theme.

Attention and Suspense

Leaving aside for now the more mysterious issue of poetic unity, I want to speculate for a moment on some possible reasons why Parmenides, Lucretius and Empedocles chose an indirect and ostensibly more complicated approach to their main topic. The best general answer in print so far is that suggested by Mansfeld in a recent article on Presocratic proems (ref. in note 8). Before considering it, however, I must point out that Mansfeld's question is not exactly the same as mine. His preoccupation is rather to find an explanation for the "intentional obscurity" he discerns in the proems of certain Presocratics. Still, the object of our interest is the same, or close enough to warrant considering his view, 226–7:

> As to their purpose in doing this [adopting intentional obscurity as a writing style], one may hazard a guess . . . By expressing themselves in an enigmatic fashion these authors moreover produce a deliberate blend of the two main functions of the proem distinguished by later authorities: they announce their theme in such a way as to attract attention and create suspense.

This is indeed a good explanation of the effect of such oracular pronouncements upon their audience. More insightful still is the main thesis of Mansfeld's paper, that such openings cannot be understood on their own, but require "insight by hindsight," i.e. are to be explained in terms of the doctrine, to which they merely allude. This is an important notion, to which I will return.

Where Mansfeld's analysis is less convincing is in its exclusive focus on obscurity of language. For such obscurity is most emphatically not confined to the proems alone in either Empedocles or Heraclitus, two of his test cases, and a difference in clarity is only tentatively to be recognized between the proem and doctrinal sections of Parmenides' work. In Empedocles and Parmenides, moreover, there is an undeniable change of *subject matter* between proem and doctrine (as in Lucretius, although he is outside Mansfeld's purview). It is not the mode of discourse that changes, but the actual subjects under discussion, so that initially the hearer might be at a loss to see the continuity between topics. As Mansfeld himself points out, 226, Diogenes of Apollonia was perhaps protesting against such works when he wrote the introduction to his own book, around 430 B.C.:

> In beginning any account, it seems to me, one ought to make one's starting-point indisputable, and one's meaning clear and dignified . . .[13]

Against Mansfeld's use of this evidence, I note that Diogenes is not *primarily* concerned with clarity and simplicity in expression, but with finding a sure, or at least uncontroversial, starting-point for the exposition. Might one not equally well take this passage as a protest against such a curious introduction to a discussion of 'what-is' as Parmenides' chariot ride beyond night and day, or Empedocles' profession of faith in reincarnation as the preamble to a work of natural science?

f. Empedocles' Divinity according to B 112, B 115, and B 17/*ensemble* a

The main difficulty, once more, lies in the problem of continuity between proem and doctrine. The key, it seems to me, has been provided by Mansfeld, when he makes the point that the proem can only be understood by hindsight, through the doctrine. If he is correct, one result of this is that we will not be able to consider alongside one another the different proems of Parmenides, Empedocles and Lucretius, to the extent that each of them will take on a different meaning, as refracted through the different doctrines of each philosopher. Although much profit remains to be had from a comparison of the three, for the time being therefore I will take my leave of Parmenides and Lucretius in order to concentrate upon Empedocles and see what light the "insight by hindsight" mode of interpretation may shed upon the relation between the work's proem and doctrine.

To illustrate the fruitfulness of this approach, I return to the vexed question of Empedocles' divine status. While I have already made my own position on this point clear, what I am proposing to investigate here is not Empedocles' "final answer" to this question. Rather, I want to survey the range of answers he seems to propose to this question, and how these answers, differing from one another in emphasis and style of presentation, play off each other and help lead the hearer further into the work. The choice of this topic is course not gratuitous, for the apparently irreconcilable positions Empedocles adopts on this question have to this day been employed as one basis from which to argue for a division of his works. More recently, David Sedley has put a novel twist on this by maintaining that B 112 and B 115 are so incompatible as to support the two-work division, with B 115 belonging the *Physics* (on the authority of Plutarch), not *The Katharmoi.* He writes:

> Is it credible that these words [DK 115, lines 13–14] came in the introductory passage of a poem in whose opening lines Empedocles had moments earlier described himself as 'a divine god, no longer a mortal?' Without the straitjacket of the old prejudice that science and religion do not mix, it is hard to believe that anyone would have ever thought of assigning the former text to the *Katharmoi.* The most natural interpretation is that B115 comes from a poem in which Empedocles classed himself a fallen daimon still working through its long cycle of transmigrations, whereas in the *Katharmoi*, opening as it does with his confident self-proclamation as a god, no longer mortal, he presented himself as having now completed the cycle and recovered his divinity.[14]

Paradoxically, what is lost from sight in seeking to maintain such a division is that this very theme, the nature of the divine, or perhaps more exactly its recurrence in these seemingly incompatible guises, is actually the principle of the work's unity, even though this can only be appreciated by hindsight.

DK B 112

According to the proposed reconstruction, Empedocles' first claim to divine status is also his boldest. In B 112.4–5, the probable opening of the work, he arrogantly introduces himself to his audience in the radiant guise of a Homeric god:

χαίρετ᾿· ἐγὼ δ᾿ ὑμῖν θεὸς ἄμβροτος οὐκέτι θνητός
πωλεῦμαι μετὰ πᾶσι τετιμένος, ὥσπερ ἔοικα . . .

Greetings! Before you a deathless god, no longer mortal, I go about, honored by all, just as is fitting.[15]

This claim, probably since the day it was made, has drawn its fascination from the direct challenge it poses to the more traditional, i.e. Iliadic, notion of the gap between gods and men. Although such a claim was not without precedent in Greek culture, for as the quotation opening this study indicates, the rule would not have been stated had there been no temptation to violate it, still, what startles us here is the directness of the challenge, which at the very least must have aroused the curiosity of its hearers. This is so, I would maintain, even allowing for the special religious atmosphere of Sicily and Southern Italy, with their strong interest in eschatological lore.[16] In openly proclaiming himself an immortal god, in terms borrowed from epic (see below), the primary reference of such a claim can hardly have been to some more specialized or secret meaning. Indeed, even if we imagine that Empedocles was addressing himself exclusively to a group of Pythagoreans or Orphics, to suppose that this intended audience would have understood it thus robs the statement of its striking rhetorical force; it would be a self-evident platitude.

Having said that much, it remains true that, as has been noted by many, despite this preponderant impression, Empedocles' claim to divine status in line 4 is not entirely straightforward. Both the dative pronoun ὑμῖν, *to you*, and the difficult clause ὥσπερ ἔοικα at line 5, perhaps *as is fitting, as it seems* (sc. I should be honored), which another source, the manuscripts of Palatine Anthology, render more plainly as ὥσπερ ἔοικεν, *as it seems,* significantly mitigate it.[17] Thus, on a second look, we must also allow that Empedocles' claim is not as direct as it first appears, and that perhaps he was hedging his bets somewhat. The minimal version of this interpretation was made by van der Ben, p. 23 who argued that ὥσπερ ἔοικα meant no more than "I look like (a god)" and concluded that no claim to divinity was at stake here. Against this, I find it perplexing in the extreme to posit that if Empedocles' sole intent had been to disabuse humanity of their mistaken belief in his divinity, he should have failed to make his thought any clearer. In fact, as well shown by Zuntz, 191, the very formulation of this claim echoes other divine epiphanies from the epic tradition, such as the Homeric *Hymn to Demeter* 120, the opening of the goddess's address to mortals, χαίρετ᾿· ἐγὼ δ᾿ ὑμῖν μυθήσομαι, *Greetings! But I to you will tell the story* . . . ; or *Iliad* 24.460, Hermes' reassuring disclosure to Priam, whereby the youthful god encourages the old king to enter the tent and face Achilles: ἐγὼ θεὸς ἄμβροτος εἰλήλουθα, *I, an immortal god, have come...* In both passages, which no doubt served as models for the Empedoclean one, a divinity reveals itself to mankind, and it is unlikely that Empedocles would have sought to exploit these allusions, as he seems to have done, if his intent had been merely to disassociate himself from their implications. The least that can be said is that the situation is unclear, but I would further venture that, on the whole, the positive claims remain preponderant.

DK B 115

Does the situation get any clearer further on? On the suggested reconstruction, Empedocles' second claim to superhuman status is B 115, which from Plutarch we know came *at the beginning of his philosophy.*[18] Here, however, the general tone and movement is quite the opposite of the first passage, albeit somewhat clearer. The proud figure of the opening lines now informs us of a decree of Necessity, according to which punishment is meted out to long-lived demons for defiling themselves with blood or perjury. This punishment consists of a banishment from the blessed for "thirty-thousand seasons," a forced wandering throughout the four elements, at the end of which comes the startling revelation that Empedocles himself is one of these demons, "a fugitive from the divine and a wanderer, in thrall to raving Strife."

Despite the obvious clash of moods between these two scenes, on the whole most editors have felt that the two have more in common than what distinguishes them. Diels-Kranz, Zuntz, Wright, and Inwood all print B 115 after B 112, whether as the opening passages of the *Katharmoi* or as part of a single work. To my mind at least, they are entirely correct in doing so, for the two passages have far more power when read together than they could ever have apart. To begin, B 115 is obviously a qualification of and explanation for the striking claim to immortality of the opening passage.[19] And while the gloomy picture of B 115 certainly undercuts the pomposity of B 112, it also displays a strong thematic continuity in explaining how the mortal man Empedocles could advance a claim to divine status. In this regard the second passage also pursues the theme of Empedocles' superiority to his fellow citizens. For on this point, we must note, there are no grounds to suppose anything has changed.[20] All that has changed is the broader context within which such superiority was portrayed. As we know independently from B 2.5–6, Empedocles was quite sensitive to humanity's tendency to mistake the part for the whole: "whatever each man happens upon, as they are tossed about in all directions, every one boasts [that in that] he has found the whole." Empedocles' obvious superiority to his fellow citizens, when considered only from within the city, made him seem godlike. But to one who takes a longer view, this perception is seriously flawed. Seen from another perspective, the larger time-scale of the long-lived *daimon*, in which the previous whole is shown to be but a part in a new, greater whole, a dramatic reversal occurs.

Such transfiguration is the experience of insight by hindsight. Empedocles obviously wished to make the contrast as violent as possible. As such, the pattern recalls the recognitions and reversals in the tragic works of Empedocles' own day, those terrible moments when Eteocles in *The Seven Against Thebes* or Oedipus in *Oedipus Rex* realize their accursedness, and finally grasp the full pattern of events for what it is. A significant distinction from those cases, however, is that Empedocles sought to make the audience itself experience a similar reversal. In first exalting his friends from Acragas and announcing his own high status, both somewhat ambiguously, he led them on into *hubris*, only to bring these high spirits crashing down in B 115.[21] For in relating his actual condition *vis-à-vis* the divine, as a fugitive and a vagrant, he directly implies the wretchedness and damnation of all mortals. If we are to seek any specific inspiration for the dramatic presentation of these ideas, Aeschylus seems the closest artistic model.[22]

As for Empedocles' purpose in adopting such an ethos, it is not hard to discern. He clearly understood that acceptance of his teachings amounted to a devastating, life-altering revelation, and harbored no illusions as to the difficulty he faced in persuading his countrymen of his beliefs. To this fragments B 2, 3, 4, 114, and 133 eloquently attest.[23] More significantly, as Osborne has pointed out (1987) 35–6, the tale of the *daimon*'s fall is a powerful explanation for the general delusion and moral corruption Empedocles imputes to mankind. B 115 and its associated themes articulate the claim that human knowledge is profoundly flawed, in particular that it is only a part of what it could be, cf. B 2.5 ff. This, it appears, is true not only of men's knowledge of external reality, but also of their self-knowledge. Just as their current lives are but a small part of a much greater story, so their current knowledge of the universe is only a part of the whole truth. Yet for all that, I also note that the resulting message is not entirely pessimistic: it also implies as a genuine possibility the "higher consciousness" and purer way of life that Empedocles claims for himself and to which he urges Pausanias.

It is in this connection, I would venture to add, that one can best appreciate the equally important rhetorical purpose of B 115. In order to render his audience more receptive to his message, Empedocles felt it was first necessary to upset the presumptions that would have otherwise blocked the "paths of understanding."[24] To this type of demolition work we can compare Socrates's practice of refutation, where a sound humiliation is often a necessary preparation for philosophical progress.[25] In another regard, however, the term "demolition work" is inaccurate. For if the alternate picture of B 115 is to some extent destructive, then its sole target is the pretensions of the first picture Empedocles presented of himself and his fellow-citizens in B 112. The reversal is meant to induce some confusion, and as I have argued even a fair dose of tragic pity and fear, but not a systematic rejection of the opening claim. Empedocles' second picture of himself is fuller and more accurate, but does not invalidate the first. In fact, the second picture is what, by hindsight, provides the key to the ambiguities of the first. Empedocles *is* like a Homeric god in that he will continue to live on after his current incarnation, but he is *not* like one in other regards. For one thing, he is fallen and suffers vexations in his exile. More than that, however, at this point in the story one cannot tell.

B 17/Ensemble a

This brings me to an even more important point: despite the force and grandeur of B 115, it was by no means the end of the story, as Plutarch explicitly tells us. From it, therefore, I now turn to consider Empedocles' third account of himself as a divine figure, or rather the one we can infer of him in B 17, with its continuation in "*ensemble* **a**" of the Strasbourg papyrus. The full passage is now the longest in the corpus, running to some 69 mostly complete lines, and, even before the papyrus's discovery, was widely recognized as the most important fragment from the *Physics*. From a doctrinal standpoint, it is the clearest and longest account of the cosmic cycle, and its intended scope of application, as argued in the opening of chapter II, is the widest of all the known fragments.

I have already touched upon the thematic links between B 115 and B 17. One notes especially the clear reference to the four elements in the description of the *daimon*'s wanderings and the fact that Empedocles describes his exile as a sort of bondage to *ravening Strife*, the cosmic agent of separation. Now, on a first hearing, these two notions would probably not have struck the hearer. As in his initial claim to divinity in B 112, where the tempering phrases *to you* and *as it seems* can easily pass unnoticed at first, so here the reference to the elements is a distinctly minor theme. At the very least, as argued above, this thematic overlap between B 115 and B 17 shows to what extent Empedocles wished to integrate his physical doctrine with the story of the *daimon*'s wanderings. But placed within the relative sequence B 112, B 115, B 17 it is obviously the case that the reference to the elements and Strife are proleptic, and that they look ahead to the account of B 17/*ensemble* **a**, where they become the dominant theme.

This latter passage is predominantly cosmological, and its focus is accordingly not on Empedocles himself.[26] Empedocles outlines the interactions of six first-principles, the four elements earth, air, fire, and water, and two psychological/mechanical powers, Love and Strife (B 17.18–20). The latter two are not quite like the four elements in that they are opposites and can act upon the elements or, more precisely, can affect their volition. Love is the principle of unification, Strife of separation, and the elements alternately come under the sway of either. The result is that the cosmos swings back and forth between a state of union under Love, in which the four elements somehow become "one," and a period when they draw apart under Strife to become many, or as Empedocles put it (line 2) *more* (sc. than one).

For now, although I have not yet dealt with the influence of Parmenides upon Empedocles' thought, one can recognize, in a provisional but hopefully uncontroversial manner, that Empedocles' response to Parmenides involved a distinction between two orders of being. On the one hand, there are the six eternal first principles, which inherit the attributes of Parmenides' "what-is" (cf. in particular B 17.17–24 with some overlaps in B 26), on the other, the products of their mixture, made up of temporary or mortal arrangements of the first principles (B 8).[27] It should also be non-controversial that, despite having baptized his eternal elements with names drawn from the Olympian pantheon (B 6), Empedocles also conceived of a class of "long-lived gods," i.e. mortal creatures, presumably more powerful and intelligent than men, yet still temporary and hence beneath the first-principles. He mentions these at B 21.12, 23.8 and now also at lines **a (ii) 2** of the Strasbourg papyrus, which I have already quoted in chapter II, while making this very point. The new passage in particular, coming as it does after a long account of his six first-principles, shows well how these creatures are not to be confused with the first principles, but belong to the realm of things produced by their mixture. In order best to display this, I quote the passage again, but include now the last two lines of B 17, and the following six lines from the papyrus:

ἀλλ' αὐτ(ὰ) ἔστιν ταῦτα, δι' ἀλλήλων δὲ θέοντα
35 γίγνεται ἄλλοτε ἄλλα καὶ ἠνεκὲς αἰὲν ὁμοῖα.
a (i) 6 [Φιλότητι συνερχό]μεν' εἰς ἕνα κόσμον,
7 [πλέ]ον' ἐξ ἑνὸς εἶναι,
8 ⌊ἐξ ὧν πάντ(α) ὅσα τ' ἦν ὅσα τ' ἐστ(ὶ) ὅ⌋σα τ' ἔσσετ' ὀπίσσω·
9 ⌊δένδρεά τ' ἐβλάστησε καὶ ἀνέρες⌋ ἠδὲ γυναῖκες,
a(ii) 1 ⌊θ⌋ῆρές τ' οἰωνοί ⌊τε καὶ⌋ ὑδατοθρ⌊έμμονες ἰχθῦς⌋
2 ⌊κ⌋αί τε θεοὶ δολιχα⌊ίωνι⌋ες τιμῆισ[ι φέριστοι.][28]

But these are the very same, yet in running through one another they become different things at different times while always similar throughout . . . in Love coming together into a single arrangement . . . [through Strife (vel sim.)] to be, out of one, more, from which from which [comes] everything that ever was, is, and will be hereafter, and [from which] spring up trees and men and women, and wild beasts and birds and fishes raised in water, and even long-lived gods, mightiest in honor.

Despite some blurring between different kinds of gods, brought on by the use of Olympian names for the first principles here and elsewhere (B 6 for the elements; B 17.24 for Love as Aphrodite), the passage clearly supports a distinction between two types of divinities in Empedocles, at least. There are, on the one hand, the eternally self-same six first-principles, the αὐτ(ὰ) ταῦτα of B 17.34, and on the other, the products of their mixture ἐξ ὧν πάντα . . . , which include plants, men and women, birds, beasts, fish, and *gods, mightiest in honor*.[29] Of the two, it is clearly to the long-lived, but not to the eternal or element-gods, that Empedocles claims to belong. That is so, despite the attempt by some, most recently the papyrus's editors, to posit an identification of the *daimon* with Love and thereby grant it status as an eternal entity.[30] Against this, as I have argued above, Empedocles' identification with these lesser gods is assured by the use of the same epithets, *long-lived* and *mightiest in honors*, to describe the gods of B 146, the summit of the cycle of reincarnation. As for the *daimon*, the only specification we find in B 115 is that he is of a class said to "have obtained a life of long span." In other words, it as well is mortal, something which would not be the case if the *daimon* consisted of particles of eternal Love. Thus the long but not eternal lifespan of the *daimon* invites identification with the gods of the same limited duration, and is probably once again proleptic, looking ahead to B 17.

Clarification and Elaboration: Long-lived, Not Immortal

Taken in that order, we can now see that the sequence as a whole displays a gradual clarification of Empedocles' status, each step looking forward to the next through proleptic use of certain terms, the significance of which in each case is only understood by the hearer through hindsight. The view from inside the work, accordingly, is quite different from that on the outside: from the inside we see a progression and a unity that was not imaginable from the outside. This hindsight, in turn, operates through not only one, but two reversals of perspective. In the first, that between B 112 and B 115, a proud yet naïve view of Empedocles' divinity, as Homeric, eternal god, is first encouraged, only to be undercut by the Orphic-Pythagorean account of the fall of the *daimon*. This reversal, as Zuntz rightly put it, "transfers the listener into a new dimension."[31] Then, in B 17, Empedocles brings about a second such reversal. For by the introduction of the eternal first-principles, ἀλλ' αὐτ(ὰ) ἔστιν ταῦτα, B 17.34), Empedocles undercuts any possible claim of eternal survival for any compound, including the *daimon*.

The sequence, I submit, is all the more probable for the skillful marshaling of terms it suggests in Empedocles' gradual presentation of himself: first, θεός, then δαίμων, then θεὸς δολίχαιων. In particular, we can observe how the final formulation, if offered first, would appear to be no more than a contradiction in terms, given the traditional associations of a θεός with immortality. But after the presentation of the first-principles, which alone in Empedocles' system inherit full immortality, a qualification is required to describe the type of beings who had been given such a name by tradition, and whom Empedocles obviously wished to keep in his theory of the world, but who could no longer truly or fully be granted such a status.[32] As for δαίμων itself, the word probably has more arcane connotations for Empedocles, but in this sequence must have been useful as a close-but-not-perfect synonym, required for the contrast with the opening passage, and still indicative of the high status Empedocles claimed for himself, until he could advance his more definitive formulation in B 17.[33] In this, I maintain, Empedocles made as strong a break as the first, and it is what allows him to stand as the author of his own particular synthesis, not merely as a devotee of Orphism and/or Pythagoreanism. This is an important point, to which I will return in the next chapter. For now, having traveled from the outside to the heart of the work, as it were, we can make a stop and reflect upon what this reveals about its nature.

Unity and the Proleptic Style

Beyond the thematic links found in the sequence B 112, B 115 and 17/*ensemble* **a**, one can observe that there is also an inflation of the general scope from one passage to the next. Through what amounts to a sort of geometrical expansion, we find that in each case, the first passage, in relation to the next, is shown to be only a part, whereas originally it seemed a more or less autono-

mous whole. Thus B 115 shows how the current life of Empedocles and his fellow citizens as depicted in B 112, is only one stage in the longer life-cycle of the *daimon* Empedocles. Then, in B 17, this second picture is subsumed into the greater and, for Empedocles' purpose, final account based on the elements and the cosmic cycle. In each set, it is as if the proper contours of the first object are only fully discerned when set against the foil of the second, although as we have seen Empedocles has inserted into each level hints, or proleptic announcements of what is to come.

This leads to a second main effect. As each of these accounts succeeds another, there is at each step a gain in clarity, as one level is illuminated by the next, through hindsight. Thus we have a situation where, from inside the work, the coherence of the various stages is given a unity that could not be discerned from outside: not only is there insight through hindsight, but also unity.

If one seeks to characterize these effects within their historical context, the first thing to note is that the structure of Empedocles' exposition is not exceptional for its age. It is another example of a type of composition best known from Aeschylus, but which also had practitioners in prose, including Heraclitus, another likely influence upon Empedocles, and later on Plato, as C. H. Kahn at different times has sought to show.[34] This style of discourse, which following Kahn I will call a proleptic composition, was—at least to my knowledge—most systematically characterized by Anne Lebeck in her study of the *Oresteia*.[35] Her description of its operation, which I will also adopt, is as follows, (1971) 1–2:

> The significance of a recurrent image unfolds in successive stages. . . . The form which repetition or recurrence takes in the *Oresteia* is that of proleptic introduction and gradual development. . . . In its early occurrences the image is elliptical or enigmatic. It is a *griphos* or riddle whose solution is strung out over the course of the individual drama or the entire trilogy. Significance increases with repetition; the image gains in clarity as the action moves to a climax. Prolepsis and gradual development of recurrent imagery, along with the corollary, movement from enigmatic utterance to clear statement, from riddle to solution, dominate the structure of the *Oresteia*.

That my analysis of the proem as reconstructed conforms to an established literary type can only reinforce the validity of both the analysis and the reconstruction. But that having been said, a skeptical reader might counter that the recognition of a proleptic composition here is potentially undermined by my own reconstruction of the work: it could be no more than an artefact of my own design. Let me therefore reassure such a reader that, while I recognize that my case is as of yet not entirely proven, there are other, more potent instances of this phenomenon in the corpus, of which B 17 is the most conspicuous, and that I will consider these in due course.

As for the term "prolepsis" or "proleptic," despite the possibility of some misunderstandings, I want to continue using it, but only in the restricted sense given above. In particular, the reader should not take it to imply a narratological analysis, as in a reference to narratives where the audience is told the ending at the outset, and the interest of the tale resides in the answer the audience is given to the *how*, not the *what* question. Here, if I am correct, Empedocles alludes to his main subject, his *what* question, over the course of the proem, but holds back from unveiling it until the doctrinal section, line 232 of book I. Moreover, since the term already has some currency in the sense Lebeck and Kahn have given it, it seems best to follow them on the point rather than attempt to coin some new term such as the "enigmatic" or "developmental style."

2. PEDAGOGICAL STRATEGIES AND PROTREPTIC PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS

a. Plato and Empedocles as Representatives of the Hierarchical Tradition of Thought

From the interpretation of one such "indirect opening," that found in Empedocles' poem, I return to the issue of the indirect opening, but now with a view to examining how Empedocles' own approach compares to its closest congeners, other literary and/or philosophical works with indirect openings. At this point, at least in light of my own reconstruction and interpretation of Empedocles' poem, it should be obvious that, since this unity can only be properly discerned by hindsight, in terms of each work's particular doctrines, the ultimate reasons in each case for choosing an indirect opening are not likely to be exactly the same. Indeed, later on I will argue that Parmenides' use of the indirect opening is at the service of a very different end than that of Empedocles. Still, ignoring for now these ultimate motives, I submit that Parmenides, Empedocles and Lucretius, despite their significant differences, have more in common than simply belonging to the tradition of didactic poetry. There is, once again, the reason we singled them out for comparison in the first place, the fact that all three have indirect openings. But is that their only shared distinguishing feature?

The Hierarchy of Knowledge

In fact, there are others. Perhaps the most conspicuous, and that most worth investigating, is the stress all three place upon the recognition of radically different grades of understanding between the source of their teachings and its recipient(s). Parmenides, or rather his goddess, and Empedocles repeatedly distinguish between "ordinary mortal" thinking, and their own divine level, as does Lucretius in treating Epicurus as a god (*DRN* V.6). This much, it is true, is to some degree a common theme of most didactic poetry, where teachings must always be advanced on some authority. But what is particular here is the prominence this theme is given, with in all three cases a strong and unmediated claim to divine authority.

Now along with the recognition of such a difference in levels of understanding there comes an increased awareness of the difficulty of communication across these levels. For in a situation where such levels or differences exist, or at least when they are felt to exist, the very possibility of communication with the audience, unless it has attained a similar level of knowledge, is necessarily put in doubt. This problem, which to some degree confronts any teacher or lecturer, must have been all the more acutely felt by Parmenides and Empedocles because of the novelty, difficulty and importance of their ideas. In particular, the question of the proper approach to the topics deemed of importance from the higher level, and of which the pupil may only dimly, if at all, appreciate the existence or interest, acquires in such circumstances uncommon importance.

Accordingly, we can now appreciate that the choice of a direct or indirect opening not only involves artistic considerations (i.e. the indirect approach leads to difficulties of unity), but also rhetorical and pedagogical concerns. Notably, it turns on whether or not one can or should disclose the whole of one's thought on any subject at the outset, let alone concerning the nature of the universe, and whether or not this constitutes good philosophical or pedagogical method.

In the cases of Parmenides, Empedocles, and Lucretius, not one of them offers any explanation for their choice of an indirect approach, and their motives for doing so remain at most implicit. While for Lucretius we have much more material from which to speculate upon possible motives,[36] for Parmenides and Empedocles it is only by the end of the fifth century that we have any evidence that these matters were openly debated. Diogenes of Apollonia, as we saw, favored the direct approach, but there is little other evidence bearing on the issue at this period.[37] Much light is thrown on the question, however, in more explicit fourth-century versions of the same debate, which allow some educated guessing as to how these implicit issues are playing themselves out in Parmenides and Empedocles. While nominally outside of my immediate topic, these later authors in fact have much to say of direct relevance to our understanding of these issues, Plato perhaps more than any other, as I will try to show.

The Fourth Century Debate

A fuller defense of the direct or "open" beginning than that of Diogenes, with a critique of the rival approach, is given in the famous story concerning Plato's lecture "On the Good," as related by Aristoxenus. In the introduction to the second book of his *Elementa Harmonica*, Aristoxenus explains why, following Aristotle, and against Plato, he prefers always to give his students a "course outline":

> This is exactly, as Aristotle always told the story, what happened to the majority of those who heard Plato's lectures 'On the Good.' Each one came assuming that he would get some or other of the things men [ordinarily] think of as a good, i.e. wealth, health, strength, in a word, some magical key to happiness.[38] But when the lectures turned out to be about sciences, numbers, geometry and astronomy, and 'limit, in that the good is one,' I think it must have seemed completely the opposite of their expectations. Some then had a low opinion of the topic, and others complained openly. And what was the cause [of this disenchantment]? They did not know what to expect, but like most contentious types[39] they came, all agape at the word [good] alone. But if, as I think, a general exposition of the whole subject had been given in advance, the prospective student would either have renounced attending or, provided it pleased him, would have thereafter remained of the same opinion.[40]

What is most striking in this description is the ease with which, *mutatis mutandis,* one could imagine that Aristoxenus is discussing Plato's *Republic.* Aristoxenus' didactic method, with its open allegiance to Aristotle's views, betrays a profound divergence from Plato's belief that no knowledge in any particular field or art is valid unless it can be related to universal knowledge.[41] As did Aristotle before him, Aristoxenus did not feel that the expertise of each specialist was diminished or invalidated if his specialty could not relate to some synoptic universal science.

However correct or not that may ultimately prove, one does not get a sense from Aristoxenus' outlook, as one does from Plato's, of the capacity of learning to alter our character and outlook on life, and of the resulting re-evaluations that can follow in the wake of some new insight. Aristoxenus' prospective student seems either to possess an inborn capacity to appreciate harmonics, or he does not. If he does, he enjoys the lectures, but we get no sense of his having been improved from such knowledge, of it making a difference in his life, or even of the possibility of his coming to like harmonics from a situation in which he did not originally.

Plato and Empedocles

If we ask which of the two didactic approaches are presupposed by our three works, it seems fairly obvious that, with the possible exception of Epicurean Lucretius, it is rather the Platonic or hierarchical. Plato himself, of course, is the author of some of the most illuminating accounts of learning in hierarchical terms, including, among others, the allegory of the cave in the *Republic* 514a–517a, the myth of the *Phaedrus* 246a–256d, and the ascent passage of the *Symposium* 209e–212a. In this regard, as Plato's own interest in Parmenides and Empedocles would tend to indicate, there are a number of shared features between the three philosophers. In particular, all three seem committed to a hierarchical conception of reality and knowledge, and the possibility of transcending normal human thinking, so as to attain a god-like perspective on the world.

For two of the four, however, Parmenides and Lucretius, it is much harder to specify the precise nature of such a state. If, in Parmenides, it seems to be the case that his trip beyond the path of men, through an ethereal gate, and subsequent initiation by the goddess, are all means of articulating an encounter with the absolute, a transcendence of his mortal condition, it is not immediately apparent whether or not this god-like perspective can even be related to terrestrial human life. Accordingly, it is difficult to say, from a human standpoint, to what extent its attainment is a good or desirable event. Nor does it appear that Parmenides thought his poem should have to provide any guidance in the here and now, as Empedocles obviously did. As for Lucretius and Epicureanism, the question seems yet more obscure.[42] Here, then, is where both the eldest and youngest of the four appear to part company with the middle pair. For Plato, I would claim, does share with Empedocles the conviction that wisdom or true learning improves us in a quite fundamental way, one that does have an influence upon our conduct in the here and now, and promises us a reward beyond this life. For Plato, true learning or philosophizing, that is to say flight to the realm of the forms, is a process whereby we not only acquire knowledge, but simultaneously become just and virtuous; it is, most famously, a ὁμοίωσις θεῷ.[43] In a similar guise, Empedocles, for whom a god is a limbless, "holy and ineffable mind alone, darting through the whole cosmos with swift thoughts" (B 134) learning or mental growth is inseparable from practical conduct, and is itself the royal road to heaven.

Although space precludes a full investigation of these matters (in particular of Plato's theory or theories of learning), I want over the next few pages to expand upon these similarities between Plato and Empedocles, because of the light Plato's more fully developed philosophy can throw upon Empedocles' thought. Indeed, beyond the wider philosophical grounds already advanced, it will be shown below that the literary structure of the *Republic* presents a potent and specific literary parallel for Empedocles' step-wise exposition of his doctrine, and as such reinforces the plausibility of the approach I have attributed to Empedocles. To bring these affinities out as fully as possible, however, it is necessary to go beyond superficial similarities of style and exposition, and consider as well the theoretical affinities underlying their similar practices. Rather, therefore, than begin with a direct comparison of the compositional structure of the *Republic* to that of Empedocles' work, it will be more helpful first to sketch out, for both thinkers, the theories of learning which motivate their common choice of a proleptic presentation of their doctrine.

I will start with Empedocles. Since at this point the reader will already be familiar with the general structure of the work, as argued above, my first step will be to reconstruct, out of the fragments, what can be made of his account of learning. This of itself will require some interpretation, and to avoid prolonging matters I will be somewhat dogmatic. From there I will then briefly consider *one* of Plato's accounts of learning, the ascent passage from the *Sym-*

posium, 209e–212a. Only then will the compositional structure of the *Republic* be advanced as a parallel for the organization of Empedocles' work, for only then will it be possible to appreciate the numerous points of contact between these two thinkers, a series of affinities which neither Plato himself nor the later readers of both authors failed to note.[44]

Finally, before I embark upon these matters, it must also be stressed to what extent, in some fundamental respects, the two do not allow for comparison. This is so because of the radically different answers, or even types of answer the two philosophers advance to questions concerning the nature of mental activity and the goal of wisdom. More specifically, Plato explicitly rejects as insufficient any exclusively physical or mechanical explanations of the soul and its activities, in favor of teleological and formal accounts, as he has Socrates argue in the *Phaedo*. Indeed, concerning the actual mechanics of the process, Plato (and probably Parmenides[45]) generally offers no speculation, and restricts himself to indirect, overtly metaphorical accounts, using images of vision and movement.[46] Only from Empedocles can we also reconstruct something along the lines of a physiological account of learning.[47]

i) Empedocles on Mental Growth and the Goal of Wisdom

The Theory: Empedoclean Panpsychism; the Identity of Growth and Learning

As of everything else, Empedocles conceived of learning in very concrete terms, and related it to his six first-principles. Mixture of the elements in varying degrees produces the full range of creation, from what we would call inanimate matter, to living creatures and gods (B 8 and **a(ii)1**). Also, since "all things have mind and a share of understanding" (B 110.10) mental phenomena are at all times part of the fabric of the universe, they do not arise *ex nihilo*. In this regard Empedocles ducks the most vexing problem of modern dualism, the difficulty of accounting for mental phenomena from apparently mindless matter. Conversely, this thoroughgoing identification of the mental and the physical has strange consequences. To begin, there is a sense in which every physical event is also a mental event (cf. B 35.11;B 17.9/26.8).[48] This means that Empedocles cannot or does not *in theory* distinguish the psychological from the physiological, or even the physiological from the physical, although he tends to do so in practice.[49] Thus, while my goal is to consider the picture this produces of mental or psychological activity, many of the criticisms to which his general theory is prone can equally well be made in these other domains. In fact, given how difficult it is to disentangle one from the other, it will be easier to illustrate Empedocles' account of learning if I first take a yet another step back to consider his theory's explanatory potential in biology, and from there return to his account of learning.

Empedocles and the Scale of Nature

By putting every creature on the same footing before the elements, as a variety of mixture, the continuity from plant to animal, animal to man, and man to (composite) god is more readily grasped. All of them are merely different ratios of mixture, placed on a scale of increasingly harmonious blends, at the pinnacle of which apparently stands the god, also known as One or the Sphairos (B 27–29), a perfect 1:1:1:1 blending of the four elements under Love, without any admixture of Strife. In the present state of the world, the closest approximation to this perfect blend is found in flesh and blood (B 98). That, for apparently speculative rather than empirical reasons, accounts for the special value of blood, as the source of the special capacities of the higher organisms. But there also, at least to later thinkers, was the theory's main blind spot. While Empedocles' theory of mixture has the great appeal of allowing us to grade all living creatures on a continuum, it fails to give any predictable or intelligible account of the *differences* between various forms of life as they actually occur, or for that matter any explanation of their ability to endure as distinct species.[50] Put another way, Empedocles fails to see the trees for the forest. Although he tends to assume as much, he cannot adequately explain the existence of different forms of life, or the emergence of new faculties up and down the chain of being.[51] To take a specific example, in his description of the working of the eye, B 84, which we can supplement with Theophrastus' *De Sensibus* chapters 12 and 18, Empedocles does not seem to distinguish the physiological phenomena of *vision* from the physical property of an object's being *visible*. As Theophrastus points out in chapter 13, regardless of the mechanical account of the channels in the eye and their ability to sort out effluences from outside, if it is by the fire (and probably water[52]) within the eye that we see the fire (and water) outside, are we then to imagine that the fire (and water) outside the body are also perceiving?

Even to begin explaining these differences was something that, at least according to Aristotle, required formal and final causes.[53] Empedocles does on occasion, it is true, employ the notion of specific ratios to explain *both* the structure of organic compounds *and* the degrees of knowledge. There is thus the germ of more specific types of explanation, but the theory is only illustrated by a few examples.[54] We are still left without any explanation why, e.g. when a man's blending is improved, this or that quality or capacity appears, be it physiological and/or mental, or, more broadly, why one ratio is innately better than another. This is particularly conspicuous in liminal cases, where a quantitative change seems inexplicably to produce a qualitatively new structure or capacity. The most obvious example of this for my purposes would of course be the passage from man to god.

But if this aspect of the theory is unsatisfying, one must not omit the other more insightful distinctions and possibilities it contains. First, Empedocles does distinguish growth from mere addition. Natural growth, that is the production of *stable* compounds, is no mere conglomeration, but requires the presence of harmony or Love. This, as many have noted, comes close to some kind of formal cause.[55] Further, Empedocles seems to recognize the possibility, in each specific organism, to transcend its status by further "harmonizing" itself. By refining and purifying oneself, perhaps even somehow increasing the amount of Love in one's make-up, it is possible to scale the hierarchy of nature. This is why, for Empedocles, it is important that "mental growth" not be a metaphor; we are mentally *and* physically altered by whatever we can "take in."[56] How a laurel bush could strive for some higher state remains difficult to imagine, but no more so than that the elements should have some minimal intelligence. On such a basis, a man becoming a god is no more outlandish than any other passage from a lower to a higher form; it is but one specific instance among others. If we reflect that some similar possible acquisition of new capacities seems to be required by the modern theory of evolution, albeit on a much greater-time scale, and without the same willingness to grade these capacities as high or low on some absolute register, one can see where Empedocles' vagueness is perhaps more congenial to us than Aristotle's rigid delineation of eternal species.

Empedocles on Learning

Having illustrated these difficulties in other fields I can now consider more clearly the question of learning. Here, then, one finds the same difficulty as previously, the tension within a view which attempts to relate one state to the next by a simple quantitative change, but which at the same time recognizes these states as qualitatively distinct. We recall that, for Empedocles, the definition of mortal thinking is a truncated or partial view of reality, no doubt as opposed to a god's view, which must be of the whole (B 2.5–6; B 39). In that sense, then, to become a god, one must simply learn, or increase one's knowledge from that of the part to the whole. Yet the two states are also radically different. Both from the outside, as from a more subjective standpoint, being a long-lived god is not at all like being a man.

On the level of physical capacities, the god transcends human limitations of space and time (B 134,142), which is not to say he is without limits of his own. In particular, as I have argued, he is only long-lived, not eternal. As for mental capacities, the psychological distance between the two seems even greater: the mortal is generally so deluded as to be incapable of imagining the world otherwise. For one thing, he thinks of his partial knowledge that it is complete; he does not even suspect there is more. Here therefore the disjunction between man and god is absolute and, paradoxically, one has to become a god actually to see the continuity between man and god. The new knowledge, if by some act of grace it is granted a mortal, without necessarily invalidating his previous beliefs, at the very least upsets their whole context, and thus their significance. Although part of a continuous process, there is also obviously at some point a leap forward, a sudden break with past experience.

The Practice

While such a broken continuity, as I have argued, is not well accounted for by Empedocles' theory of the world, in one very important respect he does recognize this aspect, namely in his practice, *in the dramatic presentation of his doctrine*. As seen above, when the scope of the poem expands from man and *polis* (B 112) to humanity and the divine (B 115), and finally, to the whole of nature, the first principles and the cosmic cycle (B 17), Empedocles deliberately coordinates these jumps with reversals in perspective, whereby, in a manner reminiscent of a tragic reversals and recognitions, or anticipatory of later religious conversions, the hearer not only learns, but is hopefully moved, or even altered from what he was previously. By being shown a new manner of conceiving the world and his relation to it, this conversion or change in external outlook brings about a change within the internal makeup of the hearer.[57]

ii) The Link to Plato: Dialectic and the Ascent Passage from the Symposium

But such recognitions, to reflect more widely upon the matter, are not confined to tragedy alone, nor are they necessarily tragic in the sense of bleak and pessimistic disillusionments. They may also take the form of illuminations, of bright moments of insight. In Empedocles, the second such movement, the revelation of the first-principles (B 17), I would interpret as a means to the subject's own divinization, analogously to the contemplation of the Forms in Plato. Without remaining committed to either thinker's eschatological framework, we can recognize that even in ordinary lives such life-altering moments of insight occur, investing the past with unsuspected meanings. These transfigurations may be benign, or even positive. If we see them essentially as the result of a moment of insight, then their link to philosophy is more apparent. If we take the further step of trying to tie such moments together into a larger continuum, then optimistically we can apply to this sequence the term dialectic, ideally a process of intellectual ascent to an ever more all-encompassing viewpoint. The main similarity with tragic recognitions lies in the re-valuations of past actions or concerns from the new viewpoint, and in the possible continuity this bestows upon a sequence which, from the previous viewpoint, we could not imagine.

The Ascent Passage

This line of thought of course leads straight back to Plato. Although both the myth of the soul in the *Phaedrus* and the allegory of the cave in *Republic* 7 have stronger claims to some degree of Empedoclean inspiration, the Platonic account I want to investigate and compare to Empedocles is the ascent passage from the *Symposium*, 209e–212a. My reason for doing so is that it is quite deliberately less fantastical than the other two. As a result, its psychological credibility as a phenomenological account of mental growth is all the greater. Accordingly, it can provide a less otherworldly model of mental growth, but one which retains enough common features with Empedocles to reveal their common hierarchical conception of learning. That, in turn, will allow a better appreciation of why both writers adopt what I will characterize as a similar rhetorical strategy in presenting their doctrine.

In the *Symposium*, a dialogue whose organizing structure is a contest of epideictic oratory in praise of Eros, Socrates makes his own speech the personal narrative of an initiation he received from the Mantineian priestess Diotima into the mysteries of that god. The ascent passage occurs in the final part of his initiation, which Diotima describes as the last level of initiation τὰ δὲ τέλεα καὶ ἐποπτικά (210a1). She prescribes a method or a process, whereby the lover's interests, if he goes about the matter correctly, will follow an ascending path, across a number of levels.[58]

Within these levels, if he loves well, the lover will experience a change in the objects of his desires, a movement from the particular to the universal. Thus, in the first level, he will pass from the love of one specific beautiful body to a more abstract appreciation of the beauty common to all beautiful bodies. This first ascent, in turn, leads to an even greater leap, whereby he learns to appreciate beauty within a whole new level of beings: no longer a lover of bodies, he becomes a lover of souls. (For brevity's sake I will take the move from particulars to their general class for granted in describing this and the next levels). A second disjunction then leads to the discovery of the beauty of practices and institutions. After yet another, he will come to love the beauty of the sciences, from which at last he will turn to "the wide sea of the beautiful" and there, at the very end, he will attain knowledge of ultimate beauty:

> For he who has been instructed thus far in the things of Eros, and who has learned to see the beautiful in due order and succession, when he comes towards the end of them will suddenly perceive a beauty of astonishing nature. That beauty, Socrates, is the cause for the sake of which were all our previous toils, which in the first place is everlasting, neither coming into being nor passing away, neither decreasing nor increasing, since it is not beautiful in some respect, but ugly in another, or at one time or in one relation or at one place fair, at another time or in another relation or at another place foul . . .[59]

For my purposes, the most notable common feature between Plato's description and Empedocles' mode of operation is the suddenness of the final vision, and its ability to impart significance, by hindsight, upon the previous steps of the quest. In this we can well discern how Empedocles' first-principles are to some extent the philosophical predecessors of Plato's Forms, not only in that they are the stable and unchanging bed-rock of reality, but also because they serve as the final, self-sufficient objects of contemplation in the intellectual quest for reality. It is worth noting, however, that in Plato, unlike Empedocles, the final revelation is distinct from the others by its sudden bursting forth; in Empedocles, I have argued, a moment of insight-by-hindsight colors both reversals (B 115 and B 17). In fact, I do not think it too much to suggest that this

may have more to do with Plato's rhetorical purposes than a preoccupation with psychological verisimilitude.[60] However that may be, we nevertheless find in Plato explicitly expressed what remains strongly implied in Empedocles: a portrayal of loving/learning as a broken continuity, in which changes are depicted as gradual, but which also give way at specific moments to more sudden and important shifts. While not as explicitly biological as Empedocles, there remain in Plato's picture indubitable traces of underlying assumptions relating intellectual progress to natural growth, with a corresponding tendency to divide it into stages within a longer process, crowned by a final and stable state of maturity, wherein the earlier stages find their end and goal.

Plato as a Practitioner of the Proleptic Style: The Example of the Republic

My comparison, I want to stress, has not been pursued in the name of any attempt at a rigorous psychological typology, or to suggest Plato's narrow dependence on Empedocles, but to show that in Plato we have a good parallel for Empedocles' own didactic approach, uniting closeness of psychological outlook, chronological proximity, and the use of a similar literary form to convey a philosophical message.[61] Most importantly, Plato and Empedocles not only appear to share some similar assumptions concerning the nature of learning, but based upon these assumptions, go about presenting their doctrines in a similar, proleptic manner.

To demonstrate this adequately, however, even via a succinct survey of Plato's practice, is clearly beyond the purview of this study.[62] Still, because Plato's own practice can help us better understand Empedocles' approach (and this in turn reinforces the plausibility of my interpretation of Empedocles' presentation) I want to consider a single, but perhaps the most convincing instance of the phenomenon, the literary structure of the *Republic*.[63]

Beyond its many other superlative qualities, the *Republic* is a marvel of organization, and the exploration of the details of this organization make it one of the most rewarding works to reread time and again. One of the most significant features of this organization is the fine balance between all its distinct parts and the whole work, and the care Plato lavishes upon anticipatory passages. With the built-in hindsight of multiple re-readings, the reader can easily discern, in book I in particular, numerous allusions to themes and notions to which Plato will return in much greater detail as the work progresses. Thus, from the very first word, κατέβην, *I went down*, perhaps evoking the allegory of the cave, and the just man's obligation to descend again to help those left behind, to the first scene, where Glaucon and Adeimantus block Socrates's path on his way back up to the city, surely an anticipation of their roles as his main opponents in the dialogue, the whole work is conceived as a unity, with no loose ends, turning upon the central theme of justice and how one should live (352d).

The result of this careful preparation of the reader, as Kahn has argued, is that much of what is discussed in book I, by his reckoning over half of it, recurs in more elaborate form throughout the rest of the work.[64] Indeed, this property of the work's design seems all the more irrefutable for the fact that Plato himself hints at it in the opening of book II. There, readers will recall, Plato momentarily breaks the illusion by having Socrates say of the previous discussion with Thrasymachus: "And with those words I thought we had settled the matter; but it was [only], so it seemed, the overture."[65] The word προοίμιον is no doubt meant to indicate to the reader that the initial part of the work is over, and that the main body of the discourse is about to begin. Here then, we have a self-conscious use of an indirect opening, where Plato seemingly reassures the reader about the continuity between the first book and subsequent sections. The reference to a proem bids us to be patient, promises us that there is much more to come, and that while the continuity may not be immediately apparent, it will be made apparent, through hindsight. That the discussion will proceed to a new level, not so much breaking with the previous concerns, but seeking out more universal grounds for them, Plato has in any case already rehearsed this as well on a smaller scale, when Polemarchus was designated heir to Cephalus' argument about justice (331d–e). Yet again what had seemed the ending became, with hindsight, only the beginning.

Some General Points of Comparison

The similarity found in these two approaches naturally invites a few general observations. First, to recapitulate, given their similar approach to the presentation of their respective doctrines, and given Plato's explicit commitment to a hierarchic conception of wisdom, it is not outlandish to use Plato to help articulate Empedocles' conception of his own project. It simply seems to be the case that a hierarchical conception of learning and intelligence is more willing to recognize discontinuities or leaps as a naturally occurring facet of intellectual life, if only to play down their significance from the higher vantage point, where unity and continuity are more strongly stressed. More importantly, what this comparison shows is that the adoption of a literary form has little to do with how philosophical or not the message is, but rather reflects a deliberate choice of literary form as the most suitable manner of conveying it, in terms of shared assumptions about the nature of learning itself.

A second shared feature of both authors, which also flows from the same core assumptions, is a dogmatic and authoritarian tendency. Specifically, in keeping with a hierarchical conception of reality, its adherent will naturally conceive of his role as one where he must first conform himself to the higher powers, and then assist the disciple in doing so; compare e.g. Heraclitus B 114. Plato, however, while remaining strongly committed to the possibility of knowledge, is much more conscious of the obstacles to its attainment, whereas Empedocles still spoke with the assurance of the prophet: as he himself tells us, he knows the truth, but recognizes that it is difficult to convince men of it (B 114). For that very reason, I have argued, later doxographers rightly classed him, but not Plato, along with Heraclitus and the Stoics among the "dogmatics."[66] To this end, both authors also see themselves as the successors of another group of hierarchical dogmatists, the officials of mystery cults: both Empedocles and Plato self-consciously adopt the methods and terminology of initiation rituals, but redirect this pattern towards the cult of more impersonal and abstract sources, making these the privileged objects of the individual's attention.[67]

This leads to one last important point of comparison between Plato and Empedocles, the similarity in their artistic depiction of the psychological and emotional condition of the possessor of wisdom, the beatific effects of wisdom. For on this point at least Plato does not retreat to an indirect formulation, but consistently shows his philosophical mentor to have been more just, and ipso facto happier than anyone else, that because of his privileged access to knowledge. If, in matters of doctrine, Plato leaves open the possibility of disagreeing with the answers he has Socrates advance in the dialogues (at least when they are advanced), in his depiction of the psychological rewards that come from finding these final answers, he never wavers. In that regard, the exalted epistemological optimism of Plato's middle dialogues especially is not that different from the intellectual triumphalism of Parmenides and Empedocles. Of itself, as has been well argued by Nussbaum, this can be a sort of tacit appeal to an irrational desire for invulnerability, a denial of the fragility of goodness.[68] But even without including that possible motivation, the commitment to the possibility of complete or absolute knowledge, to a god-like view of the world, has other sources of appeal. It can also draw more directly and exclusively on the possibility of reason's own self-fulfillment, via the logic of parts-and-whole: if it is possible at least to know some things, to have a partial understanding of reality, then it seems all the more difficult to deny, in theory at least, the possibility of reason's eventually completely comprehending reality.

At a less abstract level, both idealizing portraits of wisdom, "Empedocles the god" and "Socrates the wisest and most just" play on our expectations of what kinds of rewards such final knowledge could deliver. In Plato this idealization is no doubt conscious and deliberate; it is part of Plato' dramatic purpose, intended to attract readers to the examined, philosophical life.[69] For Empedocles, it is impossible completely to disentangle his biography from the portrait he left of himself in his poem.[70] If the historical Empedocles was significantly different from the self-portrait he left to posterity, we have no means of recovering that fact.

Thus, to bring this extended comparison to a close, it is Plato's greater self-consciousness that most clearly distinguishes him from Parmenides and Empedocles. For the two earlier authors, their own first-person experiences of transcendent insight are directly projected onto divinity and thus proclaimed as final and universally valid. The more self-conscious Plato distinguishes his own philosophical biography from the broader type of the philosophic life. He overcomes the difficulty of giving a direct, final, and universally valid account by instead depicting Socrates attempting to articulate such an account, with varying degrees of success.

This is most clearly the case, to take a last glance back at the ascent passage from the *Symposium*, if one considers the very debatable merit of the successive order of levels Plato there advances. For it would be rather odd indeed if we were to hold Plato to the letter, and take him as seriously maintaining that one could not grasp the beauty of mathematics without having previously loved boys and political institutions.[71] But as Moravcsik's analysis of the passage shows, Plato does indirectly recognize this, and tends to confine the work of ratiocination within levels, at least in the lower levels, whereas Eros is the force that effects the "transcategorical" jumps from level to level. It does so by imparting disaffection for the older objects of love, and spurring on our curiosity to explore that which we cannot as of yet fully grasp.[72] Plato's picture, therefore, can be read as deliberately overschematic, at least in the lower levels. It is only in the later stages, perhaps, that the mediation of Eros is not as strongly felt, and that intellectual curiosity becomes self-sufficient. In Empedocles or Parmenides, however, where this ascent is still only implicit, we find no such ability to question each move, but their own particular method or ascent to a more objective and impersonal view of the world is proposed as the one and only way.

b. Protreptic Philosophical Works: Rhetorical Features in Empedocles' Proem

Protreptic Philosophical Works

Although Plato quite self-consciously provides the best examples of this type of phenomenon, it is also well to remember that his work can also be considered but one strand, if perhaps the most distinguished, within the larger tradition of protreptic philosophical discourse. Indeed, it has recently been argued that the entire Platonic corpus is a gigantic protreptic philosophical project.[73] The term itself, as applied to works of philosophy, more accurately belongs to works produced after Plato, beginning with the most famous of them in antiquity, Aristotle's *Protrepticus*.[74] These works were a continuation of the Platonic program in that they were written in response to competition from the sophists or rhetors and their educational ideal, to make a case for the study of philosophy. To some extent they are an instance of the philosopher meeting the rhetors on their own terms, for this type of usually moralizing sermon, most often with a specific addressee, was a variety of epideictic oratory first developed by the sophists to recruit students.[75] Both were heirs to the tradition of didactic poetry, in particular the *Works and Days*.

In this regard, I suggest, one can already appreciate a certain similarity between the works of Parmenides, Empedocles, Plato, and Lucretius in that each work is most usefully read, at least in part, as protreptic. Each has a strong rhetorical goal, namely to persuade its audience of new and difficult truths, which could not be easily grasped because they go against habitual ways of thought. In such a work, criticism of broader commonplaces and received notions, highlighting the desirability of an alternate scheme, is a necessary preliminary, and this remains true of Plato as well as of Lucretius or Empedocles: an aporia must first be felt if there is to be any appreciation of its solution. And even when such a solution is offered, its novelty and strangeness are liable to be so paradoxical and alienating as to preclude our accepting it. This in turn reinforces the importance of these preliminary criticisms in pointing out the shortcomings of more established views.

Aristotle, in the passage from the *Rhetoric* considered above, confirms this connection when he observes that the other kinds of introduction employed [i.e. indirect] are remedial in purpose (III 14 1415a25). That is to say, the speaker is aware that his case is unlikely to get a fair hearing because of some prejudice against him, which must first be cleared away. Socrates's strategy in the *Apology* is a good practical example of this, where Socrates devotes much of his time to a refutation of the "old accusers" (19a8–24b2), i.e. his reputation as a religious innovator, before turning to his actual opponents in court. Thus, beyond suspense and attention, foreshadowing and pedagogical concerns, one can also include among the possible motives for an indirect opening an opportunity to question and to undermine received views.

Of the three poems with indirect openings singled out for comparison, this last function is most conspicuous in Parmenides, no doubt because of the greater paradox inherent in his doctrine. The goddess herself, it will be recalled, calls her whole speech an *elenchus*, a cross-examination or testing, and warns the *kouros* against the force of habit.[76] She begins to do so already in DK 28 B 6 and B 7, before the main doctrinal exposition in B 8, and the contrast between the error of mortal opinion and the Way of Truth is maintained throughout that passage, and forms a strong sub-text to the cosmology in the Way of Seeming.[77] This is much less the case in Empedocles, whose goal is to save appearances, against Parmenides, so that his criticisms center only on mortal assumptions of generation from nothing and destruction into nothing, not on the denial of any form of change. If my suggested reconstruction is correct, most of this is concentrated in the section preceding the main doctrinal exposition (DK B 12–14). In Lucretius, finally, the enunciation of these axioms is also important, but as a weapon to counter the religious imagination, which assigns to the gods whatever it does not understand (*DRN* I.150–158.)

i) Reply to the Preliminary Objection

At the same time, the recognition of the poem's overall goal as protreptic, as well as the identification of the particular role the proem plays in this respect, as a means of drawing the hearer in, so as to convert him to a new understanding the world, leads to a potential ambiguity in the proem's status. For if the opening itself is solely a device designed to entice the hearer within, then from the internal standpoint of the doctrine it can be dismissed as mere window-dressing, or "bait and switch" advertising. In Parmenides for instance, any reading of the poem which favors the Way of Truth to the exclusion of any truth-value for the cosmology in the Way of Seeming seems *a fortiori* committed to dismissing the proem, granting it at most an allegorical or metaphorical value.[78] Lucretius, in turn, as perceptive readers have pointed out, gradually strips Venus of the attributes with which she is adorned in the proem, and throughout the work redistributes these to impersonal forces, including nature, spring, and the more technical Epicurean concepts *ataraxia* and/or catastematic pleasure.[79] Here the contrast is not so striking as in Parmenides, for if Venus herself is considerably diminished from her initial Olympian status, her attributes are nevertheless recognized as true features of the world. Of the two, I think Empedocles' proem was closer to Lucretius' proem in function. Its manipulation of the reader's expectations leads not so much to an outright rejection of the previous outlook as to a reworking of it within a new framework. We have rather a reversal in perspective, as that operated by Empedocles with regards to his status as a god.

For my specific purpose in this study, recognition of this aspect in the proems of all three authors can play an important part in explaining the curious fate which Empedocles' thought underwent in the last 150 years. The division of his thought into two halves, it will be recalled, was fueled in large measure by Aristotle's selective interest in its scientific side. But now, based upon the single-work hypothesis, I can also suggest a plausible motive why Aristotle and many of our ancient witnesses simply ignored the proems of Parmenides and Empedocles: they understood them as mere poetic conventions, designed to establish the authority of the speaker and strike the hearers' imagination. Plato for instance, to consider a well-documented case, in the passages he devotes to the doctrines of Parmenides, concentrates exclusively on what he considers its central tenets, that "all is one" and that this one is immobile and unchanging.[80] He deliberately ignores the context of the chariot ride and the fact that Parmenides is merely the recipient of the goddess's teachings, not their exponent. At *Sophist* 237a, for instance, he attributes her words directly to Parmenides in quoting B 7. 1–2, Παρμενίδης δέ ὁ μέγας . . . λέγων καὶ μετὰ μέτρων, *But the great Parmenides . . . says in verse*, or again at 244e, where he introduces the citation of B 8. 43–45 with the words ὥσπερ καὶ Παρμενίδης λέγει *just as Parmenides says.*

Aristotle, in turn, adopts much the same practice in his discussions of Parmenides, e.g. at *Physics* I, 2–3, 184b15 ff. or *Metaphysics* A 3 984a 19 ff., so that I need not multiply examples to demonstrate such a common usage. Both authors, who can hardly be accused of not knowing the whole poem, merely exemplify the wider practice of disregarding the prospect that the proem of a poem is doctrinally significant, or that it actually succeeds in establishing the speaker's authority. No more than when discussing Homer or Hesiod do they ascribe to what they would have considered the fiction of crediting the poet's words to the Muses or some god, but simply asserted "Parmenides says," as when they also quoted from the epics in such terms as "Homer says," "Hesiod says."

From this I think that it can safely be inferred that Aristotle's own selective treatment of Empedocles as a *phusiologos* is not a relevant criterion for excluding the latter's claim to divine status, *especially* on the single-work hypothesis. If such a claim was given its main statement in the proem, where we would expect it according to poetic convention, and where Plutarch tells us B 115 belongs, then we have a perfectly sound explanation why Aristotle choose to ignore it. He considered it the equivalent of a poetic appeal to authority, like Parmenides' chariot ride and goddess, and not essentially relevant to the doctrine. This of course was an anachronistic distortion, as it may be wrong to think that Hesiod did not genuinely believe he had received his poems from the Muses, but one which is much more harmful with regards to the historical and literary understanding of the work than it is detrimental to an understanding of the doctrine.

ii) The Rhetorical Structure and Function of Empedocles' Proem

Empedocles' adoption of an indirect opening for his didactic poem, I have argued, has a single over-arching aim: to lead the reader to the doctrine, the final account of reality set out in B 17. That account, unlike what leads to it, is meant to stand on its own, and serve as the underpinnings of all else. It is important to note, however, that the job of persuasion cannot have ended with fragment 17. Rather, Empedocles apparently spent the rest of the work demonstrating the applicability of its general scheme.[81]

In this regard, it is necessary to recognize a distinction between the *kinds* of persuasion Empedocles employs before and after that passage. The distinction resides in that the material that follows B 17 is explicitly related to its teachings, whereas the material belonging to the proem is not. Thus the interest the proem presents for the first-time hearer is not the same as that available to one who knows the whole work; both draw on different sources. This two-sidedness to the proem has been acknowledged above, even though my focus on the unity of the work has led us to read it out of order, in that I approached the proem in cognizance of the doctrine, and thus read it first from the inside, as it were. Here I turn this back around, and attempt to chart the overt appeal of the proem, and how it gradually leads to a different type of persuasion, founded on Empedocles' doctrine. This will complete the study of the relation between proem and doctrine, and serve to introduce the main question that I will pursue in the last part of this section, a fuller survey of the appeal, or sources of persuasion, that Empedocles drew upon to convince men of his account.

I return therefore one last time to my reconstruction of the proem, but this time to consider it through the eyes of a rhetor. That the work should contain some recognizably rhetorical effects is likely not only on chronological grounds, for Empedocles' life coincides with the career of the first writers of rhetorical handbooks, the Syracusans Corax and Tisias[82] but is reinforced by the tradition of Gorgias' apprenticeship under Empedocles[83] as well as by a somewhat enigmatic fragment from Aristotle's *Sophist*, where Zeno is credited with the invention of dialectic, and Empedocles rhetoric.[84]

The Public Address to the Acragantines

The natural place to begin is to consider the first part of the proem, the material up to the change of addressees, where Empedocles *is* ostensibly giving a public speech. In fact, considered from the standpoint of rhetorical composition, this material has all the makings of complete speech on its own, including proem, narration and peroration. That Empedocles should have some basic notion of the formal divisions of a speech is not unexpected, for *partitio* is the one rhetorical precept we find attested in the earliest discussion of the art.[85] The proem (of the proem) would then consist only of B 112–114, whereas the material describing the exile and reincarnation of the *daimon* would stand as the *narratio*, giving the background and factual details, including, as in standard forensic practice, a statement of the law at issue, here the "decree of Necessity." In this light, B 112.1–3, are unmistakably a *captatio benevolentiae*, followed by a claim to authority (line 4) and leading to thrilling promises of gain and cures (lines 9–12), guaranteed to pique, if not the interest, then at least the curiosity of the hearer.[86] Following it, in what would be the *narratio*, B 115 provides a general statement of the law at issue, which Empedocles confesses he has violated, but thereby also implicating all his hearers, whereas B 135, with its stress upon the universal community of all living things, underscores the importance and universality of its application. Finally, the section I have grouped together as invective directed at plural addressees is a natural climax, with a striking emotional example in the pathetic example of the cannibalistic feast of B 137.

This possible arrangement, however, need not exclude that such a first speech could in turn have served as itself an introduction. On the contrary, its potential ability to stand on its own reminds us again of the structure of many Platonic dialogues, where a change of interlocutors occurs after a first exchange, and helps to negotiate a transition to a more comprehensive discussion of the same topic.[87] In this instance, Pausanias seems to be distinguished from the other "friends" because of his goodwill, his adhesion to the initial precepts contained in the public address, and that is what allows Empedocles' exposition to continue beyond the opening harangue.[88] Thus, as canvassed above, it might also make sense to consider only that first section the proem proper, with the address to the Muse and Pausanias marking the true transition to the doctrinal section of the work.

But then again, in terms of the doctrine contained in B 17, it is not the case that the disciple, as of the end of this first section, is in a position to appreciate it as a solution to any difficulties. For that he still has to be presented with a critique of ordinary thought, and a statement of Eleatic laws. There remains, therefore, a basic rhetorical pattern to the larger or overarching structure, as B 17 stands, in relation to what surrounds it, as an account requiring an introduction, a pre-emptive rebuttal of the possible prejudices that might deny its validity, followed by various types of proof. To this end, the first half of the proem, the whole speech to the Acragantines, corresponds well to the usual function of the initial part of a proem, winning the audience's goodwill, or at least appealing to its emotions. This will seem paradoxical if we suppose Empedocles to have been cultivating the goodwill of the "friends from Acragas." It will not if we understand that, by what we now see is a characteristic reversal, the intended audience is *not* the friends from Acragas, but the disciple, and through him, potential followers. For it is hard indeed to imagine that any hearer would want to continue listening or reading, unless he or she could sympathize with Empedocles' righteous anger at the life led by the men of Acragas. Empedocles' Pythagorean Jeremiad is therefore not solely aimed at converting all the "friends," but rather at securing the approval of the right kind of listener, the austere or puritanically minded, at separating him out from the chaff.[89]

Thus, to employ yet again my spatial metaphor, it is possible to see that, from the inside, this whole speech can also function as a *captatio benevolentiae*, according to its standard function of appealing to the goodwill of the listener, and is but the first part of the proem. That, in turn, explains why the tone softens in the following section, after the change of addressees, even though, as we have pointed out above, the critique of ordinary thought was not complete. To appreciate B 17 as an account, to see in it a solution of sorts, the disciple still needed to hear the criticism of ordinary thought and have set out for him its consequent, the Eleatic laws denying generation from or into nothing.

Yet, despite all that preparation, it is also abundantly clear that Empedocles did not feel that B 17 was self-explanatory. As I have pointed out above, the passage is capped by a transition where Empedocles promises to show the disciple the alternation of one and many in nature, *the coming-together and unfolding of life*, **a (ii) 24**. That, in turn, as the next lines show, Empedocles will support with evidence or traces of this process among living creatures. From them the disciple will convey to his *phren* "unerring proofs":

23 [δεί]ξω σοι καὶ ἀν' ὄσσ(ε) ἵνα μείζονι σώμ[ατι κύρει(?),]

24 [π]ρῶτον μὲν ξύνοδόν τε διάπτυξίν τ[ε γενέθλης]
25 ὅσ[σ]α τε νῦν ἔτι λοιπὰ πέλει τούτοιο τ[όκοιο(?),]
26 τοῦτο μὲν [ἄν] θηρῶν ὀριπλάγκτων ἀγ[ρότερ' εἴδη(?)]
27 τοῦτο δ' ἀν' ἀ[νθρώ]πων δίδυμον φύμα, [τοῦτο δ' ἀν' ἀγρῶν(?)]
28 ῥιζοφόρων γέννημα καὶ ἀμπελοβάμ[ονα βότρυν(?)]
29 ἐκ τῶν ἀψευδῆ κόμισαι φρένι δείγματα μ[ύθων·]

I will show to you, even before your eyes, where they fall into a larger body, first the coming-together and unfolding of life, and all that is left of such generation, on the one hand among the wild species of mountain-roaming beasts, on the other in the twofold offspring of mankind, or the produce of root-bearing fields and the cluster of grapes mounting on the vine. From these convey to your phren truthful proofs of my words.[90]

More extensively, as we know from Simplicius, much of book I must have been devoted to shoring up the general thesis presented in B 17/*ensemble* a. Fragments B 21, 23, 26, then 35, 98 and 96, can all be placed in book I in their relative order, after B 17, thanks to Simplicius, whereas both Simplicius and internal evidence show that these passages were meant to support, develop and illustrate the basic thesis of B 17. In B 21.1 Empedocles adduces the great world bodies as *witnesses*, ἐπιμάρτυρα, to his account, and the gracious simile of the painters, B 23, according to Simplicius, was a *luminous illustration* of the work of Love and Strife. B 96 and 98, in turn, as B 23, argue that it is the ratio of the elements that can account for the different specific properties of tissues, blood and bones, and that such variety is possible despite the limited number of elements.[91]

Continuity and the Hearer's Expectations

From this we see that the proof of Empedocles' thesis about the cycle will be carried out, *inter alia*, by analogies and illustrations from nature and the crafts, even though it was introduced, first, as the continuation of an account of the *daimon*, and secondly as a general thesis resting on abstract Eleatic laws. In all of this, we can see that the hearer, as he advances through the work, is being presented with very different forms of persuasion. While Empedocles' initial presentation of himself exploits epic and inherited religious lore to endorse his authority, the demonstration of his main thesis turns instead on a combination of *a priori* argument and empirical observation. Nevertheless, there is in all of this an undeniable *direction* to the work, as along with the new topics come changes in the mode of argumentation.

In this whole progression, Empedocles advertises his intention to lead the hearer beyond ordinary thought, but paradoxically, in so doing he also stresses the continuities with such mortal thought, as discerned from this new viewpoint. I have already suggested that the fictional situation of the work's opening stresses the return of the divine to the middle of human life, unlike Parmenides' trip beyond the paths of men. The paradox is that in *going beyond*, Empedocles simultaneously leads the hearer back to himself, so as truly to "know himself" for the first time (cf. Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math*. I 302). In this Empedocles seems to be playing somewhat with the expectations of the hearer, even perhaps leading him on. Above I argued that the otherworldly doctrine of the *daimon* was made the subject of public disclosure in the opening of the work in order to draw in the reader, or at least the right kind of reader. But, having drawn his public in with promises of thrilling revelations and secret lore, the poem's more specialized teachings concentrate upon nature and the known world, and illustrate its operations through analogies taken from ordinary life. One is reminded of the story of Plato's lecture *On the Good* and the disappointment felt by hearers who thought they could find there some key to happiness. Certainly, the poem must have been a disappointment for those seeking to escape from the world, either in the form of a *permanent* end to personal existence in death, or by means of the *eternal* life beyond the grave; if I am not mistaken, Empedocles denied both.

CHAPTER IV

The Persuasion of Empedocles

ὦ φίλοι, οἶδα μὲν οὕνεκ᾽ ἀληθείη πάρα μύθοις
οὓς ἐγὼ ἐξερέω· μάλα δ᾽ ἀργαλέη γε τέτυκται
ἀνδράσι καὶ δύσζηλος ἐπὶ φρένα πίστιος ὁρμή. (B 114)

Friends! I know that truth stands by the words that I will speak; but it is most difficult for men [to accept], *and the flow of persuasion into the mind is resented.*

To provide an alternative to the imaginable and unimaginable skeptical possibilities, a self-transcendent conception should ideally explain the following four things: (1) what the world is like; (2) what we are like; (3) Why the world appears to beings like us in certain respects as it is and in certain respects as it isn't; (4) how beings like us can arrive at such a conception. In practice, the last condition is rarely met.

T. Nagel, *The View from Nowhere*, p. 74

1. GENERAL REMARKS: EMPEDOCLES' HEROIC SYNTHESIS

B 17/ensemble **a**: *A Difficult Passage from a Difficult Work*

The discussion so far has shown the plausibility, on internal and external grounds, of taking B 17/*ensemble* **a** as Empedocles' central statement on the ultimate nature of reality. As will be felt especially on a first reading, Empedocles' presentation is quite dense, dogmatic and to some may seem even confused. A modern reader will no doubt be put off, on the one hand, by his employment of his first principles as if they were self-evident postulates or axioms, needing no further analysis or argument, and on the other, by the obscure sequence of ideas. Within the compass of some seventy lines, Empedocles alternates repeatedly between dogmatic assertions about the cycle or the first principles, and various arguments or exegetical remarks meant to bolster those assertions, but there does not seem to be any obvious logical progression to the exposition.[1] Since the passage, or the thesis it articulates, is obviously not meant to stand alone as a single chain of argument—which is different than saying that it does not contain arguments—one may suspect that its intended effect, persuasion of the hearer, has other sources than explicit argumentation.

But even before I attempt to discern these, it is important to note that, in terms of content, B 17/*ensemble* **a** is more than a statement of doctrine. Although that remains Empedocles' main goal, he is in fact here trying to do several things at once. He wants to tell us 1) what is the case about the cosmos: its furniture consists of six eternal first principles and they interact so as to form a cycle; 2) why that is the case: it allows for generation and change, yet also meets Eleatic strictures, and therefore—but all of this is only implicit—it is the best account available; and 3) what follows from its being the case: the birth and death of mortals is "double," absolute *e nihilo* change an illusion, all things (living and not) form a community, and many other teachings besides those. Having said that, it will bear repeating that all three are not so separable in practice, and that they all work to persuade the hearer of their truthfulness. Equally important, to repeat another point, is that not all of the sources of persuasion tapped by Empedocles operate on the surface. To take the most important example: without any pre-existing sense on the part of the hearer of the mutual exclusivity of being and becoming, as established by Parmenides's poem, Empedocles' persuasion is stripped of its ability to stand as a solution to that difficulty.

Lastly, it should also be noted that this general opacity of the work is not simply the result of the great cultural and historic gap between Empedocles and us. These features were also recognized by the work's ancient readers, as is shown for instance by the comments of Aristotle, who at *Rhetoric* 1407a 31–1407b1 faults Empedocles for his oracular ambiguity.[2] However, it is also quite clear that despite such a critique, Aristotle did not simply dismiss the work as empty verbiage. At *Nicomachean Ethics* 1147a19–21, he betrays a much more positive assessment, and implies that the work, in spite of its difficult language, also contained deep and difficult truths. In that passage, to illustrate the notion of moral incontinence, Aristotle compares such incontinents to sleepwalkers, or to people who can recite verses of Empedocles, or spout scientific terminology, but without really understanding them. Being able to mouth the words does not mean one has understood them, for such understanding requires independent thought to be properly internalized.[3] As Aristotle says, "it has to become part of them, and that takes time."

The obvious implication of Aristotle's comments is that Empedocles was never an easy read, and that the poem required some interpretation. For instance, in the case just considered, B 17/*ensemble* **a**, we can see that the pupil would need to understand, first, the basic outline of the doctrine, before even being in a position to grasp how it offered a solution to the problem set by Parmenides, or how any of its further applications could hold. But instead of presenting these different facets sequentially, Empedocles set these different levels of appreciation side by side. The effect is somewhat like that of a lecturer who does not know how to address a non-specialist audience; from his familiarity with his subject, Empedocles weighs down his exposition with asides and observations of interest to more advanced levels, but which only serve to confuse the novice hearer. Because so much is going on at once, multiple hearings or rereadings are required to grasp the doctrine's different facets. In fact, Empedocles' creative reuse of epic repetition, one of the most conspicuous features of his style, was probably intended to minimize that very difficulty. Conversely, such opacity does mean that the work, for those so inclined, would richly repay the study one gave it, as each rereading uncovered more of its "hidden harmony."

The Aim of the Present Section

Despite such obscurity, the importance of B 17/*ensemble* **a** remains undeniable. In fact, the three central concerns I have suggested it addresses are, not incidentally, the very questions modern Empedoclean scholarship has singled out as the fundamental issues in the interpretation of Empedocles' thought. These are, slightly reformulated: 1) what was the specific content of Empedocles' theory of the world, in particular his doctrine of the cosmic cycle? 2) What were the assumptions that generated such a doctrine, or, more broadly, what problem(s) did the element theory and the cosmic cycle solve, or what did they explain? 3) How, if at all, do all of the teachings advanced in the poem, or poems, relate to one another? (This last issue of course is merely the *Katharmoi* versus *Peri Phuseos* debate in another guise.)

Yet if B 17/*ensemble* **a** is identifiably the backbone of the poem, and hence the system, I do not think that the central insight it seeks to articulate can be rendered intelligible in isolation from the rest of the work. Just as a conclusion without its premises is but a proposition, or the punch-line of a joke without a set-up is not funny, indeed unintelligible, so here B 17/*ensemble* **a** must be taken as an answer to questions formulated or raised in the previous lines of the poem. That, I submit, must be the reason why the passage is held back from the hearer until line 232 of the poem. Its rhetorical force, moreover, will have been derived from its ability to stand as a solution, one that granted the hearer a unifying insight into a world that previously seemed without such a structure. In order, therefore, to appreciate how B 17/*ensemble* **a** is of a piece with the rest of the work, and how through it Empedocles' thesis achieves its persuasiveness, we must also remain aware of the relation between that thesis, standing as a summation of his thought, and the broader set of conventions and expectations which gave the work as a whole its meaning. From that it also follows that any proper treatment of the passage should allow us to appreciate it as it relates not only to the other parts of Empedocles' thought, but also to broader problems and traditions in early Greek philosophy.

Following upon that last point, rather than plunge directly into B 17/*ensemble* **a**, I will hold back from it. My purpose in doing so is to allow me to start again from the "outside" and work my way back "inside," to the poem's doctrine, but via a more circuitous route than previously. In the previous sections of this study I tried to show how B 17/*ensemble* **a**, thanks to comparison to other protreptic works, could cohabit the same poem as the material on the *daimon*. Now I want to widen my circle beyond the work proper, to include the question of Empedocles' philosophical debt to his two most obvious influences, the Orphic-Pythagorean background, and the poem of Parmenides. Investigation of this background will serve as the proper means whereby to approach fragment 17, and through an informed reading of it, allow me to chart the motivations of Empedocles' philosophical project. Roughly, if the previous sections argued that the extant fragments could work together and have a single general meaning, the following sections are devoted to exploring this meaning against a wider background of historical influences and philosophical motives.

But there are other good reasons for holding back. One of them is that doing so will better complement the other central preoccupation of this section, an investigation of the sources of persuasion tapped by Empedocles to convince the hearer. The issue may seem secondary, but it is an important unifying feature for a work that I have characterized above as primarily protreptic. Proceeding this way therefore merely reproduces the actual pedagogical structure of the original. And if the reconstruction and protreptic function of the work advanced above holds true, then what is to be explained is how Empedocles could have thought that his doctrine, which we want to recognize as physics, was to him a recipe for divinization. This is so even though Empedocles reinterprets what it means to be a god, and how one goes about becoming one.

Finally, because, as I will argue more fully below, Empedocles' philosophical project is at least in part an attempt to vindicate common sense, all the while including the philosophical insights of Parmenides within his own larger synthesis, Empedocles takes great pains to show how his own thesis is not a renunciation of traditional thought, but its continuation. For reasons that will become even more apparent as I proceed, the question of what exactly he thought his theory of the world explained, and the multiple means he employed to convince his audience of its truth, are therefore both closely linked and mutually illuminating.

Methodological Excursus

Finally, I must say a few words to clarify my approach. In investigating Empedocles' thought, broadly speaking, two main tools are available to us. On the one hand, we can anatomize Empedocles' thought historically, as the product of various known influences. To our knowledge, these identifiable historical influences include poetic traditions (primarily epic, but also lyric and tragedy), Ionian science, Orphism and/or Pythagoreanism, Parmenides, and probably Heraclitus, among others. On the other, in a more supra-historical vein, we can appreciate the persuasion of Empedocles' thesis by comparing it to more specific modes of persuasion or discourse, as they later came to be recognized and articulated. This is less accurate historically, for it amounts to a deliberate imposition of anachronistic categories and notions upon Empedocles, but it does have the merit of allowing *us* to articulate the sources of persuasion the work exploited. Thus, beyond argument, loosely enough understood, we can characterize the appeal of Empedocles' poem, and through it of fragment 17, in terms of several different categories of discourse. We can approach the poem e.g. as a work of science, as a piece of rhetoric, or as a work of art. In the end, however, where both these general approaches fail is in their inability to do justice to the unity of the work, or more specifically its global appeal, although perhaps treating it as art, or poetry comes closest.[4] To bring this out more fully, I want, as briefly as possible, to consider the shortcomings produced when either approach is followed too exclusively. This will best illustrate how, taken together, they can temper each other's excesses and justify a middle way.

The Supracelestial Approach

If we attempt to consider the possible appeals of Empedocles' thought *sub specie aeternitatis*, or at least in terms of expectations and conventions we still share with him, there is most obviously, as stated above, a scientific side to his teachings, which since Aristotle at least has been the most prized aspect of his thought, to the detriment of its other aspects. Considered in this regard, B 17/*ensemble* **a** should be read not as a thesis, but rather as a hypothesis. Its persuasion would then derive not so much from its inherent plausibility, but from how much it could explain, and more specifically from its ability to "save the phenomena" against Parmenides' challenge. At the same time, there is an important sense in which treating his thought as a sort of proto-science seriously misconstrues the whole ethos of the work. For, thus framed, the question then inevitably arises, as it occurred most famously to Aristotle in the *Poetics* (1447b 17–20): Why poetry? Why verse? Rather than assume Empedocles should have to justify his choice of medium to later ages, it may be that the question itself is misguided.[5] To be more exact, we can challenge the validity of Aristotle's question, and the whole critical tradition that depends upon it, by refusing to allow that the term φυσιόλογος, *natural scientist* (? or perhaps, *philosopher of nature*), adequately describes Empedocles. Most obviously, a more positivistic reading of his project cannot do justice to his preoccupation with the divine, or more precisely, his sense of the divinity of nature. In this regard, a proper recognition of the work's religious atmosphere could arouse exactly the opposite prejudice. One might well ask instead, given the cultural context, how anything but poetry could have been the proper medium for his message.[6]

But if, as some are inclined to think, true philosophy lives a supracelestial life, then perhaps we can dismiss most of this as mere *captatio benevolentiae* and head straight for the arguments. This is what Aristotle seems to have done, as I have argued. But caution urges us rather to see that, as rhetoric, as art, and even as science, which I also think are entirely valid ways of appreciating the work, at least in part, Empedocles' discourse exploits and relies heavily upon pre-established conventions and ideas, and that much will be missed by not attending to them.

The Historical Approach

Yet therein lies a great difficulty: as interpreters of his thought, our own distance from Empedocles' world means that much, if not most, of what Empedocles was relying upon to get his message across, is irretrievably lost. We can do some work, it is true, to bridge the gap. First, in a narrow but non-trivial sense, familiarity with epic and other poetic traditions help us along. Second, as indicated above, we can also appreciate Empedocles' poem in light of later traditions, such as rhetoric and science, even though the original audience, perhaps Empedocles himself, need not have recognized these types of discourse as such. But much is bound to remain foreign and obscure, especially, as seems possible, if Empedocles was an heir to secret or esoteric traditions.[7] In that case, to appreciate fully how Empedocles' discourse could meet the expectations set by that background, how it could make sense in terms of it, is probably beyond us. A recent attempt to delve into these matters only seems to confirm this.[8] To attempt even accounting for that element would require detailing a long series of customs, rituals and beliefs, many of them already obscure in their own day. Most of that background is in any case now lost forever, and even those parts of it which we do know something of have to be reconstructed, so that we often end up having to explain the *obscurum per obscurius*.[9] Such a task, moreover, even if it could be accomplished, would not necessarily explain everything. Historical and social context help us understand a thinker, but unless we ascribe to some form of rigorous social determinism, they do not "explain" him.

Empedocles' Heroic Synthesis

If the failure of the overly historical approach is, to generalize, an unwillingness to exclude material in the name of a more unified vision of Empedocles' philosophical motivations, the particular failure of the supracelestial view is an overly narrow picture of the sources of persuasion tapped by the poem. What the latter approach fails to see is the capacity of the work to function simultaneously and effectively enough in several spheres, as an epic poem, as a work of science and metaphysics, and as model for the art of life. To our minds, perhaps, it does not do so with equal success to other more specialized attempts in their respective fields, even by the standards of Empedocles' day. While I think there is some truth to that, it is in fact only a half-truth, for it does not appreciate the synthesizing aim of the work, its ideal (or assumption) of a "grand unified theory of everything." In the particular case of Empedocles, I think both approaches must be subordinated to the end of showing how these various elements all work towards a single aim, persuading the hearer of the truth of Empedocles' thesis. This impulse to unity, I stress, has an appeal all of its own, above and beyond the work or theory's varying success in its different applications. At a minimum then, I suggest that we can recognize Empedocles' genuine success as the best "pentathlete" among the Presocratics, even when he is no match for the best single-event specialists. As Walther Kranz put it:

> Freilich, eine philosophische Urkraft wie das Genie des Heraklit und das des Parmenides war sein Geist nicht. Aber er war unter allen vorsokratischen Denkern der furchtbarste, der vielseitigste, der ideenreichste, eine repräsentative Gestalt aus der Epoche zwischen Spätarchaik und Frühklassik, der denn auch eine Nachwirkung bescheiden gewesen ist wie wenigen Forschern des früheren Altertums.[10]

Equally important is the need to recognize the appeal that such a synthesizing, rather than eclectic, work could generate in the age of the first physical-allegorical interpretations of Homer.[11] The breadth of scope of Empedocles' vision, and his skill in subsuming all of it to his unified perspective, yet presenting it all in traditional epic form, is a *tour de force* to be acknowledged in its own right. The power of this appeal was such that it was not lost on later thinkers, as when it became possible for Aristotle openly to question the necessary unity of all knowledge. And even he, though one of Empedocles' fiercest critics, frequently praises the internal coherence and philosophical economy of his work.[12]

In this respect, to invoke once more the relation between the work's poetic form and its protreptic goal, we can also see how, the proleptic style is perfectly suited to render Empedocles' synthesizing vision in a very convincing manner. To this end, it has at its disposal a powerful rhetorical effect, for it can appropriate elements of other accounts into itself, as so many hints and glimpses of its own final truths. This is why, I think, Empedocles colors his depiction of the demon's exile at B 115 with references to the elements, both exploiting the Orphic/Pythagorean background and looking ahead to fragment 17. By employing such a structure, the writer can simultaneously identify the tradition to which he claims to belong *and* negotiate the transition to his own "final account," which is then shown to have been already implied by the former. Finally, and equally importantly, the proleptic structure, by holding before our eyes a complete process of quest and attainment, *aporia* and solution, has an aesthetically pleasing finality to it, an organic unity, which all the while points beyond itself to the world, as do the great works of art.[13]

For my own purposes in what follows, the identification of Empedocles as an exponent of the proleptic style both sets an agenda and supplies a reply to any overly narrow historical analysis of Empedoclean influences: we should expect similarities to his known influences, but not necessarily identity. In other words, while we must pay attention to these known influences, they need not be considered more fundamental than other philosophical motives, even though the latter may only operate under the surface of things.[14] Specifically, this means that the explicit sources Empedocles invokes, the Orphic-Pythagorean religious background and the work of Parmenides, cannot stand as the be-all and end-all of Empedocles' philosophical project.[15]

2. BACCHICS, ORPHICS, AND PYTHAGOREANS

One important result of my unitarian interpretation of the corpus is that Empedocles situates the story of the *daimon* and its wanderings within his cosmology. Given the rhetorical thrust of his proleptic presentation towards ever greater, and I would claim, more fundamental entities and explanations, the result of this is a quite literal confinement of the *daimon* within the world of the elements. This does not imply, I think, hostility to these religious notions, but rather an attempt to give them a new and more secure foundation. The best comparison for this type of situation is Plato's own attempt to reaffirm the basis of traditional morality against its various challengers. In both situations, "saving" the object in question can also mean transforming it almost beyond recognition. My views on this question, therefore, is obvious from the outset. In considering Empedocles' relation to his religious background, I do not think that his attitude is one of full and unquestioning acceptance. Empedocles has transformed this material, reforming the earlier Orphic-Pythagorean lore in light of Ionian science and Eleatic laws, among other influences. To show this, however, it is necessary to clarify what can be known of Empedocles' own philosophical and religious allegiances.

a. Three Related Movements

Despite the inherent obscurity of these topics, long-established and well-known evidence guarantees beyond doubt the existence, before and during Empedocles' lifetime, of a new and revolutionary confidence in the possibilities of afterlife existence, although probably only for a select minority, at least initially. To the best of our knowledge, this confidence is the shared legacy of three distinct but related phenomena, Bacchic cults, Orphism, and Pythagoreanism, each of whose doctrines, the tradition goes, were primarily secret and confined to initiates.[16] While Bacchic and Orphic cults ranged over the whole of the Greek world, much of the best, earliest and most abundant evidence

comes from Sicily and Magna Graecia, the latter also being the home of the more geographically fixed Pythagorean community. This of itself is a testimony to the receptivity of these lands to such ideas. Although nominally quite distinct, all three movements apparently had so much in common that, by the fifth century B.C., contemporaries (or contemporary outsiders?) believed them to be basically the same, and speculated as to which was the oldest and original.[17] To insiders, and from a more formal standpoint, each was defined in terms of the authority from whom they claimed to take their teachings.

Of the three, only Orphism, that we know of, based itself upon a fixed texts or sacred books, hexameter poems attributed to the mythical poet Orpheus, but which must have been written at the earliest after Hesiod, and which continued to be produced until the end of paganism.[18] These poems, it is thought, interpreted at need by itinerant individuals or small groups of specialists, constituted the essence of Orphism, as opposed to any broader and fixed community of believers. That at any rate is the picture we get from a famous description by Plato in the second book of the *Republic* 364e, depicting wandering priests who

> present a hubbub of books of Musaios and Orpheus, offspring of the Moon and Muses, they say, and who go door to door, persuading not only individuals but even cities, that there are absolutions and purifications from wrongdoings through sacrifices and play, both for those now living, and for those who have passed on; these they call initiations, and [they say that] they absolve us from evils in the after-life, but that for those who do not sacrifice, terrible things await . . .

In recent years our knowledge of Orphism has been increased through a number of sensational discoveries. Most significant is the Derveni papyrus, found in northern Greece in 1962. The papyrus itself, belonging to the late fourth century, is a copy of a late fifth- to early fourth-century exegetical work on an Orphic poem, preserving a number of lines from the original, itself datable to the late sixth or early fifth century.[19] Then, in 1978, ivory tablets with Orphic inscriptions from Olbia, a colony of Miletus on the Black Sea, were brought to light.[20] Dating to the fifth century B.C., they are significant not only for their antiquity, but also perhaps for demonstrating the existence of an actual Orphic community. That at any rate would seem to be the case if the original editors were correct in suggesting 'Ορφικ[οί], *Orphics*, could be read in one of the plaques: this reference would most likely be to the celebrants themselves, and thus would support the existence of regular, geographically fixed devotees, although this has now been challenged.[21] Finally, there are the so-called Orphic lamellae, most of them from southern Italy. These have long been known, but more recently discovered examples perhaps indicate that they belong to Orphic or Bacchic spheres. Yet because their exact pedigree is unclear, and given that they present a special relevance to Empedocles, these will be considered separately below.

Pythagoreans, by contrast, were an actual community, founded on the authority of a genuine historical individual, but seemingly without any fixed text.[22] Belonging for the most part to aristocratic circles in southern Italy, and for a time assuming the political leadership in Kroton, they claimed to adhere to the oral teachings of Pythagoras—said to have migrated from Samos to Kroton in southern Italy in 530 B.C.—and continued to exert an influence in the area down to the fourth century. The picture of Pythagoras as master-mathematician and scientific pioneer has come under much criticism, and it has been demonstrated, especially by Burkert (1972), that early Platonism's adoption of him as their inspirational patron has led to a serious distortion in many of the sources later than Aristotle. Where consensus does exist is in the attribution to Pythagoras himself of the doctrine of reincarnation, which is present in the earliest sources. The oral nature of his teachings, however, combined with the secrecy in which they held their doctrines, makes it difficult to discern how far back the other trademark elements of Pythagoreanism reach, namely numberlore, astronomy/cosmology and musical theory. These elements are all present at least by the publication of the oldest reasonably well-attested Pythagoran book, that of Philolaus (470–390 B.C.) circa 400 B.C., and it is very unlikely that they originate with him, but exactly how far back they go must remain guesswork.[23] The situation is further complicated, in the case of Empedocles, by the fact that later authors exploited his work as a source for early Pythagoreanism.[24]

The cult of Bacchus or Dionysus, finally, is as old as that of any of the other Olympians. Here I cannot even pretend to survey the evidence concerning the god of wine, madness and ecstasy, to this day one of the most fascinating, elusive and disturbing of the gods.[25] The minimum that can be said is that, at the latest by Heraclitus' day (DK 22 B 14 and 15) mystery rites and initiations were also part of his domain, whose promises of liberation and salvation, we may guess, were advanced alongside and perhaps within Orphism.

The Common Element

This of course is not the place to attempt unraveling the different strands of these various traditions. Perhaps the most judicious summary of the whole situation remains Burkert's, although it is now a bit dated, who writes (1985), 300: "Bacchic, Orphic, and Pythagorean are circles each of which has its own center, and while these circles have areas that coincide, each preserves its own special sphere." Most obviously, despite their internal differences, to the extent that we can discern them, the common trait or overlapping portion of these circles is a new conception of the soul.[26] Against the prevailing pessimism of the *Iliad*, which we find already somewhat relaxed in the more fabulous world of the *Odyssey*, all three groups were committed to the possibility of an afterlife whose pleasantness surpasses that of the present world.[27] In this we could more exactly speak of a reversal of the epic perspective, as Euripides and Plato noted.[28] The obvious attraction of this alternate interpretation of the afterlife, compared to the gibbering shades of Homer, were the more comforting answers they provided to age-old human anxieties, most prominently in negating the dread of death and promising rest from the ceaseless toil of earthly existence. Although it is not clear that the novel possibility of a pleasant afterlife was always equated directly with a full-scale apotheosis, as if Hades or Olympus were the only two directions available for the souls of the deceased, graduation to divine stature does seem to have figured as one extreme reward for certain exceptional figures, a Hercules or a Pythagoras, or even a Theron of Acragas (see next subsection). Given such a background, however hazy, I think that Empedocles' claim to divine status in B 112, or at least imminent divine status, was novel mostly for its directness and the public manner in which it was advanced.

Pindar and the Gold Lamellae

The elusive nature of all three "movements," combined with a probably high degree of cross-fertilization on the level of ideas between them, means that one cannot employ any hard and fast definition of Orphism as opposed to Pythagoreanism to explain this or that feature in Empedocles; all three lack the fixed outlines that would allow them to serve as the basis for any rigorous account. More useful, then, is to select from within this material as a whole, without too strong a prejudice as to their affiliations, those specific pieces of evidence that prove the most illuminating.[29] Based on such criteria, I will concentrate my efforts on two principal sources of evidence, notable for both their internal similarities to Empedocles' doctrines and their geographical and chronological proximity to him, Pindar and the gold leaves.

First in importance, there is Pindar's *Second Olympian Ode* to Theron of Acragas (476 B.C.), the only text at our disposal with which Empedocles must have almost certainly been familiar. Close as well, although until recently in a more speculative vein, are fragments 129 and 133 Snell-Maehler (1987), the former describing the life of the just in Hades, the latter with its reference to Persephone's ancient grief.[30]

Later in date of production, but quite probably representative of texts and beliefs roughly contemporary with Empedocles, there are the so-called "Orphic" gold leaves. Zuntz's edition of this corpus recognized two basic types of text, known as groups A and B.[31] The three oldest tablets from group A are from a single large tomb dated to the mid-fourth century B.C., from Thourioi, and since Zuntz's work, new finds have added one example to group B, a tablet from Hipponion (now Vibo Valentia), dated to 400 B.C., which makes it the oldest of this type.[32] In 1985 two further tablets were recovered from an excavation near ancient Pelinna in Thessaly, whose archeological context dates them to the last quarter of the fourth century B.C.[33] While these two newest tablets show some overlap with group A, they are distinct enough to form a separate class, known as group P. Against Zuntz's attempt to characterize much of the A and B material as Pythagorean, the most recent finds have reinforced the case for their Bacchic and Orphic pedigrees.[34] Most notably, the Hipponion tablet first instructs the deceased to drink from the fountain of memory, and then *to traverse the holy path which other* initiates *and* Bacchants *tread in glory* (lines 14–16).[35] The tablets from Thessaly, in turn, appear to go even further, and confirm the antiquity of the myth of Dionysus's dismemberment by the Titans. Before their discovery and publication, the story was only known from late sources, but had been advanced as the explanation for Persephone's ancient grief in fragment 133 from Pindar.[36] The myth, which makes Dionysus the child of Zeus and Persephone, rather than Semele, is the most likely explanation for Dionysus's ability to intercede before Persephone on behalf of the deceased, when she is instructed to *tell Persephone that Bacchus himself has set you free* (line 2).[37]

b) The Afterlife: A Basic Typology

I begin by observing that even within this circumscribed evidence, the formula of Afterlife bliss is not completely uniform. Regardless of any preconceptions concerning the identity of any single source as Bacchic, Orphic or Pythagorean, we can discern behind the individual variations of our chosen texts, and even cutting across their different groupings, two different schemes. There is, on the one hand, a simpler and more direct scheme, a promise of salvation: after this life, the initiate will find a happy lot in the afterlife. This is found in the B series as a whole, both P tablets, and tablets two to five of the A group. In Empedocles and Pindar's ode (56 ff.), on the other hand, a more complex scheme is found. This is also the case in tablet A1, although this is only apparent when we contrast it with its sister tablets.

I begin with Pindar, whose ode from 476 B.C. is the oldest source.[38] There, to reduce much sublime imagery to the most succinct and prosaic terms, we find three possible levels of reward in the Afterlife. A first level of justice metes out "suffering unbearable to look upon" to the evil (67), whereas the just receive a life without toil in a realm of equal nights and days (61–67). Then, a third level promises those who have lived three just lives release from the cycle of reincarnation and a place in the company of the great heroes of the past (68–83).

To that I now compare tablets A1 and A2, after Zuntz:

A1. 1 Ἔρχομαι ἐκ κοθαρῶν κοθαρά, χθονίων Βασίλεια,
2 Εὐκλῆς Εὐβουλεύς τε καὶ ἀθάνατοι θεοὶ ἄλλοι
3 καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼν ὑμῶν γένος ὄλβιον εὔχομαι εἶμεν.
4 ἀλλά με μοῖρ' ἐδάμασσε καὶ ἀστεροπῆτα κεραυνῶι.[39]
5 κύκλου δ' ἐξέπταν βαρυπενθέος ἀργαλέοιο,

6 ἱμερτοῦ δ' ἐπέβαν στεφάνου ποσὶ καρπαλίμοισι,
7 δεσποίνας δ' ὑπὸ κόλπον ἔδυν χθονίας βασίλειας
7a [ἱμερτοῦ δ' ἐπέβαν στεφάνου ποσὶ καρπαλίμοισι]
8 "ὄλβιε καὶ μακαριστέ, θεὸς δ' ἔσηι ἀντὶ βροτοῖο."
9 ἔριφος ἐς γάλ' ἔπετον.

Pure from the pure I come, Queen of the Underworld, / Eukles, Eubouleus, and other immortal gods / for I too boast that I am of your blessed race. / But fate overcame me and the lightener with his thunderbolt. / (5) Yet I have flown from the harsh and grievous cycle/ and with swift feet have stepped into the lovely crown / and descended into the lap of the mistress, the underworld Queen. / (line 6 or 7a are identical; one of them must be the copyist's mistake.) *"Blessed and most happy, a god instead of mortal will you be." Like a kid I have fallen into the milk.*

A2 1 Ἔρχομαι ἐκ καθαρῶν κοθαρά, χθονίων Βασίλεια,
2 Εὖκλε καὶ Εὐβουλεῦ καὶ θεοὶ δαίμονες ἄλλοι·
3 καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼν ὑμῶν γένος εὔχομαι ὄλβιον εἶμεν.
4 ποινὰν δ' ἀνταπέτεισ' ἔργων οὔτι δικαίων
5 εἴτε με μοῖρ' ἐδάμασσ' εἴτ' ἀστεροπῆτι κεραυνῶ(ν).
6 νῦν δ' ἱκέτης ἥκω παρ' ἁγνὴν Φερσεφόνειαν
7 ὥς με πρόφρων πέμψηι ἕδρας ἐς εὐαγέων

Pure from the pure I come, Queen of the Underworld, / Eukles, Eubouleus, and, other divine daimones / for I too boast that I am of your blessed race. / But I have paid back the penalty for deeds in no way just/ whether fate overcame me or the lightener with his thunderbolt (or: *thundering with his lightening bolt*) */ But now I have arrived as a suppliant to holy Persephone / so that she may willingly send me to the seats of the bright ones.*

It is notable that, whereas the deceased in tablet A 1 claims to have escaped the cycle of reincarnations, and thus is congratulated upon his apotheosis, the other two (tablet A3 is practically identical to A2) merely request to be sent to *the seats of the bright ones.* As Zuntz and others remarked, the difference between the two versions is probably best explained in terms of the two levels of reward described in Pindar's fuller account.[40] The owners of tablets A2 and A3 were apparently only confident of having lived at most two pure lives, and thus expected to be reborn. In this regard, to draw now Empedocles into the picture, the thematic similarities between tablet A1 and Empedocles' account are quite striking: the direct claim to the word θεός; the idea of an escape from the cycle of reincarnation; the very description of that cycle as ἀργάλεος, recalling the description of difficult paths of life in B 115.8 ἀργαλέας βιότοιο ... κελεύθους; the metaphor of being crowned in victory, reminiscent of B 112.6, where Empedocles goes about ταινίαις τε περίστεπτος στέφεσίν τε θαλείοις, *crowned with ribbons and blooming chaplets*; and finally, the overriding preoccupation with purity. Taken as such, both Empedocles and tablet A1 may even help clarify what Pindar leaves somewhat ambiguous. The plainer language of A1 may indicate that Theron expected full-fledged divinity to be his lot, even though Pindar tactfully avoids the word θεός or any direct comparisons to Olympian divinities, and lists instead the great heroes now dwelling in the Isle of the Blest.[41] As for links between the other tablets and Empedocles, most notable is the close juxtaposition in line 2 of A2 and A3 of gods and *daimones*, albeit in corrupt lines that do not scan. The formula may merely be a harmless traditional term for minor underground deities, but Empedocles' use of the term may hint at some more significant reference.

Among the tablets themselves, a second important distinguishing characteristic is the concern with justice, retribution and purity: central to A 1, 2 and 3, no such preoccupations exist in A 4, nor in the B and P tablets. The B text, according to Janko's (1984) reconstruction, instructs the deceased upon arrival in the underworld, first to avoid the fountain of Lethe, by which stands a white cypress, and then to seek out the fountain of Memory, over which stand infernal sentries. The deceased is told to sway these by telling them "the whole truth": "I am a child of the Earth and starry Heaven, but my γένος is from Heaven." (lines 13–14). It is not clear how the water of memory will save these souls, but most likely it will allow them to find their way to the other initiates and heroes (lines 20–22), something they could not manage otherwise.[42] The composite nature of man described in that formula, perhaps a sort of Greek *shibboleth*, is obviously an allusion to something further, but there is no scholarly consensus on this point.[43] Finally, in the much shorter P tablets, all we know is that Bacchus will intercede on behalf of the deceased, no doubt because she had been initiated, but there is no question of penance, and no details on what kind of salvation Dionysus can grant. It is simply better than would otherwise be the case.

By contrast, the A tablets as a group speak of purity and penance, as do both Pindar and Empedocles, but with different emphases. Pindar stresses justice in a social and political setting, whereas for Empedocles justice implies a wider community, that of all living creatures, or even of all things (B 135). In their preoccupation with morality and justice, it has been suggested that the ideals Pindar celebrated for Theron mark an improvement upon the cruder technicalities of initiation and mystery rites.[44] If that is so, then the same can be said of tablets A1–3 and Empedocles. It certainly adds another element of complication to the scheme, but one that grants it a more serious purpose, one that was later taken up in his own way by Plato.

c. Orphic or Pythagorean?

As for the debate on the proper pedigree of these notions, Zuntz's attempt to describe this more elaborate scheme as Pythagorean, while understandable, seems now countermanded by the recurrence of the same obscure formula, "kid, I / you fell in the milk" in both tablet A1, describing its bearers' apotheosis, *and* in the apparently cruder context of the P tablets.[45] As such, it raises again the question that I had previously dismissed as without a definite answer, namely what exact relation Pythagoreanism and Orphism bear to one another. But having now drawn a few distinctions within this material, it is now possible to return to this first question somewhat better armed; failing any definite answer, we may yet gain a better sense of the difficulties.

The disparity between the new evidence confirming the antiquity of Orphic-Bacchic traditions, and the lack of any new and indubitably Pythagorean material, lends further support to the possibility that Pythagoras took his teachings from Orphic sources.[46] Heraclitus, who knew of Bacchic mystery cults (B 14 and 15), and is also the earliest source to mention Pythagoras, accused him of presenting a collection of others' teachings as his own (DK 22 B 129). And to Herodotus, citizen of Thourioi, where the A series tablets were found, and as the crow flies only about a hundred kilometers north of Hipponium, Orphic and Bacchic cult practice were in fact Pythagorean, which is to say really Egyptian.[47] Even though Herodotus here favors Pythagoreanism, more important is the fact that to a knowledgeable contemporary, when it came to ritual practice, the three were easily confused.

That having been said, it should nevertheless be stressed that references to Persephone or Dionysus in our evidence need not, as seems to be assumed in more recent scholarship, *ipso facto* disqualify them from being Pythagorean. Once again, it is probably not so much the doctrine that differed, but the doctrinal authority.[48] This is well shown by another passage in Herodotus, II 123, where he tells us that, according to the Egyptians, Demeter and Dionysus rule in the Underworld, and follows that up with a description of the cycle of reincarnation,[49] to which he then adds: "And Greeks have used this account, some earlier, some later, as if it were their very own. [Although] I know their names, I will not write them down." The most likely suggestions for the individuals that Herodotus refuses to name include Dionysiac priests, Pythagoreans, Orphics, and perhaps also Empedocles. Given, however, that he has already told us at II 81 his theory concerning the origin of these traditions, it is not difficult to conjecture that those three, and not Empedocles, are what he has in mind in the later passage. What this seems to show, even though the details remain obscure, is that for some Pythagoreans as well Dionysus and Persephone/Demeter rule in the afterlife.[50]

Lastly, the tendency to claim the material from Pindar and the gold tablets for one or the other tradition also invariably reflects a certain *partis-pris* of modern specialists on behalf of their discipline. *KRS* for instance, in their handbook on the Presocratics, do not hesitate to claim most of it, including Empedocles, for Pythagoreanism.[51] On the opposite side of the debate, a significant recent survey by C. Riedweg, a scholar of ancient religion, has sought to qualify Empedocles' background exclusively as Orphic. After a review of the evidence, he concludes:

> Mag sein, daβ sich Empedokles, Bürger von Akragas, ebenfalls von einem orphischen Logos [i.e a *Hieros Logos*] zu seiner Naturphilosophie hat anregen lassen und dabei in durchaus kreativer Aneignung wesentliche Formelemente übernommen hat.[52]

Empedocles' Avowed Allegiances

That, I think, even in its mild form, is to overstate the case. It is worth explaining exactly how this is so. An important distinction should be made in these matters, one that is not often enough raised, between, on the one hand, the historical question, what kind of cults and work(s) inspired Empedocles, and on the other, what his own *avowed* allegiances were. This has the advantage of putting more possibilities before the mind than a simple either/or dichotomy. On the first question, I would concede that Riedweg, (who does not make any such distinction) may or may not be right, simply because we cannot clearly distinguish these movements.[53] But on the second, the question of what explicit allegiances Empedocles claimed, it is demonstrably wrong to align him with Orphism. The evidence for this second question is relatively clear.

Among the authorities Empedocles does invoke, we can include himself, as a god/*daimon* (B 2.9;.23.11; 112.4; 115.13), his Muse (B 3.3; 4.2; 133.1) and the gods in general (B 3.1). The only reference to another authority is B 129, discussed in chapter I, praising an unnamed intellectual hero, whom Diogenes (VIII 54; following Timaeus) and Porphyry (*Vita Pyth*. 30) identify as Pythagoras, but concerning whom Diogenes/Timaeus concedes "others say the verses refer to Parmenides." The last lines of the fragment are the most telling for any attempt at identification:

ὁππότε γὰρ πάσῃσιν ὀρέξαιτο πραπίδεσσιν,
ῥεί' ὅ γε τῶν ὄντων πάντων λεύσσεσκεν ἕκαστον
καί τε δέκ' ἀνθρώπων καί τ' εἴκοσιν αἰώνεσσιν.

For whenever he reached out with all his 'prapides' he could easily see each and every of all things, both in ten and in twenty ages of men.

The hero's capacity to see with his *prapides each and every thing both in ten and* (perhaps: *or*) *twenty lifespans of men*" is a reference to his superhuman intellect and memory, and the duration over which such memory ranges must

imply metempsychosis. The speculation in the sources concerning the identity of the hero shows that Empedocles did not name him, here or elsewhere, and this naturally led to some guessing as to Empedocles' most important philosophical influences. Ancient readers felt the top two candidates were Parmenides and Pythagoras. But given that Parmenides, although affiliated with Pythagoreanism,[54] is not particularly associated with reincarnation, whereas Pythagoras was, who could this be but Pythagoras? There is then, in fragment 129, *positive evidence* for an affiliation with Pythagoreanism, and as such this is a powerful argument against Riedweg's thesis, and may even suffice to refute it. But Riedweg, over the course of his long and meticulously documented article, makes not a single reference to B 129.[55]

The case for identification with Pythagoras, moreover, is stronger than the simple testimony of ancient authors. A further factor is worth noting, the matter of Empedocles' refusal to name the hero. While the reason for such silence is not known for sure, there is a passage from Iamblichus, perhaps originally from Aristotle, which reports that Pythagoreans avoided pronouncing the master's name.[56] This concurs with Herodotus's refusal to name him in connection with metempsychosis, as well as with and the αὐτὸς ἔφα formula, the tradition of attributing all Pythagorean learning to the master, but without naming him directly: αὐτός. And if, in turn, the passage was a reference to Parmenides, then the passage is at best polemical, for the hero's own philosophical affiliations would be with pluralism: *he could see each and every of all things*, τῶν ὄντων πάντων λεύσσεσκεν ἕκαστον, not the single Being of Parmenides. Perhaps the only other consideration that could weigh equally in favor of Parmenides is to posit that our passage belonged to a literary tradition, as when Lucretius maintains a similar silence in his praise of Epicurus at *DRN* I 62, as does Vergil in praising Lucretius, *Georg*. 2.490 ff. Certainly Ovid may be indebted to both when he avoids naming Pythagoras at *Metamorphoses*, 15.60 ff. But if there was such a literary tradition before Empedocles (rather than postulating, as seems more likely, that our passage is what established it as a literary trope) we know nothing definite about it, and only if the passage refers to Pythagoras can we make sense of this deliberate silence.[57]

Orphics and Pythagoreans

To conclude, if Empedocles must be placed in one or the other camp, his own avowed allegiances are with Pythagoreanism, not Orphism. And once we recognize that point, so framed, surely it encourages us to recognize, in Empedocles' day, two different historical entities, to which this portrayal corresponded. These, once again, may have differed not so much in cult practices or doctrines, rather than in the authorities each invoked. But even on the minimal hypothesis that Pythagoreanism was only Orphism for aristocrats, it is well to recall that these movements, once established, perdured separately and did not fuse. The desire to mask such a common background in fact may help explain why the Pythagoreans claimed only one doctrinal authority, and referred any claim to truth to the master himself, not to Orpheus or any fixed text, at least until publication of the *acousmata*.[58] Two further pieces of evidence, however, encourage me to venture a more specific conclusion. First, as far as we know, in these early sources only Pythagoras, the 'Hyperborean Apollo,' Empedocles, and the individuals mentioned in tablets A1 and A4 make a direct claim to the term θεός, as opposed to a vaguer promise of *athanasia*. Second, if the tradition of science and mathematical speculation, in addition to eschatological teachings, belong to the earliest strata of Pythagoreanism, then here too we have solid grounds to think Empedocles' own amalgam of these themes, according to the single work hypothesis, is more properly to be associated with Pythagoreanism than Orphism.[59]

d. Empedocles' Rational Theology and Eschatology

That, in the current state of our evidence, is probably the limit of reasonable speculation on this question. From the question of Empedocles' allegiances I want now to return to what can be made of Empedocles' own attitude towards the general Orphic-Pythagorean background he inherited. Here yet again, therefore, we face the great question in the study of Empedocles, the relation between of the two "halves" of Empedocles' thought, the religious and the scientific. In chapter III of this study (section 2.b.i), when considering the relation of proem to doctrine, I summarily raised and dismissed the possibility, on the possible analogy with Parmenides's poem, that this religious material is wholly unrelated to the doctrine. Such a view has already been put forward at some length by Bollack (1965–69) and Kingsley (1995) especially, although on the two-work hypothesis. It will perhaps remain a standing temptation even on the single work-hypothesis, should it gain general recognition, to dismiss the more "religious" proem as mere window-dressing. It is necessary, therefore, to give some clarification why such an approach is in my view a dead-end, even though my fuller reasons for thinking so will only emerge after my discussion of Empedocles' response to Parmenides.

Esoteric and Exoteric Strands in Empedocles?

Despite some differences, both Bollack and Kingsley suggest that the proper manner in which to frame the relation between Empedocles' two works, according to the two-work hypothesis, is by recourse to the fourth-century distinction between technical and introductory philosophical works, or the esoteric and exoteric. The *Katharmoi* would be an exoterical work, designed to impress and convert disciples, whereas the esoterical *Peri Phuseos* would be the true doctrine, a more rigorous philosophical account, minus the theatrics.[60] To my mind, this is partially correct, to the extent that it reproduces the proper general progression of those fragments, but not so when the *Peri Phuseos* material is made to *invalidate* the *Katharmoi*.[61] On the single work hypothesis this is better accounted for, as I have tried to show, by postulating a protreptic function for the work, one whose overall burden is to lead the hearer to a new way of understanding the world. The esoteric and exoteric would thus be fused into one. That is what would account for the recourse to an indirect type of opening, as found in the poems of Parmenides and Lucretius, where the unity of the work, including the proem's function, is grasped by hindsight.

Behind the desire to impose such a division, I submit, there obviously still lurks the feeling that the two sides of Empedocles' thought are incompatible, and that one must choose between them. The loser in this comparison is obviously still the religious. For whatever reasons, it is felt incapable of standing alongside, or as I suggest, within the doctrine of the elements. At root therefore, I think the same kind of anachronistic thinking that tries to deny that Plato or Socrates believed in the traditional divinities of the *polis* is at play here on some level.[62] In saying so, however, I do not want to imply that either scholar wishes to go so far as to deny the divinity of the elements, or Empedocles' heartfelt devotion to his favorite first principle, Love. What both apparently feel most uneasy about is not the divinity of the world, what we could call Empedocles' scientific deism, but his apparent endorsement of a doctrine of personal salvation, his eschatology. Against them, I do not see how it can be gotten rid of without at the same time dragging down in its ruin the rest of the edifice.

In saying that, I am not unaware that "an eschatology is not a contract in law, but an imaginative picture, designed . . . to shape attitudes and behavior here and now."[63] Depending upon the author, in pressing ancient texts for specific answers on the nature of the afterlife, we may well be asking of them what they never intended to give. We are taking them, as it were, *too* seriously. The problem is even more acute in the visual arts, on which Emily Vermeule sensibly remarks in her explorations of these matters:

> The manifold self-contradictions in Greek ideas and phrasings about death are not errors. They are styles of imagining the unimaginable, and are responsive both to personal needs and to old conventions. The same conflicts surge up in many cultures. They are the necessary ambiguities in a realm of thinking were thinking cannot really be done, and where there is no experience. Logic is not fruitful in the sphere of death and was scarcely applied to it by any Greek before Lucian, although Plato's brilliant views mingle the rational and the poetic at their best.[64]

But then again, lack of clarity and systematization is no guarantee that such questions were not taken seriously. It was the very fact that in certain circles death was considered with uncommon seriousness, indeed dread and anxiety, that led to the older pictures of it being questioned more intently in the first place. This in turn prompted either their rejection in favor of newer ones, or at least attempts at clarification and systematization. Although Empedocles, in relation to the tradition he inherited, is at an early stage of this process of questioning and clarification, he is hardly to be understood as either having taken it all on faith, or having rejected it *en bloc.* The similarities between his picture and the other manifestations of this material should not allow us to overlook some very telling differences.

To begin, in Empedocles we find no reference to the Olympians as the pliable administrators of cosmic justice. There is no Persephone to be supplicated (B 128), no Isle of the Blest, but only the implacable *decree of Necessity* (B 115.1 and 116) and the catalogue of semi-personalized opposites (B 122–123). Even the inhabitants of Empedocles' "heaven" are conspicuously faceless gods (B 146), not the individual heroes from the past, as in Pindar's ode, and the Bacchants of the Hipponium tablet. Starkest of all, the mythical "happily ever after" of Pindar and the tablets is implicitly, albeit forcefully, denied by the eternal cosmic cycle. For within it are inscribed not only the *daimon*'s wanderings, but also his apotheosis. For that matter, even the greatest Empedoclean god, the *Sphairos*, is subject to destruction upon an appointed hour (B 27–31). That, once again, with respect to the composite god(s) is the full force of the term δολιχαίων, *long-lived.*

These differences can be put into even sharper focus if we consider his whole system from the inside, in accordance with my general interpretation of the proem. Thus, against the claims found in B 112, the opening passage, I have already noted that Empedocles, in his own way, remains faithful to the Homeric gap between mortals and immortals. In his system only the six first principles inherit the stability associated with the gods of Homer, and as a result everything else is downgraded to a temporary compound or mixture. This can also be shown by his occasional reference to his first principles under the names of Homeric divinities (B 6). Although the precise identification of each name with its proper element is complicated, and contradictory reports have come down to us, the point of the passage seems to be that they are for him the true gods, along the lines of the ancient physiological allegorists.[65] Unlike the allegorists, however, Empedocles did not think that the elements were the only gods, in the sense of being the only possible entities. He remained committed to accounting for the existence of creatures superior to men; he simply rejected the traditional picture of them. Indeed, as B 134 well shows, with its debt to Xenophanes' criticisms of anthropomorphic gods (DK 21 B 11–16) we cannot allow that by a god he meant anything like that provided by the Homeric or Pindaric picture. Yet, unlike Xenophanes,[66] Empedocles did stress the continuity between men and gods.[67]

From these considerations it becomes clear that, while Empedocles is an heir to earlier religious traditions, his use of this material is strictly tailored to his own particular ends. What does not fit is left aside, and what does is used, but to different purposes. There is in Empedocles, for instance, a much more economical fusion of eschatology and theology than in the earlier scheme. While maintaining a grade of reincarnations (B 146), he apparently did not maintain a fixed scheme of three just lives, but according to some later sources, promotions and demotions are ongoing up and down the chain.[68] Most important, transmigration and the *daimon* are not self-sufficient notions, but Empedocles obviously felt the need to ground them within an account of the cosmos, and as such they serve as stepping-stones leading toward the ultimate description of the cosmic cycle. For placing them within this larger framework not only subordinates them to it but also means imposing chronological limits upon their duration. At both extremes of the cosmic cycle, it follows, there is a break without possible continuity of compounds: under the rule of Strife no mixture remains, whereas in the Sphere of Love the elements form a unity in which no distinctions, and hence individuals, can endure.[69]

All told, therefore, Empedocles' conception of the *daimon* is more an adumbration of Plato's account of the soul, at least in certain specific regards, than an unreflective acceptance of traditional lore. As does the soul for Plato, the *daimon* for Empedocles allows for the extension of reward and retribution beyond this life, and *mutatis mutandis* provides the basis for the possibility of super-human knowledge. The major difference between Empedocles and Plato was the possibility for the later thinker, not without some serious difficulties, of claiming out and out immortality for the soul by locating its true home outside the material world. Empedocles instead, as we have seen, by attempting to square an account of the soul within a world conceived in terms of material elements, had felt bound to impose certain chronological limits upon it. And if anything, it is these or similar limitations, according to a position very close to that of Empedocles, that Plato has Socrates strive to overcome in the *Phaedo.*[70] While to Plato such limitations were but a spur to further questions, leading ultimately to his abandonment of physics and the foundation of metaphysics, we should also recognize in these limitations an application of reason to inherited lore on Empedocles' part, and his willingness, in attempting to harmonize the two, to subordinate the latter to the former.

3. PARMENIDES' POEM: UNITY BY EXCLUSION

From Empedocles' relation to these obscure traditions, I turn now to the less obscure, but equally difficult question of Empedocles' relation to Parmenides. The question is difficult for a number of reasons, but primarily because a successful treatment of it has as a first requirement a correct interpretation of Parmenides. And while no one will dispute the fundamental importance of Parmenides for the history of Greek thought and hence Western philosophy in general, the precise meaning of his short but intensely provocative poem has been the continuous object of controversy through antiquity to this day. Moreover, for the interpreter of any of the thinkers who followed Parmenides, there is the additional concern of not only getting Parmenides right, but also, granted one has a good grasp of one's own author, of evaluating to what extent these later thinkers correctly understood him.[71] Did Anaxagoras, Empedocles and Democritus continue doing physics because they failed to understand Parmenides' challenge? Or did they understand Parmenides full well, but disagreed with him; or more strongly still, did they know him to be wrong, and thus could ignore his "extinguishing of becoming" (DK 28 B 8.21)? Here is where the author of a general history of Greek philosophy has a decisive advantage over the student of any specific thinker, for he can indulge in full discussion of all these problems and then take them up *seriatim* for each author. This being a study of Empedocles, and not of Parmenides, I do not propose to give the question a full airing, even though it is necessary for me at least to sketch out an outline of Parmenides' thesis. To avoid seeming even more superficial and dogmatic than space requires of me, I will indicate debts I owe to positions argued out at greater length in the scholarly literature.[72] In that as well, however, it will be necessary to be very selective.

Summary of the Poem and Some Main Lines of Interpretation

The extant remains of Parmenides' poem fall into three distinct parts. The opening, or proem, preserved by Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* VII 111, is the first person narrative of a young man's chariot ride to a place far beyond the beaten track (1.27), indeed beyond Night and Day.[73] The journey ends when his guides, the daughters of the sun, secure his admission "with soft words" through mighty aetherial gates, where he is greeted and reassured by an unnamed goddess, whose teachings will constitute the main body of the work.[74]

These teachings, as the goddess states in her programmatic announcement at the end of the proem (DK B 1.28–32) will cover "everything," and fall into two main divisions:

χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι
ἠμὲν ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ
ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, τῇις οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής.
ἀλλ' ἔμπης καὶ ταῦτα μαθήσεαι, ὡς τ ὰ δοκεῦντα
χρῆν δοκίμως εἶναι διὰ παντὸς πάντα περῶντα.

You must be informed of everything, both of the unmoved heart of persuasive reality/ and the beliefs of mortals, which comprise no genuine conviction; nevertheless, you shall learn these also, how it was necessary that the things that are believed to be have their being in general acceptance, ranging through all things from end to end. [75]

This everything includes, on the one hand, *the unshaken heart of persuasive truth,* and on the other, *the opinions of mortals, in which there is no true faith.* Not only that, but he will also learn, in ambiguous lines that have been the subject of much discussion, how appearances, τὰ δοκεῦντα, had to δοκίμως εἶναι, an ambiguous and difficult clause. In what follows the goddess remains true to her promise. Fragments 2 through 7 articulate a critique of mortal thought which prepares the ground for the longest and most important fragment in the corpus, the Way of Truth, B 8. There, the goddess argues that "what-is" must be ungenerated, imperishable, indivisible, immobile, and perfect/complete (B 8.3–4). Then, contrasting with that, in what the scholarly shorthand usually terms the Way of Seeming, she embarks upon a dualist cosmology which bears a considerable resemblance to Empedocles' own system, and which no doubt influenced it, except that it is fashioned out of a single pair of opposites, Night and Day/Fire (DK B 9 through 19). From the mixture of these two she generates the whole visible world, and proceeds to give an account whose extant sections include, despite the poor state of preservation of this part of the poem, an embryology and an explanation of human cognition.

The central insight of the poem, that which prompts its whole development, is the claim that for any "route of inquiry" it is necessary to postulate one of two mutually exclusive possibilities: either the subject of such inquiry exists, or it does not (B 2). Mortal error arises from the confusion of both routes (B 6 and B 8.53–61). More specifically, since mortals never clearly distinguish one route from the other, they fail to recognize the authentic properties of each. The proper response to the option "that it is not" is to reject that route as unintelligible or unthinkable (B 8.7–9). The option "that it is," in turn, when scrutinized, contains further indications, or signposts, of its existence. These are what the goddess sets forth in B 8, the Way of Truth. Her reasoning in that passage, it has been noted, combines two main strands of thought. One is to invoke the principle of sufficient reason to deny "what-is" any past generation or possible future change, the other consists in applying to "what-is" *a priori* considerations of what something must be like to be a successful object of thought, an item of intelligible discourse. In this regard especially, Parmenides seems to be dealing with epistemological or metaphysical concerns rather than physical ones, and failing to distinguish these different domains.[76]

a) A Defense of the Current Consensus

While any reading of Parmenides, I think, will contain a certain amount of paradox, this paradox will be differently expressed depending on how the poem is read. In what follows I want, as briefly as possible, to defend and criticize the current consensus, in order to arrive at what I believe to be the true measure of paradox in Parmenides' thesis. This, if successful, will enable us to grasp all the more clearly Empedocles' reply. I begin with my defense of the consensus.

According to the predominant view, which I have attempted to describe over the preceding pages, the paradox of the poem springs mainly from the complete rejection of mortal thinking: since only the Way of Truth obtains, this excludes any direct truth-value for the other two-thirds of the poem, the proem and the Way of Seeming. If the Way of Truth is right, then they simply drop out of the picture. To many, the force of such a paradox has been felt to be too strong. The obvious question then becomes: why did Parmenides bother to write the other two-thirds? He should instead have concentrated exclusively on this central doctrine, as Melissus appears to have done. Accordingly, one way of diminishing the force of this paradox is to reject this whole reading of the poem, and grant the Way of Seeming, and perhaps also the proem, some degree of validity. Thus a long debate, recently revived, seeks to grant the Way of Seeming at least some amount of truth-value.[77] While I do allow that, initially, it does present a problem that Parmenides should have bothered to write the other two sections if they were not meant to hold true, I do not think that the difficulty is insurmountable, or incompatible with a sympathetic understanding of the poem.

The Goddess's Instructions

Against any attempt of this kind, I think two types of consideration must be kept in mind. First and most importantly, above and beyond speculation concerning implicit authorial intent (for that is what the objection amounts to), we have the author's *ipsissima verba* repeatedly instructing us to reject the Way of Seeming. That is, on the surface of things, there should be no possible confusion as to what Parmenides or the student is being told to do. The difficulties arise, instead, from the very difficulty of the task the goddess sets us, namely, that we should give up our mortal beliefs. But however difficult it may be, that is all the same what she is instructing the youth to do. To the lines quoted above (B 1. 28–31), we can add the goddess's further instructions in the final lines of B 8.50–61:

50 ἐν τῷ σοι παύω πιστὸν λόγον ἠδὲ νόημα
ἀμφὶς ἀληθείης· δόξας δ' ἀπὸ τοῦδε βροτείας
μάνθανε κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀκούων.
μορφὰς γὰρ κατέθεντο δύο γνώμας ὀνομάζειν,
τῶν μίαν οὐ χρεών ἐστιν, ἐν ᾧ πεπλανημένοι εἰσιν,
55 ἀντία δ' ἐκρίναντο δέμας καὶ σήματ' ἔθεντο
χωρὶς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, τῇ μὲν φλογὸς αἰθέριον πῦρ,
ἤπιον ὄν, μέγ' ἐλαφρόν, ἑωυτῷ πάντοσε τωὐτόν,
τῷ δ' ἐτέρῳ μὴ τωὐτόν, ἀτὰρ κἀκεῖνο κατ' αὐτό
τἀντία, νύκτ' ἀδαῆ, πυκινὸν δέμας ἐμβριθές τε.
60 τόν σοι ἐγὼ διάκοσμον ἐοικότα πάντα φατίζω,
ὡς οὐ μή ποτέ τίς σε βροτῶν γνώμη παρελάσσῃ.

Therewith I put a stop to you to my reliable discourse and thought about reality; from this point learn human beliefs, hearing the deceptive array of my words. For they resolved to name two Forms (of which there is no need to name even one,[78] *wherein men have gone astray), and they chose opposites in*

body and assigned them marks separate from one another, on the one hand ethereal fire of flame, being mild, immensely light, the same with itself in every direction but not the same as the other; that, on the other hand, being likewise in itself the opposites, unintelligent night, a dense and heavy body. This order of things I declare to you to be likely in its entirety, so that never shall any mortal thought outstrip you. [79]

The goddess's instructions are explicit and, with one possible exception, unambiguous: there *is no true faith* in appearances (B 1.30); the *array of words* she is about to give is *deceptive* (8.52); in setting down two forms for naming, [80] mortals *have gone astray* (8.53–4). Perhaps the only possible ambiguity in the passage is ἐοικότα (8.60), which in certain contexts might have positive connotations, and for that reason is the darling of those who wish to save the Way of Seeming. But in the present context it must surely mean that the *diakosmos* the goddess will speak is to be understood as *only* likely. Finally, the goddess herself gives us her reasons for dwelling upon appearances, even if there is no true faith in them: she does so that the student may not be forced to rely upon them through habit, (cf. B 7), taken in by them, or outstripped by any mortal thought (B 8.61).[81] This may be a polemical reference, whereby Parmenides claims to be able to beat the cosmologists at their own game, but the Way of Seeming is also no doubt a sort of training exercise for the student, a dry run to prepare him to see through the contradictory world of appearances, and thereby to learn to reject it.[82]

Thus, knowing full well that her dwelling upon appearances might seem to confer upon them some degree of implicit legitimacy, but having nevertheless decided to do so for pedagogical reasons, the goddess makes both her surface meaning and motives clear for all to see. As a result, there is no conflict to be discerned here between the goddess's explicit orders and her implicit intent. The pull to see one, once again, comes from the very difficulty of what she asks us to do, so that we want her to share our mortal love of appearances. But if she does dwell upon them, it is not because she herself is enamored of them, or drawn to them by habit (B 7.3), but because she understands how difficult we find doing without them is.

Appearances before the "Heart of Truth": Poetic Form

With that I come to a second order of considerations, less often explored, and turning upon the contribution of poetic form to the meaning of the work. Here, very briefly, I want to invoke my earlier characterization of Empedocles' and Parmenides' work as protreptic, and the attendant distinction between an understanding of the poem from the inside, whose meaning is predicated upon the work's doctrine, and the outside, which operates in terms of the wider expectations and conventions of epic genre and public discourse in general. On this characterization, we recognize how the work does indeed operate on two levels, and is intended to help effect in the hearer a transition from one outlook to the other. Recognizing this feature has the advantage of freeing us, in studying the poem, from one of our strongest reflexes in approaching literary works, the expectation of simple unity, or of the possibility of a "horizontal" unity, all on one level. More specifically, the poem itself, by reproducing this paradox, drives home the lesson, applicable to both the poem and the world, that unity cannot be had without rejecting some part of what we want to take as one, but in fact cannot. The disjunction between the different parts of the poem is not accidental, but deliberate, and the poem enacts the paradox of the message. There is unity, but it must be bought at the cost of a choice, and hence by exclusion.

With that in mind I return therefore to the puzzle that the goddess should propose to teach Parmenides both truth and falsehoods. Once again truth itself, it seems, should suffice. But in fact the goddess not only wants to teach Parmenides something he does not know, but also seeks thereby to disabuse him of mistaken mortal opinions. One invariably follows the other. And like any good advocate, she recognizes that she not only has to make her positive case, but in order to reinforce its credibility, she must also explain how the false opinion that concealed the true one arose. The difficulty with her position, at least on the reading of the poem I have been defending, is that the truth she proposes is so all-encompassing as apparently to preclude the existence of these appearances. Yet for all that she is convinced of their falsehood, she has to treat light and night *as if* they were real, not because they are from her divine viewpoint, but because she must take into account her human audience. If this is correct, then it seems not outlandish to infer that, as far as she is concerned, with the exception of the Way of Truth, the whole story is a fiction, make-believe, not from the Way of Truth onwards, but from the start.[83] Crossing into her realm, the *kouros* undergoes a dramatic reversal of psychological perspective, and learns to disregard all that went before, for he is equipped to see the falsehood in the Way of Seeming. Parmenides underscores this reversal in a number of ways, most obviously by stressing the images of motion and conveyance in the proem, which are played off against the theme of stability and immobility in the Way of Truth, where the language of bonds and fetters becomes predominant.

More significant support for such a reading, although the case for it, to my knowledge, has never been made and is liable to be controversial, can be found in an important *double-entendre* from the goddess's initial contrast between truth and mortal thought at B 1.29–30, ἠμὲν ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ / ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, τῇις οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής. While the passage is riddled with difficulties,[84] the terms whereby the goddess qualifies the truth she will reveal, it is generally recognized, anticipate its more fully articulated account in the Way of Truth. Thus ἀτρεμές, *unmoved*, used to describe the "heart of truth," evokes the whole set of associations of true reality with invariability, whereas εὐπειθέος, *trustworthy*, or perhaps εὐκυκλέος, *well-rounded*[85] are also both appropriate, if different, descriptions of it. The term that I find the most significant in this regard, however, is the expression ἀληθείης . . . ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ, *the unmoved heart of truth*.

The difficulty those two words present is less well understood, and as a result less discussed in the literature on the poem, but I think they are ultimately more important than the other two. Coxon, for instance, well appreciates the difficulty, but writes:

> 'The heart of reality' is an expression to which there is no parallel in the extant fragments, for ἦτορ is never used in Greek except of a human or divine person, of whom it refers to the heart or inner self as the seat of emotion, virtue, or life, and it must be so used here. P.'s phrase does not distinguish reality from its heart but characterizes it as living; the sense is 'the unchanging and persuasive living reality.'[86]

Against such an interpretation, I would suggest that the phrase *is* meant to distinguish parts from a whole, despite the obvious complications this entails. To clarify what I mean by this, it is necessary to leave behind the immediate context of the passage and consider the larger (false) world-picture he advances in his cosmology. More specifically, I have in mind lines B 12. 1–3, from the Way of Seeming, where the goddess summarizes the general organization of the universe. Based on these lines and additional doxographic information from Aëtius, Cicero and Neoplatonic commentators, the goddess appears to describe a set of alternating (concentric?) rings, contrasted by the predominance in either of fire and night, with at the center (of the whole edifice?) a feminine god or demon "who steers all":

αἱ γὰρ στεινότεραι πλῆντο πυρὸς ἀκρήτοιο
αἱ δ' ἐπὶ τῇς νυκτὸς, μετὰ δὲ φλογὸς ἵεται αἶσα
ἐν δὲ μέσῳ τούτων δαίμων, ἣ πάντα κυβερνᾷ

For the narrower rings became filled with unmixed fire and those over them with night, in which moves a proportion of flame. In the middle of these is the divinity which governs all things.[87]

As such, this structure is apparently a sort of "scientific" version of the same world which, in the proem, we find described in mostly epic terms. For while there is a difference in types of discourse, there are sufficient continuities between both pictures to warrant identifying them.[88] Nevertheless, it is hard to determine how exactly this later picture can stand as a general frame for the topography of the proem. In particular, by going "beyond Night and Day" to meet a goddess, Parmenides could be traveling either to the center, or perhaps the periphery of the world.[89] More importantly, as we know, once Parmenides encounters this divinity, the whole background of alternating Night and Day simply falls away. This, I repeat, is the basic protreptic effect of the poem. In accordance with all of this, therefore, I venture that the expression "heart of truth," by its associations with internal, central location, and by contrast perhaps with the body's external appearance, may allude to two things. In the first place, the contrast anticipates the position of the goddess at the center, either of the whole universe depicted in the Way of Seeming, or at least as a sort of unity behind the two contrasted elements of Light and Night; and then through her, to the nexus of contrasts between truth and appearances, immortal and mortal, permanent and changing, etc. Following from that, it does not seem entirely accidental that the teachings of the goddess are sandwiched in the middle part of the poem, between two "mortal" accounts of reality. The poem then, just like the world, has a single core of truth, contrasted with a deceptive arrangement of words (8.52). To reach this changeless truth, one must travel through its deceitful exterior, and once one reaches that "heart of truth," one is equipped to see through the deception for what it is, both in the poem, and through it, in the world. Only to him who has not understood the poem, are truth and appearances both parts, i.e. both are capable of being somehow set alongside one another, as if both were real, even though truth may be more "central." But to him who understands the truth, truth is all there is, and the (false) appearances, as well as their literary correlates, the other parts of the poem, fade out of sight and mind.

This, to return to it now, may help the interpretation of the difficult expression δοκίμως εἶναι at B 1.31. The expression, it will be remembered, was the third lesson promised by the goddess, for the youth was to learn not only truth and mortal beliefs, but also *how the things that seem had to* δοκίμως εἶναι. The expression is best recognized as a sort of riddle, which is why it so frequently eludes proper translation.[90] The specific ambiguity it contains is the union of the two opposed terms appearance and being, and, even more curiously, the dependence of the verb "being" upon the adverb δοκίμως, which prescribes the mode of this "being," its form of existence. The paradox in this is that it deliberately reverses the actual relation of things, even in terms of the assumptions criticized by the goddess, where truth and appearances are set alongside one another, as if both real. Specifically, Being is here made subordinate to opinion, instead of the other way around. Coxon's translation, which renders *how it was necessary that the things that are believed should have their being in general acceptance* is a good English version, in that it captures this ambiguity nicely. For if we unpack this relation in terms of the true contrast recognized by the goddess, that between being and not-being, instead of the false mortal opposition of Being and appearances, we can gloss δοκίμως εἶναι as *to have their being in not-being*. This, once more, neatly epitomizes the general movement of the poem to a place *beyond opposition*, where an initial contrast is revealed to be, with hindsight, a single unified reality.

What this shows, if correct, is the basic soundness of the approach I have described as the current consensus. What it may add to it, although the doxographical details still need to be argued out, is a better manner of reading the poem as a whole, as opposed to the doctrinal section alone, one that decisively excludes any possible truth-value for the Way of Seeming. For by recognizing the protreptic dimension to the poem we can more easily negotiate the strong disjunction between its two outlooks, and need not seek to relate or reconcile that which was never meant to be taken together. Finally, by letting the poem share in the paradox of the doctrine, we can eliminate for the non-doctrinal sections the (apparent) conflict between authorial intent and practice. Following the standard line on the matter, therefore, I believe these sections have a purely didactic or dialectical intent; they were written not because Parmenides felt they were true of the world, but so as to facilitate their rejection by the hearer.

b. A First Contrast: βίος

To sum up the results so far: I have argued that the current consensus is correct in depicting the over-all burden of the goddess's argument as a complete rejection of mortal beliefs. The goddess asks Parmenides to make a radical choice. In choosing the Way of Truth, the consequence will be the rejection, not of the world, but of the false opinions that conceal its true nature. Reality, the goddess reveals to Parmenides, contrary to appearances and human belief, is in fact ungenerated and imperishable, indivisible, changeless, complete. And mortal thought, by failing to discern these "signs" is shown to be utterly deficient, perhaps indeed nothing at all. In other words, to attain a god's eye view of reality, we must reject not only the senses but, much more radically, our day-to-day humanity.

Here I want to stop for a moment to ponder the significance of that last point. For thus formulated, it raises a basic problem of interpretation concerning the scope and intent of Parmenides' poem. That is, one wants to know in what way Parmenides felt his poem mattered. To be schematic, was he solving abstract puzzles to satisfy his curiosity or teaching men how to achieve salvation? For instance, if one postulates curiosity as his main motive, it is tempting to read into in the goddess's division between mortal and divine thought our more familiar distinction between theory and practice. This handily removes the paradox's sting, because then it does not matter quite so much if the theory is right or wrong, and the day-to-day world will go on as before. Then again, the assumption of seriousness need not bear directly on the force of the poem's paradox. Nussbaum for example, while interpreting the poem as a genuine religious initiation, and endorsing the motif of salvation, seems closer to the assumption of simple curiosity when she writes:

> Never does Parmenides attempt to deny to mortals their experience of the phenomenal world; he simply denies that these recognizings, classifyings, and namings have any reliable connection with external reality. Mortals' *nous* and *gignoskein* are functioning, but astray; they do not obey the conditions of genuine (or successful) thought. [91]

To me, this seems to grant too much reality to appearances, as it were, because it presupposes that mortals and everything else we are accustomed to speak of *are there*, and that the only difference between Parmenides and us is that we have not understood the solution to his puzzle. On my reading of the poem, the contrast is much starker, and the effect of the κρίσις is to wipe everything else off the map, leaving us only with, as our sole image of the world, the indirect and circumspect simile of the sphere.[92] But this, if it is the whole truth, seems so bleak and unsatisfying a prospect as to drive us back to the motive of curiosity. To some, the poem becomes humanly tolerable only if we posit that its goal was exclusively theoretical, aporetic or elenctic.[93] If serious at all, were the goddess's teachings only meant for the philosopher's study, and not as a guide for life?[94] Or are they eristic puzzles, meant to spur others on to attempt a better account, and as such also an "honest record of perplexity"?

Few or no conclusive answers seem forthcoming. One thing, however, seems relatively certain: even as Parmenides' poem betrays a revolutionary confidence in the power of thought, it remains an open question to what extent this power could or should be effective in the day-to-day world. On a first and broad enough level, then, Parmenides does present a strong contrast with Empedocles, whose ideals are intimately linked to his lifestyle, and who is an advocate of significant social (and political?) reforms. We seem to have, already at this time, the first traces of the opposition between a conception of philosophy as dictating an art of living, able to question and overturn all manner of social practices and conventions, and one where "philosophy . . . leaves everything as it is." [95] At the very least, I would venture, if Parmenides did think of the goddess's truth as dictating a line of conduct, he is rather a predecessor to the skeptical tradition, as someone who, while espousing the most radical theoretical detachment from the world, can thereby operate within it all the more serenely.[96]

This, of course, presents internal tensions all its own,[97] but I want to leave behind this larger question in order to work my way back to the contrast between Parmenides and Empedocles in terms of the relation between first and second order.

c. First and Second Order

Long's Critique: The Mind/Being Identity

So much for the consensus. A more intractable difficulty in the interpretation of Parmenides, as argued by Long in an important recent paper,[98] comes from the exact means favored by this consensus in arriving at the general conclusion I have defended. While the question may seem of marginal importance, in fact it plays a vital part in determining how we read Parmenides' exact argument in the Way of Truth, so that it is worth considering even within the confines of my short treatment. Long's target in his critique is an approach to Parmenides which, while ultimately reaching back to Zeller, he thinks especially typical of Anglo-American scholars. Since his target is largely the view I have typified as the current consensus, in what follows I will treat his critique as directed against essentially the same object. The defining trait of this tradition of interpretation, which Long calls for short the "mind/being non-identity" reading of Parmenides, is its consistent reliance upon the assumption that, for Parmenides, "being itself is devoid of mind."[99] These interpreters, in Long's view, wrongly assume that, for Parmenides, while there is an object, Being/reality, which is the target of all true thinking, the object itself does not think. Yet, Long notes, if this object is then declared to be the totality of what-is, then as a consequence the thinker himself is excluded from reality. This is the essence of a critique which Long undertakes at greater length and with greater subtlety than can be rendered in a few lines, but which I will try to clarify as I proceed.

Against this approach, Long advances three orders of considerations: historical, philosophical and philological. Historically, Long points out, the elaboration of a doctrine of mindless matter was the legacy of Atomism. And if this does not preclude us postulating that Parmenides assumed as much, without elaborating it into a doctrine, then, in terms of historical continuity, this makes no sense of the assumptions found in his most immediate successors. Both Empedocles and Anaxagoras, for instance, assume that intelligence is a basic feature of the world. Then, on the level of general philosophical method, since the mind/being non-identity excludes the thinker from Being, it makes his inquiry too exclusively a first-order attack on the question, when we have no grounds on which to exclude characterizing his project as also or even primarily a second-order investigation.[100] Finally but most importantly, Long contends, the "mind-being non-identity" simply misconstrues the actual Greek of the fragments. Of the three, I want to elaborate briefly upon the philological, before simply recapitulating the philosophical.

The philological case is, in one regard, straightforward. Nowhere in the extant fragments does Parmenides assert that Being is without thought. As B 3 has it, he says exactly the opposite: τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι. But against the obvious implications of this passage, the 'mind-being non-identity' advances the objection that to understand this as an identity statement is to force an anachronistic distortion upon the passage: it makes Parmenides a proto-idealist.[101] Instead, they read νοεῖν here as a virtual passive, which produces translations such as, *what can be thought and what can be, are the same.* Instead, Long stresses what happens if we correctly understand the verb as active: *the same is both thinking and being*. And much the same operation is wrought upon two other crucial passages, B 2.2 αἵπερ ὁδοὶ μοῦναι διζήσιός εἰσι νοῆσαι, and B 8.33–36, τωὐτὸν δ' ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ οὕνεκέν ἐστι νόημα· / οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ τοῦ ἐόντος, ἐν ᾧ πεφατισμένον ἐστίν, /εὑρήσεις τὸ νοεῖν· For B 2.2, the non-identity reading will usually propose *the only ways of inquiry that can be thought of*, vel. sim., whereas Long prefers to understand the latter more simply as expressing the presence of ways of inquiry, *ways of inquiry are for thinking.*[102] Despite some obscurity, what we can take from this is the possibility that the foundation of the goddess's discourse, her starting-point, is *actively thinking something*, not that something can be thought, i.e. some (unthinking) object of thought, distinct from the thinker. As for B 8.33–36, the identity of thought and being is once again stated without compromise. Yet KRS for example translate the lines: "The same thing is there to be thought and why there is thought. For you will not find thinking without what is, in all that has been said." Once again, the problem with this is that it distinguishes thinking from being, even as it specifies being as the cause and object of thinking.

In another regard, to make all this as clear as possible would require a more comprehensive critique of the arguments used by the supporters of the mind-being non-identity.[103] Enough has been said if some suspicions have been raised concerning any rendering that translates Greek active verbs of cognition into English passives. As Long himself observes, the reason why this approach is not often espoused is simply the difficulty of grasping it as a clear idea.[104]

From these difficulties of translation I pass quickly to Long's general philosophical conclusion:

> And if, as I have argued, Being's thought is the only genuine thinking, it should follow that when we are thinking Being with Parmenides we are (in) Being and at least momentarily lose our phenomenal identities as two-headed mortals. Thus the mind/being identity reading provides a basis (the only basis, so far as I can see) for integrating human inquiry and the human subject with The Way of Truth. The mind-being non-identity reading, by contrast, excludes the thinker and therefore thinking from Being. Still worse, it saddles Parmenides with the most egregious self-contradiction. If Being does not include thinking, then thinking does not exist; hence it would follow that Being, contrary to Parmenides' initial postulate, is not thinkable.[105]

First and Second Order Thought

One of the striking features of the *elenchus*, it has been noted time and again, is its self-awareness. It is an exercise which, in many important regards we can characterize as a methodological critique of earlier thought and modes of explanation, more specifically of scientific explanation. Yet although it is in part a second-order exercise, it is not above advancing first-order conclusions of its own. What Long's critique adds to the debate, it seems to me, is the ability to see more clearly how both types of concerns are represented. Notably, with respect to the first contrast I proposed to recognize between Parmenides and Empedocles, that of the relation between thought and action, I think Long's critique shows that Parmenides' thesis, in the end, is more of a theoretical problem than a practical one. As such it is not really refuted by a stroll around the room. The challenge, rather, was to show its shortcomings not only from a practical standpoint, but also from the standpoint of reason and argumentation.

In evaluating the response to Parmenides, I would therefore suggest, we need to remain sensitive to the respective demands of these orders, as well as to the tensions between them. For our purposes, in trying to understand Empedocles, the reason that this needs to be said is that too often the response to Parmenides is framed almost exclusively in terms of first-order questions, the attempt to describe the world directly and independently of any concerns about the observer or thinker. But if we confine ourselves to this order, then it appears that the best Parmenides' successors could do was to contradict him. Against his arguments, they simply asserted plurality and motion. More generously, one could aver that, while Parmenides' successors had some intuitive sense that all was not well in Parmenides' account, they did not need to refute him conclusively to continue pursuing their (primarily) first-order interests:

> To hold the Neo-Ionians accountable to the full Eleatic elenchus strikes me as more than mildly unhistorical. We recognize that some of the semantic and epistemological assumptions that generate the Eleatic elenchus are faulty and naïve. Indeed, it seems that those assumptions are so deeply embedded conceptually that only a sophisticated analysis, one that lies beyond the intellectual horizon of the fifth century, could ferret them out. By contrast, Neo-Ionian cosmologies have the virtue of a 'robust sense of reality.' . . . Are we not being rather school-marmish when we insist, as it were, that the Neo-Ionians should have fulfilled the relevant curricular pre-requisite of the Eleatic elenchus before they could have been entitled to graduate to what, after all, is a more tenable position than that of the Eleatics?[106]

While I am wholly in agreement with that statement, I think it can be taken further. In what follows, I want to explore the possibility that an Empedoclean reply to Parmenides' second-order assumptions can be reconstructed, on the basis that Empedocles' thesis deliberately seeks to avoid the difficulties and incongruities Parmenides' thesis presents in the relation between first and second-order concerns, as well as that within the inherited concept of divine and mortal thought. According to the standard view, a full refutation of Parmenides' starting-point, the claim that not-being is a meaningless utterance, does not take place until Plato tackled and solved the problem in the *Sophist.*[107] I have no quarrel with that, but do want to question to what degree all previous rejections of Parmenides' conclusions, as opposed perhaps to refutations, operated on a merely intuitive level. Nussbaum, for instance, has made a good case for a rigorous second-order critique of Parmenides in Philolaus,[108] and from that it seems possible to imagine that Empedocles, according to the usual chronology Philolaus's elder by only twenty years, was also capable of some insight into what had led Parmenides to such a paradoxical conclusion.

In pursuing this specific question, it needs to be stressed, I am not doing so in abstraction from the overriding goal of this section, and for that matter of what remains of this study, which is to account for the persuasion of Empedocles' thesis. For if, as I have argued above, B 17 should be understood as a sort of general purpose solution, a final general theory of the universe, then much of its persuasive force will have been derived from its ability to surpass in persuasion the appeal exploited by all manner of competing public discourses, but in particular that of Parmenides, whom Empedocles obviously saw as his chief opponent.

Intelligibility and Continuity in the World and in Thought

As Mourelatos has argued, perhaps the most egregious difficulty for the credibility of Parmenides' *elenchus*, even on the level of theory, rather than practical thought, is its requirement that we abandon the rationalist quest for the world's intelligibility.[109] That is so because the continuity and internal homogeneity of Parmenides' one Being banish from within it any internal divisions, especially oppositions or polarities, which would be the first requisite for it to possess some intelligible structure. Here, in the clash between the competing intuitions of intelligibility (or more specifically, its prerequisites, structure and division) versus continuity, and in the Eleatics' arbitrary exclusion of intelligibility in favor of continuity, we have the essence of the *elenchus*.

Such a rigorous one-sidedness, and the strains involved in repressing a natural intellectual impulse like the presumption of intelligibility (for that is what the goddess asks of us), are not bought without exacting a high price elsewhere, notably in the mind. Psychologically, if one attempted to "live" an Eleatic way of life, whatever that might be, the experiment would no doubt prove damaging.[110] But even in the realm of theory, where consequences are not so dire, the exclusive insistence upon continuity over intelligibility results in an untenable second order picture of thought. For the perfect continuity of "what-is," taken as a first order account of the world, ends up denying any continuity whatsoever in the second order realm, where "mortal" or ordinary patterns of thought, which do depend upon polarities and divisions, differ *toto caelo* from divine thought, without any possible mediation.[111] In sum, Parmenides' continuous unity is all first order; it produces an intolerable lack of continuity in the realm of thought.

This, it should be stressed, Parmenides recognized, and he seems to acknowledge it in two main respects. First, and most overtly, the poem makes a claim to a revolutionary originality, even though it is presented as a revelation.[112] Second, there is, as I have already indicated, the apparent impossibility of reconciling the truth of the *elenchus* with normal human thought, which precludes making of it an ideal or pattern for the direction of human life. But if this does hold on a practical level, and Parmenides does recognize it, that does not of itself refute his thesis. In the first place the goddess could reply that she *does* have recourse to division. For division is in fact her opening move, it is the fundamental κρίσις or *choice* between Being and not-Being. In this regard, she could rightly aver that mortals are those who fail to follow through on this point, by their adoption of systematically incomplete divisions of Being in the Way of Seeming. Instead, her fundamental distinction between "what-is" and "what-is-not" is so complete as to cancel out any further use of distinctions or divisions, either in thought or in being, or between thought and Being.

Although right there, in that key move, thinkers from Plato onwards (at least) have discerned the main fallacy of the *elenchus*, I will let the matter stand for the moment, in order to take stock of what the invocation of the notions of first and second order can do for our understanding of the response to Parmenides. What such a distinction offers us, I think, is a clearer picture of the appeal and shortcomings of the *elenchus* (which are otherwise mostly tacit), against which we can better measure the rhetorical appeal of any other account. More specifically, we can now see that an account which failed to completely surpass the persuasiveness of the goddess on the level of a first-order account of the world, might still have *some success* against the *elenchus* if it presented a more coherent second-order account of thought than that advanced by the goddess. Still more subtly, by presenting a more sophisticated account on both fronts, it could perhaps at least match the persuasive force of the *elenchus*, reducing it to a merely equally plausible account, albeit without completely refuting it. That was left for Plato, or perhaps Philolaus.

Such increasing subtlety, to be sure, is generally attributed to most reconstructions of the response to Parmenides on the level of first order description of the world, be they that of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, or the Atomists. What such responses reintroduced or ceased to proscribe was, first, a revival of the central intellectual motivation of Ionian science, the "rationalist quest for intelligibility," which Parmenides had flatly denied. Second, in doing so, they also showed a more sophisticated understanding of the difficulties inherent in talk of change, and put a greater stress on continuity within such change.[113]

More subtly, and here is where most current accounts do not do full justice to the response to Parmenides, an opponent could also attack the incoherency in Parmenides' account of thought and thinking, more specifically the *lack of any continuity* between mortal and divine thought. Indeed, to a more epistemologically conservative mindset, suspicious of the radical, revolutionary and ultimately incoherent Parmenidean claims that, on the one hand, all mortal thinking was mere name or convention, and, on the other, that thought could somehow transcend these limitations and attain the "heart of truth," any account that could fill in, or at least tried to fill, in this gap would be a welcome alternative. Like most skeptical challenges, Parmenides' "test" can only disprove the soundness or indubitable nature of certain beliefs, and founders when it claims that we know *nothing*. And if Parmenides does not deny the possibility of knowledge, for it does exist on the divine level, it is of such a kind that it cannot even account for the *possibility* of false, mortal knowledge.[114]

In what follows, I argue that Empedocles did in fact employ such a two-pronged attack on the *elenchus*, and that it is a significant part of the overall persuasiveness of his account. Following those who credit his response with a more subtle and complex first order account of the world, I want to reconstruct an Empedoclean description of reality that also includes an account of thought and thinking, one that is the counterpart of the more subtle first order account already credited him, and which also recognizes, in this second order account, a debt to Parmenides as significant as in the first order realm. Unlike the *elenchus*, however, a significant feature of Empedocles' account of thought would be that, while recognizing change and the legitimacy of talk of divisions within thought as well as in the world, it could reap the rhetorical advantage of consciously portraying itself as the continuation of previous thought, not its critic. Most importantly, as I hope to show, such an account allowed Empedocles to recognize "mortal thought" as real, and reject Parmenides' unintelligible claim that human thought at no point intersects with reality.

Before plunging into these matters, however, it will be necessary to bring one more piece of the puzzle into the light. That piece is the complex of traditional notions revolving around the gap between gods and men, not so much in the realm of physical power, but in terms of intellectual capacities. As evidenced by the epic and later poetry, these themes had been of central importance to earlier Greeks, and remained important notions through, and sometimes against which the first philosophers articulated their own claims to knowledge. For Parmenides and Empedocles in particular, their importance is hard to underestimate, or if so, it is done at the cost of a significant distortion of their historical and intellectual context.

4. HISTORICAL INTERLUDE: DIVINE AND MORTAL KNOWLEDGE[115]

Empedocles as Traditional Poet and Poetic Innovator

A significant feature of Empedocles' teachings is that, although he does intermittently invoke a Muse or the gods as the source of his teachings, for the most part he seems to speak on his own authority.[116] As I have argued, this does not mean that he intended his word to be taken as that of any mere mortal. Rather, when we also take into account his claim to personal divinity, this means that he claimed to speak, as himself, with an authority equal to that of other poets, past and present, even to that of their divine sources, be they the Muses or Parmenides' goddess.

Obviously, such a claim was difficult for his audience to accept at face value. According to the more standard tenets of Greek religion, i.e. the Iliadic view of an unbridgeable gap between gods and men, it would amount not only to an impious violation of divine prerogatives, but would also imply that, when Empedocles does invoke his Muse, this is but an empty formalism. Conversely, if he was sincere in his appeal to the Muse, that would appear to render superfluous the appeal to his own divine authority. In fact, some degree of ambivalence on this count, between the early poets' self-depiction as passive vehicles for the voice of a god, or alternately somehow sharing in the god's omniscience, recurs through much early Greek poetry.[117] Viewed in this context, Empedocles' claim to divinity is no necessary obstacle to his earnest belief in his Muse.

To select one telling example, a similar phenomenon occurs in Pindar, Empedocles' elder by a generation: while both poets continue to claim external, divine inspiration for their work, both also project themselves as authorities in their own person (some examples are considered below). It is highly noteworthy, however, that the emphasis in each case is the reverse: for Pindar, the Muses continue to be held up as the primary source and authority for his poetry, although he himself is hardly without merit, whereas Empedocles' poetic persona predominates in his poem, but not to the exclusion of external divine inspiration. This contrast, in which we can still discern common elements, in fact makes Pindar a useful starting-point for my short survey of the often conflicting assumptions found in traditional poetic lore concerning the gods, man and knowledge. At the same time, in order to show the true philosophical distance between the two, I will leave Empedocles out of this survey, and return to him only after I have considered Parmenides.

a. Poetic Pessimism and Causal "Overdetermination": Pindar

To the extent that Pindar portrays the Olympians with a warmth and vividness never since equaled, perhaps more than for any other Greek poet of that age, it would be a serious error to charge him with employing the Muse as a purely formal device. Indeed, his own special relation to the Muses and Apollo is in no trivial sense an analogue to that which he described so often in his Epinician Odes between the victorious athlete and the Olympian gods. There, time and again, the victory his song celebrates is described as both a product of the victor's own innate aristocratic excellence *and* a dispensation of divine grace. In the same way, Pindar's song is a gift of the Muses to him, but only because he himself is worthy of such a gift. In the victory odes, this fleeting convergence of merit and grace in the person of the athlete, for all its causal "overdetermination," well expresses the exceptional position of the victor, somehow greater than his peers, god-like in strength and beauty, yet never to be confused with the immeasurably superior gods, from whom "are all the means for mortal excellence."[118]

Between mortals alone, of course, Pindar can and does speak of personal merit, both in the case of the athlete and of himself. In a famous passage at the end of *Olympian* II, while rebuking his poetic rivals—Bacchylides and Simonides according to the traditional interpretation—Pindar contrasts their mere learning with his own innate superiority.[119] But once more, if Pindar can there call himself the "sacred bird of Zeus," he is also the author of some of the most sublime expressions of mortal transience ever formulated. Thus, if one were to attempt to relate the two contrasting pictures of mankind Pindar proposes, one could venture that he is best understood as holding that, despite the various pretensions which men may entertain against one another, when man in turn is compared to the gods, the distinctions between one mortal and another collapse into the common nothingness of their ephemeral nature.[120]

What emerges from this is that the ambivalent nature of the poet, alternating between active creator of poetry or passive scribe of some god, Zeus' holy bird, or creature of a day, turns not so much on his intrinsic worth, *as on the different objects to which he is compared.* If the hero or poet shines against the foil of mortal men, he in turn is but a foil to the brilliance of the gods. And as for Homer's heroes, or Pindar's victorious athletes, so for the poet: that which elevates him above other men, his greater access or proximity to the gods, also, paradoxically, turns him into nothing before the gods themselves. The difficulty in relating these orders could lead to a negation of the very possibility of any link between the two, the denial of any common measure, as seems intimated by Pindar. But this then raises a serious difficulty, which Pindar and the archaic poets generally do not face, about the place the gods can have in men's lives, or what possible knowledge men could have of such creatures.

b. The Homeric Gods before the Unity of All Things: Two Types of Response

The picture becomes even more complicated when, with the elaboration of the concept of an all-pervasive natural order, a *kosmos*, the Homeric picture of the gods is called into question.[121] It is of course by no means possible here to undertake an examination of the different theories of the world and its origins which the early Greek philosophers developed, or the simultaneous development of rational theologies which this process set in motion, the object of Jaeger's great study.[122] Still, taking for granted the existence of these new ideas, and that they now provided an option, not so much in terms of cult and religious practice, but in ways of imagining the world, it is nevertheless necessary to attempt to describe their impact upon the manner in which the now dethroned Olympians—if that is not too strong a term—were imagined.

One type of philosophical response to the new cosmology was a kind of double vision concerning the divine realm. Although no clear distinction seems to have been made in theory, we find that one is often implied between the gods as some form of idealized superior beings, if after Xenophanes (perhaps before) no longer anthropomorphic, and a more abstract divinity of nature itself.[123] To be sure, Xenophanes and Heraclitus still speak unblushingly about "the gods" while preaching their doctrine of the unity of all things.[124] It seems to be the case then that some of the earliest philosophers retained a belief in the existence of individual divinities, even though they tended to subordinate them to the cosmic order.[125]

Against this first type of response, which could be called a more conciliatory approach, there existed the more radical temptation to wipe the slate clean of such lesser gods. It is unclear if it was endorsed by the Milesians themselves, or if they limited themselves to reforming men's picture of these gods, like Xenophanes. If we are to trust the indirect evidence of Aristophanes in the *Clouds* and the prosecution of Anaxagoras for impiety, it does seem to be the case that along with Ionian science there went a dismissal, perhaps denial of the traditional gods.[126] But beyond the possible case of the Milesians, all the major figures remain theists of some sort, and the only one we can possibly include in this second group is Anaxagoras. One might also be tempted to add Parmenides, but in another respect, this is a false distinction, because Parmenides' "what-is" inherits so many traditional features of the Greek god(s). Before I return to him, however, I will first consider the case of two thinkers who do clearly retain some place for gods in their cosmology, Heraclitus and Xenophanes. From there I will be in a better position to show how Parmenides and Empedocles fit into this debate, and the importance it has in framing Empedocles' response to Parmenides.

c. Xenophanes on Knowledge

As I have said, the first type of response, best characterized by Xenophanes and Heraclitus, does not openly set out to sweep the cosmos clean of all other gods. Rather, the gods seem to have been subordinated to the more abstract cosmic order. For both men, the main philosophical utility of these creatures was apparently epistemological. In Heraclitus and Xenophanes, we find that for the most part they are employed as a means of expressing the possibility of knowledge, conceived of as absolute truth or certainty. This is particularly conspicuous in Xenophanes' fragment 34:

> καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφὲς οὔτις ἀνὴρ ἴδεν οὐδέ τις ἔσται
> εἰδὼς ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἅσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων·
> εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα τύχοι τετελεσμένον εἰπών
> αὐτὸς ὅμως οὐκ οἶδε· δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται.

And the truth concerning the gods and all the matters about which I speak no man knows nor will ever know. For even if he happened to say the complete truth, he himself nevertheless would not know it; for seeming is wrought upon all.

This famous passage, in denying knowledge to men, and assigning δόκος, *seeming*, as our lot, does not deny the possibility of knowledge *tout court*, but merely of human beings having it, or even more modestly, of their having certainty about certain topics.[127] For by default it seems to follow that if knowledge is possible, yet not possessed by men, then someone must have it. The first candidate to come to mind of course is Xenophanes' "one god, mightiest among gods and men" (B 23), but I would probably include among such potential "knowers" the other gods he mentions in line 2. According to Lesher's analysis of the passage,[128] who has devoted to the question more scrutiny than anyone else, there is no fundamental difference in kind between the gods' understanding and what it would be like for us to have knowledge, except that our limitations disbar us from certainty. This at any rate seems a more promising reading than a pessimistic interpretation according to which δόκος must be equated with nothing or next to nothing. The possibility of equating it with nothing does arise, it is true, depending upon how much stress we lay on the disjunction between men and gods, and from the fact that the converse of "only gods have knowledge," if given universal scope, is that men never do. But this then exposes the statement to the full force of the second order objection that, since uttered by a man, Xenophanes, it cannot be true, or if uttered by a god (his Muse?), it cannot be recognized as true by men. Thus, it would prove no more philosophical than Pindar and the other poets' pessimistic views on the nature of man. Against this also is the fact that Xenophanes remains on the whole optimistic concerning the possibility of knowledge: his whole activity is predicated upon the assumption that there is something to be known.[129] Here this optimism clashes with his elevated religious sentiment, leading him to brand all mortal knowledge mere *seeming*. But does that imply that man cannot have knowledge *of any kind*? Thus, for fragment 34 to hold and not fall prey to too strong a second order objection, we have to limit the scope or strength of the disjunction between men and the divine. It seems best instead to say that s*eeming* or δόκος stands to man as knowledge belongs to the gods: there is a proportionality between the two orders, wherein even *seeming* must have some minimal positive value, despite its negative valuation before divine knowledge. In other words, it is still more than nothing. But in so doing, Xenophanes does not truly escape the difficulty, for he still has to rely on the concept of absolute truth while simultaneously denying his own grasp of it.

d. Heraclitus: The God's-Eye View and the Geometrical Mean

Heraclitus takes the question further than Xenophanes, and offers the best precedent for Empedocles' own synthesis. I begin with two fragments that reiterate the traditional division between man and the divine on the possibility of knowledge:

DK B 78: ἦθος γὰρ ἀνθρώπειον οὐκ ἔχει γνώμας, θεῖον δὲ ἔχει.
Human disposition does not possess discernment, but divine disposition does.

B 70: Ἡράκλειτος παίδων ἀθύρματα νενόμικεν εἶναι τὰ ἀνθρώπινα δοξάσματα (an indirect quotation)
Heraclitus deemed mortal opinions to be children's playthings.

If these and similar statements were all that we possessed of Heraclitus' thoughts on knowledge, we might justly group him with the poets. To be sure, such statements, taken in isolation, seem no more sophisticated than the traditional distinction between gods and men. From a philosophical standpoint, they would also be subject to the same second order objection as the Xenophanes passage. But Heraclitus meets just such an objection in the very first sentence of his book: The *logos* he propounds is not merely the discourse of any particular man, but is itself identified with the everlasting order, the structure of the world, the *kosmos*.[130] By inference we must take it that Heraclitus' position compared to other men is privileged in that he can hear the "language of reality"(cf. B 34), but not so privileged that he himself is completely above the flux of all things. In this regard he also retains in many of his preferred metaphors a sort of passivity before the world order, of which he is merely the auditor or witness. It would not be too much of an exaggeration to say that all of reality, and especially what he calls the "hidden harmony" (B 47) has become his Muse. In thus reworking the traditional pattern, Heraclitus inherited the mantle of the poet or prophet, along with the internal tensions of the role, for he claims to be a passive recipient of wisdom, yet also more meritorious than the rest of mankind.

But unlike the poets, he seems to have been the first to recognize that for both of these relations to obtain at one and the same time there must be more than a single division between the divine world and that of man. His solution is found in the thought pattern which Fränkel identified as the "geometrical mean"[131] as in fragment 79, and 83:

B 79: ἀνὴρ νήπιος ἤκουσε πρὸς δαίμονος ὅκωσπερ παῖς πρὸς ἀνδρός.
Foolish man has as much understanding before the divine as a child does before a man.

B 83: ἀνθρώπων ὁ σοφώτατος πρὸς θεὸν πίθηκος φανεῖται καὶ σοφίᾳ καὶ κάλλει καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν.
The wisest of men seems a monkey before god, either in wisdom or beauty or all other things.

The elegance of the solution consists in the manner in which the formula, which Fränkel insightfully compared to the geometrical mean in mathematics (A/B = B/C), preserves the worth of both relations, something that cannot be accommodated by a single division between mortal and divine levels:

> In all the instances quoted so far it was always the element C (child, ape . . .) alone which varied, and with it the predicate of the statement. The term B constantly represented ordinary humanity, and the element A referred, in some sense or other, to god and the Absolute. The equation of the geometrical mean is a method of denouncing and humiliating humanity; it is equally a method for praising and extolling the divine. But there is one more gradation implied in the scheme. The term C (child . . .) is, as we have observed, a well-known thing with notorious defects; the term B (ordinary man) happens to be a supposedly well known magnitude and a supposedly worthy subject, but the equation reveals that the common evaluation is erroneous and that the qualities of man are in actual fact the opposite of what was generally assumed. But then the term A (the Absolute) represents that which was unknown to mankind, not visualized by anyone, not worshipped or revered appropriately, until Heraclitus discovered its real essence and preached its gospel . . .

The introduction of this new level (the "A" in Fränkel's analysis), the all-encompassing world order (B 41), which Heraclitus does not hesitate to call divine, thus supplanted the Olympians for him. It was all at once the ordering principle of all things, and as such deserved to be the focus of all attention, and the basis of all understanding (B 114). The revolutionary force of this idea was that all else now had to be accounted in terms of it, including the old gods. This is what explains the double-vision I have ascribed to him concerning the divine world, the tendency to talk of the world-order as the real god, while also allowing for the existence of individual deities, in fact using them as a means to describe this higher level. The addition of this new level, however, also brought the demoted gods closer to man. For instead of being the autonomous guarantors of the world-order, the world-order became the new standard from which the gods' own existence depended (B 94). They ceased to be themselves the sources of power, intelligence and value, or even holiness, as Plato later had Socrates point out to Euthyphro (10d–e).[132] In this they became like men, cf. B 53.

This demotion of the old gods, it seems, promises at least in part a resolution of the epistemological problem as to how Heraclitus' own particular, mortal standpoint relates to the god's-eye view of reality he advances. He creates a distinction between these two concepts of the divine, in which the individual gods are no longer themselves the sources of order, but presumably more accomplished students of it than men, since their strength as well must be nourished from *the One Law, common to all* (B 114). In being himself a better student of the *hidden harmony* than the rest of humanity, he thus approaches to their level. In this regard, as it is now generally recognized, the concept of the path up and down (B 60) and the "turnings of fire" do not have an exclusively cosmic and physical role in his thought, but also illustrate the deeper harmony of the opposites.[133] They also seem to denote what we would call stages of intellectual development, for example, B 118 *clear light (is) a dry soul, wisest and best*, or B 36 *it is death for souls to become water. . . .* Further, although this is shakier ground, these passages have even been connected with eschatological themes, concerning the rewards of meritorious souls after death, in which some souls escape being "quenched" at death.[134] What seems certain, even if I need not here pursue this line of interpretation, is that by positing a single standard whereby all is measured, Heraclitus sees a possible continuity between man and the gods (the path) that was not previously imaginable.

But, once more, if his epistemological optimism prompted him to imagine that man could achieve a god-like true knowledge, this required redrawing the boundary between what men thought of as a god and the new absolute he wished to present. There remains a serious epistemological difficulty as to how a finite individual, be he god or man, could relate to the new eternal standard Heraclitus proposed. Some recognition of this seems to be the subject of one of his more obscure and mystical fragments:

B 10: συνάψιες ὅλα καὶ οὐχ ὅλα, συμφερόμενον διαφερόμενον, συνᾶιδον διᾶιδον, καὶ ἐκ πάντων ἓν καὶ ἐξ ἐνὸς πάντα.
Graspings-together, wholes and not-wholes, carried together carried apart, harmonious, discordant, and one from all things, and from one all things.

Despite the obscurity of the passage, it is fairly clear that the historical Heraclitus' answer to this problem is the discovery of the *logos*, the rational ordering of the world. That is what mediates the gap between the one and the many, the part and the whole, and allows the extrapolation from his inner self to the world. This nascent idealism, which tacitly identifies the essence of the world with language and intelligible order, has of course both the flaws and advantages of its more sophisticated descendants. As Kahn writes:

> The ambiguity in this conception of wisdom is deep and essential, and it cannot be resolved by distinguishing two senses of *sophon*, as some have proposed. The notion of wisdom is so elevated the name of Zeus is scarcely appropriate for it; but it is this same notion that Heraclitus wants to claim as his own achievement and to offer as a norm for human thinking in general.[135]

For my purposes, the precedent set by Heraclitus prefigures many important Empedoclean themes.[136] His commitment to a divine, intelligible cosmos, and its eternal station above individual divinities, whose own superiority comes from their own greater moral and intellectual subordination to its higher law, diffuses to a great extent the novelty of Empedocles' own synthesis, and helps buttress my own interpretation of Empedocles' self-conception as a god. In this regard, if that interpretation is correct, Empedocles' claim to be a god, but not an eternal, Olympian one, only makes explicit that which we find implicit in Heraclitus. Equally significant, in terms of possible influence, is the hierarchical conception of reality and learning, discussed earlier in its connection with Plato, but which also seems to be prefigured here. It is surely no accident, once again, that such a conception also finds its pedagogical counterpart in the adoption, by all three thinkers, of a proleptic presentation of their doctrine. Such a literary form exploits the hearer's expectation of intelligibility in the world by reproducing it in their work. But most important of all, with respect to the inherited debate concerning the relation of human and divine wisdom, is the ready-made reply the Heraclitean "geometrical mean" provides to the negative valuation of human wisdom before the divine. For by means of such a scheme, Heraclitus, while recognizing the superiority of divine intelligence, simultaneously asserts the continuity of all thought and defuses the possibility of ever equating it with nothing. In its own imagistic way, the geometrical mean is a transcendental argument *avant la lettre*, for it shows how the notion of divine wisdom is in fact predicated upon the recognition of the same faculty, albeit in a lesser degree, in mortal thought.

5. EMPEDOCLES' RESPONSE TO PARMENIDES: THE CONTINUITY OF THOUGHT

a. Divine and Mortal Thought in Parmenides

By contrast with Heraclitus, Parmenides has sometimes been characterized as reactionary, or as a counterrevolutionary.[137] And as far as the relation of first to second-order is concerned, his position does seem something of a throwback to the views of the poets, where the gap between gods and men remains impassable. As was the case in Pindar, where set against the majesty of the gods, which must be accepted as a blunt, inescapable truth, man is simply reduced to nothing, and his feebleness does not seem a sufficient basis from which to grasp, let alone impugn the first, so in Parmenides, before the permanence and stability of τὸ ἐόν, the sensible world is reduced to an illusion. And in this respect, if there are any grounds to the link between Ionian science and an increasingly secular worldview, then Parmenides' poem could certainly be read as a powerful retort from a religious outlook. Its devastating critique and parody of scientific explanation are the logical equivalent of a bolt from heaven. For if the reading of the poem I have defended is correct, Parmenides goes so far as to claim that mortal thinking, contrary to its claims, does not reveal any truth whatsoever, be it secular or religious, but fails completely to intersect with reality.

Parmenides, of course, obviously recognized that such a sweeping thesis would be vulnerable to the charge of inconsistency if advanced merely by himself, and it is a significant feature of the poem's rhetorical strategy that the argument of B 8 is made by the goddess, and granted to the κοῦρος, *youth*, as a revelation. For, at least in terms of the poem's setting, the κοῦρος is by no means to be confused with the goddess. Although he himself is deemed not unworthy of, or incapable of appreciating the divine revelation he receives, he seems rather the passive beneficiary of her argument.

Nevertheless, if one can grant that the poem is consistent that far, this does not eliminate its more fundamental difficulty, its initial endorsement of a contrast between two orders of thought, the mortal and the divine, on which in the end it reneges. Indeed, the goddess's implicit concession that mortal thought does exist often seems all the more undeniable for the vehemence with which she attacks it. Throughout the poem, she condemns mortal beliefs for several specific shortcomings. They are entirely conventional, man-made, *set down* B 8.53; contingent or arbitrary (B 8.54: men stipulated two forms, *of which there is no need to name even one*); supported by habit (B 7.3); they are without genuine persuasion (B 1.30); erroneous (B 8.54); nothing (B 6.4); and finally, dispensable (B 6.4–9).[138]

As she voices these criticisms, it is difficult not to feel that the goddess herself is sliding back into mortal habits of thought. For why does she pour such scorn upon mortal thought, if it is unconnected to reality? If it is nothing, why does habit drive us back to it? More seriously, how and why could men have ever "made up their minds" to name two forms, what possible event could have prompted men to abandon truth for illusion, as she implies?

Above, I granted that the purpose of the Way of Seeming was dialectical, and that the goddess could speak of appearances without being herself committed to them. But to leave it at that only drives the central inconsistency of the poem deeper. There remains an insurmountable difficulty in her assumption of there being someone, the youth, in need of instruction into divine thought, and that this someone, once postulated, should turn out, in the end, to be "nothing."[139] For would not such a student or auditor have to be, if only in mind, temporarily sundered from "what-is," until he or she could be reabsorbed into "the heart of truth"? Further, what happens when, according to Long's corrective of the consensus, we add thought to the necessary properties of Being? As David Sedley writes:

> According to Parmenides, there are no separate thinking subjects. All thinking is what-is thinking itself. How could it find room to misconceive itself? That is a question on which Parmenides left his interpreters to puzzle.[140]

The completeness of "what-is" therefore, seems even incompatible with the presumption of Parmenides as a discrete individual, and this also seems true *a fortiori* of what separates him from the goal of his quest, the route of inquiry. In this respect Owen seems to have been correct in reapplying to Parmenides' argument the image from Sextus Empiricus, and later Wittgenstein, of "a ladder to be climbed up and thrown away."[141] Once the god's-eye view has been attained, then all else simply fades away.

b) Ancient and Modern Critiques of Parmenides' Argument

As we have seen, Parmenides affirms that true/divine thinking and "what-is" are the same. Mortal thought, however, is false because (a) it tries, inexplicably, to divide the indivisible "what-is" (B 8.53–59), or (b) it combines "what-is" and what is not (B 6.6–9). (These may in fact be variants of the same mistake). What led him to such a diagnosis? Here I will summarily rehearse a number of current analyses of Parmenides' mistaken assumptions, so as to articulate all the better by contrast the precise form of Empedocles' response. More generally, since many of these issues involve fundamental problems of metaphysics and epistemology, to do them justice would take us very far afield. Such issues, however, need not long detain us, since my goal here remains only that of reconstructing Empedocles' own interpretation of Parmenides' error, and of translating it from his own picturesque mode of thought into the idiom of some more familiar abstractions.

Perhaps the best starting point, therefore, is to attempt to delineate as clearly as possible what it was that drove Parmenides to such incredulity concerning appearances. Parmenides, of course, was acutely aware of the allure, and hence dangers, of appearances. Men can and are regularly taken in by "lies resembling the truth"[142] or by "deceitful arrays of words." In other words, simple intelligibility or even plausibility, on its own, without recourse to any reference or test, is no guarantor of truth.[143] Why not then bypass it? If the real test of anything's truth is answerable only by reference to the division between "is" and "is not," then truth, reality, is simply the sum total of "what-is." As for the rejection "what-is not," Parmenides seems to have been impelled to such a verdict by the limited conceptual horizons of his day. Since it lacked a proper, tangible reference, he felt it was unintelligible.[144] Certainty or truth could only be found in the thought "it is." If one reflected further on the matter, as the goddess does in B 8, one could also be more specific about its nature, but that would be about the limit of what could be said.

Another point to note is that Parmenides, despite being perhaps the first critical thinker, does not recognize the purely evaluative, or metalinguistic aspect of his own project. In normal circumstances, when we judge the truth or falseness of some account, we do so by testing it against "the facts," the way the world actually is.[145] There is in this, accordingly, a distinction to be made, between, on the one hand, an evaluative position, self-consciously making statements about statements, and thus distinguishing itself from, on the other, statements about things, where to simplify, truth is implied or assumed.[146] Thus even when we say, of any statement: "that is false," by recognizing that that is an evaluation of the relation between a statement and facts, we are not *necessarily* declaring that the statement itself is unintelligible, unreal, unimaginable, incoherent or contradictory. We can recognize, without contradiction, that *it is true that* that statement is false, for the object of our evaluation is the relation between the statement and the facts.[147] Nor, in declaring it true, does that mean that it is "one" with the fact(s), in the sense that language, when correct, becomes completely transparent, or fuses with the facts it correctly describes.

Parmenides, I think, wrongly applies this second order function, (second-order taken here in the sense of an evaluative appraisal) directly to reality or to thought, rather than to the relation between statements and facts. Starting from the assumption that thought, when true or successful, more or less concretely grasps or makes contact with reality, without mediation, he distinguishes true thought from false not in terms of a relation between a statement and a fact or situation, but by calling it true and "real." By contrast, when thought or language is not successful, and does not make contact with what-is, it is nothing, as opposed to being false.

I pass now to a third and even more important point. For although the criticisms described above may be accurate, they do not explain the specific intellectual impulse, or thought pattern which Parmenides is following in advocating the positive route. The modern consensus on the question is that the central drive of the *elenchus* is a reapplication, by Parmenides, of a model of successful thought or discourse beyond its proper domain.[148] Parmenides starts from the model that a thought, whether in the form of a name or statement, when it is true, is identical with its reference. In more pictorial terms, it goes to, intersects or even merges with its object or reference. In this, although Parmenides speaks primarily of a voyage toward a goal, it is equally important to note that the first, and most crucial, decision is that of choosing a direction or path, as stressed in B 6. If one has made the right initial distinction, and then is able to abide by that choice, that κρίσις, then one will reach one's destination. Put another way, both the initial direction of the thought, and the thinker's capacity to see it through to its destination, will determine whether or not it will "connect" with reality.

Here, however, is where Parmenides' reapplication of this approach from names or statements to "what-is," taken as all there is, breaks down. It may be helpful, at this point, although perhaps this is too simplistic an example, to picture in our minds Parmenides' sphere, out there before us, its boundary the division between what-is and what-is-not. To arrive at it, we must first make the choice between "what-is" and "what-is-not," or, to pursue the spatial implications of that picture, take the right path, align ourselves with our goal. Setting out from there, we must also struggle to keep moving towards it, and not let ourselves be sidetracked by various distractions, notably the senses.[149]

But if such a reconstruction of Parmenides' assumptions is correct, this presents an intolerable incompatibility with the actual procedure outlined in B 2, even when we limit ourselves to the level of "thinking in pictures" along with Parmenides. For despite the goddess's protests to the contrary, what is to prevent us from charting a course for nowhere? By contrast, it is Parmenides' own divine thought which, because it can only think "that it is" which seems afflicted with tunnel vision. Mortal thought, because it grasps both truth and falsehood, seems to have a wider actual range than divine thought. More seriously, Parmenides' model of correct thought involves choosing, distinguishing, *picking something out*, as opposed to other things.[150] Thus, even though Parmenides' target, "what-is," does have a determinate nature, i.e. is fixed within boundaries, it cannot be contrasted with other possible objects of reference. Inasmuch as it, alone, is, it cannot be contrasted with anything; unlike the object corresponding to a thought, its object cannot be picked out, for there is nothing else from or against which to pick it out. Or if we do attempt this, then we are treating "what-is-not" as if it were something.

Parmenides on Thinking in Pictures: The Route and the Sphere

Although Long (1996) does not raise the issue in his critique, perhaps the strongest internal support for the view he attacks in his study is the centrality of the image of the route, the theme of the quest for reality. The quest, of course, implies a separation between the traveler and his destination, and as such it seems to be what has fueled Long's target, the "mind-being non-identity" reading. For the notion of the "route of inquiry" certainly does seem to legitimize the talk of what-is as "there to be thought," perhaps on the model of knowledge as vision, with "what-is" as both the cause and object of knowledge, all the while remaining distinct from the thinker, or in this case, perceiver.[151] It is a serious question, then, to what extent Parmenides, in the end, was willing to abide by the theme of the route, the image of knowledge as a journey. What philosophical work does it do? Is the route a model of thought in action, a sort of working hypothesis, or still less, a simple didactic device?[152] In this regard, I do not think that bracketing the "routes of inquiry" off, as is sometimes suggested, on the grounds that they are "metalinguistic," or logical framing devices, is a useful expedient in dealing with a Presocratic thinker. It amounts to granting special status to one set of images in the poem, while feeling free to reject others. The question, to me at least, seems rather to be, for each of Parmenides' metaphors or images, do they do any philosophical work? If so, then they are fair game for an adversary, who is entitled to ask how the whole picture, or series of pictures the poem sets forth, are meant to stand together.

The routes are of course not the only image in the poem whose existential status is left in doubt. To take but one important related example, we can consider the simile of the sphere. Quite simply, does it refer to anything at all? Current interpretations of its exact status vary considerably. Sedley for example has recently and provocatively argued for a literal understanding of it: "what-is" is a spherical mass.[153] In this he goes against most recent interpretations, which stress that it is only a simile (B 8.43: εὐκύκλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ, *similar to the mass of a well-rounded sphere*) and that it is meant to illustrate the more abstract notion of its completion, perfection, and the ideal of truth as perspectivally neutral, etc. But against Sedley's suggestion, taking the simile literally only gets us so far. In the first place, we can wonder, if Parmenides did mean it so literally, how are we to imagine ourselves or any other of the pictures advanced in the poem in terms of it? Where do we, the goddess and the routes fit into it? We do not even know, for that matter, from what vantage point we are to regard the sphere. It seems more intuitive, I think, to imagine the sphere as viewed from the outside, as a destination, rather than from the inside, but then again this is incompatible with it being the totality of what-is, at least insofar as that excludes the possibility of an external observer.

Accordingly, maybe we should reverse that picture in our minds. Instead of imagining ourselves completely out to sea, left to choose between absolute being and not-being, but with the added complication that we are nowhere in the mean-time, we should think of ourselves as already in "what-is" or at least as caught on the path to it, but incapable of traveling down it to its proper end. This, I think, better captures the ambiguity or even incoherence of Parmenides' image, and better fits the goddess's description of the wandering two-headed mortals in B 6, who go back and forth between the two, because they distinguish *and* identify being and not-being. But the question then becomes, how can we not interact at all, or have anything to do with the world, as the picture would then imply we do? How can our thinking about the world, which must at least in part, or part of the time, be turned towards the thought "it is," end up being "nothing"?

Several problems converge here. First, I can make the obvious remark that Parmenides' various pictures of reality do not seem capable, in literal or even general spatial terms, to account for the existence of discrete individuals and thinkers. For that matter, they do not even appear to be able to fuse together into one single general picture. Parmenides presents us with a number of different, I would claim deliberately inconsistent pictures, which do some work of persuasion, but which we must then carefully and self-consciously bracket off as not literally true. These include, if we limit ourselves to the Way of Truth (B 8) alone, the goddess and Parmenides as discrete individuals, the two routes, Dike/Necessity/Fate which constrain what-is in fetters, and finally, the sphere.

Critical Thought and Abstraction

In this, I think, Parmenides is abusively and deliberately reusing an archaic thought pattern, sometimes considered symptomatic of primitive thought in general, the willingness to account for an object from several standpoints all at once, without insisting upon any one as final or definitive. As Fränkel put it: "The archaic mode of thought does not deal with an object once and for all, thereafter simply discarding it; rather, its habit is to circle around its object, in order to inspect it afresh from changing viewpoints."[154] An example of this from earlier Greek literature would be Hesiod's various accounts of the origin of evil and human suffering, which he handles via the *two versions* of the Pandora story (*Theog.* (507–616); *W. & D.* (47–105)) *and* the myth of the Five Races, *W. & D.* (106–201). These various stories are all somehow cumulative, that is they all propose to relate the origin of human suffering, but are not strictly reducible to a single account.[155]

By contrast to such thinkers, I suggest, Parmenides deliberately sets up competing pictures, so as to force us to pick among them, and ultimately reject the lot. He wants to bring us to the fundamental, essentially abstract insight that "it is" by repeatedly drawing us forward with pictures which, once each has made its point, we are supposed to drop. In this regard Parmenides seems acutely aware of the risk of any specific picture or metaphor drawing along unwanted baggage, and prefers to play his images off against one another, and discard them once their work is done. This is overtly the case in the choice of the two ways at B 6, and the various proofs of B 8, where two alternatives are considered, and only one is retained. In suggesting this, therefore, I am not merely speculating, but reapplying a recognized feature of Parmenides' method to a larger tract of text. In this connection we can note that, even at the end of such a *via negativa*, having given little but negative qualifications of his subject, Parmenides has some difficulty stating what it is in positive terms, and has to fall back onto an indirect account, the simile of the sphere. But then, in order to explain it, and presumably to avoid having it taken literally, since he will give us no further image whereby we are to approach it, he finds himself reduced yet again to negations.

This leads to a second point. The lack of almost anything positive to cling to at the end of this exercise may in part explain why we cannot find any place for ourselves in the picture. To insist on that is to misunderstand the general direction of the eliminative thought process. The wish still to see ourselves, or the route, or the fetters of Necessity as distinct and separate, is to misconceive the direction of abstraction towards the homogenous and continuous, it is as it were, to travel backwards, it is to become one of the two-headed mortals of B 6. In this critical mode therefore, Parmenides does show an important debt to earlier "scientific" thought, for his central concern is the elimination of alternatives, in order to retain as true only what survives the *elenchus*. But in carrying the denial of contradiction to the point where no positive statement is possible except the self-identity of "what-is," his eliminative method cannot condone pluralism, and so annihilates the phenomena.[156]

Theory and Practice of Thinking

From these general questions of interpretation, I turn back now to the more specific issue of the relation between mortal and divine thought. To clarify how Parmenides so easily infers "nothing" from falsehood, we need to invoke again Parmenides' direct equation of true thought and being (B 3), or rather his failure to distinguish one from the other. According to the goddess, men falsify the picture of "what-is" by either dividing it up into opposites, or adding "what-is-not" to it. For the goddess these are really the same mistake because division implies denying to whatever parts result from the division of "what-is" some aspect of the completeness they would otherwise have: this imports "what-is-not" into "what-is." Instead, to be true, thought must be committed only to "what-is," its boundaries and those of what-is being one and the same. Thought will be untrue if it adds to or divides "what-is." Successful, true thought will have to be, as the juror's oath has it, the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. Any deviation on the part of thought from "what-is" destroys the truth. But if we see how this is so for truth, it is not apparent how thought or the thinker can, by adding "nothing" to "what-is," turn it to nothing.

This is where Parmenides' logical insight about truth is pulled up short by his own cruder metaphysical assumptions. He is correct enough when he sees that falsehood ensues when we deviate from "what-is." But by denying any possible division within "what-is," including that between thinker and object of thought, he cannot allow for the possibility of such deviation. For such a "turning away" to be a possibility, thought would need to have more than one possible object or direction for thinking. And in practice Parmenides does allow this, for time and again thought, even divine thought, distinguishes possibilities and alternatives, even if it then turns on its heels to deny it has done so.[157] The fundamental lesson from all of this, which can be taken from Parmenides' practice, and against the grain of his theory, is that, since thought necessitates divisions and distinctions to operate, there must also be distinctions within Being. That was Plato's conclusion, and if Nussbaum is right, it was also that of Philolaus.[158]

c. Empedocles' First Principles as Thinking Beings

As for Empedocles, my claim in this regard is that he as well is an heir to Parmenides' practice, as opposed to his doctrine, even though he did not go as far as later thinkers did in refuting Parmenides' doctrine on his own terms. Where he does precede them is in attacking the cleavage Parmenides proposed between *nous* and the sensible world, and in attempting once more to relate them. Although his response to Parmenides is usually seen as a dispute over the viability of cosmology, it seems equally valid, given the necessary conjuncture of the mental and the physical, a point which both thinkers assume unquestioningly, to frame the debate as one between competing attempts to describe the interrelations of thinking and being. From that angle, as from that of the cosmological question, and the two cannot be fully separated, Empedocles' approach can be described as a hybrid between Heraclitus' functional and hierarchical conception of thought and reality, and Ionian science's attempt to isolate material *archai*, or the basic building blocks of the cosmos. His debt to Parmenides, in turn, is most conspicuous in his more rigorous conception of those very building blocks. At this level, I think, he imposes only a very slight correction upon Parmenides.

We can see this most clearly, I suggest, in two important passages, B 109, perhaps the most famous three lines of Presocratic epistemology, and line 10 of B 110. In fragment 109, Empedocles tells us that:

> γαίῃ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ' ὕδωρ
> αἰθέρι δ' αἰθέρα δῖον, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ ἀίδηλον,
> στοργὴν δὲ στοργῃι, νεῖκος δέ τε νείκεϊ λυγρῷ

For by earth do we see earth, water with water, by air divine air, and with fire gleaming fire, Love by Love and Strife by hateful Strife.

What Empedocles means by this, it is generally recognized, is that at a most basic level, our ability to perceive and to think is a result of our material constitution being the same as that of the world.[159] Given that both are made up of various proportions of the six first-principles, it is through the identity of each, inside and outside us, that we can have some grasp of the cosmos. What this in turn presupposes is an unqualified capacity on the part of each first-principle to recognize its own kind, by contrast to any other(s). There is some dispute as to how exactly this takes place, and some have suggested a mechanical explanation based on pores, but I think that that begs the question.[160] It is more likely that Empedocles did not see a problem here. Rather, he simply posited that each element-god was also a *thinking* being, with some basic cognitive power.

That, in fact, is what he explicitly tells the disciple in line 10 of fragment 110:

> πάντα γὰρ ἴσθι φρόνησιν ἔχειν καὶ νώματος αἶσαν
> *For know that all things have understanding and a share of thought*

To see how we get this from πάντα, however, requires a little explanation. In this fragment, Empedocles warns the disciple that, unless he exerts himself and looks over "these things" (σφε) with "pure cares," "they will abandon you, desiring each to reach their own kind." (line 9). Based on the context, where reflection and mental organs are to the fore, we might unreflectively assume that the "things" in question are simply Empedocles' teachings. The problem is that they are described in very physical, concrete terms. Not only can they "leave" the disciple, but Empedocles urges the disciple to cultivate them, as if they were some kind of seed or crop: the disciple must "pack them down tightly in his *prapides*," watch over them, and can acquire more of them through their multiplication. Noting this peculiarity, Long (1966) suggested that in the passage Empedocles is identifying his teachings with what we would call their objects, the elements.[161] Empedocles' words, in as much as they are true, can be conceived of analogously to, or rather simply identified with, the elements themselves, which assemble and scatter under the influence of Love and Strife. Thus, as for our initial point, when at line ten Empedocles says: "For know that they all have some *phronesis* and a share of *noema*," we can take this to be a statement which applies to the teachings, but also, perhaps even primarily, to the elements. The elements are thinking beings.[162]

For my own purposes, what we can take from all of this is that Empedocles, in postulating that his elements possess some minimal cognitive capacity, seems to be operating from the same fundamental notion we found in Parmenides: that "what-is," *qua* thinking being, can in some sense know itself, be its own object of thought, and realize its unity by contrast with "what-is-not." Empedocles' key correction of Parmenides, in itself a slight shift, but of momentous importance, is to recognize officially the legitimate status of both mental "directions," the internal and external orientation. Being, or a thinking being, i.e. an Empedoclean first-principle, can know itself, but by contrast to what (it) is not, instead of an unthinkable "what-is-not." From this, in one fell swoop, pluralism follows. But that is not all. In making this basic distinction between an internal and external orientation for the "mind" of an element, and allowing both as definite, actual possibilities, Empedocles in a sense "saves" Parmenides' fundamental opposition, by providing it with a framework within which it can operate. Not only that, but in this same opposition between the internal or external path, we seem to have *in nuce* the whole of Empedocles' cosmic cycle. Indeed, for each of the four elements, to what else could this change in their mind's orientation correspond but to the influence of either Love or Strife? Under Strife, the elements literally each turn in upon themselves, which is the physical counterpart of their being the exclusive objects of their own thought or will, whereas under Love, in the language of B 35, they "change paths" (35.15), they "learn" (35.14) to turn to one another, to seek each other out and form mortal creatures.

The Parody of a Parody: Empedocles on the Elenchus

In the first chapters of this study, I argued that Empedocles' claim to divinity should be understood as a counter claim to the authority of Parmenides' goddess. On the level of doctrine, in turn, it has long been known, and Finkelberg has recently shown in detail,[163] how closely Empedocles follows the general scheme of Parmenides' cosmology in the Way of Seeming, but without the ironic distance required if, following the goddess's instructions, we deny any truth to the *doxa*. Yet occasionally, it has also been noted, Empedocles goes still further than that, and repays Parmenides his disparaging remarks about mortal thought in the same coin.[164] At present, if the dialectical exchange reconstructed in the previous section has any truth to it, we are better placed to appreciate what may well be the most striking instance of such parody.

What I have in mind with this is Empedocles' repeated claim in fragment 17 that, in giving his account of the cosmic cycle he is *telling a double tale* (B 17.1 and 17.16). On one level, and this has been noted before, it is a rejoinder to

Parmenides' exclusive affiliation with the one true path, the one direction for thought.[165] It affirms that there are in "what-is," which includes matter and mind, two directions, an external orientation towards harmonious unity, under the guidance of Love, and an opposite internal tendency, leading to plurality and individualism, led by Strife. Empedocles therefore deliberately turns on its head Parmenides' mockery of the route which mortals travel at B 6.4–9:

> . . . ἣν δὴ βροτοὶ εἰδότες οὐδὲν
> πλάζονται δίκρανοι, ἀμηχανίη γὰρ ἐν αὐτῶν
> στήθεσιν ἰθύνει πλαγκτὸν νόον, οἱ δὲ φορεῦνται
> κωφοὶ ὁμῶς τυφλοί τε, τεθηπότες, ἄκριτα φῦλα,
> οἷς τὸ πέλειν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι τωὐτὸν νενόμισται
> κοὐ τωὐτόν, πάντων δὲ παλίντροπός ἐστι κέλευθος.

[sc. the path] *on which mortals with no understanding stray two-headed, for perplexity in their own breasts directs their mind astray and they are borne on deaf and blind alike in bewilderment, people without judgment, by whom this has been accepted as both being and not being the same and not the same, and for all of whom the journey turns backwards again.*[166]

Empedocles affirms that, by means of the cosmic cycle, it is both possible, and sooner or later necessary, for mortals and elements to travel the path to the end, but in both directions; the true path is indeed back-turning: παλίντροπός ἐστι κέλευθος. Further, by including in his ontology not only these destinations or end-states, but also the intermediate stations, Empedocles seeks to vindicate the very reality of the *path* itself, the reality of *becoming* alongside *being*. For Empedocles, unlike Parmenides, the quest is as real as the goal, and that is why the theme of exile and homecoming, which is so strongly implicit in Parmenides, but which never quite breaks the surface, reaffirms itself with such force in Empedocles.[167] It is because we *are* fallen, physically, morally and intellectually, which are all facets of the same reality, and cannot simply ignore our miserable lot, as if it were some bad dream, that we must deal directly with the world of appearances.

In this there is nevertheless an important debt to his predecessor, for Empedocles does not seek so much to deny any truth to Parmenides' thought as to inscribe it within his own scheme, to present it as a part of his own fuller synthesis. Notably, we find in Empedocles an attempt to integrate the various images and themes deployed throughout the proem within the single general scheme of B 17. His goal is to show how, in a sense, they *are all true*, even though their meaning or importance is liable to be overturned when considered as part of that whole. Parmenides, by contrast, seeks to peel away the foreground in search of something ever more abstract and irreducible, and in so doing deliberately renounces integrating his various pictures.

More specifically, however, Empedocles does implicitly deride Parmenides' "one track mind" from the standpoint of his own system. For if Empedocles concedes that Parmenides' *via negativa* can be followed to the end, and does convey us to a real destination, it is not the way that leads to the πάντων σύνοδος, *the crossroads of all things* (B 17.4). Rather, it is the way of Strife, the path of division and destruction (Νεῖκος τ' οὐλόμενον δίχα τῶν, *destructive Strife, apart from them* B 17.19). Such a characterization must have seemed to Empedocles all the more legitimate for the goddess's own qualification of her discourse as a πολύδηρις ἔλεγχος, *very contentious testing*, thereby authenticating his absorption of it into his own notion of Strife, of which δῆρις is one of its many names.[168] Although Empedocles seems to grant that following this "path" may lead to a unity of sorts, that of each fully separated element, it is the unity of an atomic part, at the limit of all division, analysis or internal variation.[169]

To conclude, I think that Empedocles, in a somewhat picturesque but nonetheless effective manner, recognized the purely negative effect of Parmenides' method, and also saw that while it relied upon polarity or opposition to get going, (and thus implicitly upon divisions and distinctions), it then proscribed all talk of them. This Empedocles countered by invoking an even greater polarity, opposing Love, with its creative and unifying function, to Strife, with its separating and destructive effects.

d. Empedocles on Mortal and Divine Thought

Styles of Transcendence: Rival Interpretations of Nous

Nevertheless, we may feel that in all of this Empedocles does not allow for a sufficient distinction between thinking about the world, and interacting with it, between θεωρία and πρᾶξις. Because of the necessary link between thought and the physical world, for him, as for Heraclitus, "questions of cognition are inseparable from questions of action and intention, questions of life and death."[170] And in so far as this holds, a consequence of this assumption is that the world and its travails can never be escaped, either in body or thought. If Empedocles is much more reassuring than Parmenides in denying the possibility that human thought can fail completely to interact with reality, i.e. it cannot be "nothing," or be "about nothing," his thought, like that of Heraclitus, foreshadows much more closely some forms of Stoic determinism, with a similar stress on everlasting limits, and the impossibility of ever escaping the physical framework of the world.[171] By contrast, Parmenides' own message, with its "flight of the mind" beyond the senses, (and the implicit promise of mind's possible emancipation from bodily limits) is much more optimistic, indeed it is an intellectual message of salvation.[172]

This contrast between the two can be made even clearer by considering how closely Parmenides and Empedocles agree, in one way, in their diagnosis of the failure of normal human thinking. Here especially, their disagreement reveals how much common ground they share.

Parmenides' account of thought is given in his B 16, best understood as part of the Way of Seeming:

> ὡς γὰρ ἑκάστοτ' ἔχῃ κρῆσιν μελέων πολυπλάγκτων,
> τὼς νόος ἀνθρώποισι παρέστηκεν· τὸ γὰρ αὐτό
> ἔστιν ὅπερ φρονέει μελέων φύσις ἀνθρώποισιν
> καὶ πᾶσιν καὶ παντί· τὸ γὰρ πλέον ἐστὶ νόημα.

For as is the temper which it has of the vagrant body at each moment, so is mind present to men; for it is the same as the awareness belonging to the nature of the body for all and each; for the preponderant is the thought the mind conceives.[173]

The fragment sets forth an account of human cognition based upon the general principles of the erroneous cosmology of light and night. It explains human thought as the result of the degree of mixture found in the limbs, the κρῆσις μελέων. This is almost exactly the theory to which Empedocles will subscribe, except that instead of a mixture of two elements, Empedocles has four.[174] More significantly, it is a theory which Parmenides implicitly rejects. The main reason for this will of course be its dependence upon the false division of light and night, i.e. pluralism. But one can also discern a further and equally interesting reason for his discounting of it, namely the dependence of *nous* upon an individual's physical constitution. For were it an accurate description of the human condition, Parmenides' project, that of "thinking Being" would be disallowed. Indeed, even if *nous* could perhaps ignore the senses, it would not be capable of freeing itself from its own make-up, but its thought would depend upon whatever was preponderant in it.[175] The implication thus seems to be that for Parmenides it cannot be a satisfactory account of what *nous* is really like, even in terms of the false framework of a pluralist cosmology. In particular, Parmenides is committed, as we have seen, to mind's capacity to find Being, over and above appearances, whereas the foreshadowing of determinism the theory contains seems to disbar any possible transcendence of one's physical constitution.

Empedocles, in turn, did take up this theory, and did advocate the possibility of transcending one's mortal condition. Was his adoption of it predicated only upon his wider commitment to pluralism and change, and did he not also see how it seemed to imply that the individual's physical mixture would not only determine but also confine and limit his thought and volition? It is hard to tell. Nevertheless, against the more specific Parmenidean critique, as reconstructed above, I can advance two plausible Empedoclean counter-arguments. First, Parmenides' analysis, as stated, cannot account for what happens when the two elements are perfectly balanced in an individual. Would he or she, like Buridan's ass, cease to have any psychological activity or inclinations? Would light and night simply cancel each other out? Second, Empedocles could well reply that Parmenides' own formulation, the identity of thought with *what is preponderant*, τὸ γὰρ πλέον ἐστὶ νόημα, vitiates the theory. That is so because the individual's thought could not be identical only with that part *which predominates*, but with *the mixture*, the κρῆσις, since neither element could be reduced to nothing. Here, on a small scale, but tellingly none the less, Parmenides reproduces his own general methodological error, the reduction of the lesser in any polarity to "nothing." Against it, Empedocles could once again simply deny the possibility of such an outcome.

This hypothetical reply I think all the more plausible because, for Empedocles, a perfect balance of the elements is the goal to which all mixture strives, under the lead of Love. Its perfect realization in the Sphairos-god is the end of Love's activity, and any kind of perfection, including the degrees of knowledge, Empedocles regularly correlates to such mixture.[176] The closest but still imperfect approximation to it in things mortal occurs in flesh and blood (B 98), which must explains their higher place in the hierarchy of nature. In this regard, Empedocles could agree with Parmenides that any disruption of this balance in an individual's constitution would affect his or her intellectual condition. Empedocles certainly does recognize that physical constitution can determine thought. But within such a framework, he also seems to want to stress that the more one achieves a balance of the elements, the more intellect comes into its own. When the opposing tendencies of the elements cancel each other out, there must be a freer play of the *phronesis and share of noema* (B 110.10) present in each element, an increase the overall sensitivity of the thinker. The details are vague in the extreme, but something along these lines is perhaps what underlies the freedom of the *holy mind* in B 134 to fly about the entire universe on swift thoughts.

Mortal Thought

Even in abstraction from such further considerations, we also cannot fail to appreciate the more immediate epistemological gains to be had by Empedocles' less radical approach, against that of Parmenides. The first thing to note is that Strife, as the agent of cosmic separation and the cause of "analytical" thinking (in its etymological, not current sense), not only occasions the world's divisions, but can also explain the possibility of mortal thought, and even to a certain extent vindicate it. Because there are divisions and polarities in the mental and physical realm, which are two facets of the same reality, mortals, even when they only grasp a part of reality, are not dealing with "nothing." This is very clearly set out in B 2.1–6:

στεινωποὶ μὲν γὰρ παλάμαι κατὰ γυῖα κέχυνται·
πολλὰ δὲ δείλ᾽ ἔμπαια, τά τ᾽ ἀμβλύνουσι μέριμνας.
παῦρον δ᾽ ἐν ζωῆισι βίου μέρος ἀθρήσαντες,
ὠκύμοροι καπνοῖο δίκην ἀρθέντες ἀπέπταν
αὐτὸ μόνον πεισθέντες, ὅτῳ προσέκυρσεν ἕκαστος
πάντοσ᾽ ἐλαυνόμενοι, τὸ δ᾽ ὅλον <πᾶς> εὔχεται εὑρεῖν·

For narrow devices are spread over their limbs, and many are the miserable blows which blunt their thoughts. And having set their sights only upon the small share of life in the living, then, swift-fated, as sturdy as smoke, they fly away, having put their trust into one thing only, whatever it was that each fell upon as they were driven all directions; yet each one boasts of having found the whole.[177]

According to Empedocles' diagnosis, the basic form of mortal mistake is a confusion of part for whole. Men are right enough to think that their day-to-day world is not nothing; but they are mistaken to think it is all there is. Such an account of error was impossible for Parmenides because the first order continuity of "what-is" meant that any division within it was a complete misapprehension of it. In Strife, moreover, Empedocles also had something of a twofold explanation for such a mortal mistake. The divisibility of the world into first principles accounted for the objective possibility of such a mistake, for the distinctions made in thought actually did correspond to real divisions in the world. In turn, the negative moral and political baggage the term brought with it, associations with factionalism and arrogance, the desire to overstep proper bounds, etc., must have seemed a fitting psychological explanation of such behavior. *Each one boasts of having found the whole* we read in B 3.5, and elsewhere Strife is *destructive* (17.19), *raving* (115.14), *baneful* (109.3), it is *indecent* (of *deris* 27a), or variously described as evil (of *Erides* 20.2), *hateful* (17.8) and is synonymous with jealousy personified, *Kotos* (21.7). In this connection, Empedocles certainly knew whereof he spoke, for as he admits in B 115.14, he was not entirely *au-dessus de la mêlée*, having *put his trust in raving Strife*.

Thus, for all that he disparages mortal thought, Empedocles is not averse to recognizing its truth from that more limited standpoint. And it is indeed a crucial element in his own rhetorical strategy that he be able to demonstrate the continuity between his own doctrine and ordinary mortal thought and experience. Such continuity between his own version of divine thought and day-to-day experience was one of Empedocles' strongest sources of persuasion, especially against the more exclusive version of this same continuity Parmenides advocated between divine thought and its sole object, Being.

Mortals' Grasp of Partial Truth

Although perhaps the most overt instance of Empedocles' willingness to grant some truth to mortal though is his declaration, in B 8.5, to "abide by *nomos*" in matters of language, another telling example is the short hymn-like excursus at B 17. 20–24, where Empedocles presents the first-principle Love. He reveals her to Pausanias as the true source of the phenomena mortals associate with Aphrodite or Joy:

καὶ Φιλότης . . .
τὴν σὺ νόωι δέρκευ, μηδ᾽ ὄμμασιν ἧσο τεθηπώς·
ἥτις καὶ θνητοῖσι νομίζεται ἔμφυτος ἄρθροις,
τῇ τε φίλα φρονέουσι καὶ ἄρθμια ἔργα τελοῦσι,
Γηθοσύνην καλέοντες ἐπώνυμον ἠδ᾽ ᾿Αφροδίτην·

And Love . . . contemplate her with your mind, do not sit there in a daze with eyes wide open; she it is who is deemed even by mortals to be grafted into the joints, through whom they think friendly thoughts and accomplish seemly deeds, calling her Joy, fittingly, and Aphrodite.

Mortals *fittingly*, ἐπώνυμον call her Joy,[178] that is to say, they do have some inkling of Love's true nature, they simply do not grasp her complete range. In the first place, Empedocles suggests, she should be sought with *nous*, not with the eyes. Secondly, by the clause "she who is deemed by mortals grafted into the joints" Empedocles invokes traditional beliefs concerning Aphrodite, which he both exploits and corrects in reframing his own conception of Love. Here, I suggest, Empedocles is playing off the epic and lyric epithet λυσιμελής, *looser of limbs* which relates sexual activity and loss of vigor,[179] to propose instead that Love is the one who glues together, rather than loosens mortals' limbs. That, as we know, is the zoogonic theory he will advance more fully in B 20 and at B 57 to 62. By such an allusion, therefore, he seems to be preparing the ground for his later account.

More generally, what this example shows yet again is Empedocles' care to "naturalize" his doctrine by incessantly relating it to the hearer's experience, drawing upon the epic tradition, the external world and even the arts and crafts of man. Where Parmenides advanced one, single, momentous insight, which was bought at the price of leaving all mortal life behind, Empedocles sought by his poetry to heal this rift by multiple links between these levels, to shower the hearer again and again with multiple small insights, drawing his mind back to the wonder of the world. Such an effect is most conspicuous in its concentrated form, the multiple-correspondence similes, but was a regular feature of his verse, as Plutarch noted,[180] and this will have contributed significantly not only to the work's appeal, but also to its persuasiveness.

Complex Truth

The division or possible articulation of reality also meant that, against Parmenides' account of reality, Empedocles does recognize that reality can include multiple aspects. It can "be" in certain respects, but not others. Parmenides, however, has been described as striving to articulate a "perspectivally neutral" conception of truth, as indicated by the simile of the sphere, which looks the same from whatever angle we observe it.[181] Empedocles acknowledges this contrast both implicitly, in granting some degree of truth to mortal thought and experience, but also explicitly, as we can see most clearly in the important antithesis of becoming and being at B 17.9–13 (=26.8–12):

> ‹οὕτως ᾗι μὲν ἓν ἐκ πλεόνων μεμάθηκε φύεσθαι›
> ἠδὲ πάλιν διαφύντος ἑνὸς πλέον᾽ ἐκτελέθουσι
> τῇ μὲν γίγνονταί τε καὶ οὔ σφισιν ἔμπεδος αἰών·
> ᾗι δὲ διαλλάσσοντα διαμπερὲς οὐδαμὰ λήγει,
> ταύτῃ δ᾽ αἰὲν ἔασιν ἀκίνητοι κατὰ κύκλον.

Thus, in that, on the one hand, they learned to be one out of many, and when the one grows apart in turn, many are produced, in that respect they come into being and their span is not secure; yet, on the other, in that they never cease continually changing, in that respect they are forever, motionless in the cycle.

Although I will return to a fuller analysis of B 17 in the next section, what interests me for now in Empedocles' riposte to Parmenides is the direct endorsement of a "perspectival" notion of truth and reality, via the qualification of the first-principles as both becoming and being.[182]

Common Sense and the Fantastical

But if Empedocles' approach is more commonsensical than that of Parmenides, it nevertheless also seems to open the door, at least by implication, to the opposite paradox, the equally absurd claim that mortal perception and thought are infallible, or more subtly, perfectible to the point of infallibility with respect to their own area of application. Such a view was perhaps advanced by Empedocles' contemporary Protagoras, but in support of his own relativistic views. (For despite the promise implicit in the sentence "man is the measure of all things" with which he is said to have opened his *Truth*, what Protagoras probably meant by it was that each individual man was the measure of what appeared to him.[183] Thus if Protagoras also maintained the impossibility of contradiction or falsehood, he did not do so in the name of an objective, cognitivist position, such as later defended by the Stoics,[184] but to deny that one person could refute another when things appeared different to each.) The possibility of attributing to Empedocles the simpler assumption of direct access to reality, however, seems to me quite good. We have some direct evidence in favor of it in B 3.13, where Pausanias is instructed not to play the senses or reason off against each other, but to *understand each thing in the way in which it is clear*.[185] Another important reason for thinking so is that, thus formulated, we can easily reconstruct how Empedocles may have proposed to bridge the gap between a mortal and immortal grasp of the world. Since the falsehood of mortal opinions would not be the result of any intrinsic and insurmountable flaw, but of a mistaken understanding of the scope of such experience, mortal views could be true if one understood them properly, in relation to "the whole." Thus, to attain a complete understanding of the universe, both parts and whole, one would simply need to acquire experience on the proper scale, ultimately that of the whole world.[186]

This of course is where the doctrine of metempsychosis would be of service, for it provides a ready-made account for the possibility of expanding the scale of one's experience. On this count, when we consider the two most relevant passages, B 129 and B 134, we find that Empedocles voices no concerns about the accuracy of thought or perception *per se*, and that he stresses above all superiority in spatial range or duration. The intellectual hero of B 129 has perfect discernment, at least with his mind's eye, for "whenever he reached out with all of his *prapides*, *he could easily see each and every of all things*, in ten and twenty generations of men."[187] Similarly, the holy *phren* of B 134 "leaps through the *whole cosmos* on swift *phrontides*." In both cases, it is simply the expansion of the range of thought that provides the basis for his greater knowledge. Although the emphasis in Empedocles is rather upon the capacity we each possess, through growth, to realize our divinity, we are not that far from the Platonic theory of recollection as found in the *Meno* and *Phaedo*. For instance, at *Meno* 81c5, Socrates declares: "Since the soul is immortal and has been born many times, and has seen everything, both here and in Hades, there is nothing it has not learned."

Such a combination of the visionary and the commonsensical is not atypical of Empedocles. Indeed, for all that Empedocles' particular mix of the concrete and the fantastical may seem difficult to accept, or even laughable, we must not overlook that there is a certain internal consistency to it. To speculate on the matter, I think that this may also help explain why Empedocles seems to have trusted his imagination to a degree we find hard to condone. Given the necessary link he seems to have postulated between thought and being, and the impossibility of anything arising from nothing, I submit that he naively drew the implication that whatever occurred to mind (somehow) had to be real, not necessarily at the moment, but somewhere in the cycle. But unlike Plato, who also felt some pull in this direction, he did not have recourse to a distinction between "degrees of reality." If Plato grudgingly accepted that whatever occurred to the mind, even delusions, dreams and hallucinations, could not be dismissed out of hand, this did not imply they also had to be real in all respects, and could be said to be false without committing them to oblivion.[188]

A century earlier, such a solution did not impress itself so easily upon the imagination. Parmenides' *a priori* considerations about what was conceivable set the limits of his discourse, and allowed him to judge by that standard what was real from what was not. Empedocles simply reversed the direction by refusing to allow that thought could stray from reality at all. Thus, because there could be no possible divorce of thought from reality, reality had to include all that Parmenides had disbarred. But that did not mean that abstract speculation was wrong. Indeed, since thought and being were inseparable, it could not be wrong, and *ipso facto* the limits of thought would also be the limits of the world. Both "ways" of conceiving reality, either through the mediation of Love or that Strife, must also therefore set the framework for its possible physical arrangements, and the various possible entities the world could contain could also be rehearsed in the mind.

Here as well Parmenides' poem provides us with an illuminating comparison. For there we also find an exact parallelism between mortal thought's turning away from the unity of Being, and the world's (false) articulation into opposites and plurality: mortal naming and the emergence of the cosmic opposites are identical, if inexplicable (8.53–54). Parmenides' mortals, in turning away from Being, created a fallen, unreal world, but only in their minds. Empedocles, on the contrary, wished to hold that such a turning of the mind, and its correlate, the changes in the world, were no less real than any one specific "direction." This further entailed that wherever mortal minds turned, whatever they happened to encounter on their "wandering," must be fully real, since they could not originate from nothing. Further, and now despite the offense to common sense, Empedocles must have been willing enough to grant the existence, at one time or another, of anything he could think of, including "countless tribes of mortal creatures/ assembled into all possible shapes, a wonder to behold."[189] Among such monsters and chimaeras, Empedocles even included a few from known myth, like the Minotaur (B 61). But it is worth noting that, in granting that at some time there had existed beasts *with men's bodies and bull's heads* (B 61.3) he apparently felt compelled to insist on the possibility of its symmetrical opposite, the *bull-bodied man-faced* (B 61.2) In this, I think, he was merely doing for the popular imagination what he had already done to Parmenides.

6. INTELLIGIBLE ORDER: B 17/*ENSEMBLE* A

Empedocles' Counter-claim: Intelligible Order

From the exploration of the general background of Empedocles' persuasion I return now to the interpretation of Empedocles' central doctrinal thesis, as formulated in B 17/*ensemble* **a**. What I want to attempt to draw out is the significance of the passage, not only in terms of the work itself, whose context I have argued was the opening of the doctrinal section of the poem, but also in terms of what was at stake in Empedocles' debate with Parmenides. In particular, with regard to the *elenchus*, we have seen that its most preposterous claim was its denial of the driving assumption of Ionian science, the rationalist quest for intelligibility. Parmenides of course had recognized the force of this assumption, shored up by habit, and that is the specific reason why the goddess goes to such pains to inoculate the hearer against it by means of her false cosmology. By training the *kouros* to see through her "deceitful array of words" (B 8.52), she proves that order or intelligibility on their own are no sure guides to truth. By thus shattering her pupil's confidence in appearances, the goddess teaches him to know better than to trust in them again.

It seems quite clear that Empedocles also recognized this as one, if not the principal stake in his response to Parmenides. At B 17.26, in one of the most obvious cases of direct polemic in the Presocratics, Empedocles flatly contradicts Parmenides' denial of intelligibility: σὺ δ' ἄκουε λόγου στόλον οὐκ ἀπατηλόν, *but you, listen to the marshaling of my account, which does not deceive*. By claiming that the "marshaling of discourse" was not deceitful, i.e. that it faithfully reproduced the order of nature, he challenged Parmenides' claim that intelligibility was of no help in ascertaining truth. If Parmenides asserted that intelligibility or plausibility on its own was not a sufficient condition to guarantee the truth of any account, Empedocles countered, as part of his fuller response, that it was a necessary condition of any account. As such, the search for truth, if it did not end in the recognition of intelligibility, could not for all that bypass it. Intelligible order would remain one of the hallmarks of truth, despite Parmenides.[190]

Graham's Motif

From that general statement of intent, let us consider how Empedocles went about supporting his claim. I begin by noting that, despite Empedocles' explicit endorsement of intelligible order as a sign of truth, the main exposition of his thesis is, somewhat disappointingly, quite dogmatic and difficult to understand. As noted earlier, Empedocles introduces his first-principles as if they were self-evident postulates, without argument or analysis, and does so in no obviously logical order. Does the fragment therefore not possess *any* internal organization? To merely note the lack of argumentative structure and leave it at that seems highly unsatisfactory, for we thereby deny any element of design to probably the most important passage of the work, the principal unveiling of the doctrine. But since argumentative structure does not appear to be able to do the job, a different type of approach seems required.

Here happily some of the work has already be done. In an important study, Graham has demonstrated the relevance and contribution of poetic form to the meaning of B 17 (as it then stood) and its close doublet B 26.[191] The originality and interest of his study resides in its application of literary analysis to passages usually only investigated for their doctrinal content. For while previous scholarship on Empedocles has not ignored the relation between poetic form and philosophical content, most of the attention has been concentrated on Empedocles' similes.[192]

Part of the difficulty the passage presents, as I have already claimed, comes from the fact that Empedocles there is trying to do several things at once. In the opening sub-section of this chapter I suggested a three-part division of the fragment into what one could call propositional, argumentative, and exegetical content. Here I want concentrate almost exclusively on the propositional content of the passage. The argumentative and exegetical sections are in any case interesting enough to deserve separate study, and have already received much more attention than the poetic features of the passage.[193] I will be focusing therefore on what Empedocles simply asserts to be the case, and on the way he asserts it, at the expense of some of the reasons why he thinks it so, or of the consequences of it being so.

The fundamental thesis of the passage is the alternation of one and many. This is set out in the first two lines, before we even know what it actually refers to. In this there is something of a parallel to the "suppressed subject" of Parmenides' way of truth. It is repeated, in the same order, between seven and nine times in the roughly 70 continuous lines of the passage. As many critics have observed, this is an effective means of conveying the idea of an endlessly recurring cycle.[194] Hexameter poetry moreover, in which the Homeric model had conditioned the hearer to expect repetition and the use of formulae, turns out to be a fairly easily adapted tool to this specific end. The eternal recurrence of the cycle of unification and separation of the cosmos thus is not only described in B 17, but through the use of repetition it is actually imitated. Graham writes, (1988) 305:

> We see then that Empedocles is not content to state a principle of eternal recurrence, but at the same time he thematizes the principle and represents it by weaving a texture of motifs which embody the principle. Thus B17 must be read as more than an argument or a programme for an argument: it is also a *mimetic structure* which *portrays* the world condition which it describes.

While this was appreciated in a loose enough fashion earlier, it was Graham who first pointed out how consistently this motif is employed in the Empedoclean corpus. As his analysis shows, despite variations in wording and sentence-structure, this theme almost always takes the form of a specific AB pattern or motif: unification, then separation; one, many; Love, Strife. Consider for example B 17.1–2:

> δίπλ' ἐρέω· τοτὲ μὲν γὰρ ἓν ηὐξήθη μόνον εἶναι (A)
> ἐκ πλεόνων, τοτὲ δ'αὖ διέφυ πλέον' ἐξ ἑνὸς εἶναι (B).

I shall tell a double tale. For at one time they grew to be one alone out of many, at another in turn it grew apart to be many, out of one.

In most cases this is done over two lines, (B 17.1–2, 3–5, 7–8, 9–10, and 16–17 (a verbatim repetition of 1–2), **a (i) 6–7**) but as the papyrus now shows it can be shorter, as in the formula at **a (ii) 23** and **30**. Perhaps another instance of this motif is to be restored in the damaged lines **a (ii) 16–17**, although M-P think otherwise.[195] Notwithstanding Graham's assertion to the contrary, one or two exceptions can be found to this pattern in the corpus, but it remains very much the dominant scheme.[196] His analysis of the passage, however, while it remains by far the most penetrating to date, fails to clarify the integration of these repetitions of the motif into some larger formal structure.

The Structure of the Passage

In fact, once one recognizes the motif as such, a larger pattern does emerge. Taking a cue from these repetitions of the motif, a progression in scale can be observed, most obviously, in the number of lines between each repetition of the AB motif, but also in the detail each new exposition presents.[197] The effect is comparable to the experience of an approaching object, in which details gradually become discernible where at first only the broadest patterns could be perceived. Both conceptually as well as structurally the passage can be divided, with regard to the treatment of its main theme, into movements of increasing scale, with each unit expanding upon and clarifying the preceding one.

The key markers, once again, are the repeated motif of the double tale (δίπλ' ἐρέω), always told in the same order. Thus, once again, the opening merely sets out, quite starkly, the main theme, the principle of alternation: the many *increase* or *grow*, "to be one alone," then this one *grows apart* into many. What exactly this refers to, and why it should be so, is as yet unclear. The following lines (B17.3–5) are fundamental for the reconstruction of the cycle but enigmatic on account their great brevity.[198] All one need retain of them for now is that they provide a sort of commentary upon the first lines, by pointing out the corollary for mortal creatures of the initial statement of alternation. At the same time, they afford Empedocles a second run at the motif, for even this "consequence" is explained in terms of the AB structure.[199]

Having set out the fundamental concept of alternation between unity and plurality, and explained its corollary for mortals, Empedocles in line six caps off that first direct presentation (if one wishes to consider B 17.4–5 indirect) by insisting on its reality. He does this by asserting the permanence of this state of affairs, its immortality. But in so doing, he also paves the way for the second direct exposition of his principal concept, B 17. 7–8, in which he manages, while retaining its unification-separation motif, both to vary its form and, by specifying the agents of the process, to refine the picture it offers:

> ἄλλοτε μὲν Φιλότητι συνερχόμεν' εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα
> ἄλλοτε δ' αὖ δίχ' ἕκαστα φορεύμενα Νείκεος ἔχθει.

At one time through Love all coming together into one/ At another in turn each carried apart through the hatred of Strife.

Note once again that the *order* of exposition has not changed. By repeating the motif, Empedocles facilitates its recognition, but by repeating it in a modified form, he also forces the hearer to discern the similarity behind its slight metamorphosis. This training of the hearer to recognize sameness-in-change and search beneath the surface of words is an interesting Heraclitean effect, which I can add to other similarities in thought and didactic approach already noted.

What else do we learn here? The causes of this alternation are clearly now first given: Love and Strife. These two may seem out of place in a cosmological passage, but then again Hesiod's cosmogonic Eros, *Theog.* 120, would have served as a precedent, as would have Parmenides' *daimon* (B12 and 13) and/or Eros. It is clear in any case that Empedocles has taken pains to situate their presentation in the passage within a cosmic context, where their domain is clearly taken as universal (B 17. 7: εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα). On another level, we can note that if the principle of alternation now has an explanation, i.e. Love and Strife, the latter remain little more than postulates. Why *they* should have whatever properties they possess is not explored here or elsewhere in the fragments, beyond vague references to necessity.[200]

After pointing out the consequences of this state of affairs with respect to the Eleatic challenge of becoming, or at least to a certain portion of its strictures (B 17. 9–13), Empedocles returns for a third time to his main theme, in lines 14ff. The hearer is enjoined to pay particular attention to what follows, implying the importance of its content. Empedocles explains that so far he has only given an account in outline, πιφαύσκων πείρατα μύθων, and then repeats word for word the unification-separation theme of lines 1–2. This of course is more compact than what was already given at B 17.9–10, but only serves to call the theme once more to mind, where it is now given its fullest exposition.

Concerning the motif itself, I repeat that it is a tiny encapsulation of the cosmic cycle, and now also observe that it ends at the moment of separation into many. It seems no accident that this is also the moment at which the separate parts of the cosmos are most discernible, as pure and unmixed, and here is where Empedocles chooses to list them for us (B 17.18). First the four elements are named in one line, serially, and then Strife and Love, each with its own line, and perhaps correlated with a stronger conjunction (τε...καὶ). For unlike the elements, they are opposites.

It may also be worthwhile to ponder briefly the implications of the little aside of B 17.15 in relation to what we have observed so far. The πείρατα are declared to be the *bounds* of Empedocles' *mythoi*, the whole of which are contained in lines 1–2/16–17. In this sense, the rest of the work is an exercise in "unpacking," in developing and making explicit this pattern.[201] As such, given the universal scope of application intended for this passage (B 17.7: ἅπαντα) these bounds must mirror, or perhaps be identified with the boundaries of reality itself. For if Empedocles' discourse is to be faithful to a reality conceived of as confined within necessary boundaries, in keeping with the spirit of Parmenides' strictures, then it too must be contained within such bounds.[202]

The next appearance of the motif does not occur until lines B 17/**a (i) 6–7**. In between, Empedocles attempts to sustain the claims advanced so far, another instance of argumentation following upon direct exposition. He does so following two very different tacks, the articulation between the two being B 17.26, a direct address to the disciple.[203] The hymn to Love, B 17.20 to 26, quoted and discussed above, combines traditional hymnic form with quasi-empirical observation to assert the reality of Love's presence among men, while in the next subsection, B17.26 to 35, the first principles are qualified in such a way as to display their ability to meet the Eleatic challenge to becoming. Here too, however, one can note a looser retention of the AB pattern, as the hymn to Love precedes the Eleatic account of individual first principles, whose individuality once again must be correlated to Strife.

From B 17.35 on we can only rely on the papyrus, too ill-preserved in many places to be usefully discussed without having to enter into controversial textual matters. Let me merely note that there is a return to the motif at **a (i) 6–7**, and then, less assuredly, at **a (ii) 16–17**. In between, Empedocles leaves behind the more abstract aspects of his system to turn to more detailed physical description of the cosmos in different phases of the cycle. At **a (i) 8–a (ii) 2**, he asserts, in a formula better known from B 21, the capacity of his first principles to generate, no doubt via mixture, living creatures, such as plants, humans, animals and *long-lived gods, greatest in honor*. The next lines are too garbled for us to have a certain idea of their content. The editors suggest they describe the world under complete Strife, a sort of recurring chaos, which finds its end when Love begins to expand anew from the center, as described in more detail in B 35. I think that this is wrong, but whatever their precise content, the mention of the more familiar aspects of the world, from plants, beasts and men to the sun, **a (ii) 9** and **13**, completes a descent from a highly abstract and obscure level of discourse to one in which Empedocles' hearers could recognize themselves and their surroundings, albeit transplanted into a cyclical cosmos.

Proleptic Composition

The theme of alternation of one and many, as given particular expression in the unification-separation motif, is employed by Empedocles to create an overarching structure for the first presentation of his system. This larger pattern is a progressive increase in detail with each successive deployment of the motif. While retaining the same general pattern, each depiction is more detailed than the next, going from the most abstract and general to the particular and familiar. At first, this expression is a mere assertion, without any particular applicability or obvious explanatory power, but as it is repeated and expanded, it gains in intelligibility, until at last the known world also enters the picture. Once there, however, the hearer is brought to realize that the world he knows is no longer the whole it may have been previously felt to be, but is now seen to be a mere part of a larger whole.

In this regard, Empedocles' main exposition of his philosophical framework is the clearest and most significant example of his employment of proleptic composition in the corpus. Its indubitable use here has been the main reason why I have felt justified in arguing for a larger such structure in the proem. When combined with the independent evidence for the position of B 115 at the beginning of the poem, the anticipation of the theme of alternation we find in that passage seems a very strong indication that all this material was deliberately organized by Empedocles to the end of leading the hearer towards the doctrine of B 17.

Learning as a Form of Natural Change: Aristotle

Having shown this, one may yet wonder: What does it achieve, or what purpose does it serve? There is an obvious didactic force to repetition alone, which certainly must be acknowledged, but I would suggest that the proleptic presentation also achieves a subtle persuasion of its own.

As discovered above for Parmenides, for Empedocles and the archaic mindset in general, words and things are not clearly distinguished, especially in the case of their being to "true" to one another.[204] Discussing the path of the Muses in Pindar's *Sixth Olympian Ode*, and its relation to the proem to Parmenides' poem, H. Fränkel wrote in 1930:

> For of course the 'path' of a journey taken by the Muses is at one and the same time the course of the song and the course of the ideas, thoughts and other contents expressed therein. Utterance and thought, word and thing were inseparable in archaic times . . .[205]

So here too Empedocles' account is not "about" something, hence implicitly separate from the first principles; in as much as they are true, the teachings will be identical with the things, (cf. B 110, discussed in section 5.c). Thus B17/*ensemble* a shows how the account of the world is true, and herein lies part of its persuasive force, not only because it imitates the structure of the world, but because, like the world it describes, Empedocles' *logos* seems to grow.

On another level, perhaps closer to us, there is in Empedocles' presentation of his doctrine a strong tie to the Aristotelian conception of learning as a natural process, whereby we pass from a vague understanding of those things "more knowable to us" to those "more knowable in nature." To illustrate this, I compare Empedocles' practice in B 17 to one of the more famous expressions of the Aristotelian theory, the opening page of the *Physics*:

> . . . it is clear therefore that in natural science as well we must first attempt to define what relates to its first-principles. The natural way is <to proceed> from those things more knowable and clearer to us to those clearer and more knowable by nature. For the same things are not knowable to us and [knowable] without qualification (ἁπλῶς). And for that reason it is necessary to advance in this manner from the more obscure by nature, but clearer to us, to the clearer and more knowable by nature. The things at first clear and obvious to us are [in fact?] rather confused. Later on, from these [first notions], the elements become more knowable and the first-principles distinguish them. Thus we must advance from universals to particulars. For a whole is more recognizable to perception, and a universal is a sort of whole. For it comprehends many things [within it], like parts. And the same thing in a certain way happens to names in relation to a formula. A name like 'round' signifies vaguely a sort of whole, but its formula divides it into each of its respects. (184a14–184b2) [206]

First, both thinkers are committed to the intelligibility of nature, while recognizing different levels of such intelligibility. The goal of science or the god's-eye view is a greater clarity and articulation, based upon first-principles, of views which already display some intelligibility, but in an unrefined manner. Both thereby also stress the continuity between these two levels. But if Aristotle can consciously express these expectations of knowledge, including its principle feature, the increase in clarity at the higher level, for Empedocles this remains an implicit feature, which is none the less potently exploited by the use of the proleptic style. By producing in the hearer, through the work, a cognitive experience of initial puzzlement, which is then resolved into clarity, Empedocles induces the hearer to apply this experience to the world. This is done in a concentrated form in B 17, but the insight it finally articulates is also meant to illuminate, by hindsight, the proem, and through it, the whole world. In other words, the cognitive experience involved in understanding the poem provides a model for understanding the world. Just as in Parmenides, where the hearer could only grasp the unity of the poem by rejecting two thirds of its content, and was thereby invited to do the same for the world, here the hearer grasps the unity of Empedocles' work not by rejecting any part, but by achieving a more precise and comprehensive vision of the "roots of all things." But where Parmenides has to rely on the ability of his poem to have meaning or intelligible order so as to deny such structure in the world, Empedocles can rely directly on the presumption of intelligibility to get his message across.

For the full form of the argument, however, I want to invoke Aristotle's famous statement at the opening of *Metaphysics* I, that "All men, by nature, desire knowledge." What I mean by drawing that statement into the discussion is to point out how Empedocles, by exploiting our innate desire for intelligibility, is also arguing that learning, making sense of the world, is a natural feature of our make-up. In this yet again Empedocles has a crucial advantage over Parmenides, who claims to be able to teach the disciple that in fact there is no change and becoming. But the object of the goddess is to *change* the hearer to some degree, if only by the removal of his illusions; once again her practice is at odds with her theory. Further, Empedocles, in assuming a hierarchy of nature, avoids the charge that his doctrine is something completely new and unheard of, that it is *ex nihilo*.[207] The disciple, in learning to be a long-lived god, is merely continuing along the same ascending path which Empedocles had followed, and before him, presumably, other gods. And if that is somewhat speculative, we can recall that Empedocles makes much the same point by implicitly relating his doctrine to "mortal thought." He endorses tradition in a number of ways, by writing epic verse, or in his reliance upon the partial truth of the senses, and by illustrating the activity of Love by analogy to the arts. Aristotle, once again, with his greater theoretical apparatus, seems to articulate what is merely implicit in Empedocles, through his own insistence upon the need for pre-existing knowledge.[208]

Continuity: Heraclitus and the Perils of Metaphor

I have already noted many stylistic and intellectual affinities between Empedocles and Heraclitus, and I would like to end this long chapter with some further reflections on the links between the two. Like his Ionian predecessor, Empedocles uses the proleptic style to introduce or even inculcate his doctrine, and both are committed to a view of nature and the world as a living but eternal and indestructible order, although they go about expressing its stability in different ways. Both are also committed to the intelligibility of this order. For Heraclitus, this intelligibility is the *logos*, which is eternal and yet which men ever fail to understand (B 1), and which has modern counterparts in concepts and metaphors such as "the voice of nature" and the "language of the real." For Empedocles, this community of nature and man is rather expressed via a sort of universal sympathy of all things, a panpsychism as found in B 110.10.

Now it is a regular feature of the use of metaphor—and for this pre-technical use of such image-making that is how I think we should characterize these expressions—that it often effects a certain fusion between the two compared objects, and that properties exclusively belonging to one part can rub off onto the other.[209] In a famous study of the comparison in Greek literature, Snell points out that when, at *Iliad* 15.615 ff., Homer compares the Acheans, as they resist the attacks of Hector, to a rock in the sea, which endures despite wind and waves,

> . . . it is not quite correct to say that the rock is viewed anthropomorphically, unless we add that our understanding of the rock is anthropomorphic for the same reason that we are able to look at ourselves petromorphically, and that the act of regarding the rock in human terms furnishes us with a means of apprehending and defining our own behavior.[210]

For the philosopher given to metaphor, even more than for the poet, there exists a danger in the use of metaphor of a sort of contamination, whereby the comparison drags along a further series of associations not intended by the author. Awareness of this danger in Heraclitus seems to be at least one strand of the possible meanings of fragment 32: "the wise is one alone, willing and unwilling to be spoken of by the name of Zeus," as if one single concept or term were insufficient to capture the essence of the guiding *logos*. For Empedocles, poet of nature, the use of the proleptic style has an obvious application: the growth of the account. I have even suggested that this may have contained an element of quasi-subliminal persuasion for the hearer. But as I also said, the account only *seems* to grow. Indeed, despite the apparent expansion of the account, it, like the cosmos it describes, remains within the same πείρατα; although we see more of it and understand its various articulations better, it itself does not change as to the fundamentals. Indeed, as Empedocles tells us in fragment 8, "there is no growth (*phusis*) of all mortal/ things, nor any end in destructive death, but only mixture and dissolution of the mixed . . ." At the same time, Empedocles is more willing than Heraclitus to tolerate some degree of mortal error in this regard and go along with custom, as he tells us in fragment 9. Perhaps here as well then, in the use of this proleptic style to present the changeless order of nature, we can suspect a concession to appearances, for the sake of persuasion. On a deeper level, only a *logos* which can both change and remain the same can give a faithful account of a world that does as much.

Conclusion

1. WIDENING GAPS

Intelligibility and Clarification

The overarching goal of Empedocles' poem, I have argued, was to convert the hearer to a new, unified vision of reality, one whose initial expression was put forth in fragment 17/*ensemble* **a**. By such an undertaking, Empedocles not only sought to restore legitimacy to the project of inquiry into nature, called into question by Parmenides, but also claimed to provide his own final answer to that quest. To achieve the persuasion he sought for his doctrine, however, Empedocles did not think it sufficient merely to sow that final answer to the wind, but recognized the need to prepare the hearer to appreciate it in a number of ways. These included, as seen in the first section of this study, the establishment of his own authority as a god, a critique of normal human thought, the statement of "Eleatic laws" and, more subtly, a proleptic presentation of his doctrine.

By means of such a presentation, Empedocles managed, while holding back on the direct exposition of his doctrine, indirectly to condition the hearer's receptivity to that same doctrine, via repeated allusions to its specific contents. The significance of these allusions would of course have only been apparent by hindsight, or upon multiple hearings or readings of the work. The net effect of this procedure upon the hearer, then as now, would be to heighten the contrast between the condition of the person in possession of knowledge of the doctrine, who can thereby grasp the point of every allusion, and the person in ignorance of it, who cannot. The work thereby heightens the passage from one state to the other, a change which at its most intense it would not be inappropriate to call an initiation or a conversion.

To be effective, the proleptic presentation relies in large part upon the hearer's own expectations of intelligible order, both in the work and beyond it. Thanks to it, the work itself acts an implicit model for the experience of intellectual discovery. By leading the hearer from an initial state of puzzlement to a resolution in clarity, by setting difficulties to which it proposes answers, the work reinforces our own "cognitivist" assumptions, our sense that the world is knowable, and encourages us, through the work, to try making sense of the world. Further, because the poem, like the world it portrays, does not yield its meaning immediately, but requires repeated intellectual effort, this added degree of faithfulness to the presumed qualities of the original carries with it a strong element of persuasion. The work, like the world, grants us insight only reluctantly, but once it does, it is a light which illuminates all: what was there all along, but had hitherto eluded our notice, is suddenly clarified and rendered intelligible.

The Reconstruction of Book I

This general pattern of clarification, I suggest, can also provide us with some direction on how to approach some of the remaining material in the corpus. Thanks mostly to Simplicius, we have a general idea of the structure of book I after B 17/*ensemble* **a**, and some clues for the placement of still later fragments (see table 1). Based on this information, it appears that we can confirm for the subsequent material the same general pattern of clarification through elaboration and increasing detail as found within B 17/*ensemble* **a**. The fragments in question are B 21, 23 and 26, which Simplicius tells us followed 17, in that order, to which we can perhaps add B 35 and 98. Judging from this progression, it appears that, before turning to narrower topics such as embryology or sense-perception, which the fragments show were also a feature of the work, or even larger issues such as cosmology and zoogony, Empedocles devoted a substantial amount of material following B 17/*ensemble* **a** to further articulating and refining the general picture it advanced, in particular by illustrating its application to the world. Returning over and over to the two central themes of fragment 17/*ensemble* **a**, the theme of alternation and the capacity of the six first principles to generate "all things" (**a** (i) 8– (ii) 2), he weaves into these by now familiar patterns new variations and elaborations, thanks to which he further enhances the detail and persuasion of his account.

Although the reconstruction of the original *literary work* can proceed a little beyond B 35 and 98, the lack of further secondary evidence means that, as the gaps in our information widen, more and more speculation is required to fill them. Indeed, even within the confines of book I, where our evidence is the richest by far, it seems unlikely that the sequence I have suggested, from the proem to B 35 and 98, spans the whole of that book, nor, within that sequence, is it possible in many cases to discern what material Simplicius has skipped over. For example, Simplicius himself tells us that Empedocles "said many other things" after B 17 (*in Phys.* 159.13) and before B 21. Thanks to *ensemble* **a**, we now have some idea of these other things, but unfortunately the interpretation of the material is controversial, owing to some serious gaps in the papyrus. (Against M-P, who have suggested that in lines **a (ii)** 3 to 17, Empedocles described that period of the cosmic cycle when Strife predominates, I have argued that *ensemble* **a** simply continues the general presentation of Empedocles' general system, down to **a** (ii) **21**; see appendix[1]) After those disputed lines, whatever they may contain, Empedocles takes nine whole lines, **a** (ii) **21–30**, to announce a transition to proofs and examples which will further help convince the hearer of the general thesis of B 17/*ensemble* **a**. The two best candidates for these "proofs," at least within the immediate vicinity, are B 20/*ensemble* **c** and B 76/*ensemble* **b**, which examine or demonstrate the effects of Love and Strife upon various living creatures in our world, but here again we are not dealing with known quantities.[2]

Thus, even within the sequence B 17, 21, 23, 26 and 35 it is clear enough that there are significant, and one suspects, widening gaps. Past that sequence, matters are not entirely hopeless, but the reconstruction of the work becomes so unfeasible as to recommend a shift in objectives, away from the literary form, to focus instead upon the reconstruction of doctrine. To be sure, the abundant ancient doxographic material on Empedocles means that it is possible to refine our understanding of Empedocles' doctrine far beyond the broad framework I have concentrated upon here, the πείρατα μύθων. For a number of reasons, however, I do not think it preferable to pursue that reconstruction here.

In the first place, although it may seem that such a change of focus presents a narrowing of interest, in fact, given the nature of the evidence, it is the reverse. It means that the raw evidence for the investigation must widen from the fragments themselves to include a vast collection of secondary sources, with all the complications that this entails.[3] Second, on another front, the bibliographical, shifting the focus from the work to the doctrine would require taking a side in the debate on the single most contested aspect of Empedocles' philosophy in the last thirty-five years, the nature of his cosmic cycle. This is something I have undertaken elsewhere.[4] In that respect, moreover, I do not think that beyond B 35 and 98, the attempt to organize the other fragments which Simplicius tells us came from book I can proceed without having to rely on one or another reconstruction of the cosmic cycle.[5]

And as the gaps in the work widen, those on the level of doctrine, one suspects, must do so even more. This is not the result, once again, of any self-consciously articulated divisions between autonomous realms of thought on Empedocles' part. On the contrary, it flows from his desire to formulate the most sweeping and dramatic possible synthesis of all known experience. No doubt further knowledge of the literary structure of the work would shed much light on the links Empedocles proposed between, on the one hand, the large framework of the cosmic cycle and, on the other, such phenomena as embryology, breathing, sense-perception, the role of pores and emissions, not to mention metempsychosis, but lack of evidence precludes considering those issues from that angle.[6]

Instead, I will devote the remaining pages of this study to the investigation of those last fragments which can be considered within the literary structure of book I.

2. CLARIFICATION AND ELABORATION IN B 21, 23, 26, AND 35

B 17/Ensemble a and the Cosmic Cycle

The details of the basic picture of the universe Empedocles expounds in B 17/*ensemble* a are bound to be controversial for some time to come, especially as the sections newly revealed to us by the Strasbourg papyrus become the object of fuller scholarly debate. It would, in addition, prolong matters intolerably to rehearse here the whole history of controversy surrounding the interpretation of the cosmic cycle. In essence, that history has consisted of a series of challenges to a view of the cycle first advanced by Panzerbieter (1844), based upon his emendation of lines B 17.3–5.[7] According to that more orthodox interpretation, Empedocles' cycle consists of a symmetrical alternation between the complete dominance of Love, then Strife, over the four elements, resulting in a double creation and destruction of life within each complete revolution of the cycle. The central objection to such a view, raised in various ways over the intervening years, is that the extant fragments present a great disproportion in the *depiction* of zoogonic and cosmogonic activity on the part of Love and Strife. More specifically, over against the numerous passages where Love is depicted as the fashioner of life or at least organs, Strife is only rarely described as a zoogonic power (and vice versa for cosmogony). Nevertheless, for reasons to long to enter into here, I think that material from the papyrus has now vindicated the traditional, symmetrical interpretation.[8] In the end, while the disproportion in depiction of these activities is real, and probably reflects the original, Empedocles nevertheless also remained committed to a view of Love and Strife as equals.[9] Omitting for now various details concerning each individual phase of the cycle, I offer the following in the hope that it can now stand as the most viable account of the cosmic cycle.

World history consists of an endlessly recurring series of pendulum swings between two extreme states, which I will label a-cosmic. Under the rule of Love, all four elements are united into a single, homogeneous entity, the Sphairos-god, whereas under Strife, the four are driven apart and so form no stable compounds. In between these two states, both forces are active, and the result is the world, or to be exact, two worlds, including their mortal inhabitants. These two worlds are broadly similar, yet can be distinguished with respect to their final, and opposite, destinations. The present world is the world of Strife; in other words, the Sphere of Love is behind us, and Strife's power is waxing, driving the elements apart. More importantly, the defining feature of the cosmic phases, as opposed to the a-cosmic phases, is the interplay between the two powers. Although, in speaking of the cosmic phases, one may use the shorthand expressions "the world of Strife" or "the world of Love" this does not mean that, when one of the two is waxing or more prominent, the other has ceased to exert any power; so long as there are mortals or a world, both powers are present and at work.

Fragment 21

In B 21, which according to Simplicius followed B 17 (but not immediately) Empedocles undertakes to produce "a witness to my earlier <words>, should they have been lacking in form, (i.e. definition, precision)." This remark already confirms that clarification remains the main goal of the fragment, if not also of the wider section. After that initial promise, in B 21.3–6 Empedocles lists the principal world-bodies and their qualities:

ἠέλιον μὲν λευκὸν ὁρᾶν καὶ θερμὸν ἁπάντῃ,
ἄμβροτα δ' ὅσσ' εἴδει τε καὶ ἀργέτι δεύεται αὐγῇ
ὄμβρον δ' ἐν πᾶσι δνοφόεντά τε ῥιγαλέον τε·
ἐκ δ' αἴης προρέουσι θελυμνά τε καὶ στερεωπά.

[consider] *the sun, white to look upon and hot in all respects, and the immortals, as many as are bathed in heat and brilliant light, and rain, in all things dark and cold, while from earth flow forth things dense and hard.* [10]

In each of these bodies Empedocles intends us to recognize an element, not in its pure state, but as the predominant presence behind familiar natural phenomena, and giving each body its well-known properties. The contrast with B 17.18 ff. is that in that passage Empedocles does no more than name each element, and stresses their similarities *qua* eternal first-principles, whereas here, once their common properties have been established, the hearer is ready to understand their particular differences, as manifest and familiar to the senses, but without mistakenly assuming that these differences betray no common properties whatsoever. Once again, as seen above in the miniature hymn to Love (B 17.20–26), Empedocles respects the reliability of the senses and ordinary judgment, but seeks to place them in a unifying and more philosophically sophisticated framework, one where the continuity underlying change is maintained.

Following that, in B 21.7–8 Empedocles reprises the AB theme of alternation, except that here the theme of separation (B) comes before that of unification (A), and the elements, instead of being depicted primarily as inert stuff drawn apart and pushed together by Strife and Love (but cf. also B.17.9 μεμάθηκε, *learned*), become separate under Strife (B 21.7), and *desire one another* under Love (21.8). Lastly, Empedocles substitutes *Kotos* for *Neikos* in the separation formula. Here as above, the introduction of alternate names for the same things, sometimes synonyms, in others less close congeners, helps reproduce the variety of the actual world, and is more faithful than any once-and-for-all designation. Yet all the while it also seems intended to instruct the hearer to seek out identities and similarities beyond superficial differences.[11]

In the final lines of the passage, Empedocles repeats with minor variation the zoogonic formula, the lines describing the origin of all living things from the elements (**a** (**i**) **8**–**a** (**ii**) **2**). The net effect is to stress the common origin of all living creatures *and* of the celestial and meteorological phenomena described in the opening lines of the passage; since they are all products of the first principles, Empedocles thereby vividly impresses upon us the community of all nature.

With regard to the passage as a whole, I think it can be recognized that, even though most of these are small changes from the pattern set out in B 17/*ensemble* **a**, such variations are not accidental. By dint of repetition they add to the intelligibility of the poem's central ideas, but their small variations from the initial pattern, when read in sequence and against other similar formulas, add to the complexity and subtlety of the exposition. The importance of these constant variations, I suggest, is to keep our awareness of both background and foreground sharp. We are not being invited merely to take in images and passively let our attention play off the surface of things, to forget ourselves in *flux*, nor does Empedocles' verse seek to entrance us into a mystic rapture by mantra-like repetition of identical patterns. His verse instructs us to discern, by an active effort of the mind, the recurring patterns underlying things, without letting these blind us to the endless variations that do persist at the surface.

B 23

In fragment 23, the simile of the painters, which Simplicius tells us was meant to illustrate B 21, Empedocles does not repeat the theme of alternation. Instead, he reprises the zoogonic formula, which he creatively appends, in the accusative this time around, as the climax of the simile (B 23.6–8). What is novel in this version is the renewed emphasis laid upon the "two craftsmen," consistently described in the dual, as now distinct from their materials, who give shape and mix the elements in varying degrees of harmony (B 23.4). The simile's main purpose is to render plausible, by means of an analogy drawn from common experience, the idea that the mixture of a limited number of elements, in varying ratios, can produce the countless variety of mortal creatures (B 23.9–10). In this connection, the retention of the dual to describe the craftsmen does not seem fortuitous, but is most likely intended to designate the pair of Love and Strife. This at any rate seems more promising than other far-fetched explanations, especially given Empedocles' fondness in his similes for multiple points of contact between the objects compared. [12] As such, the lines even seem to intimate a distinction between material and formal causes, with the elements providing the matter which is given shape by the two painters, but

then again Empedocles is not consistent on the point. In particular, as I have argued, the elements are also "thinking beings."

B 26[13]

In fragment 26, by contrast, which according to Simplicius followed upon 21, Empedocles condenses the zoogonic formula down to one line, B 26.4, and elaborates instead upon the theme of alternation. Most of the fragment, B 26.5–6 and 7–12, is almost verbatim repetition of material from B 17, the most important single case of this being 26.8–12 (= 17.9–13), the Being-Becoming opposition, whereas lines 5 and 6 in turn are very close variants on the theme of alternation. The new material is the more significant, but the lines in question present a number of difficulties. The DK text of B 26.1–7 is as follows:

> ἐν δὲ μέρει κρατέουσι περιπλομένοιο κύκλοιο
> καὶ φθίνει εἰς ἄλληλα καὶ αὔξεται ἐν μέρει αἴσης.
> αὐτὰ γὰρ ἔστιν ταῦτα, δι᾽ ἀλλήλων δὲ θέοντα
> γίγνοντ(αι) ἄνθρωποί τε καὶ ἄλλων ἔθνεα θηρῶν,
> ἄλλοτε μὲν Φιλότητι συνερχόμεν᾽ εἰς ἕνα κόσμον
> ἄλλοτε δ᾽ αὖ δίχ᾽ ἕκαστα φορεύμενα Νείκεος ἔχθει,
> εἰσόκεν ἓν συνφύντα τὸ πᾶν ὑπένερθε γένηται.

In turn they predominate in the revolutions of time, and pass away into each other and increase in their allotment of fate. For these remain the same, but as they run through one another they become men and the races of other beasts, at one time through Love coming together into a single order, at another in turn carried apart through the hatred of Strife, until, all of them grown together into one, the universe becomes subsumed.

The variation between plural and singular for the verbs of line 1 and 2 is somewhat peculiar, but grammatically correct, since the subject of all three is a neuter plural.[14] It might even be that Empedocles here is exploiting this idiosyncrasy of Greek syntax in to drive home a philosophical point: the one and many, whose identity he strove to reconcile in one world, via the principle of cosmic alternation, implies that the world itself can also be considered a unity or a plurality, albeit not simultaneously.[15] However that may be, more serious difficulties begin when we try to discern what exactly is the subject of these lines. The mention of cyclical domination in line 1 perhaps calls to mind Love and Strife, whereas the mention of growth and diminution or dissolution "into each other" recalls the elements. The question has generated a surprising amount of controversy, with scholarly opinion slightly favoring the elements.[16]

Against that view, I submit that all six are meant, and Love and Strife are to be understood among those "self-same" things of line three. Two considerations can quickly settle the matter to a great degree of probability. First, when the same line is used at B 17. 34 and 21.14, Empedocles uses it in both cases after having given a list of all six first principles. Second, as the simile of the painters will have already stressed, the emergence of men, women and other mortal creatures is mediated by Love and Strife, so that when these are described in line 4, it is unreasonable to think that they are not to be understood. The next lines show this well enough, and the continuous development of the same sequence of ideas over these passages also argues against such distinctions.

The alternation in predominance, therefore, applies indifferently to the elements or Love and Strife. Empedocles' aim at this point in the sequence seems to be that of explaining the principle of dominance and latency, which he had briefly touched upon at B 17.29. That is the idea, as best attested in Anaxagoras, that "whatever substances predominate in any thing, these are most manifestly what each one is and was."[17] The principle explains why, when one thing seems to be absorbed into another, or one quality predominates in a mixture, there is no destruction into nothing of the lesser, but merely its concealment. Such an explanation is what allows Empedocles to integrate change and variation, as evidenced by the senses, into a scheme where stability is stressed with equal force, as required by Parmenides's critique. In particular, it can explain why even global changes are not to be taken as necessarily final, since the two main springs of cosmic change, Love and Strife, are never destroyed (cf. B 16, with Hippolytus' paraphrase). Even under the Sphere, the elements continue to exist, albeit without manifesting (or, I suggest, *remembering*) themselves, just as under the reign of Strife, the separation of the elements "conceals" their possible integration.

This leads to the second main novelty introduced by the passage, B 26.7. Its peculiarity comes from the way it is appended to the (by now) familiar AB theme of alternation, given in B 26.5–6. As Wilamowitz observed, the line appears to play no significant role in the sequence of ideas, and it is possible to doubt its place in the fragment.[18] In terms of formal structure, it seems to disrupt the balance between the opposite processes of unification and separation in the paired lines 5 and 6, and suggests a break in that alternation. As such, it has even resulted in attempts to view the whole passage as referring to the role of Love and Strife over the life-span of individual mortal creatures, within one cosmic stage, rather than the whole cosmic process.[19] This awkwardness moreover is not dispelled by simple surgery, namely inverting the order of it and B 26.6, where it would also become redundant while remaining difficult and inelegant.

The solution I propose is not novel, but perhaps the broader strategy of developmental exposition I have attributed to Empedocles can render it more plausible. The key to the line is to see that between B 26.1 and B 26.7 Empedocles operates two abrupt shifts in the application of the principle of alternation, jumping from its macrocosmic application to the first-principles, to its microcosmic application in mortal creatures, and then back again. Starting with a description of the permanence of the first-principles (B 26.1–3), whose local manifestations and disappearances are grounded in a framework of global stability, Empedocles moves on to their ability to generate mortal creatures in B 26.4. He then explains how the principle of alternation also regulates the life of these mortal creatures (cf. DK B 20; the microcosmic interpretation),[20] at least until, within the larger cosmic alternation of Love and Strife, the unification of all the elements under Love temporarily ends the existence of separate mortal creatures (the macrocosmic interpretation).[21]

Although on any solution the line will retain some of its awkwardness, placing the fragment in the sequence related by Simplicius, and interpreting it as part of a developmental sequence, helps to minimize the line's difficulties. Since Empedocles is here refining the picture of the cycle, with which he presumes the reader is already familiar enough, the introduction at this point of such a distinction, if insufficiently signposted, still fits a general pattern of elaboration and clarification.

In support of this reading, two other related remarks are worth making, since they bear on the main point of the passage. First, I note that, having stressed the theme of permanency in change in its opening lines, the middle section of the passage shows that the elements are never truly destroyed, even in the Sphere. Empedocles reapplies the principle of dominance and latency, used in B 26.1–3 to deny the complete destruction of anything, there within local changes, onto the largest of all changes. The Sphere, however, where *all of them grown together into one, the universe becomes subsumed*, is unlike local changes in that, by definition, none of the elements predominates within it: it is, as it were, the predominance of non-predominance, the *coincidentia oppositorum* without any resulting positive features. To see this merely requires taking τὸ πᾶν as the subject, following O'Brien, and against other construals.[22] This leads to my second remark. For once we recognize that τὸ πᾶν is the line's grammatical subject, another interesting use for the line becomes possible. Its point may be a mainly poetical desire to allow for the symmetrical antithesis of τὸ πᾶν's predicate in line 7, ἓν συμφύντα, with the formula διαφύντος ἑνός in B 26.9. The overall effect is rather forced, but it renders well enough Empedocles' refusal to consider either "one" or "many" prior to the other, as he does also in B 17/*ensemble* **a**, since each is depicted as somehow derived from the other.[23]

B 35

Finally, I turn to fragment 35. The location of this important fragment is not given to us by Simplicius, but in its opening verses, Empedocles openly announces that its subject matter presents a return to a topic previously discussed:

αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ παλίνορσος ἐλεύσομαι ἐς πόρον ὕμνων
τὸν πρότερον κατέλεξα, λόγου λόγον ἐξοχετεύων,
κεῖνον·

But I will return again to the path of songs which I previously set out at length, channelling one discourse from another, this one:

It is most likely that the initial account referred to in these lines has now been recovered in the final sections of *ensemble* **a**, lines **a (ii) 18–20**, which B 35.3–5 repeat almost *verbatim*.[24] The subject of those lines, as of the fuller account in B 35, is a description of the moment when Strife's rule is checked, and Love begins to regain the ascendant, mixing the elements and creating "countless tribes of mortal creatures, arrayed in all possible shapes, a wonder to behold." (B 35.16–17). The interest this reference presents for my purposes is that it attests to the *deliberate* adoption of a developmental scheme in Empedocles' exposition of his doctrine.[25] Empedocles tells us in so many words that this is how he works, *channelling one discourse off from another*. Given such a remark, it comes as no surprise to find that, as was the case with B 21, 23, and 26, the passage's content presents revisions and elaboration upon earlier themes.

Because of its importance, perhaps second only to that of B 17, the passage presents more facets than I will explore here. For the moment, more than any other information it contains, what I wish briefly to focus upon is the way in which this passage, as do the others we have considered, pursues the development of a number of themes already presented. In a way, it even elaborates upon itself.

The first lines, which I do not print, repeat the information already given in *ensemble* **a (ii) 18–20**. There, as here, we learn that when Strife reaches the nether depths, and Love is at the center of the whirl, that is when Love turns back to claim her privileges, and all things (begin to) come together to be one. In **a (ii) 18–20**, that is all we are told. But here the account continues:

οὐκ ἄφαρ, ἀλλὰ θελημὰ συνιστάμεν' ἄλλοθεν ἄλλα.
τῶν δέ τε μισγομένων χεῖτ' ἔθνεα μυρία θνητῶν·
πολλὰ δ' ἄμικτ' ἔστηκε κεραιομένοισιν ἐναλλάξ,
ὅσσ' ἔτι Νεῖκος ἔρυκε μετάρσιον· οὐ γὰρ ἀμεμφέως
10 τῶν πᾶν ἐξέστηκεν ἐπ' ἔσχατα τέρματα κύκλου,
ἀλλὰ τὰ μέν τ' ἐνέμιμνε μελέων, τὰ δέ τ' ἐξεβεβήκει.
ὅσσον δ' αἰὲν ὑπεκπροθέοι, τόσον αἰὲν ἐπήιει
ἠπιόφρων Φιλότητος ἀμεμφέος ἄμβροτος ὁρμή·
αἶψα δὲ θνήτ' ἐφύοντο, τὰ πρὶν μάθον ἀθάνατ' εἶναι
15 ζωρά τε τὰ πρὶν ἄκρητα, διαλλάξαντα κελεύθους.
τῶν δέ τε μισγομένων χεῖτ' ἔθνεα μυρία θνητῶν
παντοίαις ἰδέῃσιν ἀρηρότα, θαῦμα ἰδέσθαι.

. . . not at once, but from all directions some willingly stand together. And as they mix together, countless tribes of mortals are poured forth; yet many also stood unmixed, by contrast with those that were blended, as many as Strife still held aloft. For not all at once (10) *did he stand wholly clear of them, out upon the furthest limits of the cycle, but he remained in the limbs of some, having gone out from others. And however much he would run ahead, just as quickly came behind the immortal drive of gentle and blameless Love. And swiftly they grew mortal, which had previously learnt to be deathless,* (15) *and those that were previously unblended became mixed, exchanging paths. And as they mixed countless tribes of mortals are poured forth, arrayed in all possible shapes, a wonder to behold.*

The new material is appended directly to the old, without the slightest articulation; Empedocles merely continues the earlier sentence, breaking in with οὐκ ἄφαρ, *but not immediately*. The changeover to "one," we now learn, does not occur instantaneously. First different "volunteers," θελημά, cling together from various places ἄλλοθεν. Only then, Empedocles adds, as they mix, is the full range of living creatures poured forth (35.7). Thus we also now learn, between the reign of Strife and the full realization of the Sphere, there first is a zoogony. Yet, having hardly heard that, once more a qualification is added: but many (sc. of the elements) also stand unmixed, alternating with the mixed, as many as Strife still holds aloft (8–9). Both powers, then, are at play in this middle time. In 35.12–13, Empedocles explains why: Strife's retreat to the outer edge is a gradual process, yielding up only as much as Love advances. The next two lines, 35.14–15, are some of the most charged of the poem. Empedocles describes the boundary between the two powers, and the transition of the elements from a separate state to mixture, which is also as a passage from an immortal to a mortal state. Further, this passage into mixture, the first step on the road to the Sphere or full unity, he calls a change of paths, διαλλάξαντα κελεύθους, in words that deliberately echo those used to describe "the paths of life" the *daimon* must alternately take, B 115.8 ἀργαλέας βιότοιο μεταλλάσσοντα κελεύθους, *changing one harsh path of life for another*. Also noteworthy is that Empedocles employs the term *learning* to characterize the elements' previous attainment of immortality. This is in contrast with their ability also to learn to be one, as at B 17.9, ᾗ μὲν ἓν ἐκ πλεόνων μεμάθηκε φύεσθαι *in that, on the one hand, they learned to be one out of many*. . . . In these two lines, the climax of the passage, Empedocles densely interweaves several of the work's key themes: learning, elemental immortality and the life-death polarity. The passage then ends, 35.16, with a repetition of line 7, describing the emergence of living creatures, followed with a coda, stressing their variety and expressing wonder at it.

As in B 17, except upon a smaller scale, here as well Empedocles builds this account through repetition and variation. The central theme of the fragment is the passage of the immortal elements into mortal form, first given at line 7, and repeated word for word at line 16. In the first version it is conceived of more simply, as the result of mixture, whereas in its second version, it is given greater resonance, associated as it is there with the themes of learning and immortalization. Along with that line of development, Empedocles seeks throughout the passage to draw our attention away from the broader sweep of the cycle and its end-states, down to their interaction at the most minute level. That is why, over those eleven lines, we find such a high concentration of negations and contrasts. Yet for all that he is moving away from the macrocosmic down to the microcosmic, Empedocles also strives to keep the relation between the two clear. The transition of each small parcel of immortal element into mortal form is both a death and a birth, for that piece of matter, but, we are also reminded, it is also a part of the larger conflict between Love and Strife, working either toward the realization of the Sphere-god, or the reign of Strife. In each mortal life, the whole drama and history of the cosmos is implicit.

Notes

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

1 Bibliographical surveys of Empedoclean scholarship and principal modern editions of Empedocles are listed in the bibliography.

2 Empedocles does distinguish between the senses and νοῦς roughly *mind* or *intelligence* as sources of knowledge, see DK 31 B 2 and 3, but he does not value νοῦς over the senses as Parmenides seems to do, nor does he recognize what we would call his religious teachings as belonging to a different order than his physics. The two fragments are the object of a later epistemological analysis preserved by Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* VII 120–25, which distinguishes demonstrable from non-demonstrable truths, perhaps along Stoic lines. This may be a partially valid description of Empedocles' practice, but it is an external evaluation in terms of later concepts. These fragments are discussed in chapter II, section c.ii.

3 At VIII 76–77, immediately before giving the combined length of the two main works, he quotes from B 6 and B 17 on the elements and the cycle, summarizes Empedocles' account of the sun and moon, and then mentions reincarnation, which he supports by quoting B 117.

4 W. Jaeger, *Paideia*, 2nd English ed. (Oxford, 1945) vol i, 295. For a history of modern conceptions of early Greek philosophy, see A. Laks, "Philosophes présocratiques. Remarques sur la construction d'une catégorie de l'historiographie philosophique" in *Historicization-Historisierung*. Band 5 of *Aporemata, Kritische Studien zur Philologiegeschichte* (Göttingen, 2002), 293–311.

5 The other apparently minor works, which Diogenes cites at VIII 57 upon the authority of Aristotle, from his lost *On Poets* (fragment 70 Rose^3, fr.1 of that dialogue in R. Laurenti, *Aristotele I. Frammenti dei dialoghi* (Naples, 1987)), include *The Crossing of Xerxes* or *Persika*, a *Hymn to Apollo*, and various nameless tragedies and political discourses. None of these are related to any extant fragments by our sources, except for fragment B 134, which Ammonius

declares to be a description of Apollo; see F. Solmsen, "Empedocles' Hymn to Apollo," *Phronesis* 25 (1980), 219–227. As for *The Crossing of Xerxes*, or *Persika*, see below, 20-23.

6 While the editions of Sturz (1805) and Karsten (1838) assigned the fragments to different works, Stein (1852) first openly sought to establish criteria for distinguishing between the two, and was criticized for this as early as Bergk, *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie und Pädagogik* 68 (1853), 59–66, reprinted in his *Kleine Philologische Schriften*, vol ii (Halle, 1886). Notwithstanding Stein's contribution, the two most influential versions of this thesis were Zeller's account in later versions of *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*, (first edition 1844–52; 6th ed. by Nestle, Leipzig, 1919–20; repr. Hildesheim, 1963) vol. i/1, 1001 and 1004–1016, and Diel's 1898 paper "Über die Gedichte des Empedokles," *Sitzungsberichte der Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften* 63 (1898), 396–415, repr. in *Kleine Schriften zur Geschichte der Antiken Philosophie*, ed. W. Burkert (Hildesheim, 1969). As Diels points out in his paper, 403, it was Zeller who took the issue beyond philology, and made an influential case for a profound *philosophical* incompatibility between the two main works. In this regard he remains the true father of the view of Empedocles as a philosophical centaur.

7 The nature of the cycle is also highly controversial. For my own view, see now my two studies "Empedocles on the Ultimate Symmetry of the World," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 24 (Summer 2003) 1–57 and "'We' and Empedocles' Cosmic Lottery: P. Strasb. gr. Inv. 1665–1666, *ensemble* **a**," *Mnemosyne* 56 fasc. 3, (2003), forthcoming.

8 Various arrangements are possible, although the question was not much discussed in the later half of the twentieth century. Diels and Wilamowitz, reacting to Bidez, *La biographie d'Empédocle* (Ghent, 1894) took the young Empedocles to have been a scientist, who later found religion as an exile. The key notion, however, which goes back to Zeller, is the perceived incompatibility between Empedocles' demon-lore and physical materialism.

9 This section is an abridged version of comments first published in "Empedocles on the Ultimate Symmetry of the World," 14–19.

10 W. Nestle, "Der Dualismus des Empedokles," *Philologus* 65 (1906), 545–557, reprinted in his *Griechische Studien* (Stuttgart, 1948), 151–163; H. S. Long, "The Unity of Empedocles' Thought," *American Journal of Philology* 70 (1949), 142–158; H. E. Barnes, "Unity in the Thought of Empedocles," *The Classical Journal* 63 (1967), 18–23; D. Babut, "Sur l'unité de la pensée d'Empédocle," *Philologus*, 120 (1976), 139–64. More recently, C. Osborne "Empedocles Recycled," CQ NS 37 (1987), 24–50 argued not only for the unity of Empedocles' thought, but for the existence of only one original work. This position is reinforced and further developed by B. Inwood, *Poem*, the largest-scale attempt of this type post Zeller. On a different line, D. Sedley, in chapter 1 of *Lucretius*, argues in cognizance of the new material that the proem of the *Physics* did in fact contain material on reincarnation, etc., but that one should still uphold a division between two main works. For further discussion, see below.

11 M-P 83 ff.

12 M-P's text is an *editio princeps*, hence many points remain open for debate. I will concentrate here on what I take to be the least controversial aspects of this material.

13 Some notable textual points: **d 5** and **6** = DK 31 B 139; ὅτι οὐ second hand, στ οὐ first hand; **d 10** <σ·> supplied by M-P; ἐπιβ[ήσομ]ε'ν' second hand, ἐπιβ[ήσομ]εθ first and M-P; **d 15** β]ῆ'ν' second hand, β]ῆι first and M-P.

14 M-P's translation, following their reconstruction, takes this line as indicating a return to an earlier discussion, specifically fragment B 62, but line **d 10**'s αὖθις, as David Sedley has pointed out (an attribution noted by C. Osborne, "Rummaging in the Recycling bins of Upper Egypt," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, 18 (Summer 2000), 329–356, 336, note 9) may mean "later" rather than "again" and thus indicate the speaker's promise to return to the subject broached in the first nine lines.

15 For full list of verbal cross-references, see M-P 308. As we know from Simplicius, *in Phys.* 381.29, Diels, B 62 comes from the second book of the *Physics*. On the basis of such similarities, M-P 8 and 110–111, argue that *ensemble* **d** must belong to book II, whereas Osborne, "Rummaging" 334–6, prefers to think that all four *ensembles* were from the same book.

16 Cf. B 62. 6, τοὺς μὲν πῦρ ἀνέπεμπε θέλον πρὸς ὁμοῖον ἱκέσθαι [the whole-natured outlines of men and women] *which fire sent up, as it wanted to reach its like*, which offers a description of this general cosmological process. More generally still, see now also A 49a, from an Armenian translation of Philo of Alexandria's *On Providence*, which appears to have been based on a quotation rather than a doxographic account, as in Inwood, *Poem* # 40.

17 M-P 317 make heavy weather of their restored personal verb β]ῆν *I was going* at the end of the line, which they claim indicates a reversion to "demonological" material over the last lines of *ensemble* **d**. It seems more likely to me, based on B 62, that the agent who reaches or seeks to reach this *furthermost place*, is simply fire, as in the doxographic account. Hence I prefer to read **d 15** as ε̣ἰ̣ς̣ τόπον ἐσχατιώ̣[τ]η'ν', *to the furthermost place*; see my "Ultimate Symmetry" (2003), 16–18.

18 C. Kahn's article "Religion and Natural Philosophy in Empedocles' Doctrines of the Soul" set the tone for much contemporary discussion. Originally published in *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 42 (1960), 3–35, see reprints in 1) P. Anton and G. L. Kustas, *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy* (Albany, 1971), 3–38 with appendix and *retractiones* and 2) A. Mourelatos, ed., *The Pre-Socratics*, 2nd edn. (Princeton, 1993), 426–56. For more discussion, see W. K. C. Guthrie, *HGP* II, 134–8, and his general discussion of the *Katharmoi*

244–265; Barnes, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (London, 1982), 495 ff.; M. R. Wright, 57–76, as well as Inwood's general introduction, *Poem*.

19 The oldest extant attestation for the title *Katharmoi* is from a fragment of Dicaearchus, a pupil of Aristotle, #12 in the biographical testimonia on Empedocles in DK, while the earliest reference to περὶ φύσεως occurs in the Hippocratic *On Ancient Medicine*. Both are discussed below. On the difficulty of associating the title *Peri Phuseos* with specific works, see E. Schmalzriedt, *Peri Phuseos: Zur frügeschichte der Buchtitel* (Munich, 1970), esp. 120–128 and Wright 85–6, for the evidence on Empedocles.

20 That at least is the impression one gets from publications. Yet the informal, verbal assessment of their position among colleagues seems much more positive. For formal criticisms, see J. Mansfeld, *Heresiography in Context: Hippolytus's Elenchus as a Source for Greek Philosophy* (Leiden, 1992), 227–29, who criticizes Osborne's article (1987). O'Brien's long review of Wright and Inwood, "Empedocles Revisited," *Ancient Philosophy* 15 (1995), 403–470, is discussed below.

21 Here I must set aside the claim by J. Mansfeld and K. Algra, "Three Thêtas in the "Empédocle de Strasbourg," *Mnemosyne* 54 (2001), 78–84, p. 81, that *ensemble* d need not have originated from the same poem as *ensemble* a, but perhaps only from the same shelf, i.e. that both works could have sat alongside one another until their papyrus pages were put to another use. Two brief remarks can be made against this. First, Mansfeld and Algra seem to overlook that the second half of *ensemble* d deals with cosmological and/or zoogonic material. Thus, if they would still deny metempsychosis to the *Physics*, then they must grant *The Katharmoi* a zoogony. Second, insisting that we cannot exclude their alternative hypothesis in no way affects the much greater *probability* that the same material all had its origin in a single poem. Provided we restrict ourselves to probabilities, the burden of proof lies with those who would distribute the *ensembles* over more than one work, not with the hypothesis of a common origin.

22 So as to show the thematic relation of fragments to the title offered by the source, I have quoted as much of the fragment as I could fit; otherwise I have summarized its content in parenthesis. In any dubious cases, e.g. B 135, I have consciously erred on the side of tradition by putting them in the *Katharmoi* column, because in the end I think it helps rather than hurts the case for the single work. The table omits most inferences from actual fragments, or bibliographical notices unattached to any passage or testimony, all of which will be considered below, depending upon their relevance.

23 For an attempt to place these in a religious context, see Sedley, *Lucretius*, 5–7.

24 On Theon's date and activities, see J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*, 2nd ed. (Ithaca, 1996) 397–99.

25 See discussion in Inwood, *Poem*, 16–17 and table 1 for ref. D. O'Brien, in *Pour interpréter Empédocle* (Leiden, 1981) 111–115 gives an exhaustive list of its quotations in antiquity.

26 O'Brien (1981) 75–77 and Zuntz 215 discuss the possible use by Neoplatonists of an anthology containing verses from Empedocles.

27 Nor can it be claimed that Aristotle was unaware of the religious material, as is shown by his reference to Empedocles' ban on meat-eating, *Rhetoric* 1373 b14, introducing B 135, καὶ ὣς Ἐ. λέγει περὶ τοῦ μὴ κτείνειν τὸ ἔμψυχον, *as Empedocles says concerning the ban on killing animals*. Against most commentators, e.g. Wright 86, this reference must be to a passage, theme or doctrine, and not to a title; see below 17-30.

28 *Pace* Algra and Mansfeld, "Three *Thêtas*," note 21.

29 In what follows my views coincide with M-P's reconstruction, 103–114. I attempt to refine the reconstruction of the contents of book I in "Ultimate Symmetry" 48–51.

30 M-P 161 do not include B 17.9 in their edition of B 17, so that their count goes back to 233. The line, not found in Simplicius's quotation, was first inserted by Bergk (1836) from B 26.6 and retained by Diels (1901), whom I follow here against M-P.

31 See e.g. its quotation by Theophrastus, preserved by Simplicius, *in Phys*. 25.29 Diels.

32 For a further strong reason to understand the passage as programmatic, see my analysis of its structure in chapter IV, section 6.

33 See especially Zuntz 186–199.

34 *The Proem of Empedocles' Peri Phuseos: Toward a New Edition of All the Fragments* (Amsterdam, 1975).

35 O. Primavesi, "Editing Empedocles: Some Longstanding Problems Reconsidered in Light of the Strasburg Papyrus," *Fragmentsammlungen philosophischer Texte der Antike*, Band 3 of *Aporemata, Kritische Studien zur Philologiegeschichte*, 62–88, eds. W. Burkert, L. Gemelli Marciano, E. Matelli, L. Orelli (Göttingen, 1998), 85–6.

36 *Lucretius*, 9–10, quoted below, chapter III, section e.

37 Chapter III, section f. For the same reason, I will only consider in chapter II Sedley's reconstruction of the proem in the opening chapter of his *Lucretius*. Although I am convinced of his basic thesis, that Lucretius' proem contained recognizable Empedoclean elements, I am skeptical of his use of Lucretius as a witness to the *structure* of Empedocles' proem.

38 That is so, even though all of it need not have stood in the proem, as *ensemble* d shows, with its quick, one-line transition from eschatology to zoogony.

39 See for example DK or Wright's reconstruction, which total 53 and 45 lines respectively.

40 Scmalzriedt (1970) 122 ff.

41 For discussion of ancient bibliographical methods, and references, see R. Pfeiffer, *History of Classical Scholarship*, vol. i (Oxford, 1968), 129–131 in general and Schmalzriedt (1970) for the Presocratics.

42 καὶ ἔγραψε δι᾽ ἐπῶν Περὶ Φυσέως τῶν ὄντων βιβλία β (καὶ ἔστιν ἔπη ὡς δισχίλια) *He wrote two books in hexameters On the nature of Things (and it is 2,000 verses long)*. The best manuscripts are missing the number of books, whereas the codex Marcianus gives as the sum βιβλία δ; see Osborne's discussion (1987) 28, Wright (1981) 20–21, M-P 114–119.

43 Diels rejects the testimony in "Über die Gedichte des Empedokles," 131, but it is now a minority view; see Wright 253, with bibliography.

44 See O'Brien, *ECC* 47–50.

45 J. Mansfeld, "A Lost Manuscript of Empedocles' *Katharmoi*," *Mnemosyne* 47 (1994), 79–82, has renewed awareness of the claim made by Giovanni Aurispa, in a letter dated August 27, 1424, to have among other very rare manuscripts in his library in Venice a copy of Καθαρμούς Ἐμπεδοκλέους, so titled in Greek. While pointing out that Aurispa had a copy of Diogenes Laertius by 1421, Mansfeld nevertheless concludes, 80: "One fails to see for what reason he should have lied about precisely this work, though one cannot of course exclude a priori that he did." How then might this affect the single-work hypothesis? If the claim is indeed true, one wonders how the *Katharmoi*, unknown to the *Suda* in the tenth century, could have found its way to Italy in the fifteenth. Once more, economy of explanation favors tying all the evidence together: it seems just as likely that a single work could have survived down to the early Renaissance, and continued to be referred to under both titles. Finally, I note, following M-P 118, that the existence of this letter was not entirely unknown in the modern period: Sturz (1805), 76–79, knew of the supposed manuscript and made attempts to recover it.

46 ὅς περί τε τῶν θυμάτων καὶ περὶ τῆς θεογονίας διεξιὼν παρεμφαίνει λέγων· in Fortenbaugh et al., eds, *Theophrastus of Eresus, Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought, and Influence*, part 2 (Leiden/New York/Köln, 1992), # 584 A, lines 178–9.

47 (1970) 120–28.

48 Such thinkers as Heraclitus and Empedocles, who offered hearers a theory of the world alongside a theory of behavior, a physics, and an ethics, were harder cases to sort out by later standards. On Heraclitus, see C. Kahn, *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus* (Cambridge, 1979), 21 ff., who comments favorably upon Diodotus's assessment of Heraclitus as not so much a writer on nature, *peri phuseos*, as on ethics or political philosophy, *peri politeias*.

49 Fr. #4 in G. Avezzù, *Alcidamante. Orazioni e frammenti* (Rome, 1982). Once again, that Alcidamas, in a book *on natural history*, should drag in Pythagoras, despite obvious chronological difficulties, surely attests to the coexistence of religious and scientific themes in the original.

50 Theophrastus also noted the dual influences of Parmenides and the Pythagoreans upon Empedocles, albeit without reference to a specific passage: Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ὁ Ἀκραγαντῖνος, οὐ πολὺ κατόπιν τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου γεγονώς, Παρμενίδου δὲ ζηλωτὴς καὶ πλησιαστὴς καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον τῶν Πυθαγορείων . . . *Empedocles of Acragas, who was born not much later than Anaxagoras, an admirer and associate of Parmenides, and even more so of the Pythagoreans* (Simplicius, *in Phys*. 25.19, *Dox. Gr*. 477, now Fortenbaugh et al., eds., *Theophrastus*, part 1, # 227A, lines 6–8). Much the same applies in the biographical tradition on Empedocles, which I cannot consider here. An excellent recent survey of this material can be found in the *Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques*, vol. iii (Paris, 2000), 66–88, pp. 71–79. The very earliest tradition is already divided, with the secularizing interpretations merely passing over in silence the more fabulous elements, which the biographical tradition elaborated. To the Aristotelian Empedocles one can oppose the contemporary tale of his apotheosis in Heraclides Ponticus, on which, see Bidez (1894) and H. B. Gottschalk, *Heraclides Ponticus*, (Oxford, 1980; repr. 1998), 16–38, which in turn was the object of rationalizing criticisms by Timaeus. As to which strand is the older, priority should be given to the supernatural: if one can easily produce a more secular Empedocles by simple omission of his supernatural aspects, it is difficult to imagine why he should have inspired such fabulistic elaboration had this element not been present from the beginning. No such legends gathered around Anaxagoras.

51 The only possible candidate for an earlier mention of Empedocles in Greek literature is a reference to a certain Xanthus, author of a work (?) on Empedocles, at Diogenes VIII 63. P. Kingsley identifies him with Xanthus of Lydia (FGrH 675) in "Meetings with the Magi: Iranian Themes among the Greeks from Xanthus of Lydia to Plato's Academy" *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 5 (1995) 173–209. This Xanthus, an older contemporary of Herodotus, best known for his *Lydiaka* in 4 books, also seems to have discussed Persian *magoi* (F 31 and 32), not necessarily in a separate work. The link is tantalizing but tenuous, and only barely possible chronologically. Fragment 33 of Xanthus (i.e. Diogenes VIII 63), in which Empedocles is said to have refused the offer of a kingship (?), βασιλεία, could well be a confusion between Empedocles and Heraclitus, who is also said—much more plausibly—to have done this, cf. Diogenes IX 6, and the two are not infrequently confused in later sources, see Hippolytus, *Ref*. I. 3 (DK 31 A 31). A discussion of Heraclitus by Xanthus is geographically and chronologically much more plausible. Alternately, Bidez (1894) 58 speculated upon another Xanthus, a little-known doctor, son of Timon of Phlionta (Diogenes Laertius IX 109–110). In any case, we do not know if or how Xanthus referred to Empedocles' poetry.

52 καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἢ ἄλλοι οἵ περὶ φύσιος γεγράφασιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὅ τι ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ὅπως ἐγένετο πρῶτον καὶ ὅπως ξυνεπάγη. (ed. Jones, Loeb 1923)

53 These borrowings are much more numerous than the two instances where he names Empedocles directly, *Meno* 72c8 and *Theaetetus* 152e3–4. For discussion with a list of passages, see D. O'Brien, "L'Empédocle de Platon," *Revue des études grecques* 110 (1997), 381–398.

54 More recently, see P. Kingsley, *Ancient Philosophy, Mystery, and Magic* (Oxford, 1995) especially chapters 7–9. Although I will have more to say on Kingsley's interpretation later in this study, for the moment it will be enough to point out that Kingsley's approach strikes me as very selective.

55 Thus Sedley's argument, *Lucretius* p. 4, that *katharmos* cannot be applied to the general process of purification of the wandering spirit, for which only *katharsis* will do, is overly restrictive, and in any case refuted by *Phaedo* 69c, which Sedley does not consider. The *Phaedo* passage is also strangely omitted from Guthrie's discussion of *katharmos*, *HGP* II, 244–5. That life itself could be reinterpreted as sort of ritual, to be performed according to strict rules and with a view to obtaining a desired result, is paralleled once again in Pythagoreanism, where as Burkert has shown, *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism*, (Cambridge, MA, 1972) 190–92 the Pythagoreans extended to their whole life the behavior and standards of purity previously reserved for ritual days alone.

56 On Parmenides' proem, see W. Burkert, "Das Proömium des Parmenides und die Katabasis des Pythagoras," *Phronesis*, 14 (1969), 1–30, p. 5. For a still wider discussion of the theme, R. Janko, "The Physicist as Hierophant: Aristophanes, Socrates and the Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus," *ZPE* 118 (1997), 61–94.

57 The theme is echoed in the doxography, see below, as well as in Platonist authors who discuss Empedocles, cf. Theon of Smyrna, in his introduction to B 143, quoted in table 1.

58 Kingsley, *Ancient Philosophy, Mystery, and Magic* 368; see more generally A. Traglia, *Studi sulla lingua di Empedocle* (Bari, 1952) 161–186.

59 Similarly inconclusive is Aristotle's contrast between Anaxagoras and Empedocles *in their works*, ἐν τοῖς δ᾽ ἔργοις, *Met.* 984 a 11, or Theophrastus' remark that Empedocles *was a rival and an imitator of Parmenides in his poem(s)*, ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασι, whose plural does not denote different works, but verses, from Diogenes VIII 55 (= Fortenbaugh et al., *Theophrastus of Eresus*, 227B).

60 The *Problems* are generally recognized as late, whereas the authenticity of *Meteorologica* IV is still debated. A negative verdict is defended by H. B. Gottschalk, "The Authorship of *Meteorologica*, Book IV," *CQ* 11 NS (1961), 67–79, while D. Furley defends it, with some qualifications, "The Mechanics of Meteorologica IV," in P. Moraux and J. Wiesner, eds., *Zweifelhaftes im Corpus Aristotelicum* (Berlin, 1983), 73–93.

61 That Aristotle will have known the material which later sources associate with the *Katharmoi* is supported by *Rhetoric* 1373 b14 and by the interest his contemporary, Heraclides Ponticus, showed in the more supernatural side of Empedocles' thought. Note in particular that Diogenes at VIII 62, where he quotes B 112 in full (having told us that it opened the *Katharmoi* at VIII 54), claims that the passage was the inspiration for Heraclides Ponticus's dialogue *On the Woman who Stopped Breathing*, or perhaps even that Heraclides quoted it there: ὅθεν εἶπεν . . . λαμβάνων ἅμα καὶ ἀπὸ τουτών τῶν στίχων, *whence he said . . . taking this also from these verses*. As we also know through Diogenes, VIII 60, in Heraclides' dialogue, the case of the breathless woman was narrated to "Pausanias" by "Empedocles." This interesting evidence counts against the view, based on the two-work hypothesis, that Pausanias was the addressee of physical lore alone, for against it, Heraclides obviously had no qualms in recasting Pausanias as the addressee of mystical revelations on the soul. On this work of Heraclides, see Gottschalk, (1980) 16–38.

62 The standard work is A. Rostagni, "Il dialogo aristotelico Περὶ ποιητῶν," *Rivista di Filologia e d'Instruzione Classica* 4 (1926), 433–70, and 5 (1927), 145–73. Two recent editions of the work are R. Laurenti, *Aristotele, I Frammenti dei Dialoghi* (Naples, 1987) 210–300; R. Janko, *Aristotle, Poetics* (Indianapolis, 1987). For a more recent study of the work, and its possible influence upon Philodemus's work of the same title, see R. Janko, "Philodemus' *On Poetry* and Aristotle's *On Poets*," *Cronache Hercolanesi* 21 (1991), 5–64.

63 F. Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles. Heft 10, Hieronymos von Rhodos* (Basel, 1969). 37: "Das Verbrennen von Schriften bedeutet dass dieselben nie vorhanden gewesen waren."

64 D. Sider, "Empedocles' *Persika*," *Ancient Philosophy* 2 (1982), 76–78. R. Laurenti, in the introduction to his edition, *Empedocle* (Calata, 1999), 44–7, reviews the evidence and assumes the existence of the work, but without any commitment as to its contents. See also P. Kingsley, "Meetings with Magi" (1995) 189 ff.

65 So Bollack iii 374–75 n. 6.

66 Schmalzriedt, 103–07, catalogues Aristotle's usage, without suggesting any as more authentic or older, but see the more complete list in D. Ross, *Aristotle's Physics* (Oxford, 1936) 1–9.

67 Or again, if *Meteor.* IV is spurious, the later term τὰ φυσικά might be taken as evidence for its posteriority, which term a later ancient editor could have attempted to harmonize with the more common Aristotelian expression τὰ περὶ φύσεως, once again producing τὰ περσικά.

68 The authenticity of the *Hymn to Apollo*, προοίμιον εἰς Ἀπόλλωνα is defended by F. Solmsen (1980), who links it with DK fragments B 131–4, largely on the basis of Empedocles' interest in Pythagoreanism. Perhaps the source of this putative hymn was nothing more than a reference by Aristotle, now lost, to parts of the poem he considered Pythagorean, i.e. the *Katharmoi* material. For this one can compare Theophrastus' reference to Empedocles' Pythagorean allegiances, quoted in note 58. If so, then it is also tempting to translate προοίμιον as *proem* instead of hymn. While this is perhaps too speculative to count as evidence for the contents of the proem, I nevertheless note that, on the single-work hypothesis, it coheres well with the other evidence for the proem, namely Plutarch, *De exilio* 607c and Diogenes VIII 54 on the position of B 112.

69 W. W. Fortenbaugh and E. Schutrümpf, eds., *Dicaearchus of Messana: Text, Translation, and Discussion. Rutgers University Studies in Classical Studies, vol. X* (New Brunswick/London, 2001).

70 A very similar version of this information recurs in Diogenes' life, VIII 63, where it is advanced on the authority of Favorinus, ca. 85–155 A.D.: αὐτοὺς δὲ τούτους τοὺς Καθαρμοὺς Ὀλυμπίασι ῥαψῳδῆσαι λέγεται Κλεομένη τὸν ῥαψῳδόν, ὡς Φαβωρῖνος ἐν Ἀπομνημονεύμασι.

71 In favor of the former, Timaeus of Tauromenion (ca. 350–260 B.C.), a Sicilian who wrote most of his historical work in exile at Athens, where he will have been a contemporary of Dicaearchus, claims that Empedocles made quite an impression during his visit to the games (FGrH 566 fr.134, *apud* Diogenes VIII 66). To be sure, it is easy to imagine Empedocles' militant vegetarianism causing an uproar during a religious festival whose central act was a hecatomb offered to Zeus.

72 See above, pp. 15 and 18 and M-P 111–115.

73 *Lucretius* 4.

74 This is the comic basis for numerous Aristophanic attacks on seers, see e.g. *Birds*, 959–991.

75 D. Obbink, "The Addressees of Empedocles," *Materiali e discussione per l'analisi di testi classici* 31 (1993) 51–98, pp. 56–57, note 15. Obbink adduces as evidence the *katharmoi* of Epimenides (DK 3 A 2–3), Musaeus (*apud* Aristophanes, *Frogs* 1033, with scholion, DK 2 A 6) and the pseudo-Pythagorean *Carmen Aureum* 67 ff.

76 The *Katharmoi* title, moreover, if it was used Dicaearchus to denote the single work, does not imply that he held Empedocles in any particular esteem. It may be significant that, so far as we can tell, Empedocles and certain other important Presocratics are conspicuously absent in Dicaearchus' own studies in the development of philosophy, which stressed instead the role of certain important innovators, in particular Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato; see S. White, "Principes Sapientiae: Dicaearchus' Biography of Philosophy," in Fortenbaugh and Schutrümpf, eds., *Dicaearchus of Messana* 195–236. Considered in that respect, the use of the *Katharmoi* title here might even imply something of a downgrading, the reclassification of Empedocles as an important cultural or religious thinker, but not an important philosopher.

77 Perhaps, following Obbink, *op. cit.*, one could imagine that Cleomenes the rhapsode produced his version late enough for Aristotle not to have heard of it. But if the later sentences from *On Poets* fr.1 Laurenti are actually from Hieronymus, who wrote after Dicaearchus and who, in his attempt to list all known works, went so far as to introduce apocrypha, this explanation seems invalid. However, if the *Katharmoi* was merely an alternate title, or a term used to denote the religious material, then such an omission once again is more understandable.

78 Diogenes VIII 66 (Timaeus, FGrH 566 F2), a garbled passage which Diels almost entirely rewrote himself, DK I p. 280. Marcovich's text (1999) is more conservative, but still garbled. Nevertheless, it shows better that ἐν τῇ ποιήσει is certainly in the MSS.

79 Significant here as well is Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* I 302–303, who presents B 112 as a sort of riddle to be solved by theoretical physics, in particular by DK B 109. Not only does Sextus (or his sources) seem unaware of the putatively different origins of these passages, but he actually takes to the physics to sustain or explain Empedocles' claim to divinity; see further chapter II, section 4b.

80 Although (O'Brien 1995) considers the possibility of doubting Diogenes' evidence, 436 "Osborne may wish to discredit Diogenes' evidence. She may even be right to do so . . . ," his discussion shows that he is unwilling to consider it a real option.

81 To begin, see the list of twenty-four sources Diogenes cites for the life of Empedocles provided by R. Goulet in the *Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques*, vol iii, 71–73. The best attempt to sift through this morass, though quite dated, is still the first half of Bidez, (1894). Bidez proposed Hippobotus as the principal compilator, whom Diogenes mostly excerpted, while adding a few epigrams of his own and some tidbits from later sources. For a recent general assessment of Diogenes' method and use of sources, see the papers assembled in *Elenchos* 7 (1986), which is however of limited use for the lives of the Presocratics.

82 Compare the case of Parmenides, of whom A. H. Coxon writes, *The Fragments of Parmenides. A critical text with introduction, translation, the ancient testimonia and a commentary* (Assen/Maastricht, 1986) p. 2: "Diogenes Laertius, for instance, almost certainly derives his quotations from his doxographical and biographical authorities, i.e. from Peripatetic or Stoic sources; it is not accidental that both [his quotations] are anticipated by Sextus."

83 Osborne (1987) 28–9, rehearses most of the possibilities.

84 Diels (1898) suggests πάντα τρισχίλια and Osborne (1987) πάντα δισχίλια.

85 W. Crönert, "De Lobone Argivo," in Χάριτες. *Friedrich Leo zum sechzigsten Geburtstag* (Berlin, 1911), 123–145.

86 If the *Suda* passage is indeed an abbreviation of Diogenes, then perhaps the source of the *men . . . de* contrast is verse as opposed to prose, καταλογάδην, but that very term is absent from Diogenes, who only has ἰατρικὸς λόγος, at six hundred ἔπη.

87 Reference to the *Works* alone was in fact quite common, see West's note, *Hesiod. Works and Days* (Oxford, 1978), 136.

88 E.g. the entry to Palaiphatos in the *Suda*, fr. #2 in Crönert: ἔγραψε δὲ Κοσμοποιίαν εἰς ἔπη ε'· Ἀπόλλωνος καὶ Ἀρτέμιδος γονάς ἔπη γ '· Ἀφροδίτης καὶ Ἔρωτος φωνάς καὶ λόγους ἔπη ε'· κτλ. *He wrote a Creation, about 5,000 lines; the Offspring of Apollo and Artemis, 3,000 lines; The Voices and Discourses of Aphrodite and Eros, 5,000 lines, etc.*

89 Both relate to elegy, where shorter pieces are often collected into longer groupings, presumably not by the author, so that they do not undermine my interpretation of Diogenes VIII 77. Fr. 9 Crönert, on Solon, (Diogenes I 62) lists Τὰ περὶ Σαλαμῖνος καὶ τῆς Ἀθηναίων πολιτείας, ἔπη πεντακισχίλια, *The poems on Salamis and the Athenian constitution, 5,000 lines*. Fr. 21 Crönert, on Theognis, (from the *Suda*) in the midst of a list of titles without verse numbers, has γνώμας δι' ἐλεγείας εἰς ἔπη βω', *Wise Sayings in elegiacs, 2,800 lines.*

90 For general discussion, see A. Adler, *RE* s.v. *Suidas* 709.57 ff.

91 This may be the case in the notice from Herodian, Wright # 152/Inwood, *Poem* # 85 παρὰ μέντοι Ἐμπεδοκλέους ἐν β' τῶν Καθαρμῶν, where instead of *in the second Book of the Katharmoi*, for which one might rather expect ἐν τοῖς Καθαρμοῖς β' (see Obbink (1993) 57, note 15 for this—debatable—point), perhaps the notice gives its information in order of increasing precision, i.e. *Empedocles, book II, from the purificatory material.* This comes close to Sedley's reading of this testimony, against which I argued above, 9–10, except that here it would support the single-work hypothesis. In any case, it still remains difficult to see what is particularly "purificatory" about these two lines on trees. This possibility, I should add, might weaken the case for placing B 112 at the very opening of the work, for perhaps Diogenes' source meant no more than that it opened the section on purifications in the poem. But there are other reasons to think that it is still the best candidate we have for the opening of the single work; see chapter II, section 4b.i.

92 West (1978) 136. Stobaeus 4.41.35; Proclus, *Life of Homer* 57 (= Allen ed. p. 101.10) alludes to *W&D* 657–8; Diaconus on the *Theogony* p. 323.15 Fl. to *W&D* 594–5.

93 For the two styles in Lucretius, see E. J. Kenney's introduction, *Lucretius, De Rerum Natura III* (Cambridge, 1971), 14–29; on Lucretius' poetic debt to Empedocles, see Sedley, *Lucretius*, chapter 1.

94 B 112 addresses the people of Acragas, B 1 Pausanias. Diogenes, at VIII 54 and 60, is our only ancient source for the identification of each work's addressee. and Stein (1852) was the first to advocate a systematic classification of all fragments with a singular addressee into the *Physics*, those with plural addressees in the *Katharmoi*, see note 6 above. This scheme is by and large reproduced in DK and Wright.

95 Obbink (1993) adduces the new Simonides fragment, M. L. West, *Iambi et Elegi Graeci* (2nd ed. Oxford, 1992), fr. 11, with its addresses to multiple heroes, mythical and historical, as well as different gods. One can compare as well the address to the kings at *Works and Days* 202.

NOTES TO CHAPTER II

1 Inwood, *Poem*, 22

2 For text and discussion, see Wright #107, 270–5 and Zuntz 193–198

3 See especially Kahn's criticisms in "Religion and natural Philosophy" (1960).

4 See A. P. D. Mourelatos, "Heraclitus, Parmenides and the Naive Metaphysic of Things" in E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos, R. M. Rorty eds, *Exegesis and Argument: Studies Presented to G. Vlastos* (New York, 1973), 17–48; and R. Renehan, "On the Greek Origins of the Concept of Incorporeality and Immateriality," *GRBS* 21 (1980), 105–138.

5 Similar formulas occur at B 21.6–14, B 26.7, B 35.5, whose variants complicate the editors' task. These are sorted out by M-P 175–178. For the text of B 17 with its continuation in *ensemble* a, see appendix. On the level of philosophical interest, these passages well illustrate A. A. Long's definition of Early Greek philosophy as an attempt to "give an account of all things" in his introductory essay "The Scope of Early Greek Philosophy," in Long ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1999), 1–21.

6 The *locus classicus* for the formula is *Iliad* 1. 70, of the seer Chalcas, ὅς ᾔδη τά τ' ἐόντα τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα, *who knew the things that were, and those that were to be, and those that had gone before.*

7 This requires only that we identify the δαίμονες οἵτε μακραίωνος λελάχασι βίοιο of B 115.5 with the θεοὶ δολιχαίωνες of **a**(ii)2, 21.12, 23.8 and 146.3.

8 See the table given for the different names of the elements in Wright 23. The structure of the passage will be discussed in chapter IV, section 6.

9 The hypothetical use of the Homeric hymns as detachable "preludes" to epic works may indicate that their content was not always closely integrated to the whole work, as first suggested by Wolf in his *Prolegomena ad Homerum* (1795), on the basis of Thucydides 3. 104, where the historian calls the hymn to Apollo the προοίμιον Ἀπόλλωνος. On the opening lines of epic, see now G. Wheeler, "Sing, Muse . . . The Introit from Homer to Apollonius," *CQ*, 52 N.S. (2002) 33–49.

10 See chapter I, n. 35 for the now-discredited evidence from Simplicius, *in Phys.* 161.13–17.

11 This was the main thesis of N. van der Ben, *The Proem of Empedocles' Peri Phuseos* (Amsterdam, 1975) but O'Brien's subsequent critique in *Pour interpréter Empédocle* (1981) discouraged such attempts, with the exception of the advocates of the single work-hypothesis, Osborne (1987) and Inwood, *Poem.*

12 On the text of B 115, see Wright # 107; for the case for its location in the proem of the *Peri Phuseos,* M-P 111–114, and Sedley, *Lucretius* 8–10.

13 See chapter I. Even on the single-work hypothesis, there remains the possibility, considered in chapter I, note 92, that by *Katharmoi* Diogenes and/or his source meant to denote only thematic content, i.e. by contrast with physics. On that account the testomium could mean that B 112 was only the opening section of that part of the poem. Against this is 1) the identical formula found at Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* VII 111 to quote the opening of Parmenides' poem, ἐναρχόμενος γοῦν τοῦ Περὶ Φυσέως γράφει τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, *in beginning the Peri Phuseos he writes in the following manner* (the term *Peri Phuseos* being especailly notable here, since the proem is notoriously non philosophical and traditional); 2) The argument from complementarity, pp. 11–14 above; 3) the thematic relevance of B 112's contents to the message of the whole work. Although most interpreters think that the third of these supports a division of the corpus, see my interpretation of the relation between B 112, 115 and 17 in chapter III, section 1.f).

14 Cf. Osborne (1987) 305–307.

15 So Zuntz 252–3.

16 See also Osborne (1987) 34–36 and next section.

17 The position of B 6 before B 17, on the basis of its first line: τέσσαρα γὰρ πάντων ῥιζώματα πρῶτον ἄκουε, *for hear first the four roots of all things,* as in DK or Wright # 7, is still plausible, but weakened by the use of the same adverb at B 17/*ensemble* a (ii) 24 in a similar address to the disciple. Accordingly, I think that it could just as easily follow B 17.

18 See van der Ben (1975), in the tradition of Bergk (1839) and Mullach (1860).

19 Chapter 1 is an elaboration of his 1989 article "The Proems of Empedocles and Lucretius," *GRBS*, 30 (1989), 269–96. Sedley's discussion is of course not the first to have pointed out connections between Lucretius and Empedocles, but his discussion of the proem in *Lucretius* is the only one known to me to have had access to the new material.

20 "Variations on a Theme by Empedocles in Lucretius' Proem," *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies*, 17 (1970), 55–64.

21 Noted above, chapter I, p. 12. For his reconstruction of the proem to the *Peri Phuseos*, see *Lucretius* 32–34. Although for his purposes it is only a by-product of his investigation of Lucretius, it is nevertheless offered as a contribution to Empedoclean scholarship, and can be criticized as such.

22 Selective bibliography in *Lucretius* 15, note 64. For a survey, see M. Gale, *Myth and Poetry in Lucretius* (Cambridge, 1994), 206–228.

23 *Lucretius* 26–7, with bibliography on the question of lines 44–9 = II 646–51; most older editions only print the second passage, as in Bailey's OCT.

24 This is considerably strengthened by the clear allusion to the four elements, twice worked into the opening lines 1–9, see *Lucretius* 16–17.

25 The main evidence for this degree of awareness is Cicero's letter to his brother in 54 BC (Ad. Q. fr. II.9.4); see *Lucretius* 1–2.

26 Cf. the short hymn to Love at B 17.20–26, discussed below, chapter IV, section 5.

27 Sedley suggests, *Lucretius* 26, that his hypothetical hymn to Love would have a model in Hesiod's hymn to the Muses in the *Theogony*, which spans 115 lines of 1,000-line poem. But Parmenides' own proem, a narrative of his journey, not in the form of a hymn, is a more potent counterexample.

28 The caveat at *Lucretius* 28: "I am no longer [after the hymn to Venus] suggesting direct translation or line-by-line imitation . . . but the deployment of the same sequence of themes . . ." is worrisome. It requires of us to believe that we have close imitation of that which we cannot verify, but only loose thematic links where we can compare Lucretius' poem with its model.

29 On the difficulties of the interpretation of this myth, see Gale (1994) 41–2, 71–2, and 206 ff., for its possible links to Rome, the *gens Memmia* and further connections in the *DRN*. Against the identification with Empedocles' Love is her invisibility (B 17.26) and the fact that she never "mixes" with Strife; rather, both alternate, or give way before one another, cf. B 35.12–13.

30 Then again, to the extent that the scene conforms to the pattern of a Hellenistic *ekphrasis*, a source from the visual arts has sometimes been advanced; see Gale (1994) 83–4.

31 *Lucretius* 23–4, where Sedley offers a fuller list of terms.

32 Sedley's omission from his reconstruction of the "epistemological" fragments preserved by Sextus, DK B 2 and B 3, is also curious in this regard. Fragment B 2 in particular would seem to advance his case.

33 Unless we can show that other material preceded Parmenides' B1. This seems unlikely given Sextus' introduction to his quotation, *Adv. math.* VII 111 (quoted in note 13). The term ἐναρχόμενος, once more, is the same used by Diogenes to introduce Empedocles B 112. The quasi-technical force of this word is further shown by Diogenes' citation of the first line of Alcmaion's book VIII, 83 (DK 24 A1 and B 1); see Schmalzriedt (1970) 120–129.

34 I discuss these lines at greater length in my study "Empedocles on the Ultimate Symmetry of the World," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 24 (Summer 2003), 1–57, pp. 22–28.

35 This may offer some indirect confirmation of Panzerbieter's (1844) generally accepted emendation of the word from the reading θρυφθεῖσα, found in the MSS of Simplicius.

36 Although the closest translation of those terms would be Anaxagoras' seeds. The point is not considered by Sedley in his initial discussion, but at p. 203.

37 *Lucretius* 32–33.

38 The main scene depicts a father butchering his reincarnated son, B 137.1–4, but in B 137.5–6 Empedocles implies that any blood sacrifice is a crime tantamount to inter-familial cannibalism, whether son butchers father, or children their mother. The parallel was first pointed out by Furley (1970) 62. Of note as well is the manner in which Lucretius, in the following passage, I. 101–135, is particularly critical of transmigration, perhaps as a means of distancing himself from his poetic precursor, even though Lucretius singles out Ennius rather than Empedocles as the upholder of this view.

39 Aetius I 30 1, *Dox. Gr* 326, 10.

40 Nevertheless, some important qualifications are still required. In particular, I think that a position in the proem far more likely for fragments B 12, 13 and 14 than for B 8 and 9. As for B 11 and 15, I think a location in the proem likely, but less certain than for B 12, 13 and 14; see further discussion in section 4.c.iv, pp. 67–72.

41 Within the listing of DK fragments, those fragments whose location is known from external evidence are on the left column, those with good but merely probable thematic ties are on the right. A superscript ᵃ next to a fragment number indicates fragments whose inclusion in the proem I consider weaker than most. Within each thematic group, I list the fragments in what I take to be their probable order, but without irrevocable commitment to that sequence, nor should the overly neat tabular form imply that every fragment in that group necessarily stood together. The reconstruction is mainly meant to give an idea of the likely *thematic* progression of the proem and to allow an assessment of the fit within 232 lines.

42 On the two-work hypothesis, we might hope to find plural addressees in the other quotations attested from the *Katharmoi*. Unfortunately, Herodian's quotation from book II of the *Katharmoi* (Wright #152) and the testimony of Theon of Smyrna, B 153a, are both inconclusive in this regard.

43 Cf. B 62, which Simplicius identifies as from book II of the *Physics*. In *ensemble* **d** of the Strasbourg papyrus, **d 8** and **d 10**, there are apparent references to "we," but it is not clear who exactly is meant by that, whether Empedocles alone, Empedocles and Pausanias, or perhaps collective humanity; see note 56 below.

44 *Adv. Math*. I 302, ὁ δὲ ἀπὸ φυσικῆς ὁρμώμενος θεωρίας, σαφῶς γιγνώσκων ὅτι ἀρχαῖον ὅλως τὸ δόγμα ἐστί, τοῖς ὁμοίοις τὰ ὅμοια γινώσκεσθαι ... συνήσει ὅτι ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς θεὸν ἑαυτὸν προσηγόρευεν, ἐπεὶ μόνος καθαρὸν ἀπὸ κακίας τηρήσας τὸν νοῦν καὶ ἀνεπιθόλωτον τῷ ἐν ἑαυτῷ θεῷ τὸν ἐκτὸς κατείληφεν.

45 As such, it is also a standard epic formula in the opening of speeches and harangues, cf. *Iliad* 2. 79. The opening was meant to be recognizably traditional, as an epic poem, even though Empedocles, as I argue below, creatively invests this traditional poetic term with new significance.

46 See Wheeler, *op. cit.*

47 Zuntz 189: "From this exordium it is clear Empedocles is not writing (or reciting) this poem at Akragas. The circumstantial description of their abode alone suffices to show that he is sending it to his friends abroad, as Pindar sent P. iii to Hieron." KR (1957) 354; KRS (1983) 313.

48 Or after? Even with the rise of epistolary literature in the Hellenistic period, continuing on into the Imperial age, I know of no hexameter, didactic poetry that also pretends to be an open letter. Although there is much overlap between didactic poetry and certain kinds of epistolary literature, it seems nevertheless that both genres tended to coexist separately, with didactic poetry usually assuming an addressee present before the speaker, and focusing on a specific, technical topic, while epistolary literature, by definition, had an absent adressee, and greater freedom to range over various topics. For discussion of the little-known post-classical tradition of didactic poetry, including comic and/or mock-epic, see now S. D. Olson and A. Sens, *Archestratos of Gela: Greek Culture and Cuisine in the Fourth Century BCE* (Oxford, 2000), xliii ff. The closest extant examples for Zuntz's claim would be fourth-century protreptic orations in prose addressed to specific individuals, or the later tradition of philosophical letters, such as those of Epicurus. As for postclassical hexameter, the verse epistle is conspicuously absent from Greek literature, and one must go to Latin and as late as Horace's *Epistles* to find an extant parallel. Even so, the *Epistles* are not narrowly technical, as for example the *Georgics* are, or as is Horace's own *Ars Poetica*.

49 See W. Mullen, *Choreia: Pindar and Dance* (Princeton, 1982), 28, who cites *Ol*. 7. 13–14; *Pyth*. 2.3–4; *Isth*. 5.21–22.

50 Compare the similar awkwardness of the *Works and Days* 663 ff., where Perses is told what his father used to do for a living, where he stopped and settled, and what his hometown is like. The implication is not so much that Perses did not know these things, but that the poem was intended for a wider readership. No more than Parmenides (and unlike Hesiod in the *Theogony*), Empedocles does not name himself in the opening, but presumes that the reader will know who the speaker is.

51 Bollack iii, 18: "Chez Parménide, la déesse parle; elle est le moi et le poète le toi; il est initié, alors qu' Empédocle initie et se trouve, à considérer cette transposition, à la place de la déesse."

52 As Zuntz stressed, p.189, the pronoun ὑμῖν should be construed with θεὸς ἄμβροτος not πωλεῦμαι, which would produce the meaning *I go about you*.

53 Cf. B 3. 9–13, discussed below.

54 Or again, with more serious reservations, van der Ben (1975).

55 See chapter I, note 15. I incline to M-P's view, with some reservations, despite Osborne (2000) 339. The details given in the second half of *ensemble* **d**, especially those concerning the emergence of plants (?), imply that the passage occurred after the cosmogony, where Empedocles described how the element fire had separated itself out from the earth; see DK 31 A 49a, Inwood (2001) # 40. Otherwise, it seems that these same details would have been incomprehensible for the hearer.

56 Problematic in this regard is the plural subject of B 120, ἠλύθομεν τόδ' ὑπ' ἄντρον ὑπόστεγον, *we have come down into to this roofed* (i.e. *subterranean*?) *cavern,* whom Porphyry, its source, identifies as ψυχοπομποὶ δυνάμεις, *soul-conveying powers*, but whom Zuntz 204 suggests are Empedocles and his guide(s) to the underworld. This points to one possible solution to the difficulty of accounting for the change of addressees: to make Empedocles himself, in the context of a *katabasis,* the single addressee of some divine authority (Pythagoras ? cf. B 129), perhaps on the model of Parmenides' poem; so van der Ben (1975) *passim.* Thus the "I" of B 112 and B 17 would not be the same, and Pausanias, from Gela (Diogenes, VIII 60) could have been addressed besides the friends from Acragas. But against this "I" being a divinity distinct from Empedocles is the confession of accursedness at B 115.13–14 and now *ensemble* **d**, lines 5–6 (=B 139). Against its identification with Pythagoras (to which the previous objection does not hold, since Pythagoras was also a man for a time) is the absence of any reference to such an important issue in the doxography. If Empedocles had presented his teachings as the *ipsissima verba* of Pythagoras, later authors would surely have exploited it as a source for Pythagoras' life. In fact, the identity of the intellectual hero of B 129 was never given in the work, as shown by the doxographic debate preserved by Diogenes VIII 54, discussed in chapter I, pp. 16–17. That Empedocles was the main authority for the poem still seems the more obvious and correct assumption. It is also supported by sources as early as the fourth century B.C., in particular by Heraclides of Pontus' lost dialogue Περὶ τῆς ἄπνου, *On the Woman who Stopped Breathing*, in which Heraclides has Empedocles instruct Pausanias, cf. p. 201 n. 61.

For a discussion of Empedocles' different and problematic uses of "we," including how they relate to the debated passages in the Strasbourg papyrus, see A. Laks, "Reading the Readings: On the First Person Plurals in the Strasburg Empedocles," in V. Caston and D. W. Graham, eds., *Presocratic Philosophy: Essays in Honor of Alexander Mourelatos* (Aldershot, 2002), 127–37. Although Laks does not discuss B 120, I think that the "we" of B 120 could stand for 1) Empedocles and the "friends from Acragas," 2) humanity in general, or 3) Empedocles alone.

57 Discussed below in chapter III, section 3.b.iii, pp. 124–5.

58 Sedley, *Lucretius* 29–30, following Furley (1970) 61–2.

59 But the evidence here, I stress again, is very slight. Perhaps Ovid's use of Pythagoras in the last book of the *Metamorphoses* may also encourage placing B 129 in my hypothetical book III, close to the description of Golden Age vegetarianism and bloodless sacrifices.

60 A new instance from the papyrus, **d 10**, may also show that sometimes Empedocles referred to both Pausanias and himself as "we." Unfortunately, the restoration of the passage is controversial. The text as recorded by the first hand reads: ἡ̣]μεῖς δὲ λόγων ἐπιβ[ήσομ]εθ' αὖθις *but we* (Empedocles alone, or Empedocles and Pausanias?) *shall enter again into the former account.* A second hand, however, added a suprascript **ν** between two dots above the θ in the verb, correcting it from a middle intransitive form to an active transitive. This correction is adopted by M-P 147, 309–310, who must thereby supply an accusative object for the verb, so that their text reads: ἡ̣]μεῖς δὲ λόγων ⟨σ'⟩ ἐπιβ[ήσομ]εν αὖθις. *But we* (i.e. Empedocles alone) *shall make you enter once more into the former account.* Osborne (2000) 347 finds this needlessly complicated, as does Laks, (2002) 129–30. As for who *we* refers to, only if M-P are correct do we have a certain instance of Empedocles using the plural to refer to himself.

61 But Wright prints DK B 1 (her # 4) after B 2 (her #1). How then is the hearer supposed to know who σύ is at DK B 2.9–10?

62 LSJ, s.v. I 3: "in Trag. (not in Com. or Orat.) when the speaker turns from one person to another, the voc. stands first, then the pers. Pron., folld. by δέ."

63 Two passages from Hesiod, *Works and Days* 27 and 274, show that this need not always apply: both begin ὦ Πέρση, σύ δὲ ταῦτα... but Perses alone is addressed. For other examples, see Denniston, *GP* 189.

64 As can be shown by comparison: in the *Works and Days*, Perses is first mentioned at line 10, addressed at line 27, whereas in Parmenides the goddess addresses him at line 24. In Lucretius, Memmius is mentioned at lines 26 and 42, addressed at 50. Sedley's reconstruction of Empedocles' proem, *Lucretius* 33, by positing a "programmatic address to Pausanias" after the hymn to Aphrodite, and so earlier in the poem, fares better in this regard, but then does not explain why most of the material that he conjectures belonged either to the second half of the proem or at least book I (p. 30 note 107) has *plural addressees*, cf. especially B 136–137. All things considered, the ordering I propose seems the best way to account for the evidence.

65 But for a good recent treatment, see A. Calzolari, "Empedocles, FRR 2 e 3 Diels-Kranz," *Studi Classici e Orientale* 34 (1984), 71–81.

66 See Wright #2 and 5, and comm. *ad loc.*

67 D. L. Blank, *Sextus Empiricus: Against the Grammarians (Adv. Math. I), Translated with an introduction and Commentary* (Oxford, 1998), 336–7, although Blank concedes in footnote 291 that I. Kidd does not endorse the

point. On *orthos logos* in the Stoa, see I. Kidd, who argues for its articulation in the second to first century BC, "*Orthos Logos* as a Criterion of truth in the Stoa" in P. Huby and G. Neal eds., *The Criterion of Truth. Essays Written in Honour of G. Kerferd* (Liverpool, 1989), 137–150.

68 See generally C. Osborne *Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy* (Ithaca, 1987).

69 Bollack iii 17: "On n'est pas allé plus loin." i.e. Empedocles has reached the summit of *human* learning. Wright 157: "E.'s attitude is more modest here . . ."

70 ὧδ' ἐλιάσθης. The verb λιάζομαι has as primary meaning *bend, incline* (LSJ s.v.), but can also mean shrink away, as at *Il.* 1.349, or *to dodge*, *stray from*, *slip away*, *Il.* 21.255. The verb is generally associated with flight, or avoidance, but can also connote striving after something, but once again with the notion of leaving something or someone else behind, ex. Penelope's dream, which escapes through the keyhole, leaving her behind, *Od.* 4.848 or, the chorus's address to Hecuba, in Euripides, *Hecuba*, 92–3, where Euripides practically glosses the verb: Ἑκάβη, σπουδῇ πρός σ' ἐλιάσθην/ τὰς δεσποσύνους σκὴνας προλιποῦσ(α) . . . *I have run away to you, leaving behind*. . . . In later epic the sense of parting or leaving behind is strengthened, as in Apollonius Rhodius, 1.94, 3. 827. For a study of the verb's history, see H. Fränkel, "Homerische Wörter," Ἀντίδωρον. *Wackernagel Festschrift* (1924), 274–282, 275–8. Here, I presume, Pausanias has left behind the mortal ways Empedocles condemned in the opening, so as to follow the master. Instead of a description of physical exile, as conjectured in the nineteenth century, the reference is probably to Pausanias's choice of an alternative lifestyle, perhaps the first stage of his Pythagorean initiation.

71 The Homeric perfect of ὄρνυμι, *to move, stir oneself* (LSJ s.v. 3) has πλεῖον as its adverb, cf. Bollack iii 18. In epic, the verb is often used of the mind's activity, cf. Telemachus' defense of the bard Phemius's right to sing ὅππῃ οἱ νόος ὄρνυται *wherever his mind is impelled*, *Odyssey* 1.344. Here Empedocles quite literally means: *mortal thought has not gone any further*. To that "limited" mind we can contrast the holy *phren* of B 134, which darts through the whole cosmos, comparable in turn to Lucretius' description of Epicurus's flight of the mind, DRN I 73–5.

72 Discussed above, pp. 46–47. That the physical teachings were advanced upon divine authority seems also alluded to by Lucretius in his praise of Empedocles, I 730–33: carmina quin etiam divini pectoris eius /vociferantur et exponunt praeclara reperta/ ut vix humana videatur stirpe creatus. *Moreover the poems of his divine mind utter a loud voice and declare illustrious discoveries, so that he seems hardly to be born of mortal stock*. (trans. M. F. Smith, Loeb 1975). Although too much need not be made of *divinus*, the adjective here is nonetheless telling, while the play on superhuman origins in the last line can be explained as a reference to Empedoclean doctrine, where the elements, sources of all things, are also gods, as in Sextus' analysis, quoted in n. 44 above.

73 DK 28 B 7, 3–6 μηδέ σ' ἔθος πολύπειρον ὁδὸν κατὰ τήνδε βιάσθω, / νωμᾶν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἠχήεσσαν ἀκουὴν / καὶ γλῶσσαν, κρῖναι δὲ λόγωι πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον/ ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα. *But let not much-tried habit force you down this way, to wield an unseeing eye and a resounding ear and tongue, but judge by reason the very contentious examination set out by me.*

74 VII 124: παρίστησιν ὅτι τὸ δι' ἑκάστης αἰσθήσεως λαμβανόμενον πιστόν ἐστι, τοῦ λόγου τούτων ἐπιστατοῦντος, καίπερ πρότερον καταδραμὼν τῆς ἀπ' αὐτῶν πίστεως. *He puts it that perception through each of the senses is reliable, provided reason is in control of them, even though previously disparaging their reliability.* Sextus first quotes B 2.1–8 as involving a denial of the possibility of knowledge, i.e. thesis (A) *knowledge is impossible for men*. He then quotes B 2.8–9 to support the idea that "truth is not altogether unattainable, but is attainable as far as mortal thought can reach"; note in particular B 2.9 *you will learn*. This would be thesis (B): *some knowledge is attainable by men*. In (A), Sextus says that Empedocles claims that knowledge is impossible for men, but in lines 8–9 he implies (B). The point of B 3, for Sextus, is to reinforce (B), especially "*come, see*, etc." where Empedocles endorses the cognitive value of sense-perception.

75 161. See also DK's account of earlier debates on the question, vol. i 310, notes to line 5.

76 Cf. the injunction at B 17/ a (ii) 23, which, despite the lacuna, clearly specifies to which sense the proof or demonstration will appeal [δεί]ξω σοι καὶ ἀν' ὄσσ(ε) ἵνα μείζονι σώμ[ατι κύρει(?)] *I will show you, before your eyes, where* (it/they?) *happen*(*s*) *upon a greater body.*

77 As Wright suggests, p. 157.

78 Construing παρ 'Εὐσεβίης together. Bollack iii, p. 30, follows Karsten (1852) p. 176, and takes the preposition as an adverb, *send along*, with Εὐσεβίη as the owner of the chariot. The parallel with Bacchylides seems to rule this out.

79 For this comparison and a number of good linguistic points, see Calzolari (1984) 79.

80 As in Wright, who places them in succession 2 (=DK B 3. 1–5) and 3 (=DK B 131). White-armed B 3.3: Calliope B 131.3

81 For such prayers as transitions in Pindar, see E. L. Bundy, *Studia Pindarica* (Berkeley, 1986) 18, and 78–9, (a point I owe to professor A. Dyck), and Wheeler (2002) 39 in epic.

82 Contrast the milder reproaches found in DK B 9, 11,15, 39.

83 Cf. B 136.1–2: οὐκ ἐσορᾶτε/ἀλλήλους δάπτοντες ἀκηδείῃσι νόοιο; *Do you not see that you are feasting upon one another through the recklessness of your minds?*

84 VII 124: καίπερ πρότερον [DK B 2] καταδραμὼν τῆς ἀπ' αὐτῶν πίστεως... *even though previously disparaging their reliability* (i.e. that of the senses). While in other cases Sextus seems reliable enough as a witness, in some

instances he is clearly not, as in B 3 or in his quotation of Parmenides at VII 111. Fränkel "Homerische Wörter" (1927) 277 doubts that Sextus means to give the order in the passage above, while Coxon (1986) writes of his quotation of Parmenides at VII 111, p. 5: "That his text [of Parmenides] was not a manuscript of the poem, but a Hellenistic treatise containing quotations from it, is strongly suggested both by the Stoic character of the exegesis which follows the text and especially Sextus' unawareness that the last five and a half lines of his quotation cannot have followed immediately on the first thirty." Here, at VII 122–124 the material collected by his source was perhaps assembled thematically, so that Sextus' account of their position may reflect their order there rather than in the original.

85 ἅδε τοι proposed by U. von Wilamowitz, "Die Καθαρμοί des Empedokles," *Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* (1929), 626–661, (= *Kl. Schr.* vol i (1935) 496–7) is the preferred supplement, printed in DK, Wright (#3) and Inwood (#10). For other suggestions, see DK and Wright.

86 159, with bibliography.

87 Compare the structure of Sappho 1 ed. Loebel and Page, a good early example of the general type.

88 So DK, placing it in the *Katharmoi*, and translating *unsere Dichtermühen*, followed by Zuntz (1971) 211 ff. with bibliography, who speculates that it marked the opening of the second book of the *Katharmoi.*

89 In her note *ad loc.*, p. 159, she compares ἡμετέρας μελέτας to DK B 133.1–2 ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν . . . ἡμετέροις. Perhaps a closer parallel might be B 4.2 ὡς δὲ παρ' ἡμετέρης κέλεται πιστώματα Μούσης, *as the proofs from our Muse urge.*

90 See Inwood (1992), context 9 for a translation. On the background, W. Burkert, "Plotin, Plutarch und die Platonisierende Interpretation von Heraklit und Empedokles" in J. Mansfeld and L. M. de Rijk eds, *Kephalaion: Studies in Greek Philosophy and Its Continuation Presented to Prof. C. J. de Vogel* (van Gorcum, 1975), 137–146, and especially the informed discussion of J. Mansfeld, *Heresiography in Context: Hippolytus's Elenchus as a Source for Greek Philosophy* (Leiden, 1992), 221–6.

91 Cf. Hippolytus' interpretation of B 110 at *Ref.* VII 29, which seeks to establish a third, mediating power, *mind*, beyond the six first-principles.

92 A similar set of calls to attention, but with a programmatic statement of future material, is found at **a (ii) 21–30.**

93 Clement, *Stromateis* V.59,3; Proclus, *Comm. in Tim.* 351.10 Diehl.

94 Pausanias has been suggested by Karsten, Gomperz, Wilamowitz, Reinhardt, Wright, Inwood; the Muse by Bergk, Diels, Kranz, Bollack.

95 The parallel is noted by A. Traglia, (1952) 112, Bollack iii 31, n. 4.

96 W. Burkert, "Das Proömium des Parmenides und die Katabasis des Pythagoras," *Phronesis*, 14 (1969), 1–30, p. 6 ff., who compares the Sun-Maidens to their namesakes in Aeschylus's lost *Phaethon* tragedy. More recently, for comparable Mesopotamian elements in the proem, see L. D. Steele, "Mesopotamian Elements in the Proem of Parmenides? Correspondences between the Sun-God Helios and Shamash," *CQ* N.S. 52 (2002), 583–88.

97 To the best of my knowledge, this parallel was first noted by Bergk (1839) 33–34.

98 On the indicative with μή, Bollack iii 31, cites Chantraine, *Grammaire Homérique* vol ii, 331, "où la négation écarte une idée" and compares *Iliad* 23.301 μή πως καὶ Κρονίδης κεχολώσεται . . . But H. W. Smyth, *Greek Grammar*, #2705 i offers a more specific explanation: "Oaths and protestations in the indicative with μή express a solemn denial or refusal, or repudiate a charge." This fits exactly the suggested situation.

99 Wright 161. Bollack's remedy for this is to suppose that the subject of βιήσεται is Piety/Εὐσεβίη, but that is weakly supported by the context. See my alternative.

100 Although R. Janko construes 16.10's ὄφρ' ἀνέληται as a passive, *The Iliad: A Commentary. vol. IV: Books 13–16* (Cambridge, 1992), 317, "until she is picked up," Ameis-Hentze, *Homers Ilias* (Leipzig, 1913) *ad loc.* take the verb as middle in both lines. The question relates to a larger issue in the history of the Greek language, where it is unclear that the distinction between active and passive is more fundamental, in Homeric Greek, than that between active-transitive and middle, of which the passive is but one subgroup; see, H. Jankuhn, *Die Passive Bedeutung medialer Formen untersucht an der Sprache Homers* (Göttingen, 1969). If so, a passive in Homer should only be considered where other options fail. I thank Prof. A. Dyck for drawing my attention to this reference, although he is not to be held responsible for my application of it.

101 So also Bollack iii 32, n. 3, and Smyth #2279, against Wright 160, *on the condition that.*

102 This, I maintain, is simply the best sense to be had from the Greek in my reconstruction of the fragment's context. The esoteric nature of the work is rather one of moral and intellectual elitism, not secret lore, pace Kingsley (1995) 369–70. For further elaboration of this point, see chapter IV section 1.d.

103 Aeschylus, *Suppliants* 595–6 (a garbled passage): ὑπ' ἀρχᾶς δ' οὔτινος θοάζων (sc. Zeus)/ . . . κρατύνει, *but Zeus makes haste under the orders of none . . . he rules;* Sophocles, *OT* 1–2: Ὦ τέκνα, Κάδμου τοῦ πάλαι νέα τροφή/ τίνας ποθ' ἕδρας τάσδε μοι θοάζετε, *O children, the new brood of Kadmus of old, what seats of the gods do you rush* (*to serve?*). See R. D. Dawe's note *ad loc.*, *Sophocles: Oedipus Rex* (Cambridge, 1982) 85: "speed is inherent in the ten transitive and intransitive uses of θοάζω, as derived from

θοός, in the ten occurrences of the word in Euripides." It is only the etymologists who make the case for the secondary meaning *sit*, but they do so on general comparative grounds, without any hard evidence. For a religious context in Euripides, see *Bacchae* 65–6 θοάζω/Βρομίῳ πόνον ἡδὺν, *for Bromius I swiftly accomplish a pleasant toil*, whereas *Hercules Furens* 382 seems only to denote speed: θοάζω σῖτα γένυσι . . . *I swiftly dispatch the food to my knees. . . .*

[104] Despite Plutarch's much later gloss θαμίζειν, *De multitudine amicorum*, 93 a–b Pohlenz. Plutarch appears to quote the second half of the line, and is thus of no help on τάδε τοι vs. τότε δὴ, but glosses the verb as θαμίζειν *to haunt, frequent*, (or perhaps θαυμάζειν, *to wonder at*, a variant recorded in MS C, Pohlenz). Since the infinitive in Plutarch is suited to the context in quotation, it is no strong evidence for the original mood of the verb.

[105] In this there may also be a parallel from Plato's *Timaeus* 20a. In the opening of that work, long thought to betray traces of Empedoclean influences (and where Timaeus has even been posited as a stand-in for Empedocles; see J. Hershbell, "Empedoclean Influences on the Timaeus," *Phoenix* 28 (1974), 145–166). Plato has Socrates praise Timaeus as one who, being the most virtuous and influential citizen of his native city, and having occupied the highest magistracies, has also, *in my opinion, reached the peak of all philosophy*, φιλοσοφίας δ'αὖ κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν ἐπ' ἄκρον ἁπάσης ἐλήλυθεν.

[106] Cf. DRN IV 1–5 (=I 926–30), where Lucretius' claim to originality is somewhat reminiscent of our passage, with its talk of fountains and crowns, but without any fear of this innovation being branded impious: Avia Pieridum peragro loca nullius ante / trita solo. Iuvat integros accedere fontis / atque haurire, juvatque novos decerpere flores / insignemque meo capiti petere inde coronam / unde prius nulli velarint tempora Musae. *But I cross the trackless expanse of the Pierides, never yet trodden by any man. I delight in reaching springs untouched by man and there to drink, and I delight in picking new flowers, from which to make an illustrious crown for my head, from fields where before now no one has had his brows veiled by the Muses.*

[107] See G. Nagy, "Early Greek Views of Poets and Poetry," in A. O. Kennedey, ed., *The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism, vol. I: Classical Criticism*, (Cambridge, 1989), 1–77, 24 ff.

[108] See Bollack iii #699 and A. A. Long, "Thinking and Sense-Perception in Empedocles: Mysticism or Materialism?," CQ N.S. 16 (1966), 256–76, esp. 268 ff.

[109] Bollack ii places it last in his reconstruction of the *Physics*, following DK where B 110 and B 111 are the closing fragments (as in Wright) whereas Inwood, *Poem*, places it at # 15, before B 17 (his #25).

[110] Diogenes VIII 59, quoting Satyrus, but without attributing it to any work, see chapter I, table 2.

[111] See Wright # 101 and her introduction, 6–17.

[112] See discussion in G. E. R. Lloyd, *Magic, Reason and Experience* (Cambridge, 1979) 33–35 and Diels (1898) 409–10 (= *Kl. Schr.* 140–141).

[113] B. A. van Groningen, "Le fragment 111 d'Empédocle," *Classica et Mediaevalia* 17 (1956), 47–61.

[114] Bollack, iii, p. 20–21. If Bollack is right, and Empedocles immediately denied the powers he apparently claims that he will teach the disciple in B 110, then Satyrus has truly and maliciously distorted Empedocles' views. But Bollack's placement of the fragment cannot be right, since Empedocles was repeatedly accused of *alozoneia* by numerous sources, including Timaeus (*apud* Diogenes VIII 66/FGrH 566 F 2), Sextus and/or his Sources, (*Adv. Math.* I, 302, discussed above section b.i) and Aristotle, (*apud* Diogenes VIII 63). Aristotle finds Empedocles' democratic leanings in politics noteworthy, I suggest, precisely because they seemed to conflict with the authoritarian tone in the work. Once more, this only seems to confirm that Empedocles spoke in his poem as a divine authority.

[115] See van der Ben, "Empedocles' Fragments 8, 9, 10 DK," *Phronesis* 23 (1978), 197–212, who places B 8, 9, 10, 11, and 15 together, as one continuous passage. Wright proposes a different arrangement, with B 8 and 9 (her # 12 and 13) after B 17 (her # 8), while she relocates B 10, 11 and 15 to the *Katharmoi* on thematic grounds.

[116] Lines 1, 3–4, *Metaph.* 1015a1; *Dox. Gr.* 326.10.

[117] B 8.2 as found in Plutarch, perhaps quoted via Colotes rather than from Empedocles, reads οὐλομένη θανάτοιο γενέθλη, which is defended by van der Ben, (1978) 200–201. To my mind, this gives less good sense than the reading in Aristotle and Aetius, being a rephrasing of line 1, but does serve Colotes's point and is reinforced by the word's appearance in the papyrus, cf. B 17/ **a** (ii) 30: ὄψει γὰρ ξύνοδόν τε διάπτυξίν τε γενέθλη[ς.], *for you will see the coming-together and development of life*, i.e. that are life. Given Empedocles' compositional style, it may be an original variant rather than an error.

[118] Colotes's reading of B 8 consists of two moves: 1) taking φύσις to mean "stable nature" instead of *ex nihilo* growth, which goes against the immediate context and the Parmenidean background, but which does have a precedent in Aristotle, *Metaph* 1015a1; 2) applying it (probably correctly) to the six first principles, but in an exclusive manner that denies any form of reality to men. See Wright 175–6 for bibliography; further discussion in J. Cl. Nilles, "Le Fragment 8 d'Empédocle selon la perspective de Plutarque et d'Aristote," *Mnemosyne* 42 (1989), 365–79.

[119] At the very least Empedocles must be committed to the after-life survival of the elements. More problematically, he is also committed to the possible survival of some form of personal identity, as the *daimon* (witness DK B 115, 117 and 137) which presuppose the continuation of particular persons within other life forms.

120 These axioms did not originate with Parmenides; see A. Mourelatos, "Pre-Socratic Origins of the Principle That There Are No Origins from Nothing," *The Journal of Philosophy* 78 (1981), 649–685.

121 Mourelatos (1981) suggests a similar reversal of perspective in the internal structure of argumentation. Speaking of B 8 and 9, he says, 659: ". . . but the contrast with Parmenides is even there, more significant than the similarity. In Parmenides, certain epistemological-semantic considerations lead to ontological conclusions. In Empedocles, it is the ontological pronouncements that provide grounds for the disparagement of ordinary language. The movement of thought is exactly the reverse."

122 As in Wright # 104 (DK B 11) and 106 (DK B 15). Then again, neither fragment is in the form of invective addressed against a plural audience. Both passages criticize mistaken beliefs ascribed, in the third person, to men or the "unwise." Thus, both fragments thus could have come well after the change of addressees, or even B 17 for that matter.

123 As in Wright, #8 (=DK B 17) and #12 (=DK B 8). *Ensemble* **a** of the papyrus, however, now shows that it may have come later on than Wright conjectured at the time.

124 Compare Obbink (1993) who arrives at much the same conclusion, albeit on different grounds, p. 70: "In other words, Empedocles' invocation of the Muse as a divine authority was more or less immediately preceded or (more likely) succeeded by yet another type of direct address, namely exhortations to the poet's mortal companion, Pausanias, as a professional apprentice to whom the poet imparts his new and personal *logos*."

125 As well as for B 110, but the case for this material belonging to the end of the work seems to me equally strong. In my reconstruction in table 1 moreover, I prefer to place B 2.1–8 after B 2.8–9, which I believe produces a more potent sequence than B 2 8–9 followed by B 110.

126 E.g. Kahn (1960) 434 ff., in Mourelatos, ed., 10 ff., in Anton and Kustas, eds.

127 *Lucretius* 33.

128 *Hearing*, B 17.14, 26, **a** (ii) 21, 22; *vision*, lines **a** (ii) 22, 23; *mental functions*, B17. 21: *look at her* [Love] *with nous, do not sit staring and dazed*; **a** (ii) 21: *let not my words reach your ears alone*; **a** (ii) 29: *from these convey true proofs of my words to your phren.*

NOTES TO CHAPTER III

1 Both Wright and Inwood, *Poem*, place B 146 at the close of the *Katharmoi* or single poem on thematic grounds, but there is no external evidence for its location.

2 This material is reviewed in chapter I; see especially note 50.

3 Wright 55–76, and especially p. 61: "This erasing of the dividing line between men and gods, which in the epic tradition is fixed and, except for rare cases impassable, has two effects. One is to reduce to some extent the status of these gods by showing them superior only in having a longer and happier existence than other forms of life. The second is to raise the status of the life of plants, animals, and humans by recognizing in them a nature like that of the honored gods . . ."

4 This is so regardless whether one follows Plutarch's text, which has τὴν [sc. ὁδὸν] καὶ ἐγὼ νῦν εἶμι, *upon which road I too will now travel*, as in Zuntz or Hippolytus, as in DK, Wright #107 and Inwood, *Poem* #11.

5 Wright 291. Whether it was modeled on Pindar's fragment 131 Snell-Maehler, or some common source, the biographical tradition supports the ascription to Empedocles of pre-eminence in all four categories.

6 The standard modern work is H. Cherniss, *Aristotle's Critcism of Presocratic Philosophy* (Baltimore, 1935). For a brief introduction to the whole subject of doxography, see J. Mansfeld's chapter "Sources" in A. A. Long, ed. (1999), 22–44, while a good, succinct account of the philosophical distortions Aristotle imposes on his predecessors can be found in A. A. Long's own "Parmenides on Thinking Being," *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* 12 (1996), 125–15, 128 ff. Most importantly for my purposes here, this misreading is characterized by a willingness to turn a blind eye to statements about the divine, as well as by two other distortions, more subtle yet no less damaging. First, there is an assumption that the Presocratics systematically confused perception and thinking, as made plain by Theophrastus' account in the *De sensibus*. Second, that they took themselves to be describing a world that did not include or affect them as its observers. In other words, Aristotle and Theophrastus act as though the Presocratics dealt exclusively with first-order questions, and did not concern themselves with second-order or methodological issues, such as what would constitute the conditions of correct thinking and knowledge.

7 The bibliographies on both questions are vast. For Lucretius, a recent selective account can be found in Gale (1994), chapter 6; for Parmenides, Paquet, Roussel, and Lafrance covers everything from 1879 to 1980, and more recent contributions can be found in Long ed. (1999), but see also section 3.c.

8 In what follows I am indebted to J. Mansfeld's study "Insight by Hindsight, Intentional Unclarity in Presocratic Proems," *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 42 (1995), 225–232, where one can find together nearly all the relevant evidence. My differences with his views turn mostly upon his reading of Empedocles.

9 Cf. the discussion in chapter II section 4.b.i, and Wheeler (2002).

10 E.g. *The Rhetoric to Alexander* 29.1, Cicero's *De Inventione* 1.22–3. More specific types of indirect approach are considered below.

11 For discussion and parallels, see Bundy (1986), under the heading "opening foil" in the volume's index, with discussion of this specific passage, 55–6.

12 Compare Aristotle's description of musical practice in the fourth century, *Rhetoric* III 14: "The musical prelude resembles the introduction to speeches of display; *as flute-players play first some brilliant passage they know well and then fit it on to the opening notes of the piece itself* . . ." (trans. from McKeon, ed., *The Basic Works of Aristotle*)

13 DK 64 B1: λόγου πάντος ἀρχόμενον δοκεῖ μοι χρεὼν εἶναι τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀναμφισβήτητον παρέχεσθαι, τὴν δὲ ἑρμηνείαν ἁπλῆν καὶ σεμνήν.

14 *Lucretius*, 9–10, and mentioned above in chapter I, note 36.

15 I translate following Zuntz, 189–90.

16 I explore this background in chapter IV, section 2.

17 Fullest commentary by Zuntz 186–192 and van der Ben (1975). Wright 266 prefers the Anthology reading, while Inwood, *Poem* 202, retains the first person.

18 *De exilio* 607c, quoted p. 36.

19 Zuntz 252, paraphrasing B 112 before B 113: What, then, is it that distinguishes him from 'men mortal and subject to all kind of destruction? [DK 113] The question may or may not have been explicitly formulated . . . it is, at any rate, unavoidably posed by this challenging opening."

20 This is made even clearer by B 113, which according to Sextus, *Adv. Math.* I 302, followed upon B 112: *But why do I insist upon these matters, as if accomplishing some great deed if I am superior to mortals, men who die many times?*

21 Osborne (1987) 34 points out the irony of the opening address, in particular the term κακότητος ἄπειροι, *unacquainted with evil*, easily read as a double-entendre for *ignorant* of evil. Perhaps in the same class is B 112.2 ἀγαθῶν μελεδήμονες ἔργῶν, *preoccupied with good deeds*. Μελεδήμων *mindful, caring about* might also suggest μελεο-δαίμων of μέλεος, *miserable*, *unhappy with respect to*, + gen. (cf. Aeschylus, *Septem* 779, μέλεος γαμῶν, *unhappy in marriage*) and producing *demons to be pitied for your good deeds*, i.e. the numerous sacrifices which pass for piety among the benighted Acragantines. Such play with language may seem frivolous to us, but figures prominently in Aeschylus and Heraclitus. On two other occasions Empedocles seems to go out of his way to allude to *daimones*: B 9.4 δυσδαίμων πότμος, *an unfortunate fate*, literally *ill-demoned*; and B 62.3, the narration of the origins of humanity οὐ γὰρ μύθος ἀπόσκοπος οὐδ' ἀδαήμων, *for the story is not off the mark nor without learning*, with ἀδαήμων being perhaps a folk-etymology, "without daimon" (the word in fact is unrelated to *daimon*, according to the etymological dictionary of Frisk).

22 In terms of internal evidence, we can compare the general pattern of reversal and recognition just outlined, and a similar *megaloprepeia* in language with a fondness for ominous *double-entendre*, occasionally verging upon obscurity. More specifically, while comparative analysis of Empedocles' language shows important debts to Homer, Hesiod, and Lyric, (and the myth of the banishment of a god for perjury is specifically taken from the *Theogony* 793–806) these are matched and even outstripped by Aeschylean phraseology; see A. Traglia, *Studi sulla lingua di Empedocle*, 41–75; M. L. Gemelli Marciano, *Le Metamorfosi della tradizione* (Bari, 1990), index, 188–206. Finally, Aeschylus' visit(s) to Sicily between 470 and 456 correspond roughly to Empedocles' twenties and early thirties, allowing us to posit Empedocles' direct acquaintance with the older poet's work at an age when his own talent was still taking shape. For a survey of these themes in Aeschylus and beyond, R. Seaford, "Immortality, Salvation, and the Elements," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 90 (1986), 1–26.

23 Osborne (1987) 35 rightly singles out B 114 with its plural addressees, as a good candidate for the general vicinity.

24 Cf. B 4.1: ἀλλὰ κακοῖς μὲν κάρτα μέλει κρατέουσιν ἀπιστεῖν· *But it is exactly the business of base men to disbelieve their rulers*, or perhaps *betters*.

25 The clearest case of this is Socrates' conversion of Euthydemus in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* IV 2. On the Socratic *elenchus* in general, G. Vlastos, "The Socratic Elenchus," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 1 (1983), 27–58.

26 See my two studies "Ultimate Symmetry" and "'We' and Empedocles' Cosmic Lottery" for my general case for this interpretation, with more specific references given in the notes below.

27 Though the first principles are subject to change of a superficial sort, as B 17.9–13 (=B 26.8–12) show.

28 For full discussion of the text, see 1) M-P 175–179 and 2) my alternate proposals in "'We' and Empedocles' Cosmic Lottery," which are summarized in the appendix. At **a** (i) 6, I follow the corrections at the second hand, and read συνερχό]μεν' *coming together*, 21–4. The second line relates undoubtedly to Strife.

29 See note 3, above.

30 This has been advanced by M-P 62 on the basis of their text of the papyrus, where they read συνερχό]μεθ' *we come together* at **a** (i) 6, over the correction of the second hand, and εἰση]ρ̣χόμεθ' *we were coming together to*, **a** (ii) 17, which was not corrected by the second hand. In both cases, they indentify the subject of these lines, the "we," with the transmigrating *daimon*(*es*) of B 115, which in turn they wish to identify with particles of Love. Previously the identification of the *daimon* as a fragment of Love had been advanced by F. M. Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy* (London, 1912), 224–242; Kahn (1960), 2nd ed., with *retractiones* (1971) 3–38; and O'Brien, *ECC* 325–335 and (1995) 442–3. O'Brien, however, there recommends the view much more tentatively than Cornford and Kahn. So far, against the philological soundness of M-P's reconstruction of the new material, there is my own "'We' and Empe-

docles' Cosmic Lottery" and J. Mansfeld and K. Algra, "Three *Thêtas* in the 'Empédocle de Strasbourg,'" *Mnemosyne* 54 (2001), 78–84. Osborne (2000) is also quite skeptical, 344–49, as is S. Mace, *Classical World* 95.2 (2002) 195–7. In support of the "we" there is B. Inwood, *Classical Review* 50 (2000) 5–7; and A. Laks (2002) who does not, however, endorse M-P's understanding of its doctrinal implications. M. L. Gemelli Marciano, *Gnomon* 72 (2000), 389–400, does not take a side. Beyond the internal evidence against it given above, I note that its total absence from the doxography renders it highly suspect. In particular Diogenes of Oenoanda's criticism of metempsychosis, see Inwood *Poem* # A 98, would seem pointless if Empedocles had in fact identified the *daimon* with the eternal first-principle Love.

31 252.

32 The fact that in B 146.3 the epithet *long-lived* is dropped to allow space for the verb *sprout up* should not encourage taking this as a reference to immortal as opposed to long-lived gods. If the passage did occur towards the end of the work, the kind of god meant will have been understood. More problematic is the probable link of this passage with B 147, with its description of the new gods sharing hearth and table with *other immortals* as well as their description as ἀτειρεῖς, which ranges in meaning from *indestructible* (or, at least, as strong as bronze or iron) to *unwearied*. Both are hard to square with Empedocles' conception of a god as limbless being of pure thought, as in B 134. Perhaps one could claim that the picture owes more the epic tradition than anything else; see Wright 292 and Zuntz 268 for epic parallels. More certainly, I think that these passages imply a community of long-lived gods, concurrently with the present world, to which Empedocles claimed to belong, or to be in the process of rejoining. These, of course, are not to be identified with the *Sphairos* god, when all is one and plurality abolished.

33 Again, space does not allow for full study of the term here, but even in Empedocles, it seems also capable of taking on much more prosaic meanings, as at B 59. On the term's cultural background, with bibliography, W. Burkert, *Greek Religion* (Cambridge, MA; 1985) 179–181. For an outline of the term's later philosophical career, see I. Kidd, "Some Philosophical Demons," *Bulletin of the Insitute of Classical Studies* (1995) 217–224, who remarks, p. 218: "In fact one of the main characteristics of daimon is its vagueness—which is what made it so useful."

34 Kahn (1979) 87 ff. As Kahn himself states, even if he is wrong, the plurality of fragments on the same themes means that there was obviously some sort of correlation or resonance intended between them. In *Plato and the Socratic Dialogue* (Cambridge, 1996), Kahn deploys upon the Platonic corpus as a whole many of the same interpretive strategies as in his book on Heraclitus. It is to that earlier work that my own approach to Empedocles is most indebted.

35 A. Lebeck, *The Oresteia: A Study in Language and Structure* (Washington, 1971), p. 1. However, as pointed out to me by Prof. A. Dyck, it does seem to have a clear predecessor in E. Fränkel's term "*guttatim* style" in his commentary on the *Agammenon* (Oxford, 1950), commentary to line 2 and 387 ff.

36 Reviewed in Gale (1994), chapters 1 and 2.

37 We do have some examples of direct approaches. The opening fragments of Anaxagoras (DK 59 B1), Ion of Chios (DK 36 B1), Philolaus (DK 44 B1), and perhaps Melissus (DK 30 B1) all begin abruptly with unqualified, universal assertions about the nature of universe.

38 Litt. *some wonderful happiness*, εὐδαιμονίαν τινὰ θαυμαστὴν.

39 ἐριστικοί, i.e. people who are fond, or overly fond, of disputes and argumentation.

40 30.10–31.10, ed. H. S. Macran, (Oxford, 1902), translation my own.

41 In particular *Republic* 531d–534e, 537c. For discussion, J. D. G. Evans, *Aristotle's Concept of Dialectic* (Cambridge, 1977) chapter 2.

42 For a recent discussion, J. Warren, "Epicurean Immortality," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 18 (summer 2000), 231–261.

43 *Theaetetus* 176b; on which, see D. Sedley, "The Ideal of Godlikeness," in G. Fine, ed., *Plato 2: Ethics, Politics, Religion, and the Soul* (Oxford, 1999), 309–328. The whole of the *Phaedo* is also relevant here, and *Symposium* 212a7; on the latter, see M. J. O'Brien, "Becoming Immortal in Plato's Symposium," *Greek Poetry and Philosophy: Studies in Honor of Leonard Woodbury*, ed. D. E. Gerber, (Chico, 1984), 185–205. Another question, which Plato addresses more clearly than Empedocles did, so far as we can tell, is to *what type* of divinity one should seek assimilation. Plato's extant distinctions between kinds of gods allows for more flexibility here. On the goals of human life in relation to the individual, see Sedley in Fine, ed. (1999); on the different types of divinities in Plato's theology, see W. J. Verdenius "Platons Gottesbegriff," *La Notion du divin depuis Homère jusqu'à Platon* (Vandoeuvres, 1954), 271–83.

44 The myth of the *Phaedrus* 248 a ff. obviously takes some of its inspiration from B 115, so much so that DK prints it in section C under the heading *Anklang*. Much later, both Plotinus and Porphyry quote Empedocles, B 120, and take the reference to a cave as meaning our present world. This does not prove that that passage was the source for Plato's allegory in *Republic* 7, but certainly raises the possibility, see the bibliography in Wright 280. It is in any case well established that Middle and Neoplatonic authors frequently grouped Empedocles and Heraclitus together as Plato's intellectual forebears, see Burkert (1975).

45 Unless we wish to consider as well Parmenides' account in the Way of Seeming, DK 28 B 16. I prefer to discount Parmenides' own commitment to the theory, as undermined by the Way of Truth. Empedocles' theory, at any rate, is very similar, and expounded at greater length.

[46] With the exception of the account of the soul in *Timaeus* 27a–47e, on which see Sedley in Fine ed. (1999). On Plato's different types of explanation in that work, S. K. Strange, "The Double Explanation in the *Timaeus*," *Ancient Philosophy* 5 (1985) 25–39, repr. in Fine ed., vol. 1 (1999), 397–415.

[47] For a fuller account, Guthrie, *HGP* II, 160 ff. and 211 ff. and A. A. Long (1966).

[48] This is different than saying that an inanimate object or phenomena can have an intelligible structure or function. Empedocles in the passages cited speaks of the elements as actively learning.

[49] This is particularly conspicuous when he describes the activities of Love as a divine craftsman. In those instances, as in his descriptions of breathing, B 100, and the eye, B 84 the elements are treated mostly as materials, not as sentient beings.

[50] Cf. Aristotle's criticisms at *De gen. et corr.*, 333b 4 ff. For a good contemporary exploration of this question, A. Mourelatos, "Quality, Structure, and Emergence in Later Pre-Socratic Philosophy," *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* 2 (1987), 127–145. But Mourelatos' proposed solution to the problem of emergence in Empedocles, a hypothetical reconstruction of a mechanical account based on pores, 172 ff., goes far beyond the evidence, direct or indirect.

[51] While Empedocles excludes the emergence of primary properties, e.g. hard, bright, wet, by simply invoking their latent presence (B 22), he cannot do the same for the emergence of bodily structures and their attendant faculties. Instead, differences of structure are described as Love's handiwork, at most exploiting the innate properties of the elements, rather than derived from the internal properties of the elements alone. Perception and thought, however, *are* assumed from the outset, something we are bound to find very problematic.

[52] D. Sedley, "Empedocles' Theory of Vision and Theophrastus' *De sensibus*," in W. W. Fortenbaugh and D. Gutas, eds., *Theophrastus. His Psychological, Doxographical and Scientific Writings*, (London, 1992) 20–31.

[53] J. Cooper, "Aristotle on Natural Teleology," in *Language and Logos: Studies in Ancient Greek Philosophy Presented to G. E. L. Owens* (Cambridge, 1982), 197–222, pp. 212–3 well describes Aristotle's different starting-point: ". . . Aristotle plausibly argued there was reason to believe that this is how things [biological processes] *always* have been and *always* will be. . . . In other words: *if* one is determined to treat these regularities as a fact of nature, and they cannot be derived from other natural principles, one must take them as expressing a natural principle all their own."

[54] Organic compounds: B 96, 97, 98. Thought and cognition: B 105 to 110 and Theophrastus, *De sensibus*, chapters 7 to 24.

[55] *De partibus animalium*, 642a 17; *De anima*, 410a 1

[56] E.g. B 17.14 μάθη γὰρ τοι φρένας αὔξει, *for learning increases the 'phrenes'*; B 106, πρὸς παρεὸν γὰρ μῆτις ἀέξεται ἀνθρώποισιν, *for in men intelligence is increased according to what is available.* B 4.2, moreover, talks of *digesting logos*; on B 110, see discussion below. One is reminded of Democritus's δόξις ἐπιρυσμίη, *belief is a reshaping* (sc. of atoms) DK 68 B7, although both thinkers, perhaps Empedocles more than Democritus, do not allow that this recognition of change in the thinker completely disallows the possibility of ever attaining some permanent knowledge.

[57] Compare the similar sentiment at *Republic* 500c–d: "someone whose mind is really fixed on reality . . . makes this realm the model for his behavior, and assimilates himself to it as much as possible." (transl. Waterfield)

[58] The passage is well analyzed in J. M. E. Moravcsik, "Reason and Eros in the 'Ascent' Passage of the *Symposium*," in J. P. Anton and G. L. Kustas, eds., *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy* (1972), 285–302.

[59] Trans. Jowett, with alterations.

[60] In order to underline the significance of the forms, their first apprehension must be distinguished from the other steps of the ascent, even though that last step need not represent a greater intellectual leap than any of the previous strides. A similar effect occurs in this same dialogue, where Plato deliberately holds back on the term immortal, ἀθάνατος, in the *Phaedo* the property of soul in general, which is only granted to the philosopher at 212a; see M. O'Brien (1984) 196 ff.

[61] Heraclitus may have been more influential than we can show conclusively, if Kahn's reconstruction (1979), or at least its basic working assumption, is correct. However, the closest examples of *intact* philosophical works with a similar proleptic literary structure remain those of Plato.

[62] This is the main objective of Kahn's book (1996).

[63] Here I follow C. Kahn, "Proleptic Composition in the *Republic* or Why Book 1 Was Never a Separate Dialogue," CQ N.S. 43 (1993), 131–142.

[64] Kahn (1993) 139.

[65] Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα εἰπὼν ᾤμην λόγου ἀπηλλάχθαι· τὸ δ' ἦν, ὡς ἔοικε, προοίμιον (357a).

[66] Proclus, *Comm. in Timaeus*, 29c, p. 351 Diel.

[67] See chapter I, section 3 and chapter II, section 2.

[68] M. Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philospby* (Cambridge, 1986), part II.

[69] Kahn (1993), comparing the proleptic structure of the *Republic* to the educational curriculum advanced in that same work, concludes, p. 142: "The pedagogical strategy of Plato's educational scheme is thus the same as his artistic technique of proleptic composition: to prepare the mind by pre-theoretical images and patterns, before it is in a position to grasp the theory (πρὶν λόγον

δυνατὸς εἶναι λαβεῖν 402a2), so that when in the central books the doctrine finally comes, the soul of Plato's reader, like that of his guardian in training, will recognize the truth as something already familiar, congenial, and hence utterly convincing."

70 Most recent assessments in A. Chitwood, "The Death of Empedocles," *American Journal of Philology* 107 (1986), 175–191. R. Goulet, in *Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques*, is rightly critical of Chitwood's attempt to relate the whole of the biographical tradition to the work alone, vol. iii (2000) 77: "Les légendes ont besoin d'un noyeau biographique: il n'y a pas de légendes de parfaits inconnus."

71 For a similar and penetrating discussion of similar problems in the *Republic*, M. Burnyeat, "Utopia and Fantasy: The Practicability of Plato's Ideally Just City," G. Fine ed., vol ii (1999) 297–308.

72 *Op. cit.*, 292: "It [Eros] 'keeps the mind restless's by forming negative attitudes towards objects on a plane which has been fully explored already, and creating the need and motive for further exploration."

73 C. H. Kahn (1996).

74 Still basic, with a survey of the background, is W. Jaeger, *Aristotle*, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1948) 54 ff. More recent bibliography in J. Barnes ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle* (Cambridge, 1995) 305 ff.

75 No fifth-century example is extant, but Plato gives us a notion of the type at *Euthydemus* 278e–282, as do fourth-century examples from Isocrates, *To Demonicus* and *To Nicocles*.

76 B 7.3–6, quoted in chapter II, note 73. On the translation "testing," rather than the more technical "refutation," see J. Lesher "Parmenides' Critique of Thinking: The *poluderis elenchos* of Fragment 7," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 2 (1984), 1–30.

77 Following Mourelatos (1970) 222 ff.

78 If, on one reading of the Way of Truth, the only reality is the Sphere, which disallows any truth to the cosmology of the Way of Seeming, then the proem seems, to me at least, necessarily to stand at an even greater remove from the one reality of the Sphere: it is even more "unreal" than the physics of the cosmology, a veritable "shadow's dream"; see chapter IV, section 3.

79 Survey, with bibliography, in Gale (1994), chapter 6.

80 Cf. notably *Parmenides* 128a, *Theatetus* 180d, *Sophist* 242c–245e. For fullest collection of testimonia, see Coxon (1986).

81 The end of the papyrus **a (ii) 21–30** records a transition to proofs or demonstrations, while Simplicius provides us with the relative order of a number of further fragments for book I; see table I and my discussion below.

82 For surveys, S. Usher, *Greek Oratory, Tradition, and Originality* (Oxford, 1999), 2–4; G. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton, 1963), 58–61.

83 Diogenes Laertius, VIII 57–59, where he quotes Satyrus as his source, and where Satyrus (58) specifically describes Empedocles as an excellent public speaker.

84 Diogenes Laertius, VIII 57. The satirical poem of Timon at Diogenes VIII 67 may also connect Empedocles with public speaking and epic: καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἀγοραίων / ληκητὴς ἐπέων, *and Empedocles, bawler of public speeches* (but perhaps ἀγοραῖος here only means *vulgar*). Contemporary links between rhetoric and natural science, medicine in particular, are explored by G. E. R. Lloyd (1979) 86 ff.

85 Usher, (1999) 22: "The only general doctrine that seems to have governed oratorical composition from its beginnings is that of *division*. The Sicilian pioneers taught that a speech should have a prooemium, a central section containing the case proper as argued by either side (the *agon*-'contest'), and an epilogue."

86 Compare the following advice from Cicero's *De Inventione* I, 23, discussing the content of a proem: Attentos autem faciemus, si demonstrabimus ea quae dicturi erimus, magna, nova, incredibilia esse, et aut ad omnes aut ad eos qui audient aut ad aliquos inlustres homines aut ad deos inmortales aut ad summam rem publicam pertinere . . . *We will make the hearers attentive if we show that the things we are about to say are important, new, astounding, and are of relevance either to all, or to the audience, or [pertain] to famous men, the immortal gods, or to the highest matters of state . . .*

87 e.g. the *Republic*, or the *Gorgias*.

88 Despite Kingsley (1995) 365: "the notion of Empedocles beginning a poem with a public address to the people of Acragas . . . but then launching into an esoteric doctrine for a strictly limited audience is altogether implausible." To my mind, Kingsley overrates how esoterical the second part of the discourse was meant to be. At any rate, the initiatory sequence from mystery cults he invokes two pages later, *katharmos* (initiation), *paradosis* (instruction) and *epopteia* (overseeing) is preserved in my reconstruction. Thus, when he writes, 368: ". . . all the tangible signs simply serve to reinforce the conclusion that what Pausanias will hear will be a more advanced form of teaching than the one given to the people of Acragas," my only quarrel with his position is its continued assumption of two works.

89 On the Orphics and Pythagoreans as Greek "puritans," see E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and The Irrational*, chapter V. This distinction between the wider audience and "those in the know" would also explain the irony tinged with *Schadenfreude* in the double meanings of B 112, see note 23 above.

90 Translation loosely after M-P, with modifications.

91 For an attempt to further refine the outline of the work's contents into book II, see my "Ultimate Symmetry" 48–50. Beyond my suggestions there, which pertain mostly to the relation between certain passages and their putative chronological contexts in Empedoclean world-history, I note that other similar statements, such as found at B 20, B 76/*ensemble* **c** or *ensemble* **d 14** τῶν καὶ (?) ν]ῦν ἔτι λείψανα δέρκεται ἠώς, *of which traces now still see the light*, attest to further arguments and illustrations meant to convince the hearer of Empedoclean elemental physics, or illustrate some aspect of it.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

1 Except perhaps for lines B 17.1–13, on which see K. Reinhardt, *Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie* (Bonn, 1916) 51 ff. More recently, see F. Solmsen, "Eternal and Temporary Beings in Empedocles' Physical Poem," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 57 (1975), 123–145. For my own conclusions on these lines, see section 6) of this chapter. Beyond these lines however, there is no argumentative structure to the passage; contrast Parmenides' way of truth, B 8 with its program of signs at 8.2–4 and the following sequence of arguments in support of each sign.

2 Included at DK 31 A 25. Aristotle enjoins the student of rhetoric to avoid ambiguity, "unless one actually chooses the opposite [i.e. to speak in ambiguities], which is exactly what speakers do when they have nothing to say, but pretend that they do. For people of this type say such things in poetry, as does Empedocles. For his numerous repetitions (τὸ κύκλῳ πολὺ ὄν) dupe the audience, and they experience what commoners do when they listen to prophets."

3 One thinks also of B 4.3, where Empedocles talks of "digesting my account," and B 110, which also stresses internalization and meditation.

4 An excellent summary of the legacy of epic upon the Presocratics in G. Most, "The Poetics of Early Greek Philosophy," in Long, ed. (1999), 332–362. M. R. Wright, "Philosopher Poets: Parmenides and Empedocles," in C. Atherton, ed., *Form and Content in Didactic Poetry. Nottingham Classical Lecture Series*, vol. 5 (Bari, 1997), 1–22, provides a more narrow but helpful survey of Parmenides' and Empedocles' reuse of traditional epic forms.

5 So also for Parmenides Mourelatos (1970) 45–6. That is not to say, however, that the question why Empedocles or Parmenides wrote in verse is not significant or interesting, as indicative of the author's intentions for the work's reception and interpretation, see next note.

6 See C. Osborne, "Was Verse the Default Form for Presocratic Philosophy?," in C. Atherton, ed. (1997), 23–35, who goes too far however, in seeking to reverse the prejudice. My own preference is to avoid generalizations here. I think the question is best answered on a case-by-case basis.

7 Such traditions, I take it, would more likely be related to the explication of rituals, not secret philosophical doctrines. I for one would dispute the anachronistic claim that Empedocles was part of a tradition of explicit mysticism, that is, he consciously held that the highest truths or cognitive experiences were ineffable. A more helpful working definition of such esotericism is suggested by E. Hussey in "The Enigmas of Derveni," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 17 (1999), 303–323, p. 316. Hussey proposes recognizing at least three kinds of esotericism in Greek culture, one related to enigma and allusion in general (e.g. in oracles), one related to the doctrines of a school, and one related to the Mystery cults, only the third of which is properly to be associated with secret lore: "What goes naturally with the first two kinds of esotericism is not secrecy, but moral and intellectual elitism: those unable or unwilling to learn the valuable concealed truths are regarded as inferior in character and understanding. It is the second kind of esotericism, and the accompanying elitism, that is characteristic of many Presocratics." I agree.

8 This is the goal of Kingsley (1995), which according to the book jacket "is the first full-scale study of Empedocles to situate his fragmentary writings in their original context of philosophy as a way of life, of mystery religion and magic, and of the struggle to realize one's own divinity." But even at 390 pages, his book does not seem to me a full contextualization, but a selective and polemical interpretation.

9 Zuntz, while dated by now, is in my view still the clearest attempt to explore this background.

10 W. Kranz, *Empedokles. Antike Gestalt und romantische Neuschöpfung* (Zürich, 1949), 68.

11 On the early allegorical tradition, J. Tate, "On the History of Allegorism," *CQ* 28 (1934), 105–114, and F. Buffière, *Les Mythes d'Homère et la pensée grecque* (Paris, 1956).

12 One good example among many is an aside at *Metaphysics* 1000a24– 5: καὶ γὰρ ὅνπερ οἰηθείη λέγειν ἄν τις ὁμολογουμένως αὑτῷ,᾽Εμπεδοκλῆς, *for even he, whom one would especially expect to speak without contradicting himself, Empedocles, . . .*

13 For some helpful general reflections on this link, see I. Murdoch's *Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals* (London, 1992), chapter 1, "Conceptions of Unity. Art."

14 Most in Long, ed. (1999), describes well how expectations set by epic and poetry influenced the first philosophical works, and how the latter, in competing against the former for cultural supremacy, had to exploit common assumptions; see esp. 342–50.

15 My sympathies therefore are ultimately closer to the supracelestial approach, but hopefully less crudely anachronistic. B. Williams, in the preface to his study of Descartes, *Descartes, The Project of Pure Enquiry* (London, 1978), offers a concise defense of this mixed approach, p. 9: "The history of philosophy of course has to constitute its object, the work, in genuinely historical terms, yet there is a cut-off point, where authenticity is replaced as the objective by the aim of articulating philosophical ideas."

16 For general discussion, see Burkert (1985) 276 ff. A selection of more recent bibliographical references are listed below.

17 E.g. Ion of Chios speculated that Pythagoras had written the Orphic poems (DK 36 B 2); Herodotus, II 81, claims that Bacchic cult and Orphism are really Pythagorean, and thus in fact Egyptian.

18 On Orphism a recent general survey is: L. Brisson, *Orphée et l'Orphisme dans l'antiquité gréco-romaine* (Paris, 1995); for a short but excellent survey of early Orphism, R. Parker, "Early Orphism," in A. Powell, ed., *The Greek World* (London, 1995), 483–510.

19 Most recently, G. Most and A. Laks, eds., *Studies in the Derveni Papyrus* (Oxford, 1997), provides a full bibliography. On the tradition of Orphic poetry, the basic collection is still O. Kern, *Orphicorum Fragmenta* (Berlin, 1922), and recent scholarship starts with M. L. West, *The Orphic Poems* (Oxford, 1983), an important but controversial work; Parker (1995) 484–96 gives a more balanced survey of the topic, while Janko (1997) studies the history of early Greek theology and the mentality of the commentator.

20 For discussion of the original publication, see West (1983) 17–18.

21 Parker (1995) 485.

22 W. Burkert's masterpiece, *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism* (Cambridge, Mass; 1972) is fundamental; shorter accounts in C. H. Kahn, "Pythagorean Philosophy before Plato" in Mourelatos, ed. (1993), 161–185 and KRS, where much useful information is collected in a dense but penetrating survey. Most recently, see C. A. Huffman, "The Pythagorean Tradition," in Long, ed. (1999), 66–87 and C. H. Kahn, *Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans: A Brief History* (Indianapolis, 2001).

23 An older but sound attempt is Kahn (1974), in Mourelatos, ed. (1993), esp. 180–185. On Philolaus, see now C. A. Huffman, *Philolaus of Kroton, Pythagorean and Presocratic: A Commentary on the Fragments and Testimonia with Interpretive Essays* (Cambridge, 1993).

24 Explicitly so in Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* IX 126–30. As early as Alcidamas, (*apud* Diogenes Laertius, VIII 56) Empedocles is made a pupil of Pythagoras, whereas the traditional dates of his life, relying on Apollodorus and Aristotle, suggest approximately 490–430; see chapter I and R. Goulet (2000) 73–76.

25 See treatments in M. P. Nilsson *Geschichte der griechischen Religion*, 3rd, ed., vol. i (Munich. 1967), and Burkert (1985). More recent surveys, with accompanying bibliographies, are available in recent reference works, the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (Oxford, 1996) and *Der Neue Pauly*, vol. iii (Stuttgart, 1998).

26 For the best attempt so far to distinguish these traditions, W. Burkert, "Craft Versus Sect: The Problem of Orphics and Pythagoreans," in B. E. Meyer and E. P. Sanders, eds., *Jewish and Christian Self-Definition, vol. III: Self-Definition in the Greco-Roman World* (Philadelphia, 1983), 1–22. The adoption of a specific way of life, in conscious deviation from the norms of the *polis*, is most keenly present in Pythagoreanism, and fades away the closer one gets to Bacchic cult, with Orphism somewhere in between. It is not therefore characteristic of all three.

27 It may be excessive to infer from the *Iliad* a general absence of belief in the possibility of divinization among the earlier Greeks. While it undoubtedly presents the bleakest picture in epic of the fate of men, upholding the impassable gap between men and gods more stringently than the other poems, this may be a peculiarity of that work, and not representative of the whole tradition. For a defense of the traditional interpretation, C. Sourvinou-Inwood, *Reading Greek Death* (Oxford, 1995), 32–106.

28 Euripides, fr. 638 Nauck^2 (= *Gorgias* 492e): τίς δ' οἶδεν, εἰ τὸ ζῆν μέν ἐστι κατθανεῖν/ τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν; *Who knows if to be alive is really to have died, and to have died to live?* Compare also *Phaedo* 107c1–5.

29 For a comprehensive review, Zuntz is still fundamental, if now somewhat dated, and includes much archeological evidence which space precludes from consideration.

30 On Pindar's *Second Olympian Ode*, see in particular H. Lloyd-Jones, "Pindar and the Afterlife," in Vandoeuvres *Pindare* (1985), 245–83; L. Woodbury, "Equinox at Acragas," *TAPA* 97 (1966), 597–616.

31 Zuntz, part III: *The Gold Leaves*. The oldest are printed in DK 1 B 17–20.

32 R. Janko, "Forgetfulness in the Golden Tablets of Memory," *CQ* N.S. 34 (1984), 89–100 gives a reconstruction of the archetype of Zuntz's B series based on the Hipponion tablet, *SEG* 1976 # 1139.

33 *Editio princeps* in Tsantsanoglou and Parassoglou, "Two Gold Lamellae from Thessaly," *Hellenika* 38 (1987), 3–16.

34 F. Graf, "Dionysian and Orphic Eschatology: New Texts and Old Questions," in T. H. Carpenter and C. A. Faraone, eds., *The Masks of Dionysus* (Cornell, 1993), 239–258.

35 = Janko (1984) 20–21: καὶ δὴ καὶ σὺ πιὼν ὁδὸν ἔρχεαι, ἥν τε καὶ ἄλλοι /μύσται καὶ βάκχοι ἱερὴν στείχουσι κλεεινοί.

36 The myth is known from Plutarch, *De esu carnium* I 996 c and Neoplatonist commentators on the *Phaedo*, Olympiodorus, *in Phd* I 3, p. 41 Westerink, but also alluded to by Xenocrates in the fourth century, fr. 219 Isnardi Parente. For discussion, see Parker (1995) 494–8.

37 I have not been able to see the two new texts published by P. Chrysostomou, "Η Θεσσαλική θέα Εν(ν)οδία. Η Φεραία θέα. Diss. (Thessaloniki, 1991) = SEG XLIV 750

38 The chronology of Pindar's works is still that of Wilamowitz in *Pindaros* (Berlin, 1922).

[39] Line 4 has a doublet καὶ ἀθάνατοι θεοὶ ἄλλοι] ἀστεροβλῆτα κεραυνῶι

[40] Zuntz 336 with bibliography.

[41] Lloyd Jones (1985) 259: "Pindar avoids the crudity of claiming directly that Theron is likely after death to share the bliss of Peleus, Kadmos and Achilles; yet the whole burden of the poem suggests that after the many hardships of a noble and generous life he is worthy to be granted no ordinary reward." In this respect, a more direct comparison to gods, albeit of minor status, is perhaps to be understood by hindsight in the apotheoses of Semele and Ino at the opening of the ode. This, incidentally, as Prof. E. Robbins has kindly pointed out to me, presents a problem for the Bacchic-Orphic interpretation of this background, since Pindar at line 26 of the same ode explicitly names Semele as the mother of Dionysus, rather than Persephone.

[42] Remembering their past lives at this junction would seem of little help, and the B series does not mention reincarnation.

[43] Zuntz 364–7 reviews various mythological and more scientific explanations, and argues that the second line, with its insistence on Heaven, is a latter addition. More helpfully, R. Merkelbach has shown a number of striking parallels between the archetype of the B tablets and the *Egyptian Book of the Dead*, "Die Goldenen Totenpässe: Ägyptisches, Orphisch, Bakchisch," *ZPE* 128 (1999), 1–13.

[44] A. W. H. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility* (Oxford, 1960), 147: "The crude belief in formal initiation as a ticket to Bliss, non-initiation as a ticket to Mud, is of course not moral at all . . ."

[45] Zuntz does not make the claim that his Pythagoreans do not resort to mythological or narrative accounts, although he does arbitrarily suppose they did not go to the same lengths "in abstruse theological speculation," p. 318. In any case, the very badly preserved C tablet, which was found with tablet A4 in the *Timpone Grande*, contains a reference to *Protogonus* and other divinities, and is quite probably a garbled extract from an Orphic hymn.

[46] Epigenes, perhaps as early as the fourth century, claims that Pythagoreans wrote and interpreted Orphic poems, and offers a list of such poems, including some assigned to specific Pythagoreans, see Kern, *OF*, testimonium # 222.

[47] II 81. This may be a prejudice on Herodotus' part. Since he took these doctrines to have originated in Egypt, cf. II. 124, he may have supposed that Pythagoras, said to have sojourned in Egypt, was the conduit. See Burkert (1972) 127–130 for discussion, and now Merkelbach (1999).

[48] For a survey of the wide cultural dissemination of these ideas, including some possible thematic influence upon the *Prometheus Bound*, see Seaford (1986).

[49] II 123.2. But one which does not end with an apotheosis: after a three-thousand year cycle, during which the soul inhabits or becomes, respectively, a land creature, a sea animal and a winged creature, it then finds its way back into a man.

[50] This fits well with the tradition according to which "the house of Pythagoras" in Kroton was a temple to Demeter, the earth-mother. For sources, see Burkert (1969) 26 ff.

[51] (1983) pp. 220, 237–8.

[52] C. Riedweg, "Orphisches bei Empedokles," *Antike und Abendland* 41 (1995), 34–59, p. 59.

[53] Then again, Riedweg, it seems to me at least, glosses over a number of significant differences between Empedocles and "Orphism." In the first place, Empedocles never refers to Orpheus as an authority and does not invoke the myth of Dionysus' dismemberment to account for his fall. Its explanation is related to Strife, and grounded in cosmology, or rather the decree of Necessity, which also regulates the cosmic cycle. As a general rule, Empedocles does not rely *directly* on mythology or theological speculation, even though he does rely upon it *implicitly* to a great extent, as part of his own intellectual conservatism.

[54] Diogenes Laertius IX, 21–3; see discussion in Burkert (1969).

[55] 44 "Besonders der Vergleich mit einem von Platon im Menon zitierten Pindarfragment [#133, Snell Mahler] läßt darauf schließen, daß Empedokles in diesem Punkt wohl tatsächlich primär von der Orphik angeregt war." See also his note 62, p. 44, devoted to refuting Empedocles' possible links with Pythagoreanism. While Riedweg there refers to modern works that do consider B 129, he does not even mention it.

[56] *Vita Pythagorae* 88, 150, 255.

[57] Silence as a sign of intense emotion is of course a possibility, and has precedents in epic and drama; see *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (1996) under the entry "silence" for some examples. But once again this seems more appropriate for Pythagoras than Parmenides.

[58] Discussion in Burkert (1972) 135 and 166 ff. The *acousmata* were written down at the latest towards the end of the fifth century: the *Suda* tells us, s.v. that *Anaximader of Miletus* (the younger) wrote an *Explanation of Pythagorean Symbola*. From Xenophon, who mentions him at *Symposium* 3.6 along with Stesimbrotus, we can speculate upon a date in the late fifth century. On this whole milieu, see now Janko (1997).

[59] Other possible links are the catalogue of opposites in fragments DK B 122–123, which recalls the Pythagorean tables of opposites in Aristotle at *Met.* 986a22 ff., and the curious account of the sun as in fact a reflection, which is very close to Philolaus' doctrine of central fire. For literary sources and discussion of the latter, see Guthrie *HGP* II, 192–193.

[60] Bollack, in his Empedocles article in the *Encyclopédie Universalis* (1993) writes: "l'une de ses deux oeuvres, celle que précisément il avait écrite pour le peuple, les *Catharmes* (les *Purifications*). De cette épopée il reste moins de fragments encore que de l'oeuvre ésotérique sur la nature des choses . . ." See

also Kingsley (1995) 365, quoted in chapter III, note 88, and Kingsley (1995) 369.

61 So Kingsley (1995) 369.

62 A curt but effective rebuttal of this view in G. Vlastos, *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher* (Ithaca, 1991), 156–78.

63 Parker (1995) 500–501.

64 E. Vermeule, *Aspects of Death in Early Greek Art and Poetry* (Berkeley, 1979), 118.

65 Wright 22: "In calling his roots by divine names Empedocles is showing that they are the new gods; he sets them up as worthy, because of their eternal and unchanging nature, of the respect and wonder with which the Olympians were traditionally viewed." The interpretation of B 6 was disputed among the ancients; the relevant material is assembled at DK A 33. See Wright, p. 23, and more recently P. Kingsley, "Empedocles and His Interpreters: The Four-Element Doxography," *Phronesis* 39 (1994), 235–54, with a reply from J. Mansfeld, "Critical Note: Empedocles and His Interpreters," *Phronesis* 40 (1995), 109–115.

66 Of his single supreme god, Xenophanes asserted that he was in no way similar to mortals, DK 21 B23, which is taken up in many ways by later theological thinkers, especially the Stoics; see Philodemus, *On Piety*, Part II, *Pherc.*1428 cols 11.7–15, Obbink.

67 See section 5 of this chapter.

68 Cf. Plutarch, *De Iside et Osiride* 361c. Hippolytus, *Ref.* I 1.3.1, introducing B 117, is also relevant: Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δὲ...καὶ περὶ δαιμόνων εἶπε πολλὰ, ὡς ἀναστρέφονται διοικοῦντες τὰ κατὰ τὴν γῆν ὄντες πλεῖστοι . . . *Empedocles also said a lot about daimones, how they are sent back* (from heaven?) *and are very numerous in the regions about the earth*. In what follows immediately, however, Hippolytus foists on Empedocles doxographic material of obviously Stoic and Heraclitean extraction, so that the accuracy of the passage is uncertain; see Mansfeld (1992) 229–30 for criticisms.

69 See my "Ultimate Symmetry" for my views on the cycle. There is perhaps some link between this notion and the mythical statement in Plato, at *Phaedrus* 248e, that all souls grow back their wings after 10,000 years: in both cases, regardless of where one ends up, the game begins anew after a very large but fixed amount of time.

70 Inwood, *Poem* 56 ff.

71 The assumption that they all knew his poem I take as uncontroversial, in particular for Empedocles, cf. B 8–15 and B 17.26.

72 My account follows what has been called the current consensus, although it is not at all unanimous. For a recent account, with a recent selective bibliography, see D. Sedley, "Parmenides and Melissus," in Long, ed. (1999), 113–133. A fuller recent bibliography is in P. Curd, *The Legacy of Parmenides* (Princeton, 1998). Less recent, but still a sound survey, is D. Gallop, *Parmenides of Elea* (Toronto, 1984). The best critical text is now A. H. Coxon, (1986), whom I mostly follow over DK. For a good methodologically oriented survey of earlier interpretations, see A. Mourelatos, "Some Alternatives in Interpreting Parmenides," *The Monist* 62 (1979), 3–14. Mourelatos there singles out two studies as the most influential in establishing what he identifies as the consensus at the time, G. E. L. Owen's "Eleatic Questions," reprinted in Furley and Allen, eds. (1975), vol. ii, 48–81, and M. Furth, "Elements of Eleatic Ontology," in Mourelatos, ed. (1993), 241–270.

73 The correct implication of the motif, as clarified by D. Furley "Notes on Parmenides" in E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos, R. M. Rorty, eds. (New York, 1973), 1–14, is that of a journey to "the meeting place, where opposites are undivided" (p. 4), against earlier readings which characterized the journey as one of illumination, from darkness into light. See also Burkert (1969) 15–16. C. H. Kahn, however, in the concluding note to his "Parmenides and Plato" in Caston and Graham, eds. (2002), 81–93, questions this new consensus, in favor of the older one.

74 On the proem and its relation to epic, most noteworthy are H. Fränkel "Studies in Parmenides," Allen and Furley, eds., vol ii (1975), 1–47 and Mourelatos (1970) 1–46. On the religious background and relations to Pythagoreanism and beyond, Burkert (1969).

75 Text and translation after Coxon (1986).

76 For a more subtle and fully articulated account of this criticism, see A. Mourelatos, "Heraclitus, Parmenides and the Naïve Metaphysics of Things" in E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos, R. M. Rorty, eds. (1973), 16–48.

77 This position was Owen's main target in his "Eleatic Questions." A recent large-scale attempt of this type is Curd (1998); a shorter recent defense of the way of Seeming as a second-best, with some epistemic value, is J. H. Lesher, "Early Interest in Knowledge," in Long, ed. (1999), 225–249.

78 I translate following Furley (1973) 5–6.

79 Text and translation mostly after Coxon (1986), with some minor changes of my own. For line 54, see previous note; at 61, I prefer to follow DK and KRS, who take γνώμη in the nominative.

80 The interpretation of this line remains highly problematic; see Furley (1973) and L. Woodbury, "Parmenides on Naming by Mortal Men: Fr. B8.53–56," *Ancient Philosophy* 6 (1986) 1–13.

81 Yet again this appears to confirm Empedocles' willingness to match the authority of Parmenides' goddess. For in championing his views with the authority of a god, he is respecting the truth of this statement.

82 The classic study of this aspect is Mourelatos (1970) 222–263, reprinted with some small changes in Mourelatos, ed. (1993) 312–349.

83 See M. M. Mackenzie, "Parmenides' Dilemma," *Phronesis* 27 (1982), 1–12. Coxon's (1986) reading of the proem as allegorical seems correct enough, to a point, p. 15: "In any event it is clear that Parmenides' description of himself as drawn by sagacious mares guided by solar divinities is one of a piece with his later representation of the divine powers in the physical world; both are imaginative projections of phenomenal realities analyzable ultimately in terms of the two Forms light and night." The error in this, if my interpretation is correct, is that it fails to see how the rejection of the Way of Seeming carries with it a retroactive rejection of the proem.

84 The text printed by Coxon (1986) differs from DK in preferring the reading εὐπειθέος as applied to truth to the adjective εὐκυκλέος, although both have good manuscript support (see DK's apparatus). Diels preferred it as the *lectio difficilior* and because of its thematic anticipation of the comparison of reality to a sphere, but Coxon, p. 169, thinks that as such it goes too far in *identifying* reality with a spherical object.

85 See previous note.

86 p. 168. On such anatomical imagery generally, see R. B. Onians, *The Origins of European Though*, (Cambridge, 1951), now somewhat dated. More recently, R. Padel, *In and Out of the Mind: Greek Images of the Tragic Self* (Princeton, 1990) studies such imagery in tragedy.

87 See Coxon's (1986) extensive commentary on these lines, 234 ff. Although he argues for a position of the goddess as the most central of the mixed rings, I incline to follow Simplicius, who glosses the line as ἐν μέσῳ πάντων, *in Phys.* 29.5 Diels (in Arist. 184b15), but to explore this would require more space than can be allowed here.

88 Cf. most significantly the term ὁδὸν . . . δαίμονος at B 1.2–3, where the goddess must be the same as the *daimon* of B 13.

89 This difficulty need not prevent the frequent, and I think correct, comparison of Parmenides' journey to a *katabasis*. In such contexts the distance and inaccessibility of the underworld or "other world" are always more important than any precise direction. On this point, see Burkert (1969), who follows J. S. Morrisson, "Parmenides and Er," *JHS* 75 (1955), 59–68 in postulating a *katabasis*, but adds, p. 15: "Richtiger aber ist es, die Vertikale, das Oben und Unten überhaupt aus dem Spiel zu lassen. Das Jenseits ist in der wohl urtümlichsten Vorstellung weder oben noch unten, sonder einfach sehr, sehr weit entfernt." Against this, see Kahn (2002).

90 Discussion in Mansfeld (1994) 230–31.

91 M. Nussbaum, "Eleatic Conventionalism and Philolaus on the Conditions of Thought," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 83 (1979), 63–108, p. 86.

92 Guthrie in turn, *HGP* II p. 76 summarizes the impression we get from an earnest reading where the paradoxical rejection of mortal thought still has full sway: "It is hardly a criticism of Parmenides to say that in the very moment of discovery which changed the whole face of philosophy there was not also revealed to him a means of accounting for the false semblance of reality exhibited to mortals by the world of appearances, nor of bringing the two worlds into any logical relationship again without contravening the new and austere canons of thought which he himself had just laid down."

93 M. Furth, in the conclusion of his "Elements of Eleatic Ontology," in Mourelatos, ed. (1993), p. 268, answers the question "Did Parmenides believe the conclusions?" as follows: "My own groundless speculation is that he did, that his attitude toward his conclusion was belief in the sense that Hume's radical doubt was doubt, maintainable only (to his relief) in his study. Or perhaps he believed it all the time and was mad." But Furth, *ibid.*, also stresses the possibility of an elenctic goal for the poem.

94 Mourelatos (1970) 45: "Nor can we honestly read a message of 'salvation' in the poem. The imperatives . . . are all imperatives of mental activity. There is not the slightest indication that the imperatives bear on our βίος, or our πράττειν, our life-career."

95 L.Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* # 124. Wittgenstein is discussing language, not ethics, but see also # 77.

96 The systematic equivocation in the Way of Truth anticipates the later skeptical procedure of giving equal weight to two contradictories, and thus allowing us to achieve *epoche*, or suspension of judgment. This was well recognized by later skeptics, and Parmenides was claimed as a patron by Arcesilaus and Carneades; see Coxon, (1986) p. 33–4. The crucial distinction between Parmenides and the skeptics is Parmenides' commitment to Being as the exclusive and all-encompassing object of certain knowledge.

97 On the viability of the skepticism as a way of life in the ancient world, M. Burnyeat, "Can the Skeptic Live His Skepticism?," in M. Schofield, M. Burnyeat, and J. Barnes, eds., *Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies in Helenesitic Philosophy* (Oxford, 1980), 20–53.

98 Long (1996).

99 (1996) 137.

100 127: "I propose that Parmenides' first call on us is not to think about being, but *to think about thinking Being*. In modern jargon, Parmenides' project is a second-order inquiry. . . . He is investigating mind, from the starting-point that something is there—Being or truth—for mind to think."

101 For a rebuttal of the possibility that any ancient thinker could have been an idealist in the strict sense of holding that ultimately all is mind, M. Burnyeat "Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed," in G. Vesey, ed., *Idealism, Past and Present* (Cambridge, 1982), 19–50. Even the ancient Skeptics did not doubt the reality of the external world, only humanity's capacity to come to any irrevocable conclusions about it. Parmenides would not be a proto-idealist in the modern sense of holding that there is only

mind, but perhaps an incipient Platonist in implying that thought *on its own* is also a (form of) being.

[102] Note that Long (1996) 137, does not claim that the passive reading is impossible Greek, but that the sense of actively thinking something can also be had from the line. For comparison, we can consider Aeschylus, *Persae* 419, cited by Coxon (1986) p. 174, θάλασσα δ'οὐκέτ' ἦν ἰδεῖν, or Empedocles 21.3 ἠέλιον μὲν λευκὸν ὁρᾶν. In both those cases, grammar requires a passive verb, but the idiomatic active surely connotes that the action was rather considered active. If anything, that very tendency seems to underlie the idiom.

[103] See Long (1996) 132–140.

[104] Which does not exclude it having been a powerful or even indubitable assumption for Parmenides, as the historical component of Long's critique shows. Compare also Empedocles B 110.10 and my discussion above in chapter III, section 2.a.i on the difficulties with Empedocles' different version of the same assumption.

[105] p. 147.

[106] Mourelatos (1987) 127.

[107] 251a–259d.

[108] (1979). At. p. 87, she frames the debate in these terms: "But Parmenides justifies his bizarre conclusions only in the name of thought; the most appropriate opposition is, then, one which charges *him* with undermining thought. If Philolaus can successfully establish . . . a broader claim about the conditions of thought in general, he will have dealt a serious blow to Eleatic monism."

[109] (1987) 131–134.

[110] Hume, in subsection XII, 128 of *An Enquiry Concerning Human understanding*, ed. Nidditch (Oxford, 1975) long ago argued the point concerning skeptics.

[111] Vlastos made the point beautifully in "Parmenides' Theory of Knowledge," *TAPA* 77 (1946), 66–77, reprinted in *Studies in Greek Philosophy, vol .I*, Graham, ed. (Princeton 1993), 153–163, p. 158: "We are here face to face with the central paradox of Parmenides' theory of knowledge. The mortal frame, *qua* mortal, cannot think Being. Yet the "knowing man" can and does think it. Two radically different beings answer to the same name: the "wanderer" who thinks Becoming, and the "unshaken heart" that thinks Being. To resolve this paradox is impossible, for it is only the epistemological counterpart to the ontological dualism of Being and Becoming." Having made this point, in accordance with his own reading of the poem, which grants The Way of Seeming some degree of truth (this is the ontological dualism of which he speaks), Vlastos goes on to argue that while this dualism is not refuted, it is nevertheless mediated. On my reading, there is no such dualism: that is the poem's paradox.

[112] There is an ongoing ambiguity throughout the poem between the portrayal of Parmenides as actively achieving his insight (as charioteer, as "man who knows," as questing figure traversing a route) and as passive recipient of knowledge, led along by the daughters of the sun, instructed by the goddess, etc.

[113] See discussion in Mourelatos (1987).

[114] Parmenides thus seems simultaneously to court both extremes stigmatized by P. F. Strawson in *The Bounds of Sense* (London, 1966), 42: "In rejecting the senseless dogma that our conceptual scheme corresponds at no point with Reality, we must not embrace the restrictive dogma that Reality is completely comprehended by that scheme as it actually is."

[115] The topic has been discussed many times, and my own account is necessarily very short. Two good older treatments are Snell, "Human Knowledge and Divine Knowledge among the Early Greeks" chapter 7 of *Die Entdeckung des Geistes*, 3rd ed. (Hamburg, 1955), better known in English as *The Discovery of the Mind* (New York, 1960; Dover repr., New York, 1982); and K. von Fritz, "*Nous*, *Noein*, and Their Derivatives in Pre-Socratic Philosophy," in Mourelatos, ed. (1993), to which chapter VIII of Barnes (1982) is a good supplement. More recently, see also J. Lesher, "Early interest in Knowledge," and A. Laks, "Soul, Sensation, and Thought," respectively chapters 11 and 12 of Long, ed. (1999).

[116] The Muse: B 3.3; 4.2; 131.1; the gods: B 3.1. On himself as a god: B 112.4, and most clearly B 23.11: θεοῦ πάρα μῦθον ἀκούσας.

[117] The evidence for the pretensions of the early epic authors is concisely reviewed in chapter 1 of R. Lamberton, *Homer the Theologian: Neoplatonist Allegorical Reading and the Growth of the Epic Tradition* (Berkeley, 1986), 1–10.

[118] *Pythian* 1.41

[119] σοφὸς ὁ πολλὰ εἰδὼς φυᾷ· μαθόντες δὲ λάβροι/ παγγλωσσίᾳ κόρακες ὣς ἄκραντα γαρυέτων/Διὸς πρὸς ὄρνιχα θεῖον. On the passage's different interpretations, see recently G. W. Most, "Pindar O. 2.83–90," CQ, 36 N.S. (1986), 304–16.

[120] Most famously of course Pythian 8.95–6 σκιᾶς ὄναρ/ ἄνθρωπος.

[121] See C. H. Kahn, *Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology*, (New York, 1960; repr. Indianapolis, 1994), 156 ff., 200 ff. and 219–230. To the extent that this cosmic order is already present in Homer and especially in Hesiod, this is an oversimplification. It might be more accurate, without wanting to press historical claims too closely, that later Greek thinkers became more interested in questioning and filling out this background, and that this new background ultimately swamped the Homeric foreground.

[122] *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers* (Oxford, 1947); see also the short survey article by S. Broadie, "Rational Theology," in Long, ed. (1999), 205–224.

[123] The scanty evidence about the Milesians makes it impossible to discern the impact this revolution of the mind had within their own generation. The little

that can be intelligently said on this ill-documented topic is to be found in Jaeger (1947) 18–37. For the next generation, and later fifth-century discussion of the divine, see the material on the Derveni papyrus in Laks and Most, eds. (1997), and Janko (1997).

[124] e.g. Xenophanes, DK B 1.24; 11,14, 18, and especially 2. Heraclitus speaks of "the gods" at B 5, 24, 30, 53, 62(?), 83 (πρὸς θεόν, i.e. a god), 86, 93 (the god of Delphi), 94 (?).

[125] G. Vlastos (1991) 159, speaking of such rational theology, asks: "What room is there for god or gods in this new map of what there is? For supernatural gods there is none. For natural gods there is ample room—for gods existing not beyond nature, but in it."

[126] *Clouds* 828: Δῖνος βασιλεύει τὸν Δί' ἐξεληλακώς, which is of course a pun, playing off the resemblance between Δῖνος, the cosmic whirl, and the inflected forms of *Zeus*. On Anaxagoras's chronology, see D. O'Brien, "The Relation of Anaxagoras and Empedocles," *JHS*, 88 (1968), 93–113. The date of Anaxagoras' trial is argued at length by J. Mansfeld, "The Chronology of Anaxagoras's Athenian Period and the Date of His Trial," *Mnemosyne* 32 (1979), 39–69 and 33 (1980), 17–95, but his conclusion for a late dating of Anaxagoras's trial in 437/6 is a minority view; see rather L. Woodbury, "Anaxagoras and Athens," *Phoenix* 35 (1981), 295–315.

[127] So Barnes (1982) 138–140.

[128] *Xenophanes of Colophon* (Toronto, 1992), 159–169.

[129] As is clearly implied by Xenophanes himself at B 18. For more detail, see Lesher (1999) 225–6.

[130] B 50 is even more to the point: οὐκ ἐμοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας, *listening not to me, but to the logos*.

[131] H. Fränkel, "A Thought Pattern in Heraclitus," *American Journal of Philology* 59 (1938), 309–337, partially reprinted in Mourelatos, ed. (1993), 214–228.

[132] 10e1: "We agree that the holy is loved for this reason, that it is holy, but it is not holy because it is loved (sc. by the gods)."

[133] Kahn (1979) 20–23; and E. Hussey's treatment in "Heraclitus," in Long, ed. (1999), 88–112.

[134] Kahn (1979) 250–1

[135] Kahn (1979) 172, on B 41.

[136] See G. Vlastos in "Equality and Justice in Early Greek Cosmologies," *Classical Philology* 42 (1947), 156–178, repr. in Graham, ed. (1993). A fuller and sympathetic exploration of the many significant affinities between these two thinkers is found in the thoughtful, if idiosyncratic, study of Heraclitus by C. Ramnoux, *Héraclite ou L'homme entre les choses et les mots,* 2nd ed. (Paris, 1969).

[137] Mourelatos (1973) 47: "Parmenides,—for all his deductive rigor, his 'much contending ἔλεγχος,' and his assignment of startlingly unfamiliar attributes to the real—is a counterrevolutionary. His solution was to radicalize both the postulate of thinghood and the recognition of polarity: the definition of a real thing became decisively strict . . ."

[138] For a more comprehensive discussion, see Nussbaum (1979) 78.

[139] M. M. Mackenzie (1982) 1–3.

[140] In Long, ed. (1999), 113–133, p. 125.

[141] G. E. L. Owens, "Plato and Parmenides on the Timeless Present," in Mourelatos, ed. (1993), 271–292, p. 275.

[142] Hesiod, *Theogony* 27; Parmenides, B 8.60.

[143] Excellent discussion of this "peirastic" aspect of truth searching, involving scrutiny for "signs" of identity, in J. Lesher, "The Emergence of Philosophical Interest in Cognition," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 12 (1994), 1–34

[144] Mourelatos (1973) 42: "Parmenides insists on a radical κρίσις precisely because he thinks of the object of knowledge as a *thing* merely. . . . The negative route is banned not because of qualms about the status of non-existent things or non-existent states-of-affairs but because it is totally uninformative, 'a route from which no tidings ever come,' παναπευθέα (B 2.6). Contemporary philosophy is more inclined to recognize sense and reference as distinct and legitimate domains. For a critique of Mourelatos's approach, see R. Mason, "Parmenides and Language," *Ancient Philosophy* 8 (1988), 149–166.

[145] The correspondence theory of truth, beyond being that of Plato, Aristotle, Russell, and most non-philosophers, remains for all its possible faults the most intuitive. Plato's own use of it to further undermine Parmenides' thesis, by showing how it can account for the existence of falsehoods, is developed at *Sophist* 259d ff.

[146] The so-called gratuity or redundancy thesis, the notion that we generally mean what we say, so that to qualify any statement as true is, in most cases, redundant; it fails to add any significance to the statement.

[147] Discussion in P. F. Strawson, *Introduction to Logical Theory* (London, 1952), 15 ff.

[148] See Mourelatos, (1970) chapter 2, "Cognitive Quest and the Route," and Furth (1968), in Mourelatos, ed. (1993). For a survey, see again Mourelatos (1979), as well as Nussbaum (1979).

[149] J. Lesher "Parmenides' Critique of Thinking: The *poluderis elenchos* of Fragment 7," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 2 (1984), 1–30, provides a sound analysis of this theme as derived from chariot driving, p. 28: "In light of the many borrowings from the language of chariot driving and steering, the message embedded in Parmenides' poem would have been clear to his audience: right thinking requires both a correct choice of routes and a continuing

effort to stay on course. The *kouros* must take the advice of a trustworthy guide, follow the *semata* that mark the correct way, resist the pull of forces that would lead him to wander off, and avoid being overtaken from behind. In short, the moral of the story is that we must think always and only that it exists, never thinking that it is created, destroyed, divided, changing, moving or incomplete in any way, never allowing our thoughts to be influenced by how things appear or how we customarily think they are, nor being swayed by the current theories that implicitly reintroduce divisions and contradictions."

[150] As implied by the noun *krisis* B 8.15.

[151] This issue, then, or his failure to raise it, would be my only misgiving concerning Long's (1996) important paper.

[152] Owen, "Plato and Parmenides," in Mourelatos, ed. (1993), p. 276 writes: "In particular I suspect Parmenides saw the oddity of his own argument. For instead of representing the denial of birth and death and change as final conclusions, corollaries to be drawn from the thesis the X exists, he is careful to call these *signs on the way* to that conclusion (8.2–3). Destinations do not contain the signs that lead to them, and travelers at their destination have no use for the signs."

[153] (1999) p. 121.

[154] *Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy* (Oxford, 1975) p.105.

[155] For a fuller discussion of this and other similar cases, see C. J. Rowe, "Archaic Thought in Hesiod," *JHS*, 103 (1983), 124–135. His conclusion, in this connection, is not negative, but he finds, p. 134, that: "Hesiod is both capable of, and interested in, the business of comparing and contrasting rival accounts."

[156] On the history and theory of oppositions in Greek thought see G. E. R. Lloyd, *Polarity and Analogy* (Cambridge 1966), 86 ff.

[157] One could well apply to this trope Wittgenstein's famous remark about the legitimacy of discussing mental processes and states at *Philosophical Investigations*, # 308: "The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that we thought quite innocent."

[158] Nussbaum (1979) who at 87 ff. does a beautiful job of laying out the epistemological functions of Philolaus's ontology of limit, continuous and their various products.

[159] There are no obvious grounds for restricting the scope of the passage to sense-perception and Aristotle is not forcing a point when he quotes it at *Metaphys.* 1000b5 to illustrate the principle ἡ δὲ γνῶσις τοῦ ὁμοίου τῶι ὁμοίωι. Long (1966) 268 writes: ". . . there is no evidence that thinking depends on the data provided by the sense-organs and it seems unlikely that Empedocles saw any causal relation between sense-perception and thinking."

[160] Long (1966) 261, and most extensively Mourelatos (1987) 166 ff.

[161] 269: "σφε then, I suggest, does mean something like 'my teaching' or 'true statements about the world,' but this, like everything else, is conceived in physical terms."

[162] Cf. again B 103, and the correlation of change and learning in B 35. The passage, however, has some interesting applications beyond that. Most noteworthy is that the disciple's struggle to keep "these things" packed together, against their tendency to separate and seek their own kind, seems a microcosmic version of the cosmic battle of Love and Strife. The disciple, it seems, is being instructed to take on the role of Love in the cosmos, and to strive to hold together the "things" which will otherwise come under the influence of Strife, and fly away to seek their own kind.

[163] A. Finkelberg, "Xenophanes' Physics, Parmenides' Doxa and Empedocles' Theory of Cosmogonical Mixture," *Hermes* 125 (1997), 1–16.

[164] M. J. Edwards, "Being and Seeming: Empedocles' Reply," *Hermes* 119 (1991), 282–293, esp. 289 ff.

[165] Edwards (1991) 289–91.

[166] Text and translation after Coxon 5 (DK B 6).

[167] The fallen *daimon* as well, in the words of B 115.9, must *continuously alternate between the difficult paths of life*, ἀργαλέας βιότοιο μεταλλάσσοντα κελεύθους.

[168] DK 27a, probably a description of his god-sphere, οὐ στάσις ουδέ τε δῆρις ἀναίσιμος ἐν μελέεσιν; and as one of the personalized opposites in B 122, Δῆρις θ' αἱματόεσσα.

[169] As Aristotle saw, *Metaphysics* 985a 21–29. Mourelatos (1970) 177–8 also points out the analogy with Logical Atomism.

[170] Kahn (1979) 100, on Heraclitus B 1.

[171] See Long and Sedley (1987), vol. I # 52 and 55, with commentary. In physics and cosmology, these resemblances extend to a similar conception of time as cyclical, although there remain significant differences between Empedocles' cosmic cycle and the Stoic version; see my "'We' and Empedocles' Cosmic Lottery," 418–19.

[172] Contrast that with Empedocles' foolish mortals at B 11.3, who expect to die completely, to turn into nothing.

[173] Text and translation after Coxon #17 (B 16).

[174] The basic evidence is B 103 to 110 and Theophrastus, *De sens.* sections 7–24, reprinted in DK A 86. For discussion, Long (1966)

[175] G. Vlastos's interpretation in "Parmenides' Theory of Knowledge" (1946), emblematic of earlier approaches to the poem, was to suggest mortal thought could be transcended by increasing the ratio of light to night in one's constitution. Such a solution, however, depends upon an approach to the poem I think is now discredited, or at least a minority view, as argued above.

[176] These themes are most fully explored in H. T. A. Reiche, *Empedocles' Mixture, Eudoxan Astronomy, and Aristotle's Connate Pneuma* (Amsterdam, 1960) chapter III: "The Degree of Knowledge Corresponding the Hierarchy of Mixtures," 49–60, but his discussion is marred by a very difficult prose style and an over-use of technical jargon.

[177] Text after Wright # 1; line 3 after Inwood, *Poem* # 8. The meaning of line 3 is potentially obscure, but I suggest that Empedocles contrasts the eternal "life" of the elements with their short span in various animals; see "Ultimate Symmetry" 36–8.

[178] LSJ s.v., with examples, e.g. Euripides, *Phoinissae* 1494 ὦ Πολύνεικες, ἔφυς ἄρ' ἐπώνυμος, *O Polyneices* (litt. Much-Strife), *you have grown to fit your name.*

[179] The epithet is found in Hesiod, *Theog.* 910, and elsewhere in lyric. On the background to such beliefs, R. B. Onians (1951) 174 ff. This interpretation may support Empedocles' possible endorsement of sexual abstinence, as reported by Hippolytus, *Ref.* VII.30.4, but the view seems anachronistic; see especially Mansfeld's critcisms (1992) 220, 226–7.

[180] *Quaestiones Conviviales* 683 e: ". . . nor is it his habit, for the sake of a beautiful style, to deck out his subject with the most specious adjectives, like some garish flowers, but rather he gives a specific illustration of every substance or power."

[181] Mourelatos (1970) 126–9.

[182] B 17.9 does not appear in Simplicius's quotation, but is inserted on the basis of B 26, which reprises the same material. See chapter I, n. 30 for references. According to LSJ, B 17.9–13 is the first known instance of such an antithesis, combining ᾗι μὲν and ᾗι δὲ with demonstratives pronouns. That the subject of this contrast is the first-principles I argue below in section 6, despite Solmsen, "Eternal and Temporary" (1975), 129, who takes the subject of the passage to be exclusively living beings, not first-principles.

[183] The title, according to Plato, *Theaetetus* 161c, was *Truth*, whereas Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* VII 60 gives *The Overthrowing Arguments*, καταβάλλοντες λόγοι. On Protagoraean relativism and "man is the measure," DK 80 B 1, see G. B. Kerferd, *The Sophistic Movement* (Cambridge, 1981), 71–77 and 85 ff. For more detailed treatments, noteworthy are: E. N. Lee, "Hoist with His Own Petard: Ironic and Comic Elements in Plato's Critique of Protagoras" in E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos, R. M. Rorty, eds. (1973), 225–61; M. F. Burnyeat, "Protagoras and Self-Refutation in Plato's *Theaetetus*," *Philosophical Review* 85 (1976), 457–62; G. Fine, "Relativism and Self-Refutation: Plato, Protagoras, and Burnyeat," in J. Gentzler, ed., *Method in Ancient Philosophy* (Oxford, 1998), 137–63.

[184] Long and Sedley, vol. I, 236 ff.

[185] For Empedocles, basic perception depends both on the mechanical fit between the pores in the sense-organ and the effluences, but the accuracy of perception is affected by the ratio of mixture in the make-up of the sense-organ, which is how Empedocles explains variations in ability from individual to individual. As ever, excellence of any kind Empedocles attributes to the approximation of a perfect blending of the elements, as epitomized in the Sphairos-god. For discussion, see Long (1966).

[186] Protagoras, by contrast, in his work on the gods (80 B 4), defends his agnosticism on the grounds not only that human life is too short, but also that the topic itself is inherently obscure.

[187] Quoted in section 2.c.

[188] *Theaetetus*, 157e ff. and *Sophist* 259d ff.

[189] B 35.16–17: τῶν δέ τε μισγομένων χεῖτ' ἔθνεα μυρία θνητῶν,/ παντοίαις ἰδέῃισιν ἀρηρότα, θαῦμα ἰδέσθαι.

[190] Necessary, but not sufficient. The transition to a series of proofs, as now revealed by the papyrus, **a (ii) 21–30** (quoted in chapter III, section 2.b), as well as other material from book I elaborating upon or refining the picture from B 17, show that Empedocles did not think that the inherent plausibility of his account was sufficient to carry conviction.

[191] "Symmetry in the Empedoclean Cycle," *CQ* 38 (1988), 297–312.

[192] See W, Kranz, "Gleichnis und Vergleich in der frühgriechischen Philosophie," *Hermes*, 73 (1938), 99–122; B. Snell (1955), ch. 9, "From Myth to Logic: The Role of the Comparison," 284–98; D. O'Brien, "The Effect of a Simile: Empedocles: Empedocles' Theories of Seeing and Breathing," *JHS* 90 (1970), 140–179; D. Bremer, "Aristoteles, Empedokles und die Erkenntnisleistung der Metapher," *Poetica* 12 (1980), 93–111.

[193] B 17/*ensemble* **a** is the central piece of evidence for the nature of the cosmic cycle, see O'Brien, *ECC* and my "Ultimate Symmetry" for a summary of scholarly debate and my own assessment of the new evidence.

[194] On repetition, cf. B 25, Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1407a31–39 and Wright 184–5. On its didactic purpose, see Guthrie, *HGP* II, 155, Wright (1997) and Osborne (1997).

[195] M-P 208–9. For my reconstruction of the text, see appendix 1 and my "'We' and Empedocles' Cosmic Lottery," 31–5.

[196] Graham (1988) 304 mistakenly refers to lines B 21.9–10 as an instance of the AB motif. In fact the lines in question are 7–8 and the motif here is reversed to BA, as the line 7 deals with separation, 8 with unity.

[197] There are, respectively, between each occurrence of the motif: (B 17.1–2) 1 line (17.3–5) 1 line (17.7–8) (9–10) 5 lines (17.16–17) 18 lines (**a (i) 6–7**) 17 lines (**a (ii) 16–17**(?)).

198 I argue that the contrast is between the life of mortals and that of the first principles, "Ultimate Symmetry," 22–30.

199 πάντων σύνοδος (A) διαφυομένων (B).

200 See Guthrie *HGP* II, 159–167. On my interpretation, advanced in the previous section, Empedocles was led to postulate their existence for epistemological reasons: together they encompass the full spectrum of possible thought, the polar/analytic (Strife) versus the analogical/synthetic (Love).

201 Bollack iii, 62–3.

202 On πεῖραρ itself, see A. L. T. Bergen, *The Etymology and Usage of* ΠΕΙΡΑΡ *in Early Greek Poetry* (New York, 1975). The connotations of limit and constraint which we find in Parmenides' use of πείρατα notoriously applies to both the way of truth and that of appearances, cf. B 8.26 and 30 and B 10.7

203 A similar articulation by the same means at B 17.14, and a longer one at **a (ii)** 21- 30.

204 The topic is immense, but for some interesting inroads, A. Graeser, "On Language, Thought and Reality in Ancient Greek Philosophy," *Dialecta* 31 (1977), 359–388.

205 In Allen and Furley, eds. (1975), p. 2.

206 The other central passages are *An. Post.* II 8 and 19, *Metaphysics* I 1 and IX 8. For recent discussion with bibliography, D. Scott, *Recollection and Experience: Plato's Theory of Learning and Its Successors* (Cambridge, 1995), 87 ff.; and D. Bolton "Aristotle's Method in Natural Science: Physics I.1," in L. Judson, ed., *Aristotle's Physics: A Collection of Essays* (Oxford, 1991), 1–29.

207 This, in more sophisticated form, is the initial paradox of *Meno* 80e1–5, the notion that the seeker after knowledge must somehow or on some level have an intimation of that which he seeks, without which he could not set out to find it.

208 *An. Post.* I 1 71a, although this is rather a pre-emptive objection to the specific form of this paradox as given in the *Meno*. For the further refinements of Aristotle's answer, including the invocation of the potentiality-actuality distinction, see Scott (1995) 129 ff.

209 This feature, the evocation of a set of related commonplaces, is one important purpose of metaphor, but the difficulty resides in where these associations are meant to stop. For a short review of these matters, with bibliography, see the article on metaphor in R. E. Asher and J. M. Y. Simpson, eds., *The Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics*, vol. I, (Oxford, 1994).

210 Snell (1960) 201.

NOTES TO THE CONCLUSION

1 This is one of my two main points in "'We' and Empedocles' Cosmic Lottery," the other being the related issue of what to make of the implied "we" of the 1st hand's συνερχόμεθ(α) at **a** (i) 6 and ε]ρχόμεθ(α) at **a** (ii) 17; see chapter III note 30 for references. As do Mansfeld and Algra (2002), I think it is a red herring, and that the participle is the better reading in all three disputed cases.

2 It seems also to be the case that the proofs in question were pursued into the material quoted from Simplicius, since B 21 and 23 are adduced in support of the general thesis of B 17/*ensemble* **a**. Indeed, in "Ultimate Symmetry," 48–52, I further suggest that we can probably include in this whole sequence, after B 21 and 23, the "organogony" of Love, introduced by B 71, followed by B 73, 75, 84, 86, 87, 95 and B 96, the last of which Simplicius tells us is from book I. The chronological context for the work of Love will have been fixed by B 35, which describes the return of Love to the elements, and which Simplicius tells us preceded B 98; see n. 5 below.

3 The testimonia amount to approximately thirty pages in DK (vol.i, 276–307) to which should be added not insignificant amounts quoted as context to the fragments in section B. Alternatively, Bollack's vol. ii, including his edition and translation of all fragments and testimonia relating to the Physics, runs to 263 pages.

4 "Ultimate Symmetry." For a summary, see below.

5 My own view is that B 35, which describes the return of Love to the elements after the full sway of Strife, occurred in book I, and set the chronological frame for Empedocles' account of Love as artifex of life (B 71, 73, 75, 96, 98 and perhaps 84 and 86). In other words, Empedocles first described the work of Love as fashioner of limbs and organs in the anti-world of increasing Love, even though, now, in our world, it is the increasing power of Strife that generates both the world and its inhabitants. In another sense, the question is not that important, provided it is understood that both are required for the production of mortals. For the details, "Ultimate Symmetry" 44–55.

6 For example, in biology, our understanding of the various developmental phases of life (DK B 57–62 and A 72) is seriously hampered by our ignorance of the context, both literary and in terms of world-history, of the specific events described.

7 See "Ultimate Symmetry" 22–28.

8 M-P 70–82; "Ultimate Symmetry."

9 The doctrine of the cycle can be considered exclusively from a material or physical standpoint. But if the relation between world and mind I have attempted to reconstruct for Empedocles in chapter IV is sound, then perhaps a further reason for favoring the symmetrical view of the cycle is that the equality of Love and Strife seems also implied in the realm of the mind. For if mind and world for Empedocles are but two aspects of the same single reality, with the limits of thought also framing the limits of the world, then I think that Empedocles also held that both Love and Strife are equal 'ways' of conceiving the world, i.e. neither of them leads to nothing, or put another way, both are equally real.

10 DK has θελεμνά at B 21.6. On θελυμνά versus other readings, R. Janko, "Hesychius θ 216 and Empedocles fragment 21.6," *Classical Philology* 81 (1986), 308–9.

11 Bollack i 287: "Les choses ne se laissent jamais désigner justement par un seul mot. Il faut se servir de plusieurs noms, qui sont comme les attributs multiples de l'essence...La polynomie est délibérée. Comme on invoque un dieu dans les prières sous ses noms différents, Empédocle efface les frontières qu'établit le vocabulaire et recule, par les disignations nombreuses de la forme unique, les limites de la représentation."

12 Bibliography in Wright 180, who finds the duals "puzzling."

13 Some of the material in this section overlaps with my discussion of this same fragment in "Ultimate Symmetry" 28–30.

14 This I take both from B 26.2 and from the fragment's position in the overall sequence, where the six first principles, and hence the world, are αὐτὰ ταῦτα .

15 Note in particular the juxtaposition ἓν συνφύντα τὸ πᾶν, *all grown together* (plural) *into one*, *the universe*. . . . Like Heraclitus, Empedocles plays with etymology and indulges freely in kenning, so that it is not uncharacteristic for him to enroll such a purely verbal point in a wider philosophical debate.

16 Diels DK ed. 1–4 understood the elements; E. Bignone, *Empedocle. Studio Critico* (Turin, 1916) p. 533 n. 1 all six. Kranz in DK's 5th edition translates *Die Elemente und Kräfte* for line 1 and 2, but then only *Die Elemente* for 3 ff., (his note however on line 17: "*versteht Arist. Phys. Θ 1. 250b11 von Hass und Liebe, Simpl. 160. 14 von den 4 Elementen*" is an overly specific inference from general statements in both passages. Only Simplicius makes a direct comment on the line, and both passages can be balanced against others in each author, so that their views are more nuanced than he implies. For Simplicius in particular, cf. *in Phys*. 25.21–26.4 (DK A 28b, = Theophrastus, part 1, # 227A in Fortenbaugh et al.) and *in Phys*. 31.18–34.8 especially right before his quotation of B 21.3–12. Jaeger (1947) 236 n. 42, understands all six. Guthrie, *HGP* II 146–7 thinks the elements alone are the subject. O'Brien, *ECC*, 316, allows a possible double reference at B 17.29, but not here, for according to him the elements alone are meant. Bollack, iii 126–8, understands the elements alone, as does Wright 181–4.

17 B 12, *ad fin*. For a recent treatment of the idea, with bibliography, see section V of Mourelatos (1987).

18 "Lesefrüchte," *Hermes* 65 (1930), 245–50 (= *Kl. Schr*. iv 513–18)

19 The so-called microcosmic interpretation, whose application as the sole meaning of the passage is ably refuted by Graham (1988) 310–12.

20 This reading is reinforced by the small change Empedocles effects in the unification half (A) of the theme of alternation at B 26.5, which is otherwise identical to B 17.7–8. Instead of ending the line with εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα as at B 17.7, where we have a macroscopic (ἅπαντα) application of the principle, Empedocles amends it here to εἰς ἕνα κόσμον, *into a single order*. When again contrasted with B 26.7, where we clearly have a macroscopic application of the (A) half of the theme of unification, ἓν συνφύντα τὸ πᾶν, the change at B 26.5 must be understood as deliberate, and thus confirms the reading advocated.

21 Cf. M. Stokes, *One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy* (Washington, 1971) p. 167: "The sense is that the elements go on giving rise to various creatures under the growing sway of Love, but being dissolved in turn by the (waning) power of Strife, until in the end (of this dispensation at least) the power of Strife declines to vanishing point and the complete unity of the Sphere is reached, when the elements are no longer discernible."

22 O'Brien, *ECC*, 332–3. Wright 183 does not read it as an adverb, as sometimes advocated, but refuses to take it as the subject of the verb, contending that that involves " an unwarranted change of subject from, and then back to, the four roots."

23 This refusal to commit to either as prior in nature is consistent with Empedocles' all-inclusive coherentism, as opposed to Parmenides' tendency to force exclusive alternatives, see chapter IV.

24 M-P 116 and 220 ff. The new material also appears to resolve a long-standing textual difficulty in fragment 35, allowing us to correct DK B 35.3 to κεῖνον· ἐπεὶ Νεῖκος μὲν ἐνέρτατα βένθε' ἵκηται.

25 The only comparable example, on a smaller scale, is the repetition of B 17.1–2 (=17.16–17), introduced by B 17.15 ὡς γὰρ καὶ πρὶν ἔειπα πιφαύσκων πείρατα μύθων, *for as I said earlier, in enunciating the limits of my words . . .*

Appendix

I shall tell a double tale. For at one time they grew to be one alone,
out of many, at another in turn it grew to be many, out of one.
And double is the generation of mortals, double their falling-away;
for the communion of all things both begets and kills [mortal life],
and as [all things] *grow apart again,* [mortal life] *is nurtured, then vanishes.*
And these never cease continually changing,
at one time through Love all coming together into one,
at another in turn each carried apart through the hatred of Strife.
Thus, in that, on the one hand, they learned to be one out of many,
and when the one grows apart in turn, many are produced,
in that respect they come into being and their span is not secure;
yet, on the other, in that they never cease continually changing,
in that respect they are forever, motionless in the cycle.
But come, listen to my words. For learning increases the phrenes.
For just as I said before in declaring the outline of my words,
I shall tell a double tale. For at one time they grew to be one alone,

Appendix

This appendix is meant for readers' convenience only. Except for lines **a (ii) 12** to **17**, the text I print is a conservative version of M-P's edition, and all supplements, unless otherwise noted, are theirs. My own departures from their text are outlined in the small apparatus at the bottom of each page. For a full description of the papyrus and discussion of textual matters, readers should consult M-P's edition.

DK B 17/ensemble a

δίπλ' ἐρέω· τοτὲ μὲν γὰρ ἓν ηὐξήθη μόνον εἶναι
ἐκ πλεόνων, τοτὲ δ' αὖ διέφυ πλέον' ἐξ ἑνὸς εἶναι.
δοιὴ δὲ θνητῶν γένεσις, δοιὴ δ' ἀπόλειψις·
τὴν μὲν γὰρ πάντων σύνοδος τίκτει τ' ὀλέκει τε,
ἥ δὲ πάλιν διαφυομένων θρεφθεῖσα διέπτη.
καὶ ταῦτ' ἀλλάσσοντα διαμπερὲς οὐδαμὰ λήγει,
ἄλλοτε μὲν Φιλότητι συνερχόμεν' εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα
ἄλλοτε δ' αὖ δίχ' ἕκαστα φορεύμενα Νείκεος ἔχθει.
⟨οὕτως ᾗ μὲν ἓν ἐκ πλεόνων μεμάθηκε φύεσθαι⟩
ἠδὲ πάλιν διαφύντος ἑνὸς πλέον' ἐκτελέθουσι,
τῇ μὲν γίγνονταί τε καὶ οὔ σφισιν ἔμπεδος αἰών·
ᾗ δὲ διαλλάσσοντα διαμπερὲς οὐδαμὰ λήγει,
ταύτῃ δ' αἰὲν ἔασιν ἀκίνητοι κατὰ κύκλον.
ἀλλ' ἄγε μύθων κλῦθι· μάθη γάρ τοι φρένας αὔξει·
ὡς γὰρ καὶ πρὶν ἔειπα πιφαύσκων πείρατα μύθων,
δίπλ' ἐρέω· τοτὲ μὲν γὰρ ἓν ηὐξήθη μόνον εἶναι

out of many, at another in turn it grew to be many, out of one,
fire and water and earth and the immense height of air,
with both destructive Strife, apart from them, equally balanced on all sides
20 *and Love within them, equal in length and width;*
contemplate her with your mind, do not sit in a daze with eyes wide open.
She it is who is deemed even by mortals to be grafted into the joints,
through whom they think friendly thoughts and accomplish seemly deeds,
calling her Joy, fittingly, and Aphrodite.
25 *She no mortal has ever seen as she whirls among them.*
But you listen to the marshaling of my words, which does not deceive.
For all of these are both equals and coevals,
and each guards his privileges, each has his own character,
but they predominate in turn as time revolves.
30 *For beyond these nothing ever comes into being or is used up.*
For if they were always being worn away, they would no longer be.
And what could ever increase this all? From whence would it come?
And whither would it be destroyed, since nothing is bereft of them?
But these are the very same, yet in running through one another
35/a (i) 5 *they become different things at different times while always similar throughout*
6 *... in Love coming together into a single arrangement,*
7 *... through Strife growing apart (vel sim.), out of one to be many,*
8 *from which* [comes] *everything that ever was, is, and will be hereafter,*
9 *and* [from which] *spring up trees and men and women,*
a (ii) 1 *and wild beasts and birds and fishes raised in water,*
2 *and even long-lived gods, mightiest in honor.*
3 *But they never cease leaping about in all directions,*
4 *in close-packed whirls...*
5 *continuously, nor ever...*
6 *many ages previous(ly)*

ἐκ πλεόνων, τοτὲ δ' αὖ διέφυ πλέον' ἐξ ἑνὸς εἶναι,
πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γαῖα καὶ ἠέρος ἄπλετον ὕψος,
Νεῖκός τ' οὐλόμενον δίχα τῶν, ἀτάλαντον ἁπάντῃ,
20 καὶ Φιλότης ἐν τοῖσιν, ἴση μῆκός τε πλάτος τε·
τὴν σὺ νόῳι δέρκευ, μηδ' ὄμμασιν ἧσο τεθηπώς·
ἥτις καὶ θνητοῖσι νομίζεται ἔμφυτος ἄρθροις,
τῇ τε φίλα φρονέουσι καὶ ἄρθμια ἔργα τελοῦσι,
Γηθοσύνην καλέοντες ἐπώνυμον ἠδ' Ἀφροδίτην·
25 τὴν οὔ τις μετὰ τοῖσιν ἑλισσομένην δεδάηκε
θνητὸς ἀνήρ· σὺ δ' ἄκουε λόγου στόλον οὐκ ἀπατηλόν.
ταῦτα γὰρ ἶσά τε πάντα καὶ ἥλικα γένναν ἔασι,
τιμῆς δ' ἄλλης ἄλλο μέδει, πάρα δ' ἦθος ἑκάστῳ,
ἐν δὲ μέρει κρατέουσι περιπλομένοιο χρόνοιο.
30 καὶ πρὸς τοῖς οὔτ' ἄρ τι ἐπιγίγνεται οὐδ' ἀπολήγει·
εἴτε γὰρ ἐφθείροντο διαμπερές, οὐκέτ' ἂν ἦσαν·
τοῦτο δ' ἐπαυξήσειε τὸ πᾶν τί κε; καὶ πόθεν ἐλθόν;
πῇ δέ κε κὴξαπόλοιτο, ἐπεὶ τῶνδ' οὐδὲν ἔρημον;
ἀλλ' αὐτ(ὰ) ἔστιν ταῦτα, δι' ἀλλήλων δὲ θέοντα
35/(i) 5 ⸤γίγνεται ἄλλοτε ἄλλα καὶ ἠνεκὲ⸥ς αἰὲν ὁμοῖα,
6 [Φιλότητι συνερχό]μεν' εἰς ἕνα κό̣σμον,
7 [πλέ]ον' ἐξ ἑνὸς εἶναι,
8 ⸤ἐξ ὧν πάντ(α) ὅσα τ' ἦν ὅσα τ' ἐστ(ὶ)ὅ⸥σα τ' ἔσσετ' ὀπί̣σσω,
9 ⸤δένδρεά τ' ἐβλάστησε καὶ ἀνέρες⸥ ἠδὲ γυναῖκες,
a (ii) 1 ⸤θ⸥ῆρές τ' οἰων̣ο̣ί ⸤τε καὶ⸥ ὑ̣δατοθρ̣⸤έμμονες ἰχθῦς⸥
2 ⸤κ⸥αί τε θεοὶ δολιχαίων⸥ες τ̣ιμῆισ[ι φέριστοι.]
3 [Πά]ντῃ δ'ἀΐσσοντα [διαμπ]ε̣ρὲς οὐδ[αμὰ λήγει]
4 [π]υ̣κνῆισιν δίνηισ̣[ιν]τ.[ ]
5 [ν]ω̣λ̣εμές, οὐδέ πο[τ']
6 [πολλ]οὶ δ'αἰῶνες π̣ρότερ[ ]

a (i) 6 συνερχό]μεθ' 1st hand, συνερχό]μεν' 2nd hand.; I print συνερχό]μεν' cf.
a (ii) 20 τά δε πάντα συνέρχεται, B 26.5 ἄλλοτε μὲν Φιλότητι συνερχόμεν' εἰς ἓνα κόσμον. M-P print συνερχό]μεθ', as does Inwood, Poem, # 25/Supplement 4A, line 36

a (ii) 3 I read [Πά]ντῃ δ'ἀΐσσοντα, cf. B 22.8 πάντῃ συγγίνεσθαι ἀήθεα, but M-P have ['E]ν τῇ, which they compare to a (ii) 20/ B 35.5

7 *before transferring from those ...*
8 *and they never cease from leaping about in all directions.*
9 *for neither the sun ...*
10 (3 uncertain words)
11 *nor any of the others ...*
*12 *but as they change they come to predominate in the cycle...*
13 *for at one time even the earth runs uppermost of the sun,*
14 *all of it, as much as has now flourished under men.*
15 *And in just this way all of these always run through one another,*
16 *at one time each of them different, wandering apart to different places,*
17 *at another coming together in the central places to be only one.**
18 *But when Strife trespasses* (?) *into the depths of the whirl,*
19 *and Love comes to be in the middle of the vortex,*
20 *in her then do all of these* (begin to) *come together to be one alone.*
21 *Make an effort now, lest my words reach only your ears,*
22 *and as you listen to me behold the sure signs all about.*
23 *I will make plain to you, before your very eyes, where they [fall into] a larger body,*
24 *first the construction and development of life,*
25 *and all that is left of such a* [generation(?)],
26 *on the one hand among the ... of mountain-roving beasts,*
27 *on the other in the twofold offspring of mankind ...*
28 *in the produce of root-bearing ... and ... mounted on the vine.*
29 *From these convey to your phren truthful proofs of my words.*
30 *For you will see the construction and development of life.*

7 [πρὶν] τ̣ούτων μετ̣αβῆνα̣[ι]
8 [πά]ντῃ δ' ἀΐσσο̣ν̣[τ]α̣ διαμ[περὲς οὐδαμὰ λήγει.]
9 [οὔ]τε γὰρ ἠέλιος τ[ ] . ν . [ ]
10 [ ]μη τῆιδε γ . μ . . [ ]
11 [οὔ]τε τι τῶν ἄλλων̣ [ ]
12 [ἀλ]λ̣ὰ̣ μεταλλάσσον̣[τα κρατ]ε̣ῖ̣ κύκλωι̣ [ ]
13 [καὶ πο]τὲ μὲν γὰρ γαῖ(α̣) [ὑπ]ά̣τη θέει ἠελ̣[ίοιο]
14 [πᾶσα], τόσ' ἦν δὴ κα[ί ν]υν ἐπ' ἀνδράσι τ[ηλεθόωσα.]
15 [ὣς δ' α]ὔ̣τως τάδ[ε π]άντα δι' ἀλλήλων [θέει αἰεί]
16 [ἄλλο]υς τ(ε) ἄλλ[οτε ἄλ]λ̣α̣ τ̣όπους πλαγ[χθέντα ἕκαστα]
*17 [ἄλλοτε ἀν'] μ̣ε̣σάτους τ̣[ε συνε]ρχόμεν' ἓν μ̣[όνον εἶναι.]
18 ['Αλλ' ὅτ]ε̣ δὴ Νεῖκος [μὲν ὑ]περβατὰ βέν[θε' ἵκηται]
19 δ[ίνη]ς, ἐν δὲ μέσ̣[ηι] Φ[ιλ]ότης στρ̣οφά̣[λιγγι γένηται,]
20 ἐν [τῆι] δὴ τάδε πάν̣τα συνέρχεται ἓν [μόνον εἶναι.]
21 [Σπεῦ]δ̣ε δ' ὅπως μὴ μοῦνον ἀν' οὔατα [μῦθος ἵκηται(?)]
22 [ἠδέ] μευ ἀμφὶς ἐό̣ντα κλὺων [ν]η̣μερτ[έα δέρκευ(?)]
23 [δεί]ξ̣ω σοι καὶ ἀν' ὅσσ(ε) ἵνα μείζονι σώμ̣[ατι κύρει(?),]
24 [π]ρῶτον μὲν ξύνοδόν τε διάπτυξίν τ̣[ε γενέθλης]
25 ὅ̣σ̣[σ]α τε νῦν ἔτι λοιπὰ πέλει τούτοιο τ[όκοιο]
26 το̣ῦτο μὲν [ἂν] θηρῶν ὀριπλάγκτων ἀγ̣[ ]
27 τοῦτο δ' ἀν' ἀ[νθρώ]πω̣ν δίδυμον φύμα, [ ]
28 ῥιζοφόρων γ̣έννημα καὶ ἀμπελοβάμ[ονα]
29 ἐκ τῶν ἀψευδῆ κόμισαι φρενὶ δείγματα μ[ύθων·]
30 Γ ὄψει γὰρ ξύνοδόν τε δάπ̣τυξίν τε γενέθλ̣ηις.

a (ii) 7 [πρὶν] τούτων μεταβῆνα[ι, M-P, τούτων μεταβῆνα[ι, Inwood, *Poem #25* /Supplement 4A, line 46. The line must be about the first principles, not daimones/souls, as in M-P 194-5. Compare rather B 35.9-11, on Strife.

***a (ii)** 12–17 are based on my own reconstruction; for discussion and comparanda, see "'We' and Empedocles' Cosmic Lottery" 18-20 and 26-35

17 ε]ρχόμεθ' MS, which I emend to τ[ε συνε]ρχόμεν'. For this, compare 1) **a** (ii) 20 ἐν [τῆ] δὴ τάδε πάντα συνέρχεται ἓν [μόνον εἶναι] and 2) the second hand' s correction at **a** (i) 6 and B 20.2/c 3, where Simplicius has συνερχόμεν'; τ[(ε) εἰση]ρχόμεθ(α) M-P, Inwood

M-P's edition and translation of a (ii) 12 to 17

12 [ἀλ]λ̣α̣ μεταλλάσσον̣[τ' ἀΐσσ]ε̣ι̣ κύκλωι̣ [ἁπάντηι·]
13 [δὴ τό(?)]τε μὲν γὰρ γαῖ(α̣) [ἀβ]ά̣τη θέει ἠέ̣λ[ιός τε]
14 [σφαῖρά(?)] τ' ὅσην δὴ κα[ί ν]υν ἐπ' ἀνδράσι τ[εκμήρασθαι(?)]
15 [ὣς δ'α]ὕ̣τως τάδ[ε π]άντα δι' ἀλλήλων [τε θέεσκεν(?)]
16 [κἄλλο]υς τ(ε) ἄλλ[(α) ἵκα]ν̣ε̣ τ̣όπους πλαγ[χθέντ' ἰδίους τε(?)]
17 [αὐθάδη(?)·] μ̣ε̣σάτους τ̣'[εἰση]ρχόμεθ' ἓν μ̣[όνον εἶναι.]

... but as they change, they shoot in all directions in a circle. For at that time the (then) impassable earth runs, and the sun, and the globe of the heavens, as large indeed as even now it can be judged by men to be. And in just the same way all these things (i.e. the elements) were running through one another and, having been driven away, each of them reached different and peculiar places, self-willed; and we were coming together to the middle places, to be only one.

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Index Locorum

(excluding passages listed in tables)

Aeschylus
  Seven Against Thebes
  779: 220 n. 21

  Suppliants
  595–6: 215 n. 103

Aetius, ed. H. Diels, *Dox. Gr.*
  I 7.28: 19,
  I 30.1: 19, 208 n. 39, 217 n. 116,
  V 21.1: 9

Alicidamas, ed. Avezzù
  Fr. 4: 17 (cited), 198 n. 49

Ammonius (CAG 4.5) ed. Busse
  In de interpretatione , 249.1: 14

Anaxagoras (DK 59)
  B 1: 223 n. 37
  B 12: 188
  B 17: 37

Apollonius Rhodius
  Argonautica
  1.94: 212 n.70
  3.827: 212 n.70

Aristophanes
  Birds
  959–991: 202 n.74

  Clouds
  143, 254 ff: 18
  828: 147

Aristotle
  An. Post.
  71a: 246 n. 208

  Physics
  184a14–184b2: 177 (cited)
  184b15: 103
  196a22: 15, 20
  250b11: 248 n. 16

  De gen. et corr.
  333b4 ff.: 224 n. 50

  Meteor.
  381b32: 19, 21–2

  De Anima
  410a1: 224 n. 55

  De partibus animalium
  642a17: 224 n. 55

Problemata
929b16: 19

Metaphysics
980a21: 177
984a11: 200 n. 59
984a19: 103
985a11: 22
985a21–9: 243 n. 169
986a22ff: 233 n.59
1000a24–5: 229 n. 12
1000b5: 242 n. 159
1015a1: 217 n. 116

Nicomachean Ethics
1147a19–21: 110

Rhetoric
1373b14: 20, 75, 201 n. 61
1407a31–1407b1 (= DK A 25): 110, 228 n. 2, 245 n. 194
1414b22 (=III 14): 220 n. 12
1415a25: 101
1415a 23: 77

Poetics
1373b14: 75
1447b17–20: 113

Fragments, ed. Rose ³

On Poets
Fr. 70= Diog. Laert. VIII 57–8: 20–21 (cited), 193 n. 5, 201 n. 62

Sophist
Fr. 65: 104

[Aristotle]
Rhetoric to Alexander
29.1: 219 n. 10

Aristoxenus,
Elementa Harmonica
30.10–31.10: 90

Bacchylides, eds. Snell-Maehler.
V 176–8: 57 (cited)

Cicero
ad. Quint. frat.
II.9.4.4: 207 n. 25
De inventione
1.22–3: 219 n. 10

Clement of Alexandria
Stromateis
V.59,3: 214 n. 93

Democritus (DK 68)
B 7: 56

Diaconus (= Johannes Diaconus Galenus),
Scholia in Hesiodi opera et dies, ed. Flach
323.15: 204 n. 92

Dicaearchus of Messana, ed. Fortenbaugh and Schutrümpf
Fr. 85: 17, 23 (cited; =Athenaeus, *Deipnosophistae* 620 d)

Diogenes of Apollonia (DK 64)
B1: 79, 220 n. 13

Diogenes Laertius, ed. Marcovich
I 34: 26
I 62: 204 n. 89
I 111: 26, 27
VIII 54: 17, 24–5, 36, 124, 201 n. 61, 210 n. 56
VIII 56: 16–7
VIII 57: 193 n. 5
VIII 57–9: 227 n. 83
VIII 59: 25, 216 n. 110
VIII 60: 25, 52, 201 n. 61, 210 n. 56
VIII 62: 201 n. 61

VIII 63: 199 n. 51, 202 n. 70, 217 n. 114
VIII 67: 227 n. 84
VIII 76–77: 193 n. 3
VIII 77: 1, 2 (cited), 24, 26–28
VIII 83: 207 n. 33
IX 6: 199 n. 5
IX 21–3: 233 n. 54
IX 109–110: 199 n. 5

Empedocles (DK 31)
Testimonia
A 32 (=Aetius I 7.28): 19
A 49 a: 195 n. 16, 210 n. 55
A 75: 10
A 83: 9

Fragments (DK 31/with *P. Strasb.* ed. M-P, where they overlap)

B 1: 41, 51, 69–70, 205 n. 94, 211 n. 61
B 2: 13, 51, 70–1, 83,193 n. 2, 207 n. 32, 211 n. 61
B 2.1–6: 55, 166 (cited)
B 2.1–8: 213 n. 74, 218 n. 125
B 2.5–6: 82–3, 94
B 2.7: 65
B 2.7–8: 54, 56, 59, 72–3
B 2.8–9: 54, 65, 69–71, 213 n. 74, 218 n. 125
B 2.9: 124, 213 n. 74
B 2 and 3: 46, 52–65, 72
B 3: 13, 51, 64, 84, 207 n. 32
B 3.1:124
B 3.1–8: 19
B 3.1–5: 53, 57–9, 69–70, 213 n. 80
B 3.2–5: 61
B 3.3: 39, 124, 213 n. 80
B 3.3–5: 57
B 3.5: 166
B 3.6–8: 56–7, 59–61, 69–70
B 3.6–13: 53, 59
B 3.7: 54, 58, 60, 63
B 3.8: 56, 60–61, 63
B 3.9–13: 56–7, 72, 210 n. 53
B 3.10: 56
B 3.13: 168
B 4: 70–1, 83
B 4.1: 221
B 4.2: 214 n. 89, 225 n. 56
B 4.3: 228 n. 3
B 5: 60
B 6: 11, 43, 65, 84, 128, 193 n. 3
B 8–15 (as a set): 13, 44, 46, 51, 67–72, 217 n. 115, 234 n. 71
B 8: 44, 67, 84, 92, 179, 217 n. 118
B 8.1 and B 17.1: 69
B 8.2: 217 n. 117
B 8 and 9: 70, 208 n. 40, 218 n. 121
B 8, 9 and 10: 68, 70
B 9: 67, 179, 213 n. 82
B 9.4: 220 n. 21
B 9.5: 69
B 10: 68
B 11: 72, 213 n. 92
B 11.2: 68
B 11.3: 243 n. 172
B 11 and 15: 67, 68, 70–2, 218 n. 122
B 12–14: 51, 68, 70, 72, 101, 208 n. 40
B 15: 68, 72, 213 n. 92
B 15.1: 71
B 16: 188
B 17/*ensemble* a (see appendix for full text, 251–56): 11–13, 15, 31–8, 44, 46, 69, 70–2, 79, 83–7, 95–7, 103, 105, 109–112, 115, 162, 170–76, 181–3, 190, 193 n. 3, 205 n. 5, 206 n. 13, 218 n. 122–3, 245 n. 193
B 17.1 and B 17.16: 161
B 17.1–2: 172 (cited), 173–4, 245 n. 197, 249 n. 25
B 17.1–5: 42 (cited), 43
B 17.1–13: 228 n. 1
B 17.3–5: 173, 245 n. 197
B 17.4: 163
B 17.4–5: 173
B 17.7: 33, 174
B 17.7–8: 173 (cited), 245 n. 197, 248 n. 20
B 17.8 166
B 17.9: 32, 92, 185, 197 n. 30
B 17.9–10: 173, 245 n. 197

B 17.9–13 (=26.8–12): 168 (cited), 174, 221 n. 27, 244 n. 182
B 17.14: 5, 174, 218 n. 128, 225 n. 56, 246 n. 203
B 117.15: 174, 249 n. 25
B 17.16–17: 173–4, 245 n. 197, 249 n. 25
B 17.17–34: 84
B 17.18: 174
B 17.18–20: 11, 84, 185
B 17.19: 163, 166
B 17.20–26: 40, 167 (B 17.20–24 cited), 175, 185, 207 n. 26
B 17.24: 48, 84, 188
B 17.26: 49 (cited), 171, 175, 207 n.29, 218 n.128, 234 n. 71
B 17.26–35: 175
B 17.29: 188
B 17.30: 33
B 17.34: 84, 188
B 17.34–**a (ii) 2**: 84 (cited)
a: 11
a (i) 6 and a (ii) 17: 221 n. 30, 247 n. 1 and see appendix
a (i) 6–7: 173 , 175, 245 n. 197
a (i) 8–a (ii) 2: 34 (cited), 175, 182, 186
a (i) 8: 55
a (ii) 1: 92
a (ii) 2: 73, 84, 205 n. 7
a (ii) 3–17: 183
a (ii) 9 and 13: 175
a (ii) 16–17: 173, 175, 245 n. 197,
a (ii) 18–20: 190
a (ii) 21–30: 5, 183, 214 n.92, 226 n. 81, 245 n. 190, 246 n. 203
a (ii) 21–2: 218 n. 128
a (ii) 22: 218 n. 128
a (ii) 23: , 173, 213 n. 76
a (ii) 23–29: 106 (cited)
a (ii) 24: 105
a (ii) 29: 218 n. 128
a (ii) 30: , 173217 n. 117
B 20/*ensemble* **c**: 15, 183
B 20: 167, 228 n. 91
B 20.2: 166
B 20.4: 4
B 21: 11, 15, 34–5, 106, 175, 182–3, 185–6, 190, 247 n. 2, 248 n. 16
B 21.1: 106
B 21.3–6: 185 (cited)
B 21.6: 248 n. 10
B 21.6–14: 205 n. 5
B 21.7: 166
B 21.7–8: 185, 245 n. 197
B 21.9: 55
B 21.12: 73, 84
B 21.14: 188
B 22: 224 n.51
B 23: 11, 15, 106, 124, 182–3, 186–7, 190, 247 n. 2
B 23.4: 186
B 23.6–8: 186
B 23.8: 73, 84
B 23.9–10: 186
B 23.10: 55
B 23.11: 38, 49, 55, 73
B 25: 245 n. 194
B 26: 11, 15, 35, 84, 106, 171, 182–3, 187–90
B 26.1 and B 26.7: 188
B 26.1–3: 189
B 26.4: 188
B 26.5–6: 187–8, 248 n. 20
B 26.6: 188, 197 n. 30
B 26.7: 188–9, 205 n. 5, 249 n. 20
B 26.8: 92
B 26.8–12: (= B 17.9–13) 187
B 26.9: 189
B 27a: 166
B 27–B 29: 93
B 27–31: 128
B 34: 19, 21, 22
B 35: 11, 15, 35, 106, 182–3, 190–2, 243 n. 162, 247 n. 2
B 35, 1–5: 11 (ref. back to **a (ii) 18–20**), 15, 190
B 35.3: 249 n. 24
B 35.5: 205 n. 5
B 35.7: 191
B 35.8–9: 191
B 35.11: 92
B 35.11–12: 191
B 35.12–13: 207 n. 29
B 35.14: 32, 161

B 35.16: 161, 190
B 35.16–17: 190, 245 n. 189 (cited)
B 39: 94
B 39.3: 55, 213 n. 82
B 54: 20
B 57–62: 167, 247 n. 6
B 61.1–3: 170
B 62: 14, 50, 208 n. 43
B 62.3: 220 n. 21
B 62: 5, 15, 195 n. 14
B 62.6: 195 n. 16
B 71, 73, 75, 84, 86, 87, 95, 96: 247 n. 2 and n. 5
B 76/**ensemble c**: 183, 228 n. 91
B 84: 93, 224 n. 49
B 96: 15, 106
B 96, B 97 and B 98: 224 n. 54
B 98: 11, 15, 93, 105, 182–3, 247 n. 2
B 100: 224 n. 49
B 101.2: 64
B 103–110: 243 n. 174
B 105–110: 224 n. 54
B 106: 225 n. 56
B 109: 53, 55, 160, 203 n. 79
B 109.3: 166
B 110: 10, 13, 46, 66, 176, 216 n. 109, 218 n. 125, 228 n. 3
B 110.1–4: 19 (cited)
B 110.1–2: 60, 66
B 110.3: 66
B 110.10: 32, 92, 160, 165, 178, 238 n. 104
B 111: 13, 25, 46, 66, 71, 216 n. 109
B 112: 3, 9, 12, 19, 34–8, 41, 47–9, 54–5, 69, 72–4, 79, 82–4, 86–7, 95, 97, 119, 203 n. 79, 204 n. 91, 205 n. 94, 206 n. 13, 207 n. 33, 210 n. 56, 227 n. 89
B 112.1–3: 104
B 112.2: 220 n. 21,
B 112.4: 47, 49, 104, 124
B 112.4–5: 24, 80–1
B 112.5: 12, 74
B 112.6: 122
B 112.8: 74
B 112.9–12: 18, 104
B 112–14: 46, 104
B 112 and 114: 50
B 113: 46, 220 n. 19
B 114: 48, 83, 99
B 114.3: 49
B 115: 3, 5, 10, 11–13, 23, 31–9, 47–8, 50–52, 54–5, 66, 71–2, 79, 82–7, 95, 97,103, 104, 115, 176, 205 n. 2 (there referred to as Wright # 107), 206 n. 12–13, 217 n. 119, 220 n. 19, 221 n. 30, 223 n. 44
B 115.1 and 116: 128
B 115.5: 34, 73–4
B 115.8: 121, 190
B 115.9: 243 n. 167
B 115.9–11: 32, 36
B 115.13–14: 124, 210 n. 56
B 115.14: 166
B 116–26: 51
B 116–128: 38
B 117: 193 n. 3, 217 n. 119
B 120: 210 n. 55, 223 n. 44
B 122: 243 n. 168
B 122–3: 128, 233 n. 59
B 124: 48, 50
B 127: 74
B 128: 15, 19, 24, 39, 128
B 128–30: 50
B 129: 16, 51, 124–5, 169, 210 n. 56, 211 n. 59, 233 n. 55
B 129.4–6: 124 (cited)
B 131: 19, 57–9, 61, 69, 213 n. 80
B 131–4: 202 n. 68
B 131.3: 38, 213 n. 80
B 132:19
B 133: 83
B 133.1: 124
B 134: 14, 91, 94, 128, 165, 169, 193 n. 5, 212 n. 71
B 135: 20, 75, 104, 122
B 136: 48, 50, 213 n. 83
B 136–7: 211 n. 64
B 137: 43–4, 50, 51, 58, 104, 217 n. 117
B 138: 19
B 139 (= **ensemble d 5–6**): 4, 50, 210 n. 55
B 140: 19

B 141: 50
B 142: 94
B 146: 74 (cited), 85, 126, 128
B 146.3: 222 n. 32
B 153a: 9, 46

Wright/Inwood
152/85: 9, 10, 204 n. 91, 208 n. 42

P. Strasb. gr Inv.1665–6 (ed. M-P; *ensembles*)
all four main *ensembles* : 10

d: 3–4 (**d 1–15** cited), 5, 16, 27–8, 36, 38, 50, 195 nn.13 & 15, 196 n. 21, 210 n. 55
d 10: 5, 50, 195 n. 14
d 8: 5, 208 n. 43
d 10: 50, 195 n. 14, 208 n. 43, 211 n. 60
d 11–12: 5
d 15: 195 n. 17

Persica/Crossing of Xerxes
20–5, 193 n. 5

Hymn to Apollo
20–22, 193 n. 5, 202 n. 68

Epimenides (DK 3)
A 2–3: 202 n. 75

Euripides
Bacchae
65–6: 216 n. 103

Hecuba
92–3: 212 n. 70

Hercules Furens
382: 216 n. 103

Phoenissae
1494: 244 n.178
fr. 638 Nauck^{2}: 231 n. 28

Heraclides Ponticus
On the Woman who stopped breathing (Fr. 76–89, of Wherli, Die Schule des Aristoteles, Heft VII)
14, 199 n. 50, 201 n. 61

Heraclitus (DK 22)
B 1: 178, 243 n. 170
B 5, 24, 30, 53, 62, 83, 86, 93, 94: 240 n. 124
B 10: 151
B 14 and 15: 118, 123
B 70: 149 (cited)
B 32: 179
B 34: 149
B 36: 150
B 41: 150
B 47: 149
B 50: 240 n. 130
B 53: 150
B 60: 150
B 78: 148 (cited)
B 79: 149 (cited)
B 83: 149 (cited)
B 94: 150
B 114: 98, 150
B 118: 150
B 129: 123

Herodotus
II 81: 230 n. 17, 232 n. 47
II 123: 123
II 123.2: 232 n. 49
II 124: 232 n. 47

Hesiod
Theogony ed. West
22–34: 37
27: 154, 241 n. 142
120: 174
507–616: 157
793–806: 221 n. 22
910: 244 n.179

Works and Days, ed. West
on title: 27, 204 n. 87
27: 211 n.63
47–105: 157
106–201: 157
202: 205 n. 95
274: 211 n. 63
663 ff.: 209 n. 50

Hieronymus of Rhodes, ed. Wherli, (Die Schule des Aristoteles, Heft X)
Fr. 30: 21

Hippocrates
On Ancient Medicine, ed. Jones
20: 17, 200 n. 52 (cited)

Hippolytus of Rome
Refutation of All Heresies, ed. Marcovich
I.3: 199 n. 51
I.3.1: 234 n. 68
VII 29: 10, 214 n. 91
VII 30.4: 244 n. 179
VII 31.3–4: 59

Homer
Iliad, ed. Allen
1.1: 47, 77
1.70: 205 n. 6
1.349: 212 n. 70
2.79: 209 n. 45
15.615 ff.: 178
16.7–10: 62 (cited)
16.8 and 10: 63, 215 n. 100
21.255: 212 n. 70
23.301: 215 n. 98
24.460: 81

Odyssey, ed. Allen
1.1:48, 77
1.344: 212 n. 71
4.848: 212 n. 70
8.267–366: 40
21.117: 62

Hymn to Demeter
120: 81

Ion of Chios (DK 36)
B 1: 223 n. 37
B 2: 230 n. 17

'Lobon of Argos', ed. Crönert
Fr. 4: 27 (cited)
Fr. 9: 204 n. 89
Fr.16: 27 (cited)
Fr. 21: 203 n. 89

Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura*
1.1–9: 207 n. 24
1.1–43: 39–41
1.1–144: 39
1.31–40: 40
1.44–9: 38, 207 n. 23
1.50–53: 41
1.54–60: 41 (cited)
1.55–6: 44
1.56–51: 41–43
1.62: 125
1.62–79: 51
1.73–5: 212 n. 71
1.80–101: 43–44
1.101–35: 208 n. 38
1.136–45: 44
1.150 ff: 44
1.150–58: 101
1.714–34: 38
1.730–33: 212 n. 72
4.1–5: 216 n. 106
5.6: 88
6.94: 38, 58

Melissus (DK 30)
B 1: 223 n. 37

Olympiodorus
Comm. on Plato's Phaedo, ed. Westerink
I, 3 p. 41: 231 n. 36

[Orpheus]
The Gold Lamellae,
A series, ed. Zuntz (1971)
A1: 121 (cited), 122, 126
A2: 121 (cited), 122
A3: 122
A4: 126

B series, (archetype , ed. Janko)
lines 13–14: 122
lines 14–16: 120, 231 n.35
lines 20–22: 122

P series, ed. Tsantsanoglou and Parassoglou
l.2: 120

Ovid
Metamorphoses
15.60 ff.: 125

Parmenides (DK 28; ed. Coxon, where indicated)
B 1: 207 n. 33
B 1.3: 18, 55
B 1.14–15: 62
B 1.24–8 (cited after Coxon)
B 1.26: 49
B 1.28–32: 130 (cited after Coxon)
B 1.29–30: 134
B 1.30: 133, 153
B 1.31: 136
B 2: 131, 155
B 2.2: 139–40
B 2–7: 131
B 3: 139, 158
B 6: 101, 131, 155, 157–8
B 6.4: 153
B 6.4–9: 153, 162 (cited after Coxon #5)
B 7: 56, 101, 133
B 7.3: 62, 133, 153
B 7.3–6: 213 n. 73 (cited), 226 n. 76
B 7.3–5: 61 (cited)
B 8: 101, 131, 152, 154, 157–8
B 8.2–3: 242 n. 152
B 8.3–4: 131
B 8.7–9: 131
B 8.21: 130
B 8.26 and 8.30: 246 n. 202
B 8.33–6: 140
B 8.50–61: 132 (cited after Coxon)
B 8.51–2: 49 (cited)
B 8.52: 133,136, 171
B 8. 53–4: 133, 153, 170
B 8.53–9: 154
B 8.53–61: 131
B 8.60: 133, 154, 241 n. 142
B 8.61: 133
B 9–19: 131
B 10.7: 246 n. 202
B 12.1–3: 135 (cited)
B 12 and 13: 174
B 16: 164 (cited), 223 n. 45

Philo of Alexandria
De providentia
2.60 (from the Armenian): 195 n.16

Philodemus
On Piety, part II, ed. Obbink
Pherc. 1428 col. 11.7–15: 234 n. 66

Philolaus (DK 44)
B 1: 223 n. 37

Pindar, ed. Snell-Maehler
Ol. 2 : 119–20
Ol. 2.83–90: 239 n. 119
Ol. 2.89: 65
Ol. 4,3–4: 77
Ol. 7.13–14: 209 n. 49
Pyth. 1.41: 239 n. 118
Pyth, 2.3–4: 209 n. 49
Pyth. 3.48: 65
Pyth. 8.95–6: 239
Nem. 3.26: 65
Isthm. 5.21–2: 209 n. 49

Fragmenta, ed. Snell-Maehler
Fr. 150: 65
Fr. 129: 119

Fr. 131: 74, 119
Fr. 133: 120, 233 n. 55

Plato
Apology
19a8–24b2: 101

Euthydemus
278e–282: 226 n. 75

Euthyphro
10d–e: 150

Meno
72c8: 200 n. 53
80e1–5: 246 n. 207
81c5: 169

Parmenides
128a: 226 n. 80

Phaedo
65e–67b and 69c1–2: 18, 23
107c1–5: 231 n. 28

Politicus
268e–274e4 : 18

Phaedrus
246a–256d: 90, 223 n. 44
248b–249b5: 18

Republic
331d–e: 98
352d: 98
357a: 98
364e: 117
402a2: 226 n. 69
500c–d: 225 n. 57
514a–517a: 90
531d–534e: 223 n. 40
537c: 223 n. 40

Sophist
237a: 102
242c–245e: 226 n. 80
244e: 102
251a–259d: 141
259d ff.: 241 n.145, 245 n. 188

Symposium
189c2–193d5: 18
201a1: 96 (cited)
209e–210a: 18
209–212a: 90, 92, 95, 225 n. 60

Timaeus
20a: 216 n. 105
27a–47e: 224 n. 46

Theaetetus
152e3–4: 200 n. 52
157e ff.: 245 n. 188
161c: 244 n.183
176b: 91, 223 n. 43
180d: 226 n. 80

Plutarch
De multitudine amicorum
93a–b: 216 n. 104

De Iside et Osiride
361c: 234 n. 68

De exilio
607c–d: 11, 12, 13, 36 (cited), 81

Quaestiones coniviales
683e: 244 n. 180

De esu carminum
996c: 231 n. 36

Against Colotes
1111f–1113e: 67

Porphyry
Life of Pythagoras
30: 124
88, 150 and 255: 233 n. 56

De abstinentia ed. Bouffartigue and Patillon (Budé)
2.31.5: 4

2.21 (=Theophrastus #584A, Fortenbaugh): 15, 198 n. 16

Proclus
Life of Homer
57 Sev.(=Allen ed. OCT V 101.10): 204 n. 92
Comm. in Tim., ed. Diehl
in 29d, p. 351.10: 56, 214 n. 93, 225 n. 66

Protagoras (DK 80)
B 1: 244 n. 183
B 4: 245 n. 186

Sappho, ed. Loebel and Page
1: 214 n.87

Scholia
to Dionysius Thrax, p. 166, 13 Hilgard (=DK 31 A25): 20

Sextus Empiricus, ed. Mutschmann
Adv. Mathematicos.
I 302–303: 46 (cited in English), 55, 107, 203 n. 79, 208 n. 44, 217 n. 114, 220 n. 20
VII 60: 244 n. 183
VII 111: 130, 206 n. 13, 207 n. 33
VII 115: 53
VII 120–5: 193, n. 2
VII 121: 53
VII 122–124 (source of DK B 2 and 3): 53
VII 124: 54, 58, 213 n. 74 (cited) and n. 84 (cited)
IX 127–129: 50

Simonides, ed. West, *Iambi et Elegi eGraeci* 2
Fr. 11: 205 n. 95

Simplicius, ed. Diels (CAG IX and X)
In Phys.
25.21–26.4 (=Theophrastus # 227 A, Fortenbaugh): 248 n. 16
25.29 (=Theophrastus # 227 A, Fortenbaugh): 197 n. 31
29.5: 135
31.18–34.8: 248 n. 16
159.13: 182
159.27 (location of B 23): 38
161.13–17: 12, 206 n. 10
381.29 (on B 62): 195 n. 16

Sophocles
Oedipus Rex
1–2: 215 n.103

Stobaeus, Wachsmuth and Hense, eds.
4.41.35: 204 n. 91

Suda,
e 1002: 14, 26, 197 n. 42 (cited)

Theon of Smyrna
Aspects of Mathematics Useful for the Reading of Plato
15: 9, 10

Theophrastus, ed. Fortenbaugh et al.
Fr. 227A: 199 n. 50
Fr. 227B: 200 n. 59
Fr. 584 (from *On Piety*): 15, 24

De Sensibus ed.Diels, *Dox. Gr.* pp. 497–527
Ch. 12, 13 and 18: 93
Ch. 7–24: 224 n. 54, 243 n. 174

Timaeus of Tauromenion (FGrH 566, Jacoby)
F 2: 12, 24, 203 n.78, 217 n. 114
F 14: 17
F 134: 202 n. 71

Timon of Phlious ed. Diels (1901)
Fr 42 (=Diogenes Laertius VIII 67): 227 n. 84

Tzetzes
Chiliades, ed. Kiessling: 7.517; 13.74–8: 14, 15
Epistulae , ed. Leone: 97: 14
Exeg. in Il. ed. Hermann, 41.14ff.: 15

Vergil
Georgics
2.490 ff.: 125

Xanthus of Lydia (FGrH 675 Jacoby)
F 31–33: 199 n. 51

Xenocrates, ed. Isnardi Parente
Fr. 219: 231 n. 36

Xenophanes (DK 21)
B 1.24: 240 n. 124
B 2, 11, 14, 18: 240 n. 124
B 11–16:128
B 18: 240 n. 129
B 23: 148, 234 n. 66
B 34: 147–8

Xenophon
Memorabilia
IV.2: 221 n. 25

Anonymous
Carmen aureum
67 ff.: 202 n. 75

Selective General Index

(Modern authors are listed when mentioned in the main text, but not systematically in the notes)

addressees (for Pausanias, see below): 29–30, 46, 50–52, 69–70, 76, 104, 205 nn. 94–5, 227 n. 88

Agamemnon: 44

Aurispa, J. :198 n. 45

Bergk, T.: 12, 194 n. 6, 197 n. 30, 206 n.18, 215 n. 97

Blank, D.: 53

Bollack, J: 54, 66, 209 n. 51, 217 n. 114, 233 n. 60, 248 n. 11

cosmic cycle: 2, 84, 129, 161, 184, 194 n. 7

Coxon, A. H.: 135

demons (*daimôn*, *daimones*): 3, 10, 50–51, 81–3, 86, 116, 124, 129, 222 n. 33

Diels, H.: 2, 10, 12, 14, 25, 36, 58, 194 nn. 6 & 8, 197 n. 30, 198 n. 43, 203 n. 84, 217 n. 112

Dionysus: 118–23

elements (earth, air, fire and water): 1, 2, 73, 84, 87, 175, 185–92; as thinking beings: 92,159–63, 187; Parmenides' fire and night: 131, 135–6

Fränkel, H.: 56, 150, 157, 176

gods: 2, 30, 57, 80–6, 91, 93–4, 113, 124, 128–9, 144–52, 175

Gorgias: 25, 104

Graham, D.W.: 171–3, 248 n. 18

Inwood, B.: 6, 46, 49, 54, 82,194 n.10, 222 n. 30, 234 n. 70

Jaeger, W.: 2

Kahn, C. : 87, 98, 151, 195 n. 18, 198 n. 48, 205 n. 3, 221 n. 30 and 34, 225 nn. 61,63, 64, 69

Karsten, S.: 12, 54, 64, 194 n. 6

katharsis/*katharmos* : 18; 200 n. 55; Aristotelian *katharsis* : 20

Kingsley, P.: 126, 199 n. 51, 200 n. 54, n. 58, 201 n. 64, 215 n. 102, 227 n. 88, 228 n. 7, 229 n. 8, 233 nn. 60, 61, 65

Kranz, W.: 115, 248 n. 16

Lebeck, A.: 87

Long, A.A.: 138–140, 205 n. 5, 237 n. 100, 242 n. 159

Love and Strife: 2, 73, 84, 87, 125, 174–5, 184–5 (equals); the two craftsmen of B 23: 186; they regulate the thoughts of the elements: 160–63, 243 n.162; Love alone (as Lucretius' Venus): 39–41; Love and learning: 93–4; Strife alone : 5–6, 32–3.

Mansfeld, J.: 78–9, 219 n. 8, 222 n. 30

Martin, A. and O. Primavesi (M-P): 3, 12, 13, 50, 85 (the *daimon* as particles of Love), 173, 175, 195 nn. 11–15, 17, 197 n. 30, 198 n. 45, 210 n. 55, 221 n. 30, 245 n. 195, 249 n. 24

mind (*noûs*): 32, 72, 138, 159, 193 n. 2; mind and Being: 138–14, 237 n. 101; Parmenides and Empedocles on *nous* :164–70

Mourelatos, A.P. D.: 141, 224 n. 50, 237 n. 94, 242 n. 137, n. 144

Mullach, F.W.A.: 12, 206 n. 18

Muse (also *Kalliope*): 30, 38, 54, 56–65, 69, 124, 144–5

Nagel, T.: 109

Nussbaum, M.: 138, 159, 238 n. 108

O'Brien, D.: 24–5, 196 n. 20, 197 n. 26, 198 n. 44, 200 n. 53, 203 n. 80, 206 n. 11, 221, n. 30, 245 n.193, 249 n. 22

Orphics/Orphism: 86, 113, 116–129

Osborne, C. : 6, 24, 46, 49–50, 83, 194 n.10, 195 n. 14, 196 n. 20, 198 n. 42, 203 n. 83, 206 n. 14, n. 16, 210 n. 55, 211 n. 60, 212 n. 68, 220 n. 21, 221 n.23

Parker, R.: 127

Pausanias (addressee): 25, 46, 51–2, 55, 59–61, 64–5, 69–72, 76, 105, 211 n. 60, 212 n. 70

Primavesi, O.: 12, 197 n. 35

prolepsis, proleptic style: 47, 86–88, 152, 175–9 (and B 17/*ensemble* a); and Plato 97–8

protreptic discourse: 100–2

purification (of the soul): 2, 18, 112; and learning 92–5

Pythagoras: 17, 118–19,124–5, 210 n. 56

Pythagoreanism/Pythagoreans: 17, 18, 19, 47, 50–51, 81, 86, 113, 116–129, 202 n. 68, 212 n. 70

reincarnation: 3–7, 44, 118–29

Riedweg, C.: 124, 233 n. 55

roots: see elements

Schmalzreidt, E.: 16, 17, 196 n. 19, 198 n. 40, 207 n. 33

Sedley, D.: 9, 12, 13, 23, 38–44, 50, 51, 71, 80, 153, 194 n. 10, 195 n. 14, 196, n. 23, 200 n. 55, 206

n. 12, 206 nn. 19 and 21, 207 nn .23–5, n. 27, n. 28, n. 31–2, 208 nn. 36–7, 211 n. 58, n. 64, 223 n. 43, 224 n. 52

senses, sense-perception: 93, 193 n. 2

Snell, B.: 178
Stein, H.: 12, 36, 54, 194 n. 6, 205 n. 94

Strife: see Love and Strife

Sturz, Fr. W.: 194 n. 6, 198 n. 45

unity of Empedocles' thought: 2, 3, 6, 126–7, 194 n. 10, 195 n. 18

van der Ben, N.: 12, 13, 81, 197 n. 34, 206 n. 11, 210 n. 54, 210 n. 56, 220 n. 17

vegeterianism: 3, 44, 50, 58, 69

Vermeule, E.: 127

Wilamowitz, U. von: 188 (on B 26.7), 194 n. 8, 214 n. 85, 231 n. 38
Wright: 13, 54, 57, 59, 62, 82, 196 n. 18, 197 n. 27, n. 39, 198 nn. 42–3, 211 n. 61, n. 66, 213 n. 77, n. 80, 216 n. 111, 228 n. 4, 234 n. 65, 248 n. 12, 249 n. 22

Zeller, E.: 6, 194 n. 6

Zuntz, G.: 46, 48, 81–2, 119–23, 197 n. 26, n. 33, 206 n. 15, 209 n. 47, 209 n. 52, 210 n. 56, 214 n. 88, 220 nn. 15, 17 and 19, 229 n. 9, 232 n. 40 and 45